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Perfectionist Liberalism and Living Well: 
Character, Politics and Education
This thesis aims to show that a liberal character-ethics lies at the heart of perfectionist 
liberal aspirations for individual flourishing. In the past, liberal conceptions of the good 
life were tied to metaphysical conceptions of the self. However, the diversity of 
contemporary liberal societies leads liberals to seek new conceptual resources to 
underpin their normative theories. This thesis decontests a perfectionist liberal doctrine 
which highlights liberal ethical ideals associated with a malleable conception of the self 
can be most attractively conceptualised by reviving the currently neglected concept of 
character.
For agents in liberal societies to live well they should possess a certain sort of 
character. The liberal concept of character defended here has two aspects: moral and 
individual. These two aspects together provide normative content and criteria for a 
liberal character-ethics which can be promoted by the liberal state (and throughout civil 
society). In particular, a liberal doctrine based on the dual concept of character can guide 
an education for significant autonomy that nurtures the ability of children to live well in 
later life. Such an education would pay especially close attention to encouraging virtues 
associated with responsible political engagement, as these are fundamental to significant 
autonomy in a liberal democracy. The philosophical presuppositions of promoting liberal 
virtues can then be edifyingly viewed at a meta-theoretical level in quasi-Foucauldian 
terms as the inculcation o f ‘technologies of the self.
The final chapter uses the perfectionist liberal doctrine defended in Chapters Four 
and Five to assess the normative cogency of political education in English secondary 
schools, reflecting on the current politics and philosophy of education and citizenship in 
the UK. The thesis then concludes by highlighting that liberal aspirations for character, 
politics and education must be openly and confidently explicated if they are to shape the 
processes of ‘govemmentality’ in liberal democracies.
Length: 84,000 words approx.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1. Aims of the Thesis
Growing social diversity, scepticism about the good life and an emerging civic deficit in 
Western democracies has caused liberals to re-appraise their normative theories. 
Impartialist liberals have withdrawn as far as possible from making judgements on the 
moral worth of lives, while perfectionist liberals seek to promote those activities which 
should be valued within a liberal society. In response to this debate, this thesis explicates 
a perfectionist liberalism that is sensitive to pluralism and scepticism about the good life, 
developing and defending a liberal conception of the good life based on a liberal 
character-ethics. It proposes (a) that perfectionist liberals should first acknowledge that 
the self is malleable, and (b) that the importance of being able to live well autonomously 
in liberal societies necessitates the promotion of specific virtues amongst citizens to 
enable them to become significantly autonomous. The main argument of the thesis is that 
a perfectionist liberal concept of character can provide suitable criteria for guiding the 
development of the ability to be significantly autonomous. Such a liberal concept of 
character has two vital aspects: moral and individual. Moral character pertains to the 
ethical conduct of an agent, while individual character pertains to the distinctiveness of 
their participation in different social practices. The virtues inherent in both aspects of the 
liberal concept of character are intrinsic to living well autonomously. Virtues associated 
with moral character would centre on civility, conscience and responsible political 
engagement; virtues associated with individual character would centre on competence, 
integrity, commitment and imagination. The virtues of moral and individual character 
thus constitute a liberal character-ethics which can provide normative content for a 
liberal doctrine based on a right to be able to be significantly autonomous.
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The (non-metaphysical) liberalism developed here is intended to provide an 
intellectually and emotionally appealing interpretation of liberal concepts adhering to 
significant autonomy. Its key claim is that the importance of being able to live well 
autonomously in a liberal society generates a duty on the part of the state to promote the 
development of character. The malleability of the self means that character is susceptible 
to a range of influences on the environment in which it develops. The thesis then 
highlights that, for political theorists, perfectionist promotion of a liberal character-ethics 
through a range of policy instruments, especially the state education system, can be 
understood at a meta-theoretical level in quasi-Foucauldian terms as the inculcation of 
technologies of the self which enable agents to constitute their character. The theoretical 
cogency of the liberal doctrine explicated here is therefore edifyingly illuminated by 
exploring Foucault’s view of state-led efforts to aid character-development.
Social diversity and value-pluralism have transformed contemporary political 
discourse. In particular, an acceptance of the demands of diversity has profound 
implications for liberal political theorists. Many liberals believe that the various 
conceptions of the good held by agents in liberal societies should be excluded from 
politics and political philosophy. To conceptualise this, these liberals propose 
determinate principles that are impartial between ethical conceptions of the good life. 
However, the thought of such impartialist liberals does not do full justice to common 
liberal aspirations for the lives of agents in liberal societies. Commitment to the 
flourishing of diverse valuable activities, such as co-operative societies or the arts and 
sciences, has conventionally been a concern of liberal thinkers (especially, in the UK). 
The value attributed to tolerance by liberals also implies forbearance of what they 
perceive as less worthwhile ways of living, indicating that they have (latent) deeply held 
views on the good life.
7
Liberal theorising is an inherently normative activity which takes place in a 
distinctive liberal cultural setting and can be reflected in varying explications of liberal 
concepts, values and ideals. This means that liberal theorists need not seek grounds for 
excluding considerations pertaining to the good life in liberal societies. They can and 
should respond to scepticism by justifying the appeal of their ethical ideals to liberals and 
would-be liberals. The appeal of the perfectionist liberalism presented in this thesis 
therefore rests on the extent to which it provides a theoretically coherent, culturally 
relevant and comprehensible explication of the moral and political concepts associated 
with living well autonomously. Indeed, it proposes that explication of perfectionist liberal 
concepts of autonomy and character rebuts scepticism about the good life and can make 
contemporary liberal political theory more responsive to diversity by recognising it is an 
intrinsically liberal commitment.
Liberal political theory should seek to sustain a distinctive approach to politics 
and ethics, rather than attempt to maintain an impossible even-handedness between rival 
conceptions of the good life. A right to be able to be significantly autonomous is the 
cornerstone of a liberal conception of the good life because living autonomously is 
culturally characteristic of a liberal society. Significant autonomy implies that agents can 
‘adopt personal projects, develop relationships, and accept commitments to causes, 
through which their personal integrity and sense of dignity and self-respect are made 
concrete’.1 The rights attached to significant autonomy are not negative rights of 
freedom from physical constraint alone. Agents in liberal societies should not only be free 
from physical interference, they should also be able to be significantly autonomous 
because it is central to their flourishing in a liberal society. They therefore have a 
fundamental moral interest in being able to live well by developing a certain sort of
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liberal character. And the political implications of the right to be able to be significantly 
autonomous can be explored at a meta-theoretical level in quasi-Foucauldian terms.
Foucault’s work provides a rich variety of concepts which can be used to explain 
the interaction between ethics, politics and government. For him, the malleability of the 
self meant agents could apply disciplinary techniques to their character and conduct. 
Such ‘technologies of the self permitted agents to ‘effect by their own means or with the 
help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, 
conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves’.2 These technologies could 
reflect different forms of political domination or specific types of constitutive self- 
mastery. In this thesis, the language of technologies of the self is used as a conceptual 
device to illustrate that the promotion of specific liberal virtues can assist agents to 
configure their character in diverse ways. This is not a strictly Foucauldian interpretation 
as he believed liberal technologies associated with autonomy circumscribed rather than 
facilitated the free development of different character-configurations. Indeed, 
contemporary Foucauldians have contended that agents in liberal societies are only 
recognised as autonomous when they displayed a fixed set of publicly approved moral 
attitudes associated with ‘character’.3
By contrast, a quasi-Foucauldian interpretation of the liberal doctrine explicated 
here is presented throughout to highlight that the inculcation of technologies of the self is 
actually critical to the free development of different configurations of character. Hence, 
the inculcation of technologies of the self inherent in significant autonomy through 
various processes of ‘govemmentality’ (such as state schooling) can be regarded as
1 J.Raz, Morality o f  Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 154.
2 M.Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self, in L.H.Martin et al eds., Technologies o f the Self: a Seminar 
with Michel Foucault, London, Tavistock, 1988, p. 18.
3 M. White and A.Hunt, ‘Citizenship: Care of the Self, Character and Personality’, Citizenship Studies, 
vol.4, no.2, 2000, p. 103.
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intrinsically valuable where it is associated with promoting the flourishing of agents in a 
liberal culture and society. Foucault’s work thus furnishes us with an attractive way to 
understand the philosophical presuppositions which underpin state promotion of virtues 
of character.
Acknowledging the malleability of the self focuses the attention of perfectionist 
liberals on the importance of character-formation. To live well and autonomously in a 
liberal society, agents should be able to develop worthwhile configurations of different 
liberal virtues when developing their character. The promotion of liberal virtues 
pertaining to moral and individual character through policy instruments, such as 
education, can enable agents to constitute themselves as agents of good character. 
Within the perfectionist liberal doctrine presented here, the virtues of good character are 
articulated within a liberal character-ethics.
A liberal character-ethics can reflect the dual aspect of the concept of character 
by synthesising a range of liberal virtues that agents can display when developing 
different configurations of character. It is contended here, that the liberal state can and 
should promote the virtues found in this character-ethics within a wide range of policies 
to give full value to a right to be able to be significantly autonomous. Foucault’s work 
shows that liberal states do inculcate technologies of the self, while the work of liberal 
thinkers such as Mill and Green shows that liberals are often unashamed of this. Of the 
policy areas where the promotion of virtues has greatest interest and purchase, education 
is especially pertinent for perfectionist liberals, as it is an area in which they are willing to 
directly engage in ‘soulcraft’.4 It is therefore a highly appropriate focus for exploring the 
implications of a distinctive perfectionist liberal doctrine based on the malleable self, the 
right to be able to be significantly autonomous and a liberal character-ethics.
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Consideration of (state) education illustrates the links between politics and ethics 
which are inherent in liberal political thought, because liberals acknowledge that it ‘both 
reflects and produces social circumstances and values’.5 Education generally relies upon 
a whole range of philosophical presuppositions relating to the malleability of the self, 
character-formation, and the appropriate use of some overtly coercive measures. It is 
therefore the critical area for exploring the nature of perfectionist liberalism, because it is 
where state-led efforts to shape the conduct of agents are most commonly accepted. As 
we have noted, within the perfectionist liberal doctrine explicated here, the right to be 
able to be significantly autonomous establishes the legitimacy of state intervention to 
guide the character-development of agents within a liberal society. State schooling would 
play the vital role in sustaining significant autonomy within liberal societies, because it 
can be explicitly directed towards the development of character. Liberal state education 
can thus be understood in quasi-Foucauldian terms as focusing on inculcating 
technologies of the self inherent in significant autonomy. Such an education would also 
pay particular attention to political education, as politics and democratic decision-making 
are crucial arenas in which agents in liberal societies participate in the evolution and 
revision of decisions which impact on opportunities for being significantly autonomous. 
Indeed, declining electoral turnout and participation in democratic processes highlight 
the need for political education to redress a growing ‘civic deficit’.
By reflecting on education it becomes strikingly apparent that it is an area in 
which liberals can and do promote a distinctive ethical doctrine. But how would 
responsiveness to contemporary philosophical and political concerns be most attractively 
conceptualised within a perfectionist liberalism?
4 P.Digeser, Our Politics, Our Selves?: Liberalism, Identity and Harm, Princeton University Press, 1995.
5 R. Jonathan, Illusory Freedoms: Liberalism, Education and the Market, Oxford, Blackwell, 1997, p.4.
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The explication of a perfectionist liberalism that is sensitive to diversity will be 
cognisant of current philosophical and political disputes regarding the limits of liberal 
politics. The sweeping social and demographic changes that occurred within liberal 
democratic societies during the latter part of the last century have generated important 
new philosophical debates about the role of the state. In particular, the diversity of 
conceptions of the good life within liberal societies has led impartialist liberals to stress 
the need to separate politics from ethical concerns by applying principles of liberal 
neutrality to political decision-making. But the explosion of diversity does not require 
that liberals so neglect the ethical ideals with which they actually so often identify; 
attempting impartiality simply gives up too much that many liberals hold dear. Plural 
conceptions of the good life, along with the growing ‘civic deficit’, demands renewed 
consideration of the need to sustain certain virtues amongst members of liberal societies. 
Efforts to resolve the tensions between sensitivity to diversity and the promotion of 
social solidarity should therefore focus on the aspirations associated with being a 
member of a liberal society or culture. And this interplay between philosophical and 
political issues in contemporary liberal discourse reflects the intense debate about the 
relationship between the state and citizens revived by impartialist liberals.
Arguments amongst contemporary liberal political theorists over diversity and 
scepticism have become a dispute between impartialist and perfectionist liberals. As we 
have seen, impartialist liberals seek to disengage ethics from politics by ensuring that the 
state is neutral between different conceptions of the good within liberal society. By 
contrast, perfectionist liberals are concerned with defending the link between liberal 
politics and ethics through the state promotion and active support of a liberal conception 
of the good life. The re-evaluation of liberalism that this dispute has engendered has
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especially clear implications for the limits of state intervention in the moral lives of 
citizens.
Impartialist liberals have drawn the limits of the liberal state much narrower than 
many liberals such as John Stuart Mill or T.H.Green previously proposed. Typically, they 
argue that such state intervention is legitimate ultimately only to maintain the basic 
framework of civil rights and liberties that are said to constitute a liberal polity.6 This 
makes the grounds for legitimate state intervention pertaining to the moral lives of 
citizens extremely parsimonious. Perfectionist liberals argue that this constriction of the 
legitimate scope of the state threatens individual flourishing and the existence of a liberal 
society, because it does not reflect liberal ethical commitments and ideals or that the state 
is actually a critically useful tool for their promotion (especially within schools). 
Principles of neutrality have not been applied in the past by liberal political theorists, 
politicians or governments when making sense of the limits of the state.7 If we consider 
the interaction of common liberal aspirations relating to the character of liberal citizens 
with liberal politics and policy-making we can see that the impartialists’ unwillingness to 
promote a liberal conception of the good life starts to look incoherent. This is especially 
evident when we reflect on education and schooling.
By its very nature, education embodies a normative commitment to the 
development and flourishing of members of society, as well as to their academic 
advancement. Indeed, the delivery of academic disciplines within state schools has 
conventionally been founded upon the establishment of morally appropriate conduct 
within the classroom and the corridor. It would seem clear that all liberals who accept 
the need for (some) state education are committed to promoting certain values and
6 R.Dworkin, ‘Liberalism’, in M.Sandel ed., Liberalism and its Critics, Oxford, Blackwell, 1984;
J.Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1996.
7 M.Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp.259-75.
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activities and hence to some form of state intervention pertaining to the character- 
development of agents. Impartialist liberals wary of state involvement in the moral lives 
of citizens could claim that the normative aspects of education are (or could still be) 
impartial between particular conceptions of the good, for example, being (merely) 
instrumentally useful for the employment prospects of children. But (even) this 
nevertheless implies that they subscribe to some liberal conception of flourishing within 
liberal society, albeit one which may be solely based on the skills required for negotiating 
the rigours of the capitalist labour market. Perfectionist liberals can openly affirm that 
education can be the focal point for promoting an intrinsically, rather than instrumentally 
valuable conception of flourishing. The development of a perfectionist liberal doctrine 
which can ground and guide political action to promote liberal virtues should therefore 
pay particular attention to understanding how a liberal concept of education will express 
these normative commitments.
Pluralism and scepticism about the good life have important implications for how 
liberalism should be conceived and explicated. This thesis aims to demonstrate that the 
possibilities for character-formation associated with the malleable self can underpin a 
perfectionist liberalism which is responsive to diversity while retaining distinctive liberal 
ethical ideals. The doctrine explicated in the thesis contends that the importance of 
individual flourishing in liberal societies means liberal governments have a democratic 
duty to uphold a positive (or social) right to be able to be significantly autonomous. This 
doctrine comprises a liberal character-ethics that can guide significant autonomy, and the 
thesis highlights that liberal political theorists can understand and explain the meta- 
theoretical presuppositions associated with the promotion of a liberal character-ethics in 
quasi-Foucauldian terms. The thesis then explores the implications which the promotion 
of a liberal character-ethics has for an education for significant autonomy, concentrating
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particular attention on the importance of political education. The following section 
describes the methodological approach used to develop a non-metaphysical perfectionist 
liberalism and the use of quasi-Foucauldian language as an edifying meta-theoretical 
device.
2. Explicating a Non-Metaphysical Perfectionist Liberalism
Liberal political thought (like all social and political theorising) is constituted by the 
interplay of a range of variously conceptualised concepts. Some of these concepts (such 
as autonomy) we may regard as central to its structure, other concepts (such as the 
welfare state) we may regard as either peripheral or adjacent to the central concepts.8 
These concepts ‘are typically contestable concepts, in the sense that each may be 
interpreted in a variety of incompatible ways’.9 Different explications (or expositions) of 
liberalism reflect the development of different configurations of these concepts by 
theorists or students of political ideas. This does not take place in a hermetic 
environment. Political theorists are required to ‘move with confidence and skill, between 
social conditions and political concepts’, because their reflections have a unique 
‘practical, action-guiding character’.10 The movement between normative concepts and 
political concerns is reflected in the explicatory method used in this thesis to defend a 
non-metaphysical perfectionist liberalism. The success with which this method can be 
applied is reflected in criteria relating to the coherence, relevance and comprehensibility 
of projects of conceptual explication. These criteria are internal to the discourse in which 
concepts are explicated, but can be assessed from without by students of political theory.
8 ibid., p.4.
9 D.Miller and L.Siedentop, ‘Introduction’, in D.Miller and L.Siedentop eds., The Nature o f  Political 
Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, p. 10.
10 ibid., pp. 1-2.
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Michael Freeden has stressed that the formulation of political theories and 
ideologies should highlight the ‘emotional as well as the intellectual attractiveness of 
arguments.’11 Conceptual explication of a distinctive perfectionist liberal doctrine should 
thus display logical and cultural coherence to be both emotionally and intellectually 
compelling. It should also be relevant to ensure its appeal as a guide for current and 
future liberal thinking and political action. And these explications should be 
comprehensible within a recognisably liberal vocabulary. This highlights that liberal 
political theory and liberal political ideology can be viewed as similar enterprises which 
share common concepts and concerns. Indeed, where metaphysical presuppositions are 
been discarded, ‘[i]deologies may well be all we have’.12 Projects of explication can 
therefore represent an especially attractive way for liberals to develop robust responses 
to pluralism and scepticism about the good life, because they are grounded in an appeal 
to the inevitable influence of liberal ethical, political and cultural ideals on liberal political 
concepts.
Many liberal political theorists have striven towards putatively objective accounts 
of liberalism by proposing metaphysical accounts of universal rational principles. For 
these theorists projects of explication propel political theory into ‘a no-man’s land of 
political controversy’.13 Hence they argue social and political theorising should only be 
pursued within ‘very narrow limits’ to guarantee that there can be no ‘implication that 
theorising about society is necessarily informed or corrupted by the theorist’s values.’14 
But these metaphysical accounts of political theorising rest on explications of key moral 
and political concepts which are drawn from a particular type of culture. The distance
11 M.Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, p.37.
12 M.Freeden, ‘Practising Ideology and Ideological Practices’, Political Studies, vol.48, 2000, p.307.
13 J.Gray, ‘Political Power, Social Theory, and Essential Contestability’, in D.Miller and L.Siedentop 
eds., The Nature o f Political Theory, p. 101. For Gray, the ‘generally accepted idiom of essential 
contestability constitutes an impediment to further advance in social theory.’ ibid., p.77.
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from political practice and cultural values which a metaphysical ‘view from nowhere’ 
specifies renders political theorising a philosophically implausible enterprise. The desire 
to withdraw from the inevitable contestable judgements that accompany the configuring 
of liberal political concepts is neither a coherent liberal strategy nor an accurate 
representation of liberal political theory. If we accept that political theory is an inherently 
normative activity related to ideological exposition then we can begin to regard the task 
of liberal political theory somewhat differently.
The normativity associated with political theory can enable its practitioners to 
decontest certain concepts by developing coherent, relevant and comprehensible 
interpretations of their theoretical configuration. This coherentist approach mixes 
ideological, cultural and emotional appeal with philosophical rigour by clarifying the 
theorists’ intentions for their theory or doctrine, without excluding the possibility of 
revision or reconfiguration. Perfectionist liberals who adopt this approach to theorising 
can view their work as a continual process of reflexive explication of configurations of 
concepts that liberals can and should embrace qua liberalism. A non-metaphysical 
perfectionist liberalism may thus be characterised as the on-going ‘exploration of the 
structure and postulates of a specific historic achievement’.15
Liberal political theorists who embrace the normativity of their reflections should 
focus their attention on developing appealing configurations of the concepts inherent in 
liberalism. Stressing the intellectual and emotional appeal of a non-metaphysical 
perfectionist liberalism rebuts scepticism about the good life. Furthermore, the method of 
explication is extremely appropriate for exploring the practical implications of liberal 
political thinking. Political theory cannot be disentangled from the ideological discourses
14 ibid., pp.78, 100.
15 J.Gray, ‘Introduction’, in J.S.Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford University Press, 1991, xxix.
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and political practices in which political concepts are generated. Explications (or 
expositions) of liberalism therefore use political concepts ‘descriptively’ while also using 
them to pass ‘value-judgements’.16 In this respect, a perfectionist liberal doctrine can 
reflect certain ethical ideals that inform liberal politics and ideology which impartialists 
overlook or take for granted. Explication can thus highlight the interplay between the 
theoretical and ideological usage of liberal concepts, enabling perfectionist liberals to 
develop robust philosophical responses to pluralism and scepticism. So, for example, 
they could highlight the conceptual continuum along which a liberal concept of character 
influences and is influenced by the ‘character-ideals’ that inform liberal politics, policy 
and ideology, especially within the field of education.
Although liberal political theory will be constrained by existing liberal 
understandings of political concepts, it can also reconfigure the ideological use and 
understanding of those concepts, rendering them in more or less attractive forms. 
Explication can thus invigorate the terms of liberal normative debates by openly avowing 
the ideological appeal of political concepts, eliciting the ethical content latent within 
liberal theorising. It can also provide an evaluative function highlighting gaps and 
continuities between liberal ideals and liberal politics. Indeed, the different expository 
configurations (or strategies) adopted by liberal theorists should demonstrate their 
coherence, relevance and comprehensibility in relation to cultural, philosophical and 
political context from which they are drawn.
The analysis and exposition of political concepts must inevitably start from 
somewhere. Such concepts are contestable and their configuration in different theories 
and ideologies is heavily influenced by their context, whether that is the historical context 
of their evolution, the political context of their interpretation, or the general ideological
16 D.Miller and L.Siedentop, ‘Introduction’, p.9.
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or cultural context of their explication. By following an explicatory methodological 
approach, normative political theorists can openly affirm that the interpretation of 
political concepts and ideas is informed by ideological preoccupations. An acceptance of 
this heightened normativity can render political theory more emotionally appealing and 
relevant to the policy implications which its outcomes may entail. It can also enable 
political theorists to explore the relationship between normative concepts and ideals and 
their political manifestation. To understand this relationship at a meta-theoretical level, 
they can make use of Foucault’s work on technologies of the self and liberal 
govemmentality.
As we have noted, quasi-Foucauldian concepts are a highly pertinent device for 
understanding and assessing the meta-theoretical presuppositions of the state-promotion 
of liberal ethical ideals. The non-metaphysical perfectionist liberalism developed in the 
thesis presupposes a malleability of the self which Foucauldian concepts can render plain. 
In particular, the language of technologies of the self implies that agents can modify their 
own character, and can be encouraged to do so by the state in specific ways. However, 
the use of Foucault’s concepts here is ‘quasi-Foucauldian’ because it borrows the idea of 
the constitutive view of power, but rejects Foucault’s pessimism about the involvement 
of liberal governments in the character-formation of citizens. Quasi-Foucauldian 
terminology is therefore adopted to clarify and illuminate the conceptual structure and 
presuppositions of a doctrine which decontests state involvement in the moral lives of 
citizens; it is not used to critique such a doctrine. This indicates that the quasi- 
Foucauldianism in the thesis performs an edificatory role, functioning as a strategy for 
justifying perfectionist liberal faith in state promotion of character-ideals in policy areas 
such as education, and indeed in the practice of education itself.
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The perfectionist liberal doctrine presented in this thesis decontests certain liberal 
concepts relating to the central value accorded by perfectionist liberals to significant 
autonomy within liberal societies. It is also intended to signify that commitment to a 
degree of state intervention to promote autonomy is intrinsically appealing to all liberals 
qua liberals. The relationship between liberal political theory, autonomy and state 
intervention is described next.
3. Autonomy and State Intervention
Many contemporary impartialist liberalisms can be criticised for their inability to 
coherently address diversity in liberal societies. Their fundamental concepts are presented 
as impartial between different conceptions of the good life, but nevertheless express 
liberal values that contradict their principled stance on impartiality. Such contradictions 
could be overcome if these philosophically overdetermined liberalisms were openly 
liberal in intent as perfectionist liberals are. Liberal theorists can and should develop 
doctrines which both affirm a liberal conception of the good life and acknowledge that 
liberalism can promote diversity. For instance, J.S.Mill affirmed the importance of a 
variety of ‘experiments in living’ to the flourishing of agents in a liberal society. Diverse 
modes of individual flourishing are also integral to a perfectionist liberal doctrine based 
on the right to be able to be significantly autonomous. This doctrine is therefore 
particularly concerned with how explicitly a liberal conception of the good life should be 
expressed within the activities of the state that pertain to the varying autonomy of liberal 
citizens.
Debates surrounding the limits of the state are a central feature of contemporary 
liberal political theory. Impartialist and perfectionist liberals both appeal to contrasting 
conceptions of autonomy to ground their reflections on state intervention. Impartialists
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typically consider autonomy to be an intrinsically human capacity for self-direction, 
focusing on the freedom from constraint necessary to delimit its exercise. For them, the 
value of this capacity for self-direction to agents is so great that the liberal state must 
scrupulously maintain impartiality between the different ways in which citizens choose to 
exercise autonomy (save where they threaten the capacity for self-direction of their 
fellows). This, however, is the critical point for perfectionist liberals. For them, 
autonomy in liberal societies is not simply freedom from the external interference of 
others. Autonomy can be more or less significant, even when external interference is 
substantially minimised. As Joseph Raz makes clear, significantly autonomous agents are 
not merely able to ‘choose between options’, but are ‘part creators of their own moral 
world’.17
While significant autonomy implies both quantitative and qualitative variation, 
our concern here is with its qualitative aspect, as this gives greatest meaning to the 
flourishing of agents in liberal societies and to the flourishing of a liberal culture. Central 
to liberal debates about the limits of state intervention pertaining to autonomy are the 
notions of a conception of the good and state neutrality between conceptions of the 
good.
i) Conceptions of the good
Although many liberals in the past (such as Locke and Mill) discussed the limits of 
tolerance and the role of state intervention into the moral lives of citizens, it is only 
recently that the diversity in liberal societies has come to be associated with a plurality of 
‘conceptions of the good’. As the study of Aristotle makes clear, the notion of the good 
life, or of the good for individuals or for society are not new notions. Nonetheless,
17 J.Raz, Morality o f Freedom, p. 154.
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reflection on diverse conceptions of the good within society is a current liberal 
innovation. The foremost consideration of the idea of a conception of the good is found 
in John Rawls’ Political Liberalism.
Rawls argued that a ‘moral power’ underpinned the conceptions of the good held 
by agents in liberal societies. This ‘capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a 
conception of one’s rational advantage or good’ was not an entirely abstract moral 
power, because ‘persons have at any given time a determinate conception of the good 
that they try to achieve.’ And the determinate aspect of a conception of the good broadly 
comprised an understanding of ‘what is valuable in human life’. Consequently, 
conceptions of the good themselves usually comprised:
a more or less determinate scheme of final ends, that is, ends we want to 
realise for their own sake, as well as attachments to other persons and loyalties to 
various groups and associations’. These attachments and loyalties give rise to 
devotions and affections, and so the flourishing of the persons and associations 
who are the objects of these sentiments is also part of our conception of the 
good. We also connect with such a conception a view of our relation to the world 
-  religious, philosophical, and moral -  by reference to which the value and 
significance of our ends and attachments are understood. Finally, persons’ 
conceptions of the good are not fixed but form and develop as they mature, and 
may change more or less radically over the course of life.18
Crucially, for Rawls, if a liberal citizen is unable to exercise the capacity for a conception 
of the good to a minimum degree, they ‘cannot be a normal and fully co-operating 
member of society over a complete life.’19
Rawls contended that as ‘free persons, citizens claim the right to view their 
persons as independent from and not identified with any particular such conception with 
its scheme of final ends.’20 And, most impartialist liberals take something like the moral
18 J.Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 19-20.
19 ibid., p.74. Citizens also have a ‘higher-order interest’ in adopting principles of justice to regulate the 
basic structure of society that enable them to ‘promote and advance some determinate (but unspecified) 
conceptions of the good over a complete life, allowing for possible changes of mind and conversions 
from one comprehensive conception to another.’ idem.
20 ibid., p. 30.
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power to have and revise a conception of the good to be the defining characteristic of an 
agent’s autonomy. The right to exercise this is therefore the key condition of freedom for 
liberal citizens. The liberal state should not impose, prefer or discriminate against 
citizens’ conceptions of the good, because this impedes their freedom autonomously to 
conceive and pursue their own conceptions of the good. Typically, impartialist liberals 
propose two types of state ‘neutrality’ between different conceptions of the good: 
procedural neutrality and attempted neutrality. These are discussed next before a 
perfectionist liberal critique of neutrality is outlined.
ii) Procedural neutrality
Many impartialist liberals argue that liberal policy making should maintain a principle of 
absolute neutrality between different conceptions of the good. For a liberal state to 
accomplish this it must first subscribe to rigorous procedural neutrality. That is, the 
decision-making procedures of liberal democratic governments must be as independent 
of contestable moral or ethical claims as is practically and theoretically conceivable.21 To 
achieve such ‘epistemic abstinence’, political decisions should only be made within a 
framework of entirely impartial rules and procedures.
For those impartialist liberals who support procedural neutrality alone, questions 
of acceptable conceptions of the good are irrelevant because there can never be neutral 
means for adjudicating between their claims. Liberal governments can only treat citizens 
with respect for their capacities as free persons when the state framework pays no heed 
to different accounts of their conceptions of the good. This means that each citizen’s 
conception of the good would be formally held to be of equal worth - or as of equally no
21 RDworkin, ‘Liberalism’, p.64.
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worth - within the procedures of political decision-making22 However, this formal 
principle of equal respect could never guarantee that neutral procedures did not have 
non-neutral values. Indeed, applying this model to actual political decision-making is an 
extremely demanding requirement. Not only does procedural neutrality gloss over the 
value-laden and interest-based nature of politics and political decision-making, it relies on 
an impartialist liberal conception of the good based on the value of autonomy with 
respect to the capacity for having a conception of the good. Consequently, most 
impartialist liberals have proposed more complex models of neutrality between 
conceptions of the good than procedural neutrality; in particular, they argue that the 
liberal state can respect the capacity for a conception of the good best where its policies 
and procedures are guided by attempted neutrality.
iii) Attempted (or justificatory) neutrality
Attempted neutrality entails that a liberal government should aim to avoid privileging any 
one particular conception of the good in the outcomes of its decision-making. It does not 
proscribe non-neutral policies, but tries to ensure that as far as possible these can be 
justified in terms of their ‘neutrality of aim’. Although non-neutral policies may even be 
needed to attempt ‘neutrality of aim’, where particular conceptions of the good are 
inadvertently privileged this should be done in such a way as is publicly acceptable to 
citizens. Attempted neutrality is therefore a type of justificatory neutrality because it 
implies that ‘institutions and policies are neutral in the sense that they can be endorsed by 
citizens generally’.23
22 ibid., pp.62-6.
23 For instance, Rawls claimed that political liberalism embodied a theory of the good. The principles of 
justice ‘are substantive and express far more than procedural values.’ Political Liberalism, p. 192.
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For impartialist liberals, attempted neutrality involves seeking common ground 
amongst all citizens for justifying institutions and policies. Such common ground ‘is not 
procedurally neutral ground’ since ‘respect for civil liberties will necessarily have 
nonneutral consequences’.24 Attempting neutrality also entails that political decision­
making is neutral when it avoids discriminating against particular conceptions of the 
good. It is therefore based on the recognition that certain conceptions of the good may 
be privileged within political decision-making procedures, provided the outcomes of 
those procedures does not undermine other conceptions of the good. The justificatory 
aspect of attempted neutrality thus enjoins that the aim to avoid bias towards particular 
conceptions of the good is made and can be seen to be made. This can even be pursued 
through certain non-neutral (but non-perfectionist) means, such as economic 
redistribution, because attempting neutrality places a responsibility on government to 
ensure that all conceptions of the good can prosper without undue discrimination. In this 
respect, neutrality does not apply to policies whose object is to support the value of the 
capacity for autonomy. Nonetheless, non-neutral policies to sustain competition between 
different conceptions of the good in the cultural marketplace are only regarded as 
legitimate if they attempt to sustain a wider neutrality throughout civil society. However, 
some impartialists also claim that non-neutral ‘neutrality of aim’ can have unintended 
benefits in a liberal society.
By attempting neutrality through limited non-neutral policies a number of 
desirable non-neutral outcomes can also be guaranteed. First, the evaluation of the worth 
of ways of life is kept separate from the coercive political apparatus of the state. 
Furthermore, attempted neutrality can ensure that within the ‘free play’ of the cultural 
marketplace ‘satisfying and valuable ways of life will tend to drive out those which are
24 W.Kymlicka, ‘Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality’, Ethics, 99, p.884.
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worthless and unsatisfying.’25 However, if it is recognised that there are indeed more 
valuable ways of life then we are inevitably drawn to ask whether (in theory) 
democratically accountable bodies might not be better placed than the market to 
determine which valuable conceptions of the good should survive or be deemed worthy 
of extra support.
Impartialists claim that a free cultural marketplace is a necessary and perhaps 
sufficient precondition for valuable ways of living to supplant those less worthy. Clearly, 
the fears which they express regarding the fallibility of governments in pursuing non­
neutral policies are prescient. But a commodified cultural marketplace can privilege 
profitable and marketable ways of life, rather than those that might be inherently valuable 
or make a worthwhile contribution to the significant autonomy of agents. Although 
impartialist liberals adhere to a formal principle of respect for the capacity to hold a 
conception of the good, it is impossible to conceive of agents being so separate from 
their conceptions of the good. Indeed, their autonomy and their configurations of 
character are inevitably underpinned by conceptions of the good. The pursuit of 
impartiality between different conceptions of the good is thus misguided for three 
reasons. First, it assumes an inappropriately abstract account of the agency of liberal 
citizens. Second, politics makes no sense as an activity without reference to the 
conceptions of the good of its participants. And, third, impartialist liberalism is itself 
driven by a partisan conception of the good.26 In particular, impartialists do not explore 
the implications associated with valuing autonomy in a liberal society.
25 In a liberal society with a neutral state,., people who cannot persuade others of the value of their way 
of life will lose out in the competition with other conceptions of the good being advanced in the cultural 
marketplace, but they will not face adverse state action.’ ibid., p.900.
26 Liberalism is a moral tradition which, as MacIntyre writes, has ‘its own broad conception of the good, 
which it is engaged in imposing politically, legally, socially and culturally wherever it has the power to 
do so.’ A.MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, London, Duckworth, 1988, p.336.
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While an ‘autonomy-based justification’ may be the foundation for a principle of 
neutrality, to uphold significant autonomy impartialist liberals would have to concede the 
necessity of intervention based upon ‘more than respect for autonomy.’27 For significant 
autonomy to be valued it should not and need not be left to the vagaries of the cultural 
marketplace: a ‘positive defence of liberalism cannot be that it is neutral amongst 
preferences; it must be a defence of the kind of preferences liberalism produces’.28 
Foucault’s analysis of liberal govemmentality shows us that liberal states can and do 
recognise and promote a conception of the good life that they believe gives value to 
autonomy. Openly justifying this ‘soulcraft’29 will mean abandoning the principle if not 
the animating spirit of liberal neutrality.30 It will also require the reconfiguration of many 
key liberal concepts to ground the explication of a perfectionist liberalism that promotes 
significant autonomy.
iv) Significant autonomy and living well
The liberal state should ensure that citizens are enabled to be significantly autonomous in 
a range of valuable ways, because the flourishing of agents in liberal societies depends on 
how well they diversely choose to live. Only the liberal democratic state has sufficient 
resources and the democratic legitimacy to fully support the ability to live well. It can do 
this by implementing policies which can encourage as well as facilitate the ability to be 
significantly autonomous. This has especial resonance within schools, where state
27 A.D.Mason, ‘Autonomy, Liberalism and State Neutrality’, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol.40, 
no. 160, pp.433-52.
28 P.Neal, Liberalism and Its Discontents, London, Macmillan, 1997, p.28.
29 P.Digeser, Our Politics, Our Selves?: Liberalism, Identity and Harm.
30 Though, governments may adopt laws to promote the good ‘it does not follow that they may enforce 
these laws in arbitrary and oppressive ways. ’ A ‘nonneutral state can retain most, if not all, of the 
classical liberal protections’. Provided ‘governments enforce a suitable complement of rights, they can 
try to promote the good without raising the spectre of oppression.’ G.Sher, Beyond Neutrality: 
Perfectionism and Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp.6, 110.
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involvement in the socialisation of children is taken for granted by most liberals. The 
perfectionist liberal doctrine presented in the thesis therefore rests on a liberal conception 
of significant autonomy that reflects its cultural status and interaction with other liberal 
ethical and political concepts, particularly those associated with education.
Significant autonomy is the central concept of a perfectionist liberal doctrine 
because it is the distinctive feature of living well in a liberal society. Acknowledgement 
that autonomy has this special value in a liberal society therefore entails accepting that 
the lives of liberal citizens go better if they are able to invest significant autonomy with 
suitable ethical content. Consequently, perfectionist liberals are concerned with the 
extent to which agents in liberal societies are indeed able to do so.
Perfectionist liberal concern with establishing the conditions for significant 
autonomy is manifested in two key ways. First, it presumes a commitment to the 
negative rights associated with freedom from constraints, as without these rights 
autonomy would be impossible. Second, a commitment to the ability of citizens to be 
significantly autonomous justifies establishing a positive right to the abilities, 
environment and opportunities for each to be able to do so. Indeed, perfectionist liberals 
argue that this latter right is possessed by all members of a liberal society simply by virtue 
of their membership. That is, that as liberal citizens, they have a right to be able to live 
well in a society in which significant autonomy is valued above all else. This right cannot 
be given due consideration solely by ensuring that agents’ autonomous choices are free 
from external interference. It also assumes that agents are equipped to be significantly 
autonomous, thereby generating an obligation for public bodies and institutions to 
promote the ability to live well. State intervention to promote ethical content associated 
with significant autonomy in this way does not violate a commitment to freedom from 
constraint, because it complements the negative rights established to facilitate autonomy.
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Nevertheless, many impartialist liberals still argue that scepticism about the good life 
prevents liberal commitment to autonomy from justifying state intervention to promote 
its practice. They also propose a ‘repressive hypothesis’ of power, which emphasises that 
any state interference in the moral lives of citizens represents a serious restraint on their 
capacity for autonomy. This stands in direct contrast to Foucault’s constitutive theory of 
power, which claims that state intervention is integral to constituting the ability of 
citizens to be autonomous.
For impartialist liberals, uncertainty about the good life and the innately 
repressive nature of state power justifies only the maintenance of the basic institutional 
conditions for the exercise of the capacity for autonomy, such as the rule of law and 
democratic political processes. On this reading of liberalism, liberals qua liberals have no 
business prescribing how citizens in liberal democracies choose to be autonomous 
beyond the requirement to respect the negative rights of their fellows. Although this does 
not proscribe state provision of public services or redistributive economic policies,31 it 
does severely limit the scope of liberal ethical ideals. By contrast, this thesis argues that 
an appealing perfectionist liberal doctrine will pay particular heed to liberal ethical 
commitments about which it is certain and their promotion, maintaining a liberal degree 
of respect for ways of life it judges to be less good. A quasi-Foucauldian approach 
indicates that the liberal state can promote the ability to be significantly autonomous by 
inculcating certain technologies of the self. This means liberals can reject the ‘repressive 
hypothesis’ proposed by impartialists in favour of a more optimistic view of the limits of 
state intervention in the moral lives of citizens. However, Foucault’s work is 
genealogical rather than normative. Thus, the quasi-Foucualdianism adopted here merely
31 For instance, Rawls supported a principle of neutrality between conceptions of the good and an 
egalitarian difference principle to ensure that social and economic inequalities benefit the least- 
advantaged groups in liberal society. J.Rawls, Political Liberalism.
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illuminates meta-theoretical presuppositions associated with promoting significant 
autonomy; that autonomy still requires ethical content and state intervention still requires 
careful delimitation and legitimisation.
Perfectionist liberal theories state that the intrinsic value attributable to certain 
activities in a liberal society generates a duty on the part of the liberal state to implement 
policies prescribing their promotion. But many perfectionist liberals fail to account 
adequately for the normative content associated with significant autonomy in liberal 
societies. For example, by focusing on policies to enhance only ‘essential’ human 
attributes, such as agents’ rational capabilities, they promote an unnecessarily monistic 
(and metaphysical) account of the liberal good life.32 Moreover, perfectionist liberals 
rarely give sufficient attention to the critical role that the concept of character plays 
within liberal ethical and political thought. And where they do recognise its role, they 
often view its development as instrumentally valuable, for example, by describing the 
liberal virtues as contributory to the purposes of the liberal state.33 The weaknesses of 
conventional perfectionist accounts of liberalism provide instructive lessons for 
perfectionist liberals seeking to develop a robust non-metaphysical defence of the ethical 
content which drives state intervention to promote the ability to live well. And the 
strength of the approach developed here lies in its explication of coherent, relevant and 
comprehensible arguments that relate to liberal politics, culture and education. These 
may potentially have universal appeal, but they are not necessarily intended to generate 
such appeal, nor do they hinge on metaphysical claims. Quasi-Foucauldian interpretation 
of these perfectionist arguments focuses on the conceptual and practical realities of 
liberal theorising about the malleable self, in particular, it illuminates the policies which
32 G.Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics.
33 W.Galston, Liberal Purposes, Cambridge University Press, 1991.
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can enable members of liberal societies to develop good character (especially, within the 
state education system). Acceptance of the role of state intervention to promote the 
ability to live well can thus be rendered best by explicating the relationship between 
liberal concepts of autonomy, character, politics and education.
4. Character, Politics and Education
The concept of character has received scant attention from contemporary liberal political 
philosophers, often being associated with the kind of neo-conservative moral 
declamations impartialists view as autonomy-constricting.34 Nevertheless, character is a 
liberal concept with a venerable history and has conventionally been an important feature 
of liberal educational philosophy. Juxtaposing a perfectionist liberal concept of character 
with the more general liberal commitment to education can thus provide strong 
justification for the state promotion of liberal ethical ideals.
The concept of character is a particularly appropriate focus for the normative 
reflections of liberals because it is a familiar object of ethical concern to members of 
liberal societies. Exposition of a liberal concept of character becomes even more 
appealing if we acknowledge that the democratic credentials of a perfectionist liberal 
doctrine will hinge, at least partly, on the extent to which it is coherent, relevant and 
comprehensible to liberal citizens themselves.35 However, the concept of character has 
not featured prominently in recent liberal political theory. Despite this theoretical 
abstinence, it continues to play a critical role in the ethical considerations within many 
aspects of liberal society. In particular, character has long been regarded as an ideal 
which guides the aims of state education in liberal democracies. It is therefore a concept
34 T.Ball, ‘The Formation of Character: Mill’s “Ethology” Reconsidered’, Polity, vol.33, no.l, 2000, 
pp.25-48.
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that clearly pertains to how liberals can delineate a conception of he good life. Indeed, 
one theorist has recently described how character can be viewed ‘as a solid psychological 
invariable from which to start the construction of a conception of the good, thicker than 
minimalist liberal theories but vague enough to allow room for a diverse pluralism’.36 
This attempt to reconcile the concept of character with diversity is in tune with 
perfectionist liberal concerns, but relies on a metaphysical moral psychology. By 
contrast, the perfectionist liberal concept of character explicated here adopts a non­
metaphysical view of character by stressing the importance of autonomy and the 
malleability of the self.
Emphasising autonomy and the malleable self means that character can be 
understood as the product of certain modifiable dispositions and traits, rather than as a 
fundamentally human attribute, potentiality or ‘psychological invariable’. This can render 
it flexible enough to accommodate substantial variation in its configuration without 
undermining attempts to give it an overall liberal orientation. Liberal theorising that 
focuses on the character-development of agents in liberal societies should therefore 
concentrate on delineating a range of different virtues that liberals would wish agents 
could display in different individual configurations when being autonomous. Such virtues 
have both a distinctive liberal moral aspect and a distinctive liberal individual aspect. 
These contrasting but complementary aspects of character can be synthesised in a liberal 
character-ethics that provides broad criteria for their development. This ethics would 
comprise a variety of virtues which the liberal democratic state can and should actively 
promote to enable its citizens to live well. From a quasi-Foucauldian perspective, 
promotion of these liberal virtues can be understood as the inculcation of liberal
35 C.Bertram, ‘Political Justification, Theoretical Complexity, and Democratic Community’, Ethics, 107, 
1997, pp.563-83.
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technologies of the self. This indicates that (in theory, at least) the use of state power to 
promote a liberal character-ethics is not necessarily repressive, but can be constitutive of 
the ability to live well autonomously.
Autonomy has a great many implications for the dual aspects of character. 
Indeed, significant autonomy is central to the development of character. Perfectionist 
liberals would not ascribe moral or individual character to someone who was not 
autonomous in any sense (nor would they attribute autonomy to an agent unable to 
display some degree of moral character). Philosophically speaking, autonomy is a 
necessary (though not sufficient) condition of achieving good character because it is 
pivotal to the ability of agents in liberal societies to develop their own configurations of 
moral and individual character. It is not a sufficient condition for achieving good 
character, because that hinges on the actual manifestation of some configuration of the 
liberal virtues. The liberal virtues appropriate to moral character centre on civility, 
conscience and restraint, while those appropriate to individual character centre on 
competence, integrity, commitment and imagination. So for instance, virtues such as 
politeness, forgiveness and public-spiritedness are associated with moral character, while 
virtues such as professionalism, sincerity, liberality and creativity are associated with 
individual character.
Agents in liberal societies should be able to develop their character by 
autonomously exhibiting different configurations of a range of liberal virtues. However, 
it is unlikely that they could accomplish this untutored. The central paradox at the heart 
of Rousseau’s Emile highlights that an agent’s significant autonomy requires careful
36 M.Mangini, ‘Character and Well-being: Towards an Ethic of Character’, Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, vol.26, no.2, 2000, p.79.
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cultivation.37 In fact, it is clear that the ‘Emile paradox’ is not a paradox at all. The 
development of autonomy and character is necessarily linked to a range of disciplinary 
techniques, many of which are inculcated through the use of state power. The inculcation 
of liberal technologies of the self is not a random or speculative process. As Foucault 
made clear, a host of political technologies (such as the rule of law, education or 
medicine) can lead directly to the inculcation of certain technologies of the self.38 Liberal 
states can utilise these different political technologies to establish specific types of 
constraint and opportunity which shape how citizens choose to develop their character. 
Although the assumed efficacy of political technologies raises the spectre of political 
repression, state inculcation of technologies of the self would be subject to liberal 
principles of policy-making which established democratic control and legitimisation. The 
perfectionist liberal doctrine presented here carefully conceptualises and justifies the use 
of political technologies in terms of their role in promoting the ability of citizens to live 
well. Policy-making principles would constrain the use of these technologies within a 
well-defined framework of liberal policy areas. For perfectionist liberals, not everything 
that they regard as ethically valuable needs to be politically relevant. In a liberal society, 
guidance on how agents can develop their character is drawn from (and may be 
promoted through) a wide range of sources throughout civil society. So, for instance, 
there may be little need for state intervention to promote some activities (such as, social 
clubs or newspaper publishing). Of those activities regarded as ethically valuable within 
liberal society which are politically relevant, the education of children is conventionally 
viewed as the most appropriate area for delimiting some overt coercive measures of 
‘soulcraft’.
37 This paradox is so named because it forms the centrepiece of the influential educational philosophy 
found in Rousseau’s Emile, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1979.
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Liberal technologies of the self may be inculcated within a number of different 
policy areas,39 but perhaps the most important and ethically complex of these is 
education. Indeed, it is in this field that the nature of autonomy and the malleability of the 
self have conventionally received the greatest attention from liberal political 
philosophers. Moreover, one liberal philosopher of education has recently stressed that 
‘education as a practice requires an ethical interpretation of liberalism for its direction, if 
it is to foster autonomy’.40 Perfectionist liberals are thus better placed than their 
impartialist counterparts to ‘provide a framework within which the aims of public 
education can be explicated without internal contradiction’.41
Education has a highly distinctive relationship with perfectionist liberal concepts 
of autonomy and character. In particular, the melding of liberal ethical and educational 
ideals in the concept of character leads us to consider the type of liberal education for 
significant autonomy that can be promoted by the liberal state. Some educationalists fear 
that the inculcation of technologies of the self within state schools often takes place 
through illiberal means which are harmful to autonomy (such as, overtly disciplinary 
pedagogy).42 The value attributable to significant autonomy may therefore proscribe 
certain types of pedagogy, but it is also suggested here that in liberal state schools and 
classrooms the inculcation of technologies of the self through the use of some structured 
methods can take place within a learning environment imbued with respect for the 
developing autonomy of children. Indeed, the importance of the virtues associated with
38 M.Foucault, ‘The Political Technology of Individuals’, in L.H.Martin et al eds., Technologies o f the 
Self: a Seminar with Michel Foucault.
39 As we will see later, a minimal social morality could be maintained through the legal proscription of 
certain offensive acts deemed to be a public nuisance, public advertisements can be used to promote good 
health and state support for the Arts can contribute to the tastes of liberal citizens.
40 R.Jonathan, Illusory Freedoms, p. 13.
41 ibid., p.203.
42 C. Winch and J.Gingell, Key Concepts in the Philosophy o f  Education, Routledge, London, 1999, 
pp.64-5.
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significant autonomy to individual flourishing in a liberal society, focuses the minds of 
perfectionist liberals on the role that moral and (especially) political education play in 
promoting a conception of the good life based on a liberal character-ethics.
Amongst the virtues attached to good moral character, the political virtues of 
good citizenship are crucial for agents in liberal societies to be able to sustain their own 
configurations of character. Responsible political engagement is central to the democratic 
evolution of liberalism itself, providing an opportunity for citizens to develop their own 
character and to contribute to evolving interpretations of a liberal character-ethics within 
liberal society. A programme of liberal political education that promotes relevant liberal 
participative and deliberative political virtues within a suitable learning environment can 
therefore play a prominent role in enabling children to become good citizens in later life. 
This ethical ideal has great resonance at this time, given the apparent disaffection with 
liberal democratic politics which many young people display. Within education, a liberal 
character-ethics can therefore have both an advocacy and a critical function, highlighting 
the ideas and activities which should be valued as contributory to responsible political 
engagement and casting doubt on those which do not. In the UK, the recent introduction 
of a statutory programme of political education in England represents a compelling 
opportunity for perfectionist liberals to critique an important and historic example of 
state intervention in the moral lives of citizens.
Overall, education should promote a range of virtues inherent in both the moral 
and individual aspects of a liberal character-ethics. This will generate broad requirements 
for an education for significant autonomy in liberal state schools, and a particular type of 
political education. The liberal character-ethics at the centre of this liberal education can 
be used to evaluate actual state schooling, especially the recent introduction of
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citizenship education in England. The explication of the perfectionist liberal doctrine and 
its application within education found in the following chapters is summarised next.
5. Summary of Chapters
The structure of the thesis reflects the progression of the argument that an attractive 
perfectionist liberalism should be concerned with promoting a liberal character-ethics, 
especially within an education for significant autonomy. The second chapter begins by 
focusing on the vital relationship between moral character, autonomy and education, 
arguing that the right to be able to be significantly autonomous entails state intervention 
which (above all) promotes the development of a liberal ideal of moral character. Agency 
in a liberal society can have no meaning where agents did not possess sufficient moral 
character to be significantly autonomous. In turn, autonomy is a necessary condition of 
the development of moral character. Developing individual character is also a vital 
feature of living well autonomously in a liberal society. Individual character hinges on the 
giving of colour to the unfolding of an agent’s life, through their enhancement and 
exercise of performative or appreciative virtues in diverse social practices, such as art, 
science, business or sport. This aspect of character is often strongly associated with 
specifically liberal ethical ideals, entailing that members of a liberal society should give 
particular care to deciding in which social practices they choose to participate. Indeed, 
agents should give great care to the development of both their moral and individual 
character.
For members of a liberal society to develop character they should be able to draw 
appropriate ethical guidance on its development from a variety of sources within that 
society. The liberal ethical ideals inherent in the two aspects of character can therefore 
structure a framework within which a range of liberal virtues may be outlined. This
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‘liberal character-ethics’ can provide the resources to conceptualise normative 
prescriptions pertaining to state promotion of individual flourishing.
As we have seen, impartialist liberalism does not adequately account for the 
relationship between liberal politics and a liberal conception of the good life. By contrast, 
perfectionist liberals have developed strong justifications for the active promotion of 
certain liberal ideals by the state. However, the promotion of these is often tied to a 
metaphysical conception of the good.43 And where perfectionist liberals propose less 
metaphysically strenuous accounts of the good life, there is either underdetermination of 
its ethical content or its commitments are tied too closely to instrumental purposes of the 
state.44
Accepting state intervention to promote a liberal character-ethics but rejecting 
some of the available perfectionist justifications for such intervention leaves the task of 
carefully conceptualising the state-sponsored enhancement of citizens’ autonomy. The 
chapter concludes by indicating that the theoretical relationship between political 
intervention to promote a liberal character-ethics and significant autonomy has been 
clearly expressed in Michel Foucault’s work on liberal govemmentality. State promotion 
of a liberal character-ethics can thus be understood as the inculcation of certain liberal 
technologies of the self (or liberal virtues) amongst citizens to assist their efforts to 
become significantly autonomous. This ‘edificatory’ strategy is a quasi-Foucauldian 
approach because it highlights that state intervention in the moral lives of citizens is not 
necessarily repressive as impartialist liberals and some Foucauldians suggest, but 
constitutive of the possibility of the free development of character. Although the scope 
for such intervention requires careful justification and delimitation, it can promote
43 See G.Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics.
44 J.Raz, Morality o f Freedom', and W.Galston, Liberal Purposes.
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diverse ways of living well, as agents in liberal societies can apply technologies of the self 
in a multitude of individually distinct but valuable ways.
The legitimacy of a liberal doctrine that focuses on the promotion of a liberal 
character-ethics is substantiated in the third chapter. This chapter traces the genealogy of 
the concept of character within the British liberal tradition to vindicate its rehabilitation 
as a robust perfectionist liberal response to impartialism. The chapter begins by outlining 
how John Locke’s thought reflected the sort of moral character needed to cope with life 
in a liberal-bourgeois society. A concern with the virtues required to flourish within a 
liberal society is also evident in the work of David Hume and Adam Smith. Hume 
stressed the malleability of the self, indicating that the moral virtues could be contrived 
by human artifice, especially though education and laws. Indeed, the importance of moral 
education was acknowledged by Hume and Smith, with the latter emphasising how the 
growth of imaginative sympathy and self-command could contribute to the development 
of moral character. Nevertheless, none of these early liberal moralists acknowledged the 
role which individual character could play in a liberal conception of individual 
flourishing.
Nineteenth century liberals began to focus their attention on the ‘the cultivation 
of character’ as ‘an end in itself.45 In particular, John Stuart Mill highlighted that 
individuality and ‘experiments in living’ were major sources of individual and social 
progress within liberal societies. Moreover, allied to the moral virtues they were critical 
to the development of character. To encourage this character-development the state 
could become an ‘educative democracy’ by establishing public schooling, wider political 
participation and cooperative industrial principles. However, British Idealist critics of
45 S.Collini, ‘The Idea of ‘Character’ in Victorian Political Thought’, Transactions o f  the Royal 
Historical Society’, 5th Series, (35), 1985, pp.42, 46.
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Mill’s indirect utilitarianism claimed his philosophy did not acknowledge the communal 
origins of those activities which were conducive to the development of character. For 
them, character-development could only occur where citizens contributed to the social 
good. Thus, T.H. Green claimed the state had a responsibility to remove the barriers 
preventing all citizens from making autonomous worthwhile contributions to the social 
good.
A genealogy of the liberal concept of character does not furnish perfectionist 
liberals with straightforward answers to the impartialist challenge. For instance, Green’s 
Idealist concept of character is metaphysically grounded and hence is not regarded here 
as suitable to underpin a liberal conception of the good life which is sensitive to diversity. 
Nonetheless, the thought of those liberal thinkers surveyed indicates that character is 
very much a legitimate liberal concern and one which can provide an indication of the 
ethical content associated with a perfectionist liberalism.
Having established the liberal credentials of the concept of character in Chapter 
Three, the technologies of the self inherent in autonomy and the structure and content of 
a contemporary liberal character-ethics are conceptualised in Chapter Four. The 
promotion of the liberal character-ethics explicated here does not imply that character is 
developed by accepting all the given norms in liberal society. But neither is character an 
altogether slippery indefinable concept. Agents can develop different configurations of 
the liberal virtues associated with good character that can be made coherent, relevant and 
comprehensible within the overall framework of a liberal character-ethics. A liberal 
character-ethics thus grounds the possibility of new configurations of moral and 
individual character. The development of moral character presumes that when facing 
moral dilemmas, agents manifest different virtues according to their own interpretation of 
their circumstances and dispositions. By contrast, the development of individual
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character presumes that agents manifest generic and specific virtues appropriate to the 
various types of social practice that structure their opportunities to flourish within liberal 
societies. Overall, an ethics of moral character is primarily constituted by liberal social, 
moral and political virtues; and an ethics of individual character is primarily constituted 
by liberal social, moral, cultural and intellectual virtues.
The achievement of good character builds on display of certain key liberal virtues 
(especially, those which relate to good citizenship, such as restraint), but is not subject to 
tight prescription. Achieving good character is a highly sophisticated and complex 
activity that takes into account a wide range of circumstances and virtues. Scope for 
diverse configurations of character also entails that interpretation of a liberal character- 
ethics must be handled with a great degree of sensitivity, and state promotion of a liberal 
character-ethics must be executed with care, especially given the repressive possibilities 
impartialists and conventional Foucauldians associate with liberal govemmentality. To 
accomplish this effectively it should be guided by ethical principles relating to the range 
and purposes of liberal politics and policy-making. Perfectionist liberals can therefore 
codify appropriate liberal principles of policy-making to guide policies that aim to 
constitute the ability to live well. The principles of liberal policy-making introduced here 
are: a principle of equal respect; the priority of autonomy; a perfectionist principle of 
valuable activities; a perfectionist principle of legitimate intervention; and a commitment 
to moral and political education. These principles can guide a wide range of policies in 
liberal democracies, but have particularly great import within the education system.
Chapter Five explores an education for significant autonomy. Liberal education 
has conventionally been delivered in the shape of a character education that viewed 
physical education and direct moral instruction as the key to character-development. 
However, it is argued here that a conventional character education is inadequate for
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inculcating the technologies of the self that are integral to developing the ability to be 
significantly autonomous. In particular, excessively disciplinary teaching styles are not 
necessarily conducive to the autonomous development of different configurations of 
character. One interesting radical alternative to a conventional character-education which 
has autonomy as its central aim is the progressive educational thought of the de­
schooling movement. These educationalists argued that children should be given the 
opportunity to learn what they chose and with whom at their own leisure. However, the 
pedagogical prescriptions of many de-schoolers cannot support the content of an 
education for significant autonomy and are likely to be impracticable and anti­
democratic. In particular, de-schoolers underestimate the force of the ‘Emile paradox’ - 
that learning presupposes the use of (at least some) disciplinary pedagogical techniques.
The development of different character-configurations in schools assumes that 
the promotion of liberal virtues takes place in a suitable learning environment. To 
promote the autonomous development of character, such a learning environment would 
maintain a careful balance between democracy and discipline. This implies that a liberal 
education requires careful explication and interpretation, and skilful delivery by teachers 
within classrooms. The philosophical presuppositions of an education for significant 
autonomy based on the promotion of a liberal character-ethics may be edifyingly 
understood from a quasi-Foucauldian perspective.
The aptness of the language of technologies of the self is extremely apparent 
when considering the nature of public schooling. Processes of education are where 
coercive measures of state intervention to promote significant autonomy can have the 
greatest direct impact on the malleable self of future citizens. Within an education for 
significant autonomy the careful use of some disciplinary methods will enable children to 
begin to constitute their character. The stress on autonomy and democracy illustrates
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that education has major implications for citizenship, also indicating that an appropriate 
political education would be an especially important means for promoting the ability to 
live well. Ideal liberal pedagogical principles for political education are described, with 
especial attention given to the promotion of the deliberative political virtues that can 
shape citizens’ own explications of their autonomy in the public sphere. Indeed, it is 
argued that the relationship between moral character and democratic politics is a central 
liberal preoccupation.46 The role of education in the development of individual character 
is then considered, before the final chapter reflects on issues surrounding the recent 
introduction of political education in the English education system.
The introduction of Citizenship in English schools was the result of a prolonged 
campaign for political education in schools accompanied by concern about a perceived 
‘civic deficit’ in British society.47 The curriculum orders for Citizenship comprise a 
comprehensive programme of learning outcomes and objectives relating to virtues of 
good citizenship. That this be given statutory status within the English National 
Curriculum is an important proviso because if it were not then (as has previously been 
the case) political education in English schools may be likely to dissipate into other areas, 
particularly voluntary or charity work.
The principles of the Citizenship orders in England are clearly related to the ideal 
liberal political education outlined in Chapter Five. Nevertheless, the focus in the 
Citizenship course material is on community involvement, rather than responsible 
political engagement. The thesis therefore draws to a close by discussing concepts and 
ideals of citizenship and education inherent in Citizenship, concluding that these are 
subject to great tension between the civic-republicanism and civic-individualism which
46 N.Rosenblum, ‘Democratic Character and Community: The Logic of Congruence’, Journal o f  
Political Philosophy, vol.2, no.l, 1994, pp.67-97.
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characterises Third Way’ politics in the UK. Perfectionist theorising can thus throw 
significant light on the often strained relationship between politics, philosophy and 
education. For perfectionist liberals committed to the right to be able to be significantly 
autonomous, the interplay of these tensions provides a salutary reminder of the political 
contingencies associated with shaping and promoting a liberal conception of the good 
life.
471.Davies, ‘What has Happened in the Teaching of Politics in Schools in England in the Last Three 
Decades, and Why?’, Oxford Review o f  Education, vol.25, nos.l&2, 1999, pp. 125-40.
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Chapter 2: Character and Perfectionist Liberalism
There are two aspects of the concept of character at the heart of a perfectionist liberalism 
based on the right to be able to be significantly autonomous: moral character and 
individual character. These aspects of character are ethical ideals which comprise 
intrinsically valuable virtues. In liberal societies, moral and individual character can only 
be developed by significantly autonomous agents. For agents to be significantly 
autonomous, they should manifest those virtues associated with these different aspects of 
character. Perfectionist liberals could present these virtues within a liberal virtue-ethics, 
but this might imply a metaphysical conception of the self and a determinate set of 
virtues. A liberal character-ethics can acknowledge the existence of plural conceptions of 
the good in liberal societies, providing agents with appropriate guidance for the 
development of diverse configurations of character. The role of the liberal state in 
promoting such a liberal conception of the good life is then discussed here by examining 
some prominent perfectionist liberal justifications for such state intervention. The chapter 
then concludes by indicating that the Foucauldian language of ‘technologies of the self 
represents an edifying meta-theoretical perspective from which to justify the state 
promotion of a liberal character-ethics.
1. The Concept of Moral Character
Character is generally distinguished from other related concepts (such as personality and 
the self) by its close relationship to ethics and morality. Indeed, the entry for character in 
the Oxford Companion to Philosophy offers the simple suggestion that it should be 
viewed as ‘a person’s moral nature.’48 Nevertheless, for perfectionist liberals, the concept
48 R.Crisp, ‘Character’, in T.Honderich ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford University
Press, 1995, pp. 129-30.
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would not be interpreted quite so straightforwardly. While agents possess an ability to 
display character in their moral conduct, they also possess individually recognisable sets 
of character-traits that give a distinctive shape to the course of their lives. This suggests 
that there are two different dimensions of character. One aspect of character implies the 
moral propriety of an agent’s dispositions, while the other implies the particularity of 
their traits. These two aspects can be best viewed as concepts of moral character and 
individual character. This section discusses the origins of the concept of moral character 
and its relationship with autonomy, politics and education, concluding that moral 
character is inherent in the idea of significant autonomy. The subsequent section will then 
describe how this is also the case for individual character.
i) The origins of the concept of character
The origins of the Western concept of character are found in the Homeric Epics.49 These 
great works entertained audiences and transmitted social understandings of moral 
approbation, providing the moral foundations for Ancient Greek society and culture. 
Indeed, the heroes and scenes depicted by Homer have played a formative role in the 
development of the Western moral and aesthetic consciousness. And, the idea of 
character continues to fulfil a similar role within literature and debates in civil society 
about complex and commonplace issues of moral conduct. Nevertheless, there are vital 
differences between contemporary liberal conceptions of moral character and those 
found in Ancient Greece. An agent’s character in Homer was constituted by the 
responsibilities of their social status within an aristocratic warrior society. Consequently, 
approbation of their character was based on how well they exercised the arete
49 Homer, The Iliad, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1987; and The Odyssey, Oxford University Press, 1980.
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(‘excellence’) appropriate to their ergon (social role or ‘characteristic activity’).50 Unlike 
liberal understandings of character, there was little autonomy attributed to human 
conduct. In Homer, ‘[e]valuative questions are questions of social fact’, that is, to be 
good is to be noble.51 Although the Homeric view of character does not accord with 
latter-day liberal conceptions, the evolution of subsequent Greek concepts of character 
nonetheless provides an interesting introduction to a perfectionist liberal understanding 
of character.
Humanism and the growth o f moral responsibility
Following Homer, successive generations of Greek poets began to emphasise the idea 
that agents had moral obligations beyond those owed to the aristocratic class system, fate 
or the decrees of the Gods.52 Individual qualities essential to the prosperity and stability 
of the developing Greek city-states were increasingly valued, leading poets such as 
Xenophanes to link arete with the political skills adhering to responsible rule.53 Indeed, 
many poets identified the agathos (good man) with the agathos polites (good citizen). 
The increased involvement of the poorer classes in the armed forces and their 
participation in deliberations about civic matters cemented this link between good moral 
character and good citizenship, eventually spurring radical re-evaluation of the traditional 
Homeric view of character.
50 R.D McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates, Indiana, Hackett, 1994; T.Irwin, Classical Thought, 
Oxford University Press, 1989.
51 A.MacIntyre, After Virtue 2nd ed., London, Duckworth, 1985, p. 123. Social certitude meant Homer’s 
characters could side-step deliberation on the right choice of action and immerse themselves in 
uninhibited action. Although they were capable of recognising immoral decisions post hoc, their shame 
is always based on their having dishonoured the moral code of heroic society.
52 In Euripides’ Electra, Orestes proclaims that ‘only by conduct and by character should you judge the 
quality of a human being’. Euripides, ‘Electra’ in Ten Plays, New York, New American Library, 1998, 
p. 179.
53 A. W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, Oxford, 1962, p.74.
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Central to these changing ideas of good moral character was the contention that 
agents could act out of the character assigned by their social status.54 This belief 
originated with the responsible political participation of the lower classes. Moral 
character and good citizenship was thus thought to be malleable or indeed ieamable’ 
from advice given by tutors and elders, or from within an agent’s own conscience. By 
acting independently agents could also behave in a way that was more in keeping with 
their own moral dispositions, rather than those assigned by their social status. Moreover, 
character could be understood as a product of self-conscious choice, implying that 
humans could autonomously contribute to the development of their own self. Having 
accepted the malleability of the self, poets and philosophers then proposed that the polis 
(state) should discipline or educate citizens to act in morally approved ways. Moral 
character need not be determined by social class or individual vigour alone, it could be 
systematically inculcated via education and training. The first philosophical exploration 
of these vital developments is found in Plato’s Republic.
Plato: Education fo r good character
Plato sought to establish that humans could discipline themselves in order to display 
agathe psuche (good qualities of the soul). Drawing an analogy between the ideal 
political constitution and the ideal human soul, he argued that the maintenance of the 
social system (like the human soul) required that different classes (or qualities) were 
trained to fulfil specific roles. Each of these classes/qualities embodied specific virtues 
necessary for the flourishing of the state/soul. While humans had certain natural aptitudes 
for specific roles, they required correct education to develop the characteristic virtues of
54 This is, of course, the implication of the central plot of Sophocles’ Antigone, indicating that the tragic 
vision of the Greek poets exhibited sensitivity to a kind of moral pluralism. Antigone, London, Dover,
1993.
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their class.55 Above all, Plato stressed that self-discipline was central to the stability 
(justice or harmony) of the state. A notion which was especially true in relation to the 
good soul: ‘Where each of the constituent parts of an individual does its own job, the 
individual will be moral and do his job.’56 Such self-discipline in an individual (as for the 
state) could only be the product of appropriate education.
Educating the soul entailed bringing each of its parts into harmony with the other 
under the rule of the rational part. In this respect, the agent with the greatest agathe 
psuche would be the one who made ‘the best blend of physical exercise and culture, and 
who applies them to the mind in the right proportions’.57 Education was not only crucial 
to the development of good moral character it also had a wider significance because
58political systems were dependent on the ‘characters of the community’s inhabitants’. 
Hence, a Platonic education for good moral character had the nature of the political 
system as its highest object. The link between politics and ethics was therefore bridged 
through education, with the political system being improved in proportion to the 
effectiveness of the educational system.59
For Plato, it was essential that children were involved in appropriate activities 
because where children ‘play in the proper manner right from the start, and their cultural 
education introduces them to the orderliness of law... lawfulness accompanies them in 
everything they do, guides their growth, and corrects any aspect of the community which
55 Although Plato argued that only a ruling-class consisting of philosopher-kings should be fully 
educated, he acknowledged that all human dispositions were susceptible to training and that the capacity 
for reason and understanding transcended gender and class. Plato, Republic, Oxford University Press,
1994.
56 ibid., p. 140.
57 ibid., p. 114.
58 In the Republic, Socrates asks, ‘If one type of character outweighs the rest... then don’t you think it 
draws all the other types with it?’ ibid., p.279.
59 An ideal educational system would produce ‘people of good character; and then people of good 
character, if they in turn receive the benefits of an education of this kind, become even better than their 
predecessors in every respect, but especially... in that they produce better children.’ ibid., p. 128.
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was formerly aberrant.’60 In fact, the overall aim of an ideal education should be to 
substitute habitual good conduct for the injunctions of the law. In Plato’s ‘well-governed 
community a genuine legislator’ would not need to ‘occupy himself with laws and 
administration’. Education would ensure that some laws would be ‘obvious and others 
will follow automatically from habits the citizens will already have acquired.’61
While he recognised the capacity for self-discipline, for Plato, the ideal education 
system would not aim towards producing agents able to live well in a liberal democracy. 
Plato rejected democracy because (among other reasons) it would reflect and reproduce 
‘democratic character’ amongst citizens. Agents of democratic character gave 
themselves up to any passing desire.62 Democracy was therefore characterised by an 
‘undiluted freedom’ that resulted in lawlessness and social and political instability. It 
could neither generate harmonious individuals nor sustain a harmonious political 
community.63 Despite Plato’s hostility to democracy, his vision of the vital relationship 
between politics, ethics and education still influences normative political theory. Indeed, 
justifications for education in liberal democracies rest on similar grounds to those first 
established by Plato. A liberal society and its political system are heavily dependent on 
the dispositions of its members to contribute to their own flourishing and the flourishing
60 ibid., p. 129. In abiding the law, children rediscover ‘those apparently trivial rules which their 
predecessors had completely lost... For example, that one should be silent in the presence of people older 
than oneself. Younger people should also give up their seat to elders, stand up when they enter the room, 
and look after their parents. Then there are the rules about hairstyle, clothing, footwear, and in general 
the way one presents oneself, and so on...’ idem.
61 ibid., p. 132.
62 The man of democratic (or egalitarian) character ‘indulges in every passing desire that each day 
brings. One day he gets drunk at a party, the next day he’s sipping water and trying to lose weight; then 
again, he sometimes takes exercise, sometimes takes things easy without a care in the world, and 
sometimes he’s apparently a student of philosophy. At frequent intervals, he gets involved in community 
affairs, and his public speaking and other duties keep him leaping around here, there, and everywhere. If 
military types arouse his admiration, he inclines towards the military life; if  it’s businessmen, he’s all 
for business.’ ibid., p.301.
63 ibid., pp.302-5.
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of a liberal culture. To help sustain individual flourishing in a liberal society, perfectionist 
liberals should pay close attention to the character-development of liberal citizens.
Impartialist liberals are uncomfortable with associating politics and policy so 
closely with ethics and morality. Nevertheless, if the moral interests of agents in liberal 
societies are tied to the development of a particular type of character, they can be served 
through the positive involvement of the state in the constitution of their self. Indeed, this 
is a presupposition of many policies implemented by liberal governments, especially those 
associated with education. State involvement in the development of moral character can 
also facilitate broad intelligible standards of conduct within a liberal society, providing 
ethical guidance for agents, in particular, an education for good moral character could 
enable agents in liberal societies contribute to their own flourishing and the flourishing of 
a liberal society. The link between liberal politics and ethics can therefore be most 
coherently explicated by examining the relationship between the concept of character, 
significant autonomy and education.
ii) Liberal moral character
The concept of moral character can be used by perfectionist liberals to synthesise their 
aspirations for ideal moral conduct. It signifies that agents may refresh and reform liberal 
normative commitments, perhaps by directly challenging or by subtly refining 
conventional liberal understandings of ethics, politics and morality. We might say that 
character is therefore a concept which indicates how agents in liberal societies structure 
the moral worth of their lives. The concept of liberal moral character thus represents a 
powerful liberal ethical ideal. And, evaluations of moral character provide an indication 
of its position within the conceptual framework of a perfectionist liberal doctrine.
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Evaluating moral character
Evaluation of moral character is based on the assumption that the self is malleable. An 
agent’s character can therefore be conceptualised as a theoretical construct relating to 
the interaction of a wide range of continually evolving dispositions, with constantly 
changing circumstances. Although agents may be bom with certain psychological or 
biological tendencies, these are usually mediated through socially and individually 
constructed dispositions. However, this does not mean that moral character is 
constituted by dispositions that are commonly approved or disapproved. If moral 
character were simply a product of people’s attitudes or their likes and dislikes, we 
would have difficulty making sound judgements about the intrinsic value of ethical 
conduct. For instance, we can say that we disapprove of an agent’s offhand manner, but 
we can also acknowledge that they are of good moral character, because they meet then- 
many obligations to family, friends and so on. So how are evaluations of moral character 
to be distinguished from our immediate reactions to an agent’s conduct?
Moral character is constituted by something like a moral overview of the whole 
spread of a life. This cannot be understood by reference to socially agreeable dispositions 
or an additive index of prescribed virtues. An agent’s moral character develops in 
relation to a far greater range of dispositions, virtues and circumstances than is apparent 
in immediate perceptions of the dispositions of agent a or b. It refers to the possession 
and display of a range of moral virtues over a period of time, many of which will be 
circumstance-dependent. No one agent is likely to possess or display all the virtues 
associated with good moral character. These can be combined in as many ways as there 
are individual lives. Evaluating these different combinations inevitably enjoins a 
substantial degree of understanding of an agent’s situation and circumstances. 
Consequently, perceptions of agreeableness cannot ground moral approbation. We may
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doubt the moral character of those agents who are disagreeable, but we cannot 
categorically state that they have a bad moral character without conducting a balanced 
assessment of the virtues evinced throughout the conduct of their life. But how should 
perfectionist liberals regard the development of moral character? And, how does this 
relate to agents themselves?
Both aspects of the dual concept of character may be viewed as ethical ideals as 
much as ideas. For instance, ‘[e]ach of us is a “character” in the colloquial sense that he 
or she is a unique configuration of neuroses’, but ‘[e]ach of us also has character, 
something quite different.’64 This implies that good moral character is worthy of esteem 
because of the display of some ideal configuration of virtues thought to be inherent in its 
development. Liberal moral character is developed when the moral conduct of agents 
evinces virtues which perfectionist liberals would (or could) associate with good moral 
character. Within a perfectionist liberal doctrine based on the right to be able to be 
significantly autonomous, moral character reflects virtues associated with living well.
If moral character is conceptualised as a perfectionist liberal ideal its link with 
significant autonomy becomes clearer, in particular, it can be interpreted as an ideal 
which guides the choices made by agents. This has two key implications for agents in 
liberal societies. First, it suggests that character is an achievement; it is not attainable 
without some difficulty or effort. It is therefore achieved autonomously, but not alone, 
because significant autonomy is premised on a range of relationships with other agents. 
In addition, the impact of character on an agent’s life is cumulative in a somewhat 
circular manner: to have moral character, agents must have displayed it in fashioning 
their character. This again presumes that they will have developed character
64 R. J.McShea, ‘Morality and Human Nature’, in Philosophy, Temple University Press, 1990, p.232.
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autonomously; indeed, autonomy is a necessary feature of a liberal concept of moral 
character.
Autonomy and Moral Character
The relationship between autonomy and moral character is central to the perfectionist 
liberal doctrine presented in this thesis. Although agents may be predisposed towards 
having a particular moral character, they are nonetheless: (a) responsible for that 
character and their actions and decisions pertaining to it; (b) liable and susceptible to 
moral approbation with regard to the quality of their character; and (c) able to choose 
good moral character over a bad character. The role of choice and responsibility here 
illustrates that autonomy is a necessary condition for the development of moral 
character. In turn, good moral character is inherent in the ability to live well 
autonomously. Given the malleability of the self, analysis of the relationship between 
autonomy and moral character should therefore focus on the contribution that 
appropriate autonomy-enhancing social conditions make to significant autonomy and the 
development of character. Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship between 
character, choice and socialisation is a good starting-point for exploration of the ability 
to become significantly autonomous.
Aristotle viewed character as the product of choice and moral socialisation, 
stressing that the choice of the most excellent life possible and the means to achieve it 
was above all a question of ‘what sort of character is needed if sound choices are to be 
made.’65 Indeed, he argued that moral character itself is or must be chosen.66 However, 
the disposition to choose to be of good moral character could only be induced through
65 J.OUrmson, Aristotle’s Ethics, Oxford, Blackwell, 1985, p.22.
54
appropriate training and habituation.67 This could take its cue from the actions of those 
thought to possess good moral character, but its frill development required careful 
cultivation by the state.
Agents should continually choose what is good by acting as agents of good moral 
character acted. The example that agents of good moral character would set would also 
ensure that the activities and practices in which they chose to engage would be those that 
were most choiceworthy and appealing.68 Autonomy was a necessary presupposition of 
the development of character, ‘for our characters are determined by our choice of what is 
good or evil’. But autonomy was also constituted by ‘a certain moral state’.69 Agents of 
good moral character would by their very nature make manifest to others the fact that 
they were good judges. The development of good moral character accompanied the 
growth of significant autonomy and vice versa. To ensure that this could occur without 
undue internal conflict, agents should have been socialised into making moral rectitude 
effortless as children. Hence for Aristotle, the capacity for autonomous choice and 
judgement should be disciplined at an early age through trained habituation directed 
towards excellence of character.70
Education, habituation and socialisation were necessary to guide the development 
of autonomous choice and moral character. But they were constitutive rather than 
repressive of the possibility of living well. However, Aristotle’s view of the relationship 
between autonomy, character and education was based on his metaphysical biology. The
66 Aristotle, Ethics, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976, p.l 17. Sarah Broadie explores the cognitive issues 
and implications of Aristotle’s ascription of character as voluntary in her excellent study Ethics with 
Aristotle, Oxford University Press, 1991.
67 Aristotle, Ethics, pp.91-2.
68 It then follows that ‘the question ‘how shall I live well’ leads to the question ‘how shall I become a 
good judge” . S.R.L.Clark, Aristotle's Man, Oxford, Clarendon, 1975, p.97.
69 Aristotle, Ethics, pp. 117, 205.
70 ibid., pp.337-8.
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self was not malleable, but an objectively knowable potentiality (or essence) which 
required elicitation.
Aristotle claimed that autonomous choice would ideally be exercised in strict 
accordance with dictates of reason so humans could realise their essential nature as 
beings with a rational soul.71 Aristotelian legislators could therefore ‘study the soul’ to 
derive principles of education which were conducive to the progressive realisation of 
latent pre-existing potential for character. The non-metaphysical liberalism explicated 
here rejects such a metaphysical conception of the self, but Aristotle’s conception of the 
relationship between autonomy and moral character remains a vital touchstone for 
configuring its ethical ideals.
Autonomy and liberalism
The concept of autonomy commonly holds a central place in liberal doctrines. In fact, it 
has been described as the most appropriate ‘liberal foundation for a political morality’, 
because it is an ‘ultimate value’ - a ‘non-derivative value’ - that is, the necessary 
reference-point for the justification of all other liberal values.72 Nevertheless, there are 
many competing interpretations of how it should be conceptualised. It can be seen as a 
capacity for a particular type of (invariably rational) thought or as an ethical value of 
personal development. This thesis conceptualises autonomy as in terms of its significance 
in generating valuable ‘projects, relationships and causes’73 within a liberal society or 
culture.
Autonomy can go badly or it can go well for agents living within liberal societies. 
For them to flourish in a liberal society agents must be able to become significantly
71 ibid., p.76.
72 J.Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom, pp.2-3, 177, 200.
73 ibid., p. 154.
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autonomous by having ‘a commitment to projects, relationships and causes which affects 
the kind of life that it is worth living’.74 The development of good moral character is an 
essential counterpart to this ability to live well autonomously. Moreover, significant 
autonomy in liberal societies in turn contributes to an agent’s moral character by 
facilitating diverse instances of its configuration. It entails ‘a normative creation, a 
creation of new values and reasons’75 which reflects, and is reflected in, diverse 
character-configurations in a liberal society.
Given that significant autonomy presupposes that an agent’s choices have this 
normative quality, there is strong reason for perfectionist liberals to promote the 
development of character amongst agents. In a liberal society, agents forge their fives as 
individual normative responses to the moral demands of their particular circumstances. 
Their moral character is then constituted by the choices they make everyday.76 Agents 
should be able to create coherent, relevant and comprehensible combinations of the fife 
options they autonomously choose. To do this they should be able to demonstrate the 
worth of their choices to their own fives and that of others (even if only to show that 
their choices do not adversely impact on those of others). The concept of character is the 
most appealing means to articulate criteria which agents should apply to the value of 
their autonomous choices. These criteria can also reflect diversity in liberal societies, by 
acknowledging that there are a wide range of ways of living well within the constraints of 
a dual concept of character. The intrinsically normative nature of significant autonomy in 
liberal societies entails that the moral dimension of character is especially critical to living 
well, preceding and in part constituting individual character, nevertheless, forging
74 idem.
75 ibid., p.387. The significant autonomy presupposes fresh normative creations because each individual 
has particular talents and opportunities, and interprets them in distinctively different ways.
57
individual character when becoming significantly autonomous is an important ethical 
ideal in its own right.
2. The Concept of Individual Character
Individual character is a concept which refers to how the particularities of an agent’s 
character-traits manifest themselves in the distinctive way in which they live. For 
perfectionist liberals, it is an ethical ideal pertaining to those virtues which can establish 
an agent’s individuality within different valuable social practices, such as art, science or 
sport. It is a concept that illustrates the multidimensionality of perfectionist concerns, 
emphasising that they associate living well with more than being moral. A commitment to 
individual character therefore indicates that significant autonomy is associated with very 
particular types of individual flourishing, as well as a liberal conception of moral conduct. 
This section explores the conceptual status of individual character, before outlining its 
relationship with autonomy.
i) Liberal individual character
Liberals accord great value to individual liberty, in particular, they are often thought to 
have an especially fine sensitivity to diverse modes of individual flourishing. Thinkers 
such as John Stuart Mill have held that individuality and eccentricity should not only be 
tolerated, but celebrated and promoted. Liberal celebration of diversity can be most 
attractively explicated in a doctrine which views the development of individual character 
as inherent in becoming significantly autonomous. Individual character is thus an intrinsic 
feature of a perfectionist liberalism, because it is integral to both the concepts of
76 For instance, Raz contends that, a ‘significantly autonomous’ agent is someone ‘who can shape their 
life and determine its course.’ ‘[Tjhe more one’s choices are dictated by personal needs the less 
autonomous one becomes.’ ibid., pp. 154-5.
58
character and autonomy, providing an especially potent way of highlighting the 
naturalness of a liberal commitment to diversity. Examination of the philosophical 
presuppositions of a liberal concept of individual character indicates why this is so.
Individuality, personality and idiosyncrasy
Before fleshing out the concept of individual character we must establish its distinction 
from other related concepts. In particular, it must be stressed that individual character is 
not another term for personality. Personality is entirely ‘to do with how one is different 
from other people, or... how one establishes oneself as different from other people’.77 It 
‘reflects the construction of a set of dispositions unique to each individual which has no 
necessary content’.78 Although personality (like character) seems to involve ‘distinct 
methods of self-development, self-mastery, and presentation of the self,79 its dearth of 
ethical content means it can only be associated with the bare fact of human difference. It 
doesn’t imply either a malleable self or the possibility of individuality. Personality is an 
arbitrary construct, and can not account for an agent’s autonomous shaping of their self 
in response to the changing circumstances of their life. By contrast, individual character 
can illustrate that agents may be predisposed towards particular types of individuality but 
that they can also develop and modify these in a variety of valuable ways.
Although the notion of personality suggests that difference is natural, it also 
indicates that this difference is somehow inadvertent. Having a personality or being ‘a 
character’ is thus not the same as developing individual character. Being different in 
these former senses simply enables agents to be distinguished. While an agent’s 
personality may develop over time, this is often experienced by them (and observers) as
77 J.J.Kupperman, Character, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp.5-6.
78 White and Hunt, ‘Citizenship: Care of the Self, Character and Personality’, p. 104.
79 ibid., p. 105.
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an inexorable response to contingent circumstances. It is in a sense beyond their control. 
By contrast, individual character is susceptible to modification and development in a 
similar manner to moral character. However, there are certain key differences between 
individual and moral character which will be noted here.
Individual character-traits are more immediate than moral dispositions and can 
also seem to be more susceptible to adaptation. For instance, when we talk about agent a 
not being themselves we are usually referring to their individual character-traits, rather 
than their moral dispositions. Consequently, individual character-traits seem to exhibit a 
closer relationship with our everyday perceptions of an agent’s conduct and the notion of 
personality. Nevertheless, it is important to stress again that individual character-traits 
are not simply ‘arbitrary personal idiosyncrasies’ such as those which constitute 
personality. The reasons for this are twofold. First, idiosyncrasies are external to our 
understanding of an agent’s character and in no way can be said to constitute their 
individuality. Second, individual character-traits are assumed to be susceptible to 
modification in a way that idiosyncrasies, quirks and personality are not. Although we 
might concede that personal idiosyncrasies may be brought under control, they would 
not be genuine quirks if they were willed. So does this mean that individual character and 
individual character-traits are entirely willed?
Some philosophers argue that character-traits can only be understood as the 
external manifestation of some belief or principle.80 However, this suggests that the self 
is not just malleable, but entirely plastic. Individual character-traits are in some sense 
‘natural’ and determinate, but are nonetheless susceptible to modification and
80 L.H.Hunt, ‘Character and Thought’, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 15, 1978, pp. 179-86.
Hunt recognises that a character-trait is not simply internal or external concluding that it ‘includes an 
entrenchment of something internal in our outward behaviour’, but believes that 'which trait of character 
a given pattern of behaviour evinces apparently depends on which principle generates the pattern. ’ ibid., 
p. 183.
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development. An agent’s traits are reflected in their individual character to some extent 
simply by virtue of their having been bom with a distinct biological identity, nevertheless, 
the malleability of the self means that an agent’s characteristic traits are receptive to 
education and ‘improvement’. Hence, the malleability of the self can facilitate the 
development of moral and individual character in a manner conducive to an agent’s 
dispositions and traits. In particular, individual character presupposes the display of 
moral character in fine-tuning or enhancing certain innate qualities in order to develop 
individuality. Understanding these aspects of the malleable self is thus critical to 
evaluating the nature and quality of individual character.
Evaluating individual character
In evaluating individual character we inevitably assess its quality. But does this mean we 
always consider its moral rectitude? Whether or not one accepts that character-traits are 
chosen, it seems that in describing an individual character-trait one is inescapably drawn 
into making some form of evaluative judgement about the malleable self, from which the 
moral aspect cannot be easily disentangled. Crucially, though, individual character-traits 
have an aesthetic dimension that leads to their being partially evaluated in terms of their 
agreeableness. As we saw earlier, this is not the case for moral dispositions. Moreover, 
an agent’s moral dispositions may contradict their individual character-traits. An agent’s 
individual character-traits may be vicious, lewd or unpleasant, but they may be morally 
disposed to rein in these tendencies. By contrast, an agent’s individual character-traits 
may be gentle, refined and agreeable, but they may be morally disposed towards acts of 
depravity. These complexities indicate that moral dispositions and individual character- 
traits must each evince a sufficiently generaliseable shape for each agent to possess a 
recognisable ethical and individual regularity susceptible to evaluation.
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To evaluate the development of individual character we are drawn towards 
examining the integrity of the activity and interaction of virtues, traits and circumstances 
with each other in the construction of individual character.81 Basing the evaluation of 
individual character on the integrity with which it is developed can thus be distinguished 
from other related ideas liberals may adopt to evaluate individual character. For instance, 
Bernard Williams claims that life-plans are what give agents a ‘distinctive character’. 
Life-plans or projects provide an ethical framework which can structure the development 
of individual character. These ‘set of desires, concerns or... projects’82 determine the 
meaning of a person’s life through a ‘nexus of plans.’83 However, an emphasis upon the 
constitutive role of planning is unnecessarily rationalistic and too structured to facilitate 
diverse configurations of individual character. As Charles Larmore has recognised there 
is no necessary connection between planning one’s life and living well. Agents’ individual 
characters are equally constituted by their autonomous responses to unexpected and 
unplanned events and occurrences.84 What is critical though is that agents are able to 
display integrity when developing their individual character, as it is essential that the style 
they give to their life is sufficiently coherent to be called their own.
Autonomy, integrity and the liberal self
The liberal concept of individual character can be more responsive to diversity and 
unforeseen circumstances when it is regarded as an ethical ideal associated with living 
well. Such an ideal would be manifested in the integrity of an agent’s individual 
character. Concentrating attention on the role of choosing a life-plan within individual
81 O.Flanagan, Varieties o f  Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism, Harvard University 
Press, 1991.
82 B. Williams, ‘Persons, Character and Morality’, in B. Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 
1973-1980, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp.5-6.
83 O.Flanagan, Varieties o f  Moral Personality, p.68.
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character fails to fully account for the evolving interaction of individual character-traits 
and circumstances. Nevertheless, these traits unmodified do not determine an agent’s 
individual character. Agents self-consciously discipline their innate character-traits, 
manifesting certain virtues when developing individual character in order to contour their 
significant autonomy in a distinctive fashion. The development of individual character 
therefore presumes that agents act upon self-knowledge when autonomously choosing to 
participate in diverse social practices. This self-understanding enables agents to decide 
how to develop their individual character at any given time. Good individual character 
thus hinges on a relationship of care towards the type of life one is living and creating. 
And, the nature of this relationship hinges on the integrity with which agents forge their 
individual character.
Integrity is the key generic quality inherent in the development of individual 
character. For it to be efficacious in contributing to individual character it presupposes 
that different virtues may be developed in diverse fields of social life. These ‘social 
practices’ can range from complex industrial organisations to small informal networks of 
agents sharing their personal interests. Critically, for perfectionist liberals, these practices 
should contribute to an environment in which agents are able to live well. In liberal 
societies, individual character is thus likely to be developed within (or in relation to) 
those social practices which are (or could be) valued by liberals. This implies that in 
developing their individual character, agents should participate within one or more of a 
range of social practices which can facilitate their distinctive modes of being significantly 
autonomous, such as a local choir or a sports club. To develop individual character, 
agents will have to exhibit integrity when displaying virtues which are inherently valuable 
to their participation within these social practices. However, a society in which
84 C.Larmore, ‘The Idea of a Life plan’, Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 16, no. 1, 1999, pp.96-112.
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significant autonomy is valued often generates conflicts of reasons for participating in 
different social practices. Where agents are able to choose from a large variety of 
‘valuable options’, it is also likely that there will arise ‘incommensurabilities’ between the 
configurations of individual character which they may decide to develop. No one agent 
could maximally display all the virtues of individual character which may be associated 
with their individual character-traits.85 The development of individual character will 
therefore often presuppose that agents neglect or underdevelop certain worthwhile traits 
in favour of others. Again, integrity is critical if agents are to accomplish this in a way 
which evinces self-respect and care for their own flourishing.
In forging a distinctive liberal self, agents will probably have to make a range of 
serious moral choices. These will relate to their individual character as well as their moral 
character. The thesis now explores how liberals can explicate the interplay of individual 
and moral character within a liberal character-ethics.
3. The Concept of a Liberal Character-Ethics
The dual concept of character illuminates two interpolated aspects of a perfectionist 
liberal doctrine based on the right to be able to be significantly autonomous. But how can 
the ethical injunctions that commitment to virtues of moral character and individual 
character enjoin be explicated? The chapter has so far highlighted that moral and 
individual character are ethical ideals which agents pursue in order to live well. In this 
respect, they can be the focus for substantive codes of conduct which specify certain 
classes of virtue agents should display in some distinctive configuration to develop 
character. There are two particularly cogent ways in which perfectionist liberals can 
conceptualise the overall shape of this conception of the good life: through a liberal
85 J.Raz, Morality o f  Freedom, pp. 318-20.
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virtue-ethics or through a liberal character-ethics. This section establishes that a liberal 
character-ethics can give the fullest expression to perfectionist liberal commitment to the 
development of moral and individual character.
i) Liberal virtue-ethics
The retrieval of virtue-ethics has been a prominent movement in moral philosophy during 
the past few decades.86 Virtue-ethics stresses that moral conduct is properly understood 
within the framework of a set of approved virtues that are associated with specific 
morally demanding situations. Such a framework is typically situated within a well- 
established community or way of life and can receive either a metaphysical or an 
instrumental grounding. Virtuous behaviour occurs when agents display those virtues 
associated by a community with an appropriate response to a given set of circumstances. 
But would perfectionist liberals be comfortable with this characterisation of morality? 
What exactly would the liberal virtues look like? And, how might they constitute a 
virtue-ethics? The nature of a possible liberal virtue-ethics is assessed below, beginning 
with a summary of its key aspects.
Liberal virtues
Aristotle claimed that virtues made an agent of good moral character able to perform 
their functions well. Such virtues were displayed when an agent’s ‘purposive disposition’ 
to act appropriately within a given situation was made apparent in their actions. The 
context dependence of their display meant that the virtues were ‘in a mean, that is 
relative to [each of] us’, though ‘in respect of what is right and best’ each virtue ‘is an
86 See D. Stanton ed., Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader, Edinburgh University Press, 1997.
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extreme’ and certain dispositions were ‘simply wrong’.87 For Aristotle, manifesting the 
virtues in a manner ‘appropriate to the demands of the environment’ was thus a rational 
process of organic self-realisation. That is, the telos (moral purpose) of human beings 
was to rationally realise their moral character by achieving an ‘organic mean’ in their 
exhibition of the virtues within a community.88 Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that 
contemporary liberalism has lost this moral foundation, because it does not recognise 
such a universal human telos. For him, it is only through the recovery of such a telos that 
humans can hope to make sense of how the virtues should be applied to today’s moral 
and political dilemmas.89 This contention lies at the heart of contemporary virtue-ethics 
MacIntyre claims that the relationship between the virtues and their realisation 
within a community is determined by three different factors: their embodiment in 
different practices; their function in providing a rationally ordered narrative unity to 
human life; and their role within a particular tradition or way of life.90 Evaluation of an 
agent’s conduct is thus situated within a ‘framework of agreed modes of argument’ 
which enables a community to criticise and appraise the required content of a virtue- 
ethics.91 Hence it is possible for a liberal virtue-ethics to be drawn from those relatively 
stable notions of virtue that form part of a distinctive liberal moral culture or tradition. A 
liberal conception of the good life based on a liberal virtue-ethics would be structured 
around virtues firmly anchored to traditional notions of moral conduct and the 
flourishing of the community in which agents are situated. But this type of ethics can not
87 Aristotle, Ethics, pp. 101-2. Aristotle’s mean dispositions include courage, temperance, liberality, 
magnificence, magnanimity, proper ambition, patience, truthfulness, wittiness, friendliness, modesty 
and righteous indignation. Each of these dispositions has two corresponding aberrations, one of which is 
an excess of the appropriate disposition the other of which is a deficiency. So, for instance, the 
disposition towards courage is accompanied by the vices of rashness and cowardice.
88 S.RX.Clark, Aristotle's Man, pp.85-9.
89 A.MacIntyre, After Virtue.
90 ibid., pp.201-3.
91 S.Mulhall and A.Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, p.85.
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fully account for the importance of autonomy and individual flourishing in a liberal 
society. Indeed, some perfectionist liberal virtue-ethicists view virtues as instrumentally 
useful to the survival of a liberal society and culture, rather than inherent in living well. 
For instance, William Galston develops a perfectionist liberalism based on four categories 
of virtue which are instrumentally useful to the survival of liberal society: (i) General 
virtues, comprising qualities such as law-abidingness; (ii) Social virtues, such as self- 
restraint; (iii) Economic virtues, encompassing the work ethic; and (iv) Political virtues 
which are exercised in: citizenship; leadership; and through general political literacy.92 
However, such an instrumental understanding of the liberal virtues pays less heed to 
many of the social and moral virtues integral to the development of moral character, 
especially those associated with civility. Indeed, there are a whole series of further 
virtues that perfectionist liberals should recognise as intrinsically valuable which are 
missing from Galston’s list. Intellectual and cultural virtues (such as creativity and 
originality) make a fundamental contribution to the development of individual character 
and the flourishing of diverse social practices in liberal societies. For it to constitute an 
attractive conception of the good life, a liberal virtue-ethics should therefore reflect the 
intrinsic value attributable to both aspects of the concept of character. It should also 
reflect the centrality of the ability to be significantly autonomous to individual 
flourishing.
92 W.Galston, Liberal Purposes, pp.221-7. The virtues of citizenship include the capacity to respect 
others rights and to discern the ‘talent and character’ of electoral candidates and their performance in 
office. The virtues of political leadership include patience and the ability to ‘forge a common sense of 
purpose’, especially, the capacity to close ‘the gap between popular preference and wise action.’ The 
general political virtues are, first, the disposition and ability to ‘engage in public discourse’, and, second, 
‘the disposition to narrow the gap (insofar as it is one’s power) between principles and practices in 
liberal society.’ ibid., pp.224-7.
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Liberal virtues and the dual concept o f character
As Alasdair MacIntyre has made clear, virtue-ethics aims towards some universal telos 
which encompasses the exercise of the virtues. The dual aspects of liberal character 
could perhaps be regarded as such a human telos. Prescriptions for the development of 
character could relate to how well agents manifest those specific virtues relevant to the 
situation and circumstances in which they found themselves. Good moral character 
would thus be conditional upon agents carefully harmonising the manifestation of virtues 
and context, in accordance with well-defined communal guidelines. The instances of this 
occurring could then be considered and calculated by the virtue-ethicist in order to make 
an evaluative judgement about the relative worth of an agent’s character. But is this the 
most attractive way of conceptualising the ethical prescriptions that may be associated 
with a liberal concept of character?
Character is a liberal ethical ideal (rather than a universal human telos) to which 
agents in liberal societies should aspire when becoming significantly autonomous. Unlike 
a telos based on a virtue-ethics, it specifies no necessary or universal content. This is an 
(especially) attractive way for perfectionist liberals to understand individual flourishing, 
because it can make normative prescriptions sensitive to diversity and democratic 
deliberation. A liberal virtue-ethics would systematise a determinate range of virtues 
associated with character. The doctrine explicated here stresses that different 
configurations of character are inherent in living well. Virtue-ethics is closely tied to 
metaphysical essences, such as human nature93 or a universal telos, or instrumental goals, 
such as the purposes of the state. Neither of these outcomes is desirable for liberals 
seeking to explicate a conception of the good life based on the intrinsic value of 
individual flourishing. The place of the liberal virtues within a perfectionist liberal
doctrine can therefore be more attractively conceived as contingent on the development 
of those diverse character-configurations that could be associated with living well 
autonomously in a liberal society. This gives full recognition to the malleability of the self 
and to the importance of individual flourishing.
The idea of a liberal character-ethics also offers a number of further advantages 
over a virtue-ethics for conceptualising the promotion of a liberal conception of the good 
life. As Martha Nussbaum notes, ‘[a]n emphasis upon character means that the focus of 
ethical education will be the entire person over a complete life.’ Stressing a determinate 
set of virtues cannot account for how an agent’s character may evolve through time. 
Crucially, concentration on a character-ethics rather than a virtue-ethics can make it 
easier to ‘acknowledge the possibility of conflicting attachments and obligations, and 
serious moral dilemmas.’94 Indeed, we have noted that the development of character 
involves a more sophisticated configuration of an agent’s virtues and circumstances than 
can be derived by manifesting specific virtues in specific situations. Promotion of a liberal 
character-ethics is therefore more sensitive to diversity than simply promoting an additive 
index of virtues or linking these with a universal human telos. The conceptual structure 
of a liberal character-ethics is briefly outlined next.
ii) A liberal character-ethics
The distinction between a virtue-ethics and a character-ethics is perhaps fine but 
nonetheless important. Perfectionist virtue-ethicists view the liberal virtues either in an 
instrumentally valuable fashion or as related to character-development through the 
manifestation of an additive index of virtues. This latter contention supposes that agents
93 R.Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford University Press, 2001.
94 M.Nussbaum, ‘Character’, in L.C.Becker and C.B.Becker ed., Encyclopaedia o f  Ethics vol.l, London, 
Garland Publishing Inc., 1992, p. 133.
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are able to comprehensively fulfil this code of virtues. But agents would not be able to 
exhibit each of the imaginable liberal virtues nor would it be possible to accurately 
define, measure and calculate the manifestation of such a determinate set of virtues. The 
development of character presupposes many different configurations of the liberal 
virtues. A liberal character-ethics can thus synthesise a range of virtues which agents may 
exhibit in varying combinations to live well, but it will not directly specify the relationship 
between these combinations and their context. The explication of a liberal character- 
ethics and the evaluation of character-configurations are discussed below.
Explicating a liberal character-ethics
The development of a perfectionist doctrine based on the dual concept of character 
entails the explication of a range of generic liberal virtues within a liberal character- 
ethics. Explication of such a liberal conception of the good life would not be like that for 
a virtue-ethics, because it would not directly specify how character should be configured. 
It also differs from relativist justifications of liberalism because of its appeal to 
coherentist-type criteria associated with the decontestation of liberal concepts. A 
perfectionist liberalism that focuses on the attractiveness of a liberal character-ethics can 
develop a coherent, relevant and comprehensible defence of its concepts by referring to 
the ethical ideals inherent in a liberal democratic culture. It can draw attention to the 
need for a liberal society to promote individual flourishing through processes of moral 
socialisation, presenting a character-ethics as intrinsically valuable to this process. In 
doing so, a liberal character-ethics would provide the content for a doctrine to which 
liberals qua liberals should aspire.
Commitment to liberal concepts here precedes or undergirds justification rather 
than vice versa. As a result, liberals should focus their attention on explicating the most
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intellectually and emotionally appealing doctrines.95 While a perfectionist liberal project 
of explication may establish epistemological relativism, this does not indicate normative 
relativism. A liberal character-ethics can evince a deep evolving commitment to a family 
of contingent liberal virtues and values. It will thus be intrinsically related to living well 
autonomously insofar as it is coherent with, relevant to and comprehensible within a 
liberal vocabulary that pertains to the concept of significant autonomy. This makes moral 
and individual character legitimate objects of moral socialisation, because their 
development is understood to be critical to the significant autonomy of agents in a liberal 
society. Nevertheless, this will only commit perfectionist liberals to claiming that they are 
ethical ideals to which liberals should aspire because they will wish to remain sensitive to 
diversity; it does not commit them to tightly prescribing their shape. A liberal character- 
ethics would establish that certain key liberal virtues may be integral to the development 
of moral character, but it will highlight that different configurations of character 
inevitably result from the different lives which agents lead.
Evaluating character within a liberal character-ethics
As we have seen, the concepts of moral and individual character are ethical ideals which 
reflect perfectionist liberal commitment to individual flourishing. A focus on character 
means that a perfectionist liberal ethical doctrine can accommodate more sensitive 
evaluation of an agent’s moral character than the study of a check-list of virtues. For 
instance, although agent x may never display virtues e or g  (indeed, they may conflict
95 Moreover, closer inspection reveals that something like an explicatory position is held by even the 
most abstract or non-committal of impartialist liberals. M.Evans, ‘Pragmatist Liberalism and the 
Evasion of Politics’, in M.Evans ed., The Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2001.
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with virtues a, k and /), overall their character could still be regarded as good.96 They 
may also display vices/and t, but their manifestation of virtues a, b and c means that we 
may still consider them to be of good moral character. To be an agent of good moral 
character one does not have to display all the virtues that pertain to moral character. 
Indeed, one may display certain moral failings and still be regarded as an agent of good 
moral character provided certain minimal conditions of virtuous conduct have been 
exceeded.
An agent’s character should be evaluated on the basis of how well it reflects their 
commitment to virtues, dispositions and traits which are or could be associated with 
moral and individual character. It is not evaluated on the basis of meeting a set of 
predefined virtue-targets, but is subject to subtle interpretation of an agent’s autonomy 
based on criteria of coherence, relevance and comprehensibility. It would therefore focus 
on assessing the diverse manifestation of autonomous configurations of liberal virtues. 
The scope within a liberal character-ethics for accommodating subtle nuances of moral 
judgement can facilitate a wide liberal sensitivity to moral diversity and individuality 
within liberal society. But to what extent should this inform and influence liberal politics 
and policy-making?
4. Perfectionist liberalism and the Limits of the State
In recent times, the limits of state intervention into the moral lives of citizens have been a 
major concern of liberal political philosophers. As we saw in the introduction, many 
prominent liberal theorists argue that the state should maintain impartiality between
96 Stephen D.Hudson, recognises that although it is true that we can ‘distinguish the principle that 
evaluations of the merit of an act can be grounded independently of an appraisal of the agent who 
performed the act’, it is never the case that we ground such ‘evaluations of the merit of an act., 
independently of the moral evaluation of any agent.’ S.D.Hudson, Human Character and Morality: 
Reflections from the History o f  Ideas, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986, p. 59.
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different conceptions of the good. By contrast, others believe that this is neither possible 
nor desirable. Perfectionist liberals argue that liberalism is committed to distinctive liberal 
values and that this commitment means that the liberal state can and should actively 
promote a liberal conception of the good life. This section reflects on perfectionist 
liberalism, considering the suitability of two schools of perfectionist liberalism for 
conceptualising the promotion of a liberal character-ethics.
i) Perfectionism and politics
Perfectionism in moral and political philosophy highlights the centrality of certain values 
and activities to human flourishing. It generates duties incumbent on agents to promote 
and enhance the development of these within their own and others’ lives. The application 
of perfectionist principles in politics pertains to the institutional implications of the rights 
and obligations associated with these specific human ‘excellences’, in particular, it can 
establish that the value of certain activities is such that society and its political institutions 
should be structured so as to reflect their promotion. This relationship between 
perfectionism and politics is discussed further below, beginning with a summary of its 
recent revival within liberal political theory.
Perfectionism, pluralism and progress
Perfectionism has been a persistent concern of philosophers throughout the history of 
Western thought. Thinkers as diverse as Plato, Rousseau and Marx have argued for the 
moral imperatives behind active promotion of specific human excellences.97 Inevitably,
97 Plato believed that human rationality was progressively perfected as it developed towards absolute 
knowledge. Republic. Rousseau stressed that democratic participation perfected the social sympathy of 
each citizen so they could identify with the general will. The Social Contract and Discourses, London, 
Dent, 1993. For Marx, free social relations would enable the perfecting of each individual agent’s self- 
determined productive activity. The Communist Manifesto, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985.
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these prescriptions for perfecting or improving the development of human beings have 
had major implications for political thought and practice. When applied to politics, 
perfectionist principles comprise two identifiable elements:
One is an argument that some forms of human activity or experience have special 
value. The other is that a policy of furthering this special value should play a part 
in some aspects of our conduct toward others, including some social and political 
decisions.98
These elements can form the basis for a range of policies and institutions to promote 
human excellence, in particular, those associated with culture and education. The 
familiarity of many contemporary perfectionist prescriptions, such as state-support for 
the Arts or sport, highlight that in addition to being a doctrine in its own right, 
perfectionism can provide principles for adoption within a range of ideological doctrines. 
Although they can be criticised for tightly specifying the nature of human development, 
perfectionist principles have recently been rehabilitated by liberal critics of impartialism. 
Indeed, emphasis upon human improvability has often been a feature of liberal thought.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries many liberal thinkers expressed 
faith in the ability of humans to control their environment and their fundamental 
dispositions and traits in ways which were valuable to individuals and society alike. At 
the time, this reflected a belief in a universal metaphysical conception of human nature, 
the rationality of liberal political principles and the liberating possibilities of technological 
control.99 However, the moral optimism typical of nineteenth century liberals was 
superseded in the twentieth century by the anti-prescriptive tenor of post-war liberals. 
Isaiah Berlin, Hannah Arendt and many other emigrant European intellectuals were 
keenly aware of the dangers posed by philosophical monism and political certainty to
98 J.J.Kupperman, ‘Perfectionism’, in T.Honderich, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, p.653.
991. Collins, Liberalism in Nineteenth Century Europe, Historical Association, London, 1957.
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diverse ways of life.100 The horrors of the Second World War (had also) seriously 
damaged the idea of uninterrupted human progress. Moreover, the experiments of 
psychologists such as Stanley Milgram on the nature of authoritarianism threw liberal 
notions of moral responsibility and state involvement in its promotion into serious 
doubt.101 The capacity for ideological forces to sweep agents towards ‘inhuman acts’ in 
the name of freedom, their nation, class or leader caused many political thinkers and 
observers to become extremely sceptical of any programmatic philosophical or political 
doctrines.102 Scepticism about human progress was supplemented by a growing 
sensitivity to social diversity which undermined established arguments for the 
perfectibility of a universal human nature. These two developments were linked insofar 
as the growing acknowledgement of diversity strengthened philosophical and empirical 
scepticism about the good life. Perfectionist principles were therefore rejected by 
sceptical liberal philosophers, because they believed there were no longer adequate 
grounds for policies which promoted any one set of moral values in the face of plural 
competing moral doctrines. Such policies would also be redolent of the moral certainty 
that accompanied totalitarianism. Indeed, many perfectionist philosophers (such as Plato 
and Rousseau) were identified as the progenitors of totalitarian doctrines.
Sceptical post-war liberals argued that human flourishing had no definite 
specifiable quality and hence characterised liberalism in terms of negative rights. 
Individual liberty and the value of autonomy would only be secured where the state 
retreated from contentious intervention within the moral lives of citizens by maintaining a
100 H.Arendt, The Origins o f Totalitarianism, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973; I.Berlin, 
Against the Current: Essays in the History o f Ideas, Oxford University Press, 1981.
101 S.Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, London, Tavistock, 1974. See also 
T.W. Adorno, The Authoritarian Personality, Norton, New York, 1969.
102 This was particularly so where philosophers criticised the notion of rational or positive freedom. See 
E.Kedourie, Nationalism, Oxford, Blackwell, 1993.
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basic framework of civil, legal and economic liberties.103 Nevertheless, during this time 
the politics and policy-making of many Western democracies continued to uphold 
aspects of nineteenth century liberal optimism. In particular, within the realm of 
education, faith in the susceptibility of moral character to improvement remained largely 
unaltered.104 Perfectionist principles were therefore never far from the political decision­
making of liberal states, but were increasingly marginalised in the work of (liberal) 
political theorists. This neglect was decisively altered by the revival of normative political 
theory during the 1970s.
Perfectionist liberalism
Perfectionist liberal theories emerged as critical responses to the weaknesses of 
impartialist liberalism associated with John Rawls’ A Theory o f Justice. Perfectionist 
liberals openly theorise and justify common liberal intuitions regarding state intervention 
into the moral life of citizens. Their discussions of the place of perfectionist liberal 
principles in politics have therefore revolved around what values or activities the liberal 
state ought to promote and what means should be used to promote those values. While 
‘promotion’ does not entirely capture the idea that the state can facilitate a conception of 
the good life by withholding intervention, it is central to the work of perfectionist liberals 
because it can dilute fears of intrusive coercion associated with state intervention. Joseph 
Raz notes that much ‘perfectionist action... could be encouraging and facilitating action 
of the desired kind, or discouraging undesired modes of behaviour’.105 Hence liberals can 
envisage a whole range of ways in which perfectionism may impact on political
103 I.Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969.
104 Indeed, during the 1960s increased stress was laid on the inherent goodness and innocence of human 
nature. This prescriptive emphasis on improvability (or at least, malleability) is to some extent an 
inevitable feature of the philosophy of education.
105 Joseph Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom, p. 161.
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deliberations, for instance, in legal judgements, in the funding of education, in support 
for leisure or cultural pursuits, and a variety of other policy areas. Unlike impartialist 
principles, perfectionist principles can also supply ethical content for critiquing the 
conduct and quality of decision-making in a liberal society.
Contemporary perfectionist liberals have sought to develop principles which 
rebut liberal scepticism about the good. Such perfectionist principles are inherent in the 
content of a liberal conception of the good life and can also be used to evaluate how far a 
liberal society is successfully facilitating that liberal conception of the good life. 
Perfectionist liberals can here be divided into two schools of thought. The first school of 
strong or ‘thick’ perfectionist liberalism is distinguished by its reference to the 
metaphysical characteristics that constitute human nature whose perfection can and 
should be the aim of state policies. The second school of ‘thin’ perfectionist liberalism 
centres upon the more modest claim that within a liberal society ‘some forms of human 
activity or experience have special value’ which justifies their support or promotion.106 
These two schools are examined below.
ii) Thick and thin perfectionist liberalism
The development of perfectionist liberal theories has reinvigorated many aspects of 
contemporary political theory. Although impartialist liberals argue that the liberal state 
should refrain from actively promoting a liberal conception of the good life, there is no 
self-evident justification for attributing ‘no weight at alV to perfectionist reasoning in 
‘deliberations about law and policy.’107 Indeed, perfectionist liberals contend that such 
reasoning is a central aspect of good government and political decision-making. Liberals
106 J.J.Kupperman, ‘Perfectionism’, p.653. See J. Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, Oxford University Press, 
1973, pp.325-6 for a discussion of the philosophy of these two variants of perfectionism.
107 G.Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics, p. 17.
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who accept the role of perfectionism within politics and philosophy have developed thick 
and thin doctrines based on very different philosophical assumptions.
Thick perfectionist liberalism
Thick perfectionists argue that human beings have a duty to develop, exercise and 
perfect those characteristics which are ‘the truest, simplest, and most predictively 
powerful explanations of humans’ other properties’.108 They also contend that i f ‘some 
traits, activities, and ways of relating to people really are superior to others’ then the 
state has an obligation to intervene in the lives of citizens to promote these. Only a 
universal theory of the good can clarify how some ‘activities, traits, and relationships 
are best’. Such metaphysical (rather than cultural) foundations for the promotion of 
valuable attributes are grounded in a universal conception of human nature.109 Amongst 
the universal attributes of human nature they wish to promote, thick perfectionists 
typically agree that rationality is the most appropriate foundation for a metaphysical 
liberal theory of the good. It is therefore desirable that the liberal state should seek above 
all to perfect the rational capabilities of liberal citizens.
The perfection of citizens’ rational capacities entails the state support and 
promotion of a wide range of complex activities in which citizens can exercise and 
enhance their rational capabilities.110 For thick perfectionists, this is justified because a 
liberal government which could promote superior activities would not be fulfilling its 
duty to uphold a right to be able to be significantly autonomous where it did ‘not try to
i°8 x.Hiirka, Perfectionism, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 19.
109 G.Sher Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics, pp. 177-8.
110 Thomas Hurka argues ‘the best life has a single organising end that demands many different 
challenging activities that are also valued for themselves, whereas the worst is an unconnected series of 
passive experiences. In the first case, there are extended, structured goals both for one’s whole life and at 
particular times; in, the other, there are no such goals anywhere. ’ Perfectionism, p. 128.
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induce its citizens to live good lives.’111 There are a number of means governments can 
use to induce citizens to live good valuable lives, including: i) ‘threaten to punish them 
for not living as it thinks best’; ii) ‘offer them incentives to live in the desired ways’; iii) 
‘nonrationally cause them to prefer to live in those ways’; iv) ‘create the conditions 
under which they can live in those ways.’112 Clearly, a liberal government which wanted 
to promote the rationality of citizens would focus attention on the fourth of these means, 
as the others imply a use of coercive measures that would be largely unacceptable to 
perfectionist liberals committed to encouraging significant autonomy. In this regard, 
democracy is thought to be inherently valuable because it can facilitate greater 
opportunities for the maximisation of many diverse states of perfection113 -  though, of 
course, Mill alerts us to how in a mass society the opposite might result.
Although, for thick perfectionists, the promotion of perfection amongst fellow- 
citizens is an additional condition of an agent’s promotion of their own rational 
capabilities and a condition of maximising perfection more widely, the duty to maximise 
perfection throughout society ultimately remains incumbent on the democratic state.114 
Thick perfectionist liberalism is a maximising morality, because it contends that it must 
always be better that intrinsically valuable goods are had in ever-greater quantities.115 
Liberal governments should therefore provide at least basic levels of material security 
and education, because state intervention to promote a right to be able to be significantly
111 G.Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics, pp.97, 104.
112 ibid., p.37.
113 T.Hurka, Perfectionism, pp. 130-1.
114 ibid, pp. 14, 18.
115 ibid., p.56. Thomas Hurka states that ‘perfectionism has a precise cardinal measure of each human’s 
development of his nature at each time’, which ‘aggregates first across times and only then across 
persons.’ This entails that a ‘single-peak perfection’ principle (such as an agent’s greatest work of art, 
sporting achievement, moment of kindness, etc.) cannot account for perfectionist value over a lifetime. 
Perfectionism therefore enjoins a commitment to egalitarianism to give ‘equal weight to unit gains in all 
human lives.’ Perfectionism, pp.69-81. The guidance found in the character-ethics explicated here 
would stipulate only that character-configurations should meet criteria of coherence, comprehensibility
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autonomous should favour ‘whatever distribution of resources most promotes aggregate 
perfection.’116 Nevertheless, many liberal supporters of perfectionist principles are likely 
to be uncomfortable with the metaphysical arguments of thick perfectionism, especially 
given its association with philosophical monism. They may also be wary of utilitarian 
justifications for maximising or quantifying moral values, particularly as such an additive 
index of values may not be very sensitive to diversity or democratic revision. A strict 
maximising approach also over-prescribes the conditions for the achievement of good 
character. Agents can be of good character, without ever having perfected themselves 
(desirable though this may be). Acceptance of an agent’s flaws and of the loss which 
accompanies the incommensurabilities of moral choice, are especially attractive features 
of a perfectionist liberalism based on a liberal character-ethics. Indeed, perfectionist 
liberals do not need to adopt a metaphysical conception of human nature or a strict 
maximising view of perfectionism to explain state intervention within the moral lives of 
citizens.
Thin perfectionism: Public virtues and political authority
Thin perfectionist liberals typically contend that state intervention in the moral lives of 
citizens is either necessary for the survival of liberal society or for the flourishing of 
individual agents. As a result, they claim that ‘the path to defensible clarity in these 
matters leads through, not around, a direct consideration of the understanding of well­
being on which liberalism rests.’ For a thin perfectionist concerned about the survival of 
liberal society, their principles can provide ‘a shared basis for public policy’ by 
prescribing ‘a range of normal, decent human functioning’, that falls short of ‘defining a
and relevance. The evaluation of these criteria would then make reference to the circumstances, 
dispositions and practices pertinent to the development of each agent’s character-configuration.
116 ibid., p. 164.
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full way of life’. This prescription would require a ‘special set of reasons for restricting 
the movement from the good to public coercion’.117 Consequently, the liberal state 
should promote liberal values in accordance with ‘a determinate but limited conception 
of liberal public purposes’.118
Liberal public purposes ‘define what the members of a liberal community must 
have in common’. These shared public purposes are essential for a liberal state to 
maintain the ‘conditions necessary to its own health and perpetuation.’119 The liberal 
state, if it is to survive, must therefore ensure that its citizens publicly affirm ‘specific 
excellences and character-traits: the liberal virtues’. In turn, this means that perfectionist 
liberals should be ‘especially attentive to the processes, formal and informal, by which 
these virtues are strengthened and eroded’.120 State-led education is an essential 
formative process because a liberal state, however, ‘inclusive of diversity’ cannot afford 
to ignore the character of its citizens’.121 Although thin perfectionists accept these 
general principles of policy-making, not all of them pay such heed to the interests of the 
liberal state, preferring to focus their attention on the individual flourishing of liberal 
citizens.
Joseph Raz argues that the liberal state has a responsibility to ‘promote and 
protect the interests of its subjects’.122 It should therefore create conditions conducive to 
significant autonomy, because this is the central value within a liberal society. State 
intervention to promote autonomy is justified because ‘it serves the public interest’ and 
because its ‘public authority is ultimately based on the moral duty which individuals owe
117 W.Galston, Liberal Purposes, pp.94-5, 177-80.
118 ibid., p.154.
119 ibid., pp.3-6.
120 ibid., pp. 18-9. Furthermore, Galston advocates a programme of civic education.
121 ibid., p.216.
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to their fellow humans.’123 Both the state and agents therefore have a responsibility to 
establish and maintain an autonomy-supporting environment, as in a liberal society an 
agent’s fundamental interest in having a significantly autonomous life is an interest in 
living in a society where ‘many... options are available.’124 Furthermore, the life-options 
between which agents choose must be of a quality which demands a higher degree of 
autonomy than merely dealing with the arbitrary necessities of human existence 
(significant though these are). Agents in liberal societies can only live well where their 
life consists of worthwhile opportunities for the exercise of their personal autonomy.125 
Liberal governments therefore have an obligation to ‘create morally valuable 
opportunities, and to eliminate repugnant ones.’126
The role of thin perfectionist policy-making principles is ‘extensive and 
important’. Nevertheless, perfectionist liberals should be concerned that some thin 
perfectionists are not forthcoming about the ethics which liberal states should promote in 
order to uphold a right to be able to be significantly autonomous. Nor do they have much 
to say about the concepts of moral and individual character, especially the latter. Indeed, 
of the thin perfectionists studied here, only Galston appears willing to prescribe the 
ethical content of a liberal conception of the good life. However, his perfectionist 
liberalism does not place individual flourishing at the heart of liberal politics or culture, 
giving little emphasis to the development of individual character. By contrast, the 
perfectionist liberal doctrine explicated in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis places
122 J.Raz, Morality o f  Freedom, p.6. Raz argues that because liberal rights advocated ‘in the name of 
individual freedom’ were done so ‘against a background which secured collective goods without which 
those individual rights would not have served their avowed purpose.’ ibid., p.251.
123 ibid., p.72.
124 ibid., p.206.
125 So much so that, for Raz, ‘[A] person who has never had any significant choice, or was not aware of 
it, or never exercised choice in significant matters but simply drifted through life is not an autonomous 
person.’ ibid., p.204.
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individual flourishing at the heart of a right to be able to be significantly autonomous. It 
also stresses that perfectionist liberals are committed to promoting individuality, as well 
as the ability to be moral. Given that perfectionists typically retreat from exploring an 
ideal liberal character-ethics or its promotion, or fail to recognise the centrality of 
individual flourishing to a liberal doctrine, we must consider what alternative theoretical 
resources are available to justify and explain the state-promotion of a liberal character- 
ethics.
5. Character-Ethics and 4Technologies of the Self*
Conventional perfectionist liberalisms do not provide suitable resources to conceptualise 
the promotion of a liberal character-ethics. For liberal supporters of perfectionist 
principles, a more illuminating way to understand the presuppositions associated with the 
right to be able to be significantly autonomous, is to explicate them within a theoretical 
framework that can reflect the interplay between liberal politics and society. This means 
that philosophical discussion about the promotion of autonomy and character should be 
conducted in a manner which pays close attention to their relationship with politics and 
the state. The work of Michel Foucault on liberal govemmentality provides an especially 
pertinent and edifying means of conceptualising the relationship between autonomy, 
character, politics and education in this context. This section outlines the nature of a 
quasi-Foucauldian interpretation of the liberal concepts which the liberal doctrine 
explicated here decontests. It begins with a discussion of the idea that the virtues of 
character may be regarded as ‘technologies of the self, before focusing on Foucault’s
126 ibid., p.417. For Raz, the liberal state can ‘use coercion both in order to stop people from actions 
which would diminish people’s autonomy, and in order to force them to take actions which are required 
to improve people’s options and opportunities.’ ibid., p.416.
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view of state intervention in the moral lives of citizens and distinguishing the liberal 
approach from it.
i) Technologies of the self
Foucault’s genealogical work on subjectivity and power culminated in a consideration of 
how humans are able to constitute their ‘identity through some ethical techniques of the 
self which developed from antiquity down to now’.127 These ‘technologies of the self 
enable ‘individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain 
number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of 
being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, 
wisdom, perfection, or immortality.’ Technologies of the self can help agents to develop 
their character and may be inculcated through ‘certain modes of training and 
modification’.128 They therefore provide a highly edifying meta-theoretical perspective 
from which perfectionist liberals can view the exhibition and promotion of liberal virtues.
Origins o f technologies o f the self
Foucault’s early work concentrated on the structures and processes by which agents 
were controlled, labelled and, therefore, produced.129 Later, he focused on the techniques 
that were available for agents to develop their own self and subjectivity. Foucault 
conducted genealogical investigations of these by examining the sexual interdictions of 
ancient philosophers and Christianity.130 Specific techniques for achieving and 
demonstrating self-discipline were found in esoteric and ethical texts demonstrating how
127 M.Foucault, ‘The Political Technology of Individuals’, p. 146
128 MFoucault, ‘Technologies of the Self, p. 18.
129 See, in particular, Madness and Civilisation, London, Routledge, 1989; and Discipline and Punish, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1991.
130 M.Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self, p. 17.
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agents could understand and modify themselves. The ‘technologies of the self specified 
in these texts were regarded as virtues which when exercised ‘free from disturbances of 
the body and mind’ become constitutive of an agent’s care for the development of their 
character.
By applying technologies of the self to themselves agents could constitute their 
own character. To accomplish a ‘complete achievement of life’ they should manage their 
selves very carefully, striving to apply appropriate rules of conduct to their character- 
development.131 Where a range of related technologies were applied to the management 
of the self these would then constitute a particular form of living or style of existence.132 
In Antiquity the dominant styles of existence were constituted by an emphasis on self- 
mastery in sexual relations, which took the form ‘of an intensification of the relationship 
to self by which one is formed as a subject of one’s acts.133 Critically, moral failings were 
not cause for harsh judgement and penance, but were to be corrected by applying 
appropriate technologies of the self. Agents would therefore examine, administer and 
regulate themselves by exercising appropriate virtues.134
This Stoic idea of ‘taking stock’ did not presume that there was an essential or 
authentic self to be ‘deciphered’, realised or created. Rather it prescribed effective self­
management and character-development through the active ownership of technologies of 
the self that conduced to the proper care of the self. This process was not solipsistic. An 
agent’s self and conduct was increasingly problematised by the prescriptions of 
technologies of the self, because they were obliged to consider how they should form 
themselves as ‘an ethical subject in the entire sphere of social, political and civic
131 Thus, Seneca viewed the application of technologies of the self as akin to the activity of a ‘stock­
taking administrator’ who constantly reflects on and attempts to discipline the actions of the 
management subject, in this case their life. ‘Technologies of the self, pp.33-4.
132 ibid., pp. 18-9.
133 M.Foucault, The History o f  Sexuality, Volume 3: The Care o f the Self, p.41.
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activities.’135 Thus, as ‘dominion over oneself progressed, it was ‘increasingly 
manifested in the practice of obligations with regard to others’.136 Care for one’s own 
character became objectified through relationships with others, with the application of 
technologies of the self preceding and constituting specific forms of decision-making. 
Self-management was not equivalent to planning one’s life, because such forward 
thinking was predicated on the continually renewed application of technologies of the 
self.
Foucault’s understanding of the constitution of an agent’s character through the 
constant application of technologies of the self can provide perfectionist liberals with an 
excellent means for explicating what is actually going on in the application of the 
doctrine of character. But before discussing the attractiveness of a quasi-Foucauldian 
view of perfectionist liberalism further, we must first examine Foucault’s consideration of 
the relationship between technologies of the self, power and government.
Discipline, truth and normalisation
Technologies of the self were associated with the precepts of the Stoics philosophy of 
care for oneself. ‘To be concerned with oneself was a vital ingredient of the good life, 
which manifested itself in an agent’s social, political and personal conduct. Foucault 
argued that this principle of self-care preceded the well-known Delphic exhortation to 
‘know oneself, with the latter dependent on the development of self-care. However, this 
relationship was undermined and eventually reversed as Western societies became less 
concerned with an agent’s care for themselves, than for ensuring that they behave in a
134 M.Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self, p.34.
135 To accomplish this successfully, agents should keep in mind ‘which of these activities’ are 
‘obligatory or optional, natural or conventional, permanent or provisional, unconditional or 
recommended only under certain conditions. ’ M.Foucault, The History o f Sexuality, Volume 3: The Care 
o f the Self, p. 94.
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manner expected of them. To live by ‘taking pains with oneself was thus supplanted by 
an exhortation to tell the truth about oneself.137
The impulse towards telling the truth about oneself was reflected in the transition 
from a Stoic understanding of moral conduct to that of Christianity. Study of Christian 
prohibitions regarding sexuality was particularly instructive in this regard, because they 
were ‘constantly connected with the obligation to tell the truth about oneself.’138 In 
Christianity, injunctions against inappropriate conduct become less a matter of self- 
mastery than of self-knowledge, with care of the self dependent on an agent’s 
understanding of their inherently sinful nature. Demonstration of this self-understanding 
was then manifested through public displays of penance and through confession. Such 
public self-revelation was ‘at the same time self-destruction’, because it was ‘modelled 
on the renunciation of one’s own will and of one’s own self through ‘an analytical and 
continual verbalisation of thoughts carried on in the relation of complete obedience to 
someone else’.139 For Foucault, these confessional ‘techniques of verbalisation’ would 
later influence the development of the human sciences.
As Western culture grew more secular and the power of the Church waned, 
opportunities for agents to tell the truth about themselves proliferated, resulting in a 
paradoxical situation: techniques of self-verbalisation derived from medical and social 
science facilitated healthier modes of self-understanding, but were tied to the purposes of 
the modem state. Increased possibilities for individual freedom were thus gained ‘at the
136 ibid., p. 149.
137 ibid., pp.40-3. For Foucault, this development was best exemplified in the introspective and 
confessional literature that emerged from the first and second centuries AD onwards, and which, he 
claimed created the modem Western understanding of self-consciousness.
138 MFoucault, ‘Technologies of the Self, p. 16.
139 ibid., pp.43-8.
87
cost of an intensified and more efficient hold of power on their bodies and actions, of an 
intensification of relations of domination at the level of their individual existence.’140
The art of government in modem Western societies began to involve the 
regulation of the interaction between citizens and their surrounding environment. This 
could only be effective if the activity of citizens was calculable and susceptible to 
control.141 Human sciences, such as medicine and psychology, enabled states to calculate 
the behaviour of citizens within a variety of different institutions. These processes of 
normalisation would then become technical principles of government through the use of 
statistics and disciplinary technologies of domination (such as surveillance). Moreover, 
the rise of social science inaugurated new confessional technologies of the self through 
which citizens could learn to articulate the ‘truth’ about themselves, technologies which 
rendered them even more vulnerable to classification and control. As a result, Foucault 
argued that Western societies were characterised by the ‘coexistence in political 
structures of large destructive mechanisms and institutions oriented toward the care of 
individual life’.142 Conceptually speaking, this resulted in a condition of 
‘govemmentality’ where ‘technologies of domination of individuals over one another 
have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself and conversely... 
where techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion’.143
‘Govemmentality’ aimed to reproduce obedient productive citizens by inculcating 
technologies of the self via state-led political technologies of domination (such as 
education and the rule of law). Foucault emphasised that govemmentality established the
140 G.Burchell, ‘Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self, Economy and Society, vol.22, no.3, 
1993, p.279.
141 Such a ‘bio-politics’ could also become a ‘thanatopolitics’, in that, the state may choose to slaughter 
rather than sustain its own population. M.Foucault, ‘Political Technology of Individuals’, p. 160.
142 ibid., p. 147. Sometimes individuals are expected ‘to live, to work, to produce, to consume; and
sometimes... to die’, ibid., p. 152.
88
‘integration of the individuals in a community or in a totality’ through ‘a constant 
correlation between an increasing individualisation and the reinforcement of this 
totality’.144 However, inculcation of certain technologies of the self could open up space 
for the free development of character. The technologies of self-verbalisation and 
representation inherent in the human sciences (and art) can permit agents to continually 
re-problematise their present in such a way as to indicate the possibility of radically 
different types of individual character. Such problematisation, if pursued with integrity, 
would have both a ‘critical effect (making it more difficult for us to think and act in 
accustomed ways) and its positive effect (clearing a space for the possibility of thinking 
and being otherwise, for a consideration of the conditions for a real transformation of 
what we are).’145 This ‘permanent agonism’ constituted a ‘transgressive’ personal ethic, 
through which agents could perfect their individuality.
Foucault argued that liberal govemmentality could not facilitate genuinely 
individual modes of flourishing, because it focused on the inculcation of tightly specified 
liberal technologies of the self. But, it could be argued that the inculcation of 
technologies of the self is in fact integral to promoting the ability to be significantly 
autonomous in a diverse range of ways. At a meta-theoretical level, this ‘quasi- 
Foucauldian’ claim can therefore edifyingly illuminate the importance of perfectionist 
policies to promote significant autonomy by highlighting that individual flourishing can 
only occur within certain constraints. The nature of liberal technologies of the self and 
their relevance to the perfectionist liberal doctrine presented in the thesis is discussed 
next.
143 M.Foucault, Truth and subjectivity’, The Howison Lecture, Berkeley, quoted in G.Burchell, ‘Liberal 
Government and Techniques of the Self, p.267.
144 M.Foucault, ‘Political Technology of Individuals’, pp. 158-62.
145 G.Burchell, ‘Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self, p.278.
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ii) Liberal technologies of the self
The inculcation of technologies of the self is identified with political technologies by 
which the state can effect ‘govemmentality’ over agents. For Foucault, govemmentality 
was the ‘conduct of conduct’ through direct disciplinary means (such as the rule of law 
and punishment) and indirect disciplinary means (such as education and popular 
morality).146 In a liberal state, the shape of citizen’s relationships to themselves would be 
contoured by the inculcation of certain liberal technologies of the self. Foucault believed 
that this unduly circumscribed the freedom of agents, but it is argued here that it is 
constitutive of the ability to be significantly autonomous in diverse ways. This quasi- 
Foucauldian understanding of the implications of a perfectionist liberal doctrine can 
highlight the philosophical presuppositions associated with the state-promotion of a 
liberal character-ethics, especially within education.
Technologies o f the self and liberal govemmentality
The structure of a liberal character-ethics can be conceptualised in quasi-Foucauldian 
terms as that synthesis of the requisite technologies of the self (the liberal virtues) that 
can enable agents to care appropriately for their autonomy. These liberal technologies of 
the self enable agents to constitute themselves as agents or participants in a 
characteristically liberal ‘stylistics of living’. Some Foucauldians contend that such a 
liberal ‘stylistics of living’ simply reflects the rationality of consumer capitalism. Liberal 
citizens are encouraged by the state to ‘fashion themselves’ as productive law-abiding 
capitalist consumers through ‘saving and providentialism, the acquisition of ways of 
performing roles like father or mother, the development of habits of cleanliness, sobriety,
146 M.Foucault, ‘On Govemmentality’, in G.Burchell, C.Gordon and P.Miller eds., The Foucault Effect, 
London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.
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fidelity, self-improvement, responsibility and so on.’147 However, it is argued here that 
Foucault’s notions can be adapted by perfectionist liberal theorists to illustrate at a meta- 
theoretical level that state intervention is necessary to constitute the ability to live well by 
promoting moral and individual character.
State-promotion of a liberal character-ethics can (when guided by suitable liberal 
principles of policy-making) stimulate the development of different configurations of 
character and diverse modes of individual flourishing in liberal societies. A quasi- 
Foucauldian interpretation of the govemmentality associated with the inculcation of 
liberal technologies of the self thus highlights that for perfectionist liberals the state can 
introduce policies which may have attractive implications for how agents exercise 
autonomy.
The promotion of a liberal character-ethics is not equivalent to a perfectionist 
maximisation of rational capabilities, the prescription of a determinate set of specifiable 
liberal virtues or the promotion of instrumental public purposes. Neither is it akin to 
Foucault’s ‘transgressive’ perfectionism, which washes its hands of politics and morality. 
It represents a ‘quasi’ Foucauldian view because it is not ashamed to ‘take sides’, 
asserting that the inculcation of technologies of the self is inherent in developing agents’ 
ability to give suitable ethical content to significant autonomy. Properly directed and 
constrained state intervention can enable agents to give individual ethical style to their 
autonomy by developing their own configurations of moral and individual character. The 
use of political technologies of liberal govemmentality (such as education) when 
constrained by liberal principles of policy-making is not repressive of the free
147 This also makes intelligible ‘the construction of that characteristically hybrid domain of the public 
and the private’ and also the ‘often privately conducted public campaigns aimed at the moralisation and 
normalisation of the population through practical systems at the interface of society and the state, private 
and public (medical, psychiatric, educational, philanthropic, social...).’ G.Burchell, ‘Liberal 
Government and Techniques of the Self, pp.271-2.
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development of character, but may be regarded as facilitative and constitutive of this 
possibility. The flourishing of agents within a liberal society can only be assured by 
equipping them to develop different configurations of the liberal virtues inherent in a 
liberal character-ethics. Inculcation of liberal technologies of the self by the state and 
throughout civil society can thus enable citizens to develop their moral and individual 
character in ways that evince an appropriate care for their autonomy.
The quasi-Foucauldian approach to understanding the promotion of a liberal 
character-ethics can also illuminate the relationship between the concepts of character, 
autonomy and education.
Character, autonomy and education
At a meta-theoretical level, perfectionist liberal concepts of learning and education can 
be clarified and explained by adopting the language of technologies of the self. Indeed, 
for Foucault, the educational aspects of ‘technologies of the self were the defining 
feature of the early stages of their historical evolution. The pupils of Stoic philosophers 
learnt self-mastery by memorising the teaching of their teachers and converting what they 
heard into ‘rules of conduct’.148 Foucault himself did not advocate any particular ethical 
code beyond an inner impulsion to test one’s self and one’s boundaries when developing 
individual character. The liberal character-ethics explicated here is in effect a liberal 
‘stylistics of existence’, which in turn presupposes a certain sort of liberal education.149 
To accomplish this, liberal state schools become institutions which aim to promote the 
development of character. In Antiquity, this was first and foremost a disciplinary activity, 
with ‘masters’ teaching disciples technologies of the self they should later autonomously
148 M.Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self, p.35.
149 M.Foucault, History o f Sexuality, Volume 3: The Care o f  the Self, p.71.
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apply to the development of their character.150 For perfectionist liberals, education 
should likewise focus on ensuring agents are able to autonomously discipline their 
character-development.
In liberal democracies, state schools are the most pertinent means by which an 
education for significant autonomy may be implemented. In fact, Foucault argued that 
the emergence of liberal govemmentality was modelled on the ‘organising routines, 
pedagogical practices, personal disciplines and interpersonal relationships’ found in 
Christian schools. Christian pedagogy focused on developing ‘the capacities required for 
individuals to comport themselves as self-reflective and self-governing persons’ - a 
process later secularised as the ‘discipline of conscience’ to secure the appropriate ‘civic 
comportment of the citizen’.151 Evidently, these ideas have clear implications for 
understanding the processes of education, but what more might Foucault tell us about an 
education for significant autonomy?
Foucault’s early work was guided by the view that the liberal state was 
concerned with little else but the scientific procedures required to create ‘good citizens’. 
He later recognised that the interaction between technologies of domination and 
technologies of the self could open up the space for citizens to posit alternative styles of 
living. As a result, the technologies of the self inculcated through an appropriate 
education could be actively utilised by liberal citizens in ways that were not constitutive 
of political obligation alone. In particular, the inculcation of the technologies of the self 
could enable the ‘truth-telling’ of agents to become a potent site for resistance to 
repressive conceptions of subjectivity and character. Indeed, Foucault argued that 
citizens ‘can and must question those who govern them, in the name of the knowledge,
150 M.Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self, pp.32-7.
151 I.Hunter, ‘Assembling the School’, in A.Barry et al eds., Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, 
neo-liberalism and rationalities o f  government, UCL Press, 1996, pp. 143-63.
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the experience they have, by virtue of being citizens, of what those who govern do, of 
the meaning of their action, of the decisions they have taken.’152 However, this would be 
a ‘transgressive’ ‘stylistics of living’ that gave individual character priority over moral 
character, especially by elevating virtues of difference over those of citizenship. Despite 
applauding Foucault’s focus on individual character, perfectionist liberals would still 
question whether the technologies of the self he associated with difference could be 
consistent with many of those associated with liberal citizenship.153 His perfectionist 
doctrine of transgression and resistance was thus based on a personal rather than a 
political ethic. This highlights that an ethical liberal education should contain a normative 
political dimension. Indeed, the ability to participate in democratic politics is especially 
important if agents in liberal societies are to develop moral character.
Perfectionist liberal policies to promote significant autonomy rest on the 
inculcation of those technologies of the self that can enable agents to develop their moral 
and individual character. Nevertheless, the liberal technologies of the self (or liberal 
virtues) inherent in each aspect of character imply different processes of promotion. In 
particular, an education for moral character will embody a more prescriptive range of 
liberal virtues than its individual counterpart because individual character implies a more 
open-ended view of the liberal virtues associated with its development. This promotion 
of the virtues of moral character and individual character is neither illiberal nor 
repressive; both aspects of character are recognisably liberal ethical ideals and neither 
need be regarded as stifling individual expression or undermining liberal values. Within a
152 Foucault describes this process as the application of the technology of parrhesia (free speech). 
M.Foucault, ‘The Aesthetics of Existence’, in L.D.Kritzman ed., Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy 
and Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, London, Routledge, 1988, pp.51-2.
153 Indeed, Foucault would not have sympathised with Richard Rorty’s contention that liberal citizens 
should have ‘a self-image in which their real or imagined citizenship in a democratic republic is 
central.’ R.Rorty, ‘Globalisation, the Politics of Identity and Social Hope’, in R.Rorty, Philosophy and 
Social Hope, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1999, p.238.
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liberal character-ethics, each aspect of character complements and completes the other. 
From a meta-theoretical perspective, viewing the promotion of liberal virtues as the 
inculcation of technologies of the self in an education for significant autonomy is an 
attractive way to understand how liberal states can enable agents to care for their own 
flourishing in diverse but valuable ways.
The promotion of a liberal character-ethics can enable agents to be significantly 
autonomous in liberal societies. Foucault’s concepts of liberal govemmentality and 
technologies of the self provide an edifying conceptual framework for reflecting on the 
relationship between liberal ethical ideals and their promotion by the state. But how can 
perfectionist liberals establish that a concern with character is a crucially important and 
legitimate liberal philosophical and political preoccupation? And, from what sources can 
virtues associated with a liberal concept of character be drawn? A genealogy of liberal 
concepts of character based on the work of some key British thinkers associated with the 
evolution of liberalism can furnish trenchant answers to these questions.
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Chapter 3: British Liberalism and the Concept of Character
Throughout the history of its evolution, liberalism has been driven by an emphasis on the 
link between politics, ethics and society. British contributors to the development of 
liberalism created a distinctive legacy highlighting the relationship between politics and 
ethics in a liberal society, in particular, they paid a great deal of attention to the role of 
moral character. These philosophers shared a concern with the relationship between 
character, politics and education, emphasising that its promotion was an important liberal 
ethical ideal. Indeed, it can be seen as the center-pin of their aspirations for a liberal 
society. A genealogy of liberal concepts of character is presented in this chapter to 
illustrate how the idea of a liberal character-ethics has a venerable liberal pedigree in 
Britain. It will also highlight continuities and gaps in relation to a contemporary liberal 
view of character, before the character-ethics at the heart of a perfectionist response to 
impartialism is explicated in Chapter Four.
I. The British Liberal Tradition
British liberalism emerged from commitment to the political institutions and moral 
principles which supported religious toleration and capitalism during the Reformation. 
This commitment was marked by many early liberal notions such as individual rights, 
consent, limited government, and popular sovereignty.154 Later, industrialisation, 
imperialism and the influence of socialist political movements generated an acceptance of 
the role of state intervention in many areas of social and economic life, including the 
moral lives of citizens. For instance, the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act 1802 
restricted the working hours of apprentices in textile mills, proscribed night work and 
required suitable accommodation and elementary education; and a whole series of
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factory acts in the nineteenth century established the commitment of the state to the well­
being of citizens.155 The origins of the British liberal tradition in the social and political 
concerns of its time therefore engendered a deep interest in notions of character and 
individual flourishing.
Historians often associate the ethical ideals of liberalism with a particular type of 
moral attitude to flourishing which accompanied the rise of capitalism. The foremost 
examination of this phenomenon was Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
o f Capitalism. For Weber, the growing success of capitalist enterprise (particularly in 
England, Holland and Scotland) was attributable to the rigours of a Puritan work ethic. 
The middle-class in Protestant countries laboured and accumulated capital, turning away 
from sensual pleasures in order to claim their reward in both this life and the next. A 
strong ethic of self-denial and restraint thus infused the practice of free trade, sustaining 
the determination of the middle-classes to establish themselves in society and to assert 
their right to practise religion how they chose.156 Accumulation of wealth, 
entrepreneurialism and economic growth were associated with a moral attitude that 
placed hard work and deferral of gratification at the heart of personal success and 
reputation. This attitude mirrored the Protestant emphasis upon the individual conscience 
and came to be identified with economic individualism and a suspicion of government 
interference in private matters, generating disdain for the unearned privileges of the 
aristocracy and leading to demands to establish the right to property.
154 A. Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies 2nd Ed., Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, p.25.
155 J. Gardiner and N.Wenbom eds., The History Today Companion to British History, London, Collins 
and Brown, 1995, pp.372-3, 301.
156 M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f  Capitalism, London, Routledge, 1991. Some critics 
of Weber (in particular R.H.Tawney) question his assertion that the economic force of capitalism could 
so comfortably rest upon the formation of a religious sensibility. R.H.Tawney, Religion and the Rise o f  
Capitalism, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984. However, as Donald G. McRae writes, ‘capitalism and the 
Reformation as major historical movements are too closely linked in time for any mere contingent play 
of events to be a probable account of what happened.’ D.G McRae, Weber, Fontana, London, 1974, p.79.
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In Britain these social, political and economic developments were mirrored in the 
emergence of liberal political ideology. The ethical foundations for capitalist expansion 
underpinned the early development of the political morality of British liberalism. Indeed, 
some commentators have argued that liberalism served only as an apologia for the 
acquisitive behaviour and self-interested character of those engaged in the relentless 
pursuit of wealth. In particular, C.B.MacPherson claimed that liberal political thought 
propagated a harmful ideology of ‘possessive individualism’ which rested on a distorted 
understanding of human nature. The perpetual selfishness of humans portrayed in British 
works on political theory such as Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan were merely abstractions 
from the daily machinations and exploitation typical of bourgeois capitalist society.157 
Such criticism of the individualism inherent in liberal ideology has been made by a wide 
range of socialists, conservatives and other opponents of free market practices and 
ideology. Nevertheless, as we shall see, these criticisms do not fully account for the 
range of ethical influences on British liberalism or how these have consistently been 
worked through, developed and revised by many liberal thinkers to answer anti-liberal 
critiques.
British liberals never advocated the superiority (or acceptability) of materialistic 
or possessive individualist conceptions of the good life, but preferred to focus on the 
intrinsic value of moral character and the virtues of good citizenship for individual (and 
social) flourishing. To view liberalism as either the ‘philosophical counterpart to laissez- 
faire economics’, or as a doctrine of impartiality, thus underestimates the moral force of 
its ethical ideals. As Richard Bellamy notes, liberal notions ‘such as the belief in progress 
and reason and the emphasis upon individual character shaped as well as reflected the 
economic and social institutions of the middle-classes; informing their attitude towards
157 C.B.MacPherson, The Political Theory o f Possessive Individualism, Oxford University Press, 1962.
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the role of the state and the management of the economy.’ Hence ‘a more accurate 
version of the liberal ideal would consist of a meritocratic society of self-reliant and 
responsible citizens, co-operating together in pursuit of individual, social, material, and 
moral improvement.’158 The first political theorist to explore many of these liberal ideals 
was John Locke.
2. John Locke: Property Rights and Self-Labour
The most important early exploration of liberal political ideas amongst British 
philosophers is found in John Locke’s Two Treatises o f Government159 Locke’s political 
philosophy was both practical and theological; his emphasis on practical understanding 
and experience reflected the conscientious prudence of the commercial middle-classes, 
and from the ideas of religious toleration and individual conscience at the heart of the 
Protestantism he developed a wider argument for property rights and the freedom and 
value of pursuing one’s temporal good. Drawing on these sources of inspiration, Locke 
explicated a perfectionist ethic of labour and self-labour based on the notion that humans 
were the ‘workmanship of God’. He also stressed that flourishing in a liberal society was 
dependent on developing a certain sort of character, a process which could be assisted by 
a proper education. This section outlines Locke’s view of labour and character, and his 
understanding of the relationship between education and character.
158 R  Bellamy, ‘Introduction’, in R.Bellamy ed., Victorian Liberalism, London, Routledge, 1990. 
‘Liberalism incorporated a variety of heterogeneous political languages and evolved piecemeal over a 
long period of social change. Intellectual sources as diverse as natural rights doctrines, Whiggism, 
classical political economy, utilitarianism, evangelical Christianity, idealism, and evolutionary biology 
all played a part in liberal ideology, modifying its understanding of, and emphasis on, the market 
mechanism and property ownership.’ p.2.
159 J.Locke, Two Treatises o f  Government, London, Dent, 1986.
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i) Character and property rights
Locke claimed that as beings subject to God’s Law of Nature (reason) humans were 
entrusted with the right to dispose of themselves rationally. Because this natural right of 
propriety over himself and his possessions is granted man by God, humans had a duty to 
respect the well-being of themselves and others.160 The moral duties of the Law of 
Nature that this entailed could be apprehended through a rational faculty possessed by all 
humans. Observance of the God-given Law of Nature implied a duty to respect the right 
to property, which also implied the rational apprehension of an agent’s own status as 
God’s property. Human agents therefore had an obligation to judge how best to use their 
property in themselves, with implied a responsibility for judging the best use of their own 
capacity for labour. In Locke, the Protestant work ethic was therefore revealed as a duty 
to rationally maximise (or perfect) our capacity for labour. But this did not mean humans 
should accumulate unlimited capital. Morally speaking, because man had a property in 
himself, his moral character was above all the most appropriate object for perfectionist 
self-labour. Agents would thus develop moral character by labouring to the best of their 
ability. Work and the accumulation of capital could contribute to the development of 
moral character, but only where it was guided by a particular type of ethic. As Locke put 
it, ‘God, when He gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man also to 
labour... to subdue the earth- i.e., improve it for the benefit of life.’161 The appropriate 
moral attitude towards labour would be realised where agents did ‘what tends to the 
preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.’162 Respect for 
property rights was an essential grounding for this moral development, suggesting that
160 ibid., p. 119. God has a property in humans, consequently, humans also have a property in 
themselves. Man ‘hath by a nature a power., to preserve his property- that is, his life, liberty, and 
estate.’ ibid, pp. 157-9.
161 ibid., p. 132.
162 ibid., p. 120.
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non-interference in the rights of others and even minimal obligations to aid those whose 
rights required support would contribute to the growth of moral character.163
Locke acknowledged that the rational capacity of humans could be turned to 
purely self-interested ends. Government was therefore necessary in order to ensure that 
the public interest would not be overridden by private interests. But despite recognising 
these concerns, Locke’s Protestant convictions caused him to view humans as rational 
enough to recognise the importance of ethics and morality. Civil society could thus be 
constituted by ‘a culture of shared religious good intentions.’164 The development of 
such shared good intentions underpinned equitable distribution of property through the 
respect and support for the rights of others to accrue the fruits of their labour. And from 
this foundation of mutual moral obligation liberals could derive a framework of negative 
rights to facilitate capital accumulation within clear limits.165
Many thinkers have attacked this aspect of Lockean liberalism. For example, 
C.B.Macpherson argued ‘Locke’s natural man is bourgeois man: his rational man is man 
with a propensity to capital accumulation.’166 These critics view Locke’s concept of 
reason as essentially an abstraction of the capacity to contract for the pursuit of 
individual advantage. On their reading, the natural rights of productive man implied a 
reciprocal respect for the right to the unlimited accumulation of wealth. However, this 
rendering of Locke’s thought does not do justice to his commitment to liberal ethical 
ideals.
163 John Chapman argues that Locke’s position on this can be interpreted in a Rawlsian vein to permit 
economic inequality only where it promotes the good of the least-advantaged. ‘Natural Rights and 
Justice in Liberalism’, in D.D.Raphael ed., Political Theory and the Rights o f  Man, Indiana University 
Press, 1967, pp.27-42.
164 John Dunn, Locke, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 20.
165 J.Locke, Two Treatises o f  Government, pp. 158-9, 164.
166 C.B Macpherson, Natural Rights in Hobbes and Locke, in D.D.Raphael ed., Political Theory and the 
Rights o f Man, p. 1.
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The critique of Lockean character as a propensity to accumulate, rather than to 
perfect the self by contributing to a shared culture of good intentions, underestimates the 
place of a Christian ethic in Locke’s thought. In Two Treatises Locke states that the 
‘same law of Nature that does by this means give us property, does also bound that 
property too.’ The earth is the object of man’s labour only insofar as work upon it is for 
‘the benefit of all.’ God has given us ‘all things richly’, but only as ‘much as any one can 
make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a 
property in. Whatever is beyond this is more than his share, and belongs to others.’167 In 
the Two Treatises o f Government Locke establishes the development of moral character 
on three grounds. First, under the guidance of the Law of Nature, individual conscience 
should rationally dictate the choices agents make. Second, the substance of how an agent 
chooses to use their labour constitutes their character. Third, human partiality grounds 
the need for government intervention to secure at least minimal conditions for the 
perfection of character. Hence, the establishment of government and a shared culture of 
good intentions within civil society would have an educative effect on the character of 
citizens, encouraging them to work for the good of themselves and others. While this 
stress on the negative rights and background culture necessary for the development of 
character is an important presupposition of a liberal conception of the good life, Locke’s 
political theory does not furnish perfectionist liberals with sufficient grounds for 
introducing policies which actively promote a liberal character-ethics. However, Locke’s 
educational philosophy highlights that he was concerned with cultivating the flourishing 
of agents in liberal society.
167 J.Locke, Two Treatises o f Government, p. 131.
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ii) Character and education
Although in Two Treatises o f Government Locke did not directly specify an ethics of 
character, it is clear that his emphasis on the virtues of work is an early precursor of 
subsequent liberal character-discourse. Indeed, a perfectionist liberal ethic of character 
may be plausibly imputed to him. As we have seen, this focused on the virtues of labour 
and the contribution made by agents to a shared culture of good intentions. In his work 
Some Thoughts on Education Locke discussed a range of substantive virtues of character 
suitable for equipping gentlemen in a liberal society to make such a contribution.168 
These reflections on education provide a further illustration of the evolution of liberal 
ethical ideals.
Locke’s educational philosophy is based on a distinct view of the malleable self 
drawn from his empiricist masterpiece An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
Here he established that the mind at birth is ‘as we say, white paper, void of all 
characters, without any ideas’, but may be furnished with the ‘materials of reason and 
knowledge’ from experience. Coupled to ‘the idea of a power in any agent to do or 
forebear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind’,169 
this implied that the character-development of agents was susceptible to deliberate 
processes of education and socialisation. And in Some Thoughts on Education, Locke 
stated that ‘of all the men we meet with, nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, 
useful or not, by their education.’ Indeed, the ‘little and almost insensible impressions on 
our tender infancies have very important and lasting consequences’. Because ‘[m]en’s 
happiness or misery is most part of their own making’, education was essential to
168 It is, of course, important to recall that for Locke women were conceived as the property of men. 
Indeed, Locke outlined an ethic of patriarchal authority in Chapter 6 of Two Treatises.
169 J.Locke, ‘An Essay Concerning Human Understanding’, in S.M.Cahn ed., Classics o f  Western 
Philosophy, 3rd ed., Indianapolis, Hackett, 1991, pp.620-1, 640-1.
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‘produce virtuous, useful, and able men in their distinct callings.’170 The precepts of 
Locke’s educational theory illustrate his commitment to a distinctive liberal theory of 
virtue and character, if not to state-led promotion of these.
For Locke, ‘the principle of all virtue and excellency lies in a power of denying 
ourselves the satisfaction of our own desires where reason does not authorize them. This 
power is to be got and improved by custom, made easy and familiar by an early 
practice’. Locke recognised that ‘repeated cautions and rules, ever so often inculcated’ 
were critical to character-formation, because as ‘years increase, liberty must come with 
them, and in a great many things he [the child] must be trusted to his own conduct’.171 
The esteem and disgrace associated with maintaining their good reputation could also 
supply an important influence on children’s character, as these were ‘of all others, the 
most powerful incentives to the mind, when once it is brought to relish them.’ Although 
Locke acknowledged that ‘the child’s natural genius and constitution... too must be 
considered in a right education’,172 education was to be primarily conducted with respect 
for the ‘skill of living well and managing as a man should do his affairs in the world’. In 
this respect, it should play a vital role in promoting ‘that virtue, ability, and learning 
which has hitherto made England considerable in the world’.173
Locke’s educational thought illustrates that he shared the perfectionist liberal 
concern with a liberal conception of the good life, valuing moral character valued above 
the accumulation of wealth. For instance, he argued that any parent who ‘procures his
170 J.Locke, ‘Some Thoughts Concerning Education’, in J.Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education 
and O f the Conduct o f the Understanding, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1996, pp. 10, 8.
171 ibid., pp.29, 15.
172 ibid., pp.36, 41. ‘God has stamped certain characters upon men’s minds, which, like their shapes, 
may perhaps be a little mended but can hardly be altered and transformed into the contrary.’ idem.
173 ibid., pp.46, 49. Virtue ‘is the solid and substantial good which tutors should not only read lectures 
and talk of, but the labour and art of education should furnish the mind with and fasten there, and never 
cease till the young man had a true relish of it and placed his strength, his glory, and his pleasure in it’, 
idem.
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child a good mind, well principled, tempered to virtue and usefulness, and adorned with 
civility and good breeding, makes a better purchase for him than if he laid out the money 
for an addition of more earth to his former acres’. Education could produce a ‘a good 
gentleman as he should be’ by promoting ‘a love and imitation of what is excellent and 
praiseworthy, and in the prosecution of it... vigour, activity, and industry’. Moreover, it 
would be essential to teach children to ‘love and be good-natured to others' , as this was 
the ‘true foundation of an honest man’.174 These proposals do not seek to inculcate 
technologies of the self associated with acquisition and accumulation rather they were 
designed to inculcate those which perfectionist liberals would associate with moral 
character, such as praiseworthiness, civility and honesty. However, these proposals were 
restricted to the schooling of middle-class children by personal tutors. They were not 
viewed by Locke as principles to be applied within a state-sponsored education.
As we have seen, Locke’s liberalism should not be regarded as an apologia for 
capitalism or as a principled stance of impartiality, but as a doctrine which reflected the 
ethical ideals associated with a liberal culture of shared good intentions. Where Locke 
sought to justify the development of character via reference to a universal Christian 
moral foundation, most subsequent liberals have attempted to develop a more secular 
understanding of the dynamics of ethics, capitalist economics and a liberal society. Of 
these thinkers, Adam Smith remains the most salient. But before examining how secular 
liberal virtues and the capitalist economy were combined in Smith’s work, we must 
consider the influential moral philosophy of David Hume.
174 ibid., pp.63, 65, 70, 105.
105
3. David Hume and Adam Smith: Sympathy and the Middle-Class Virtues
Hume problematised Western moral philosophy by proposing that humans did not 
rationally apprehend moral truths, but were naturally disposed to feel moral approval and 
disapproval of certain acts. This radically secular vision of ethics was castigated by 
natural law theorists and Christian moralists, but reflected growing bourgeois 
preoccupation with a secular concept of moral character. Such concerns were also 
evident in the work of Adam Smith. In his Theory o f Moral Sentiments Smith argued 
that although short-term acquisitive rationality and behaviour was an observable 
psychological condition, it was a perversion of the true moral principles of human nature. 
In fact, the positive moral approbation that attached to good moral character indicated 
that humans were capable of the most admirable natural sentiments. It also reminds us 
that some prominent liberals, who promoted capitalism, did not necessarily approve of its 
moral effects. Hume and Smith’s commitment to a liberal conception of the good life 
thus distinguishes them as an important touchstone for perfectionist liberals. The 
relationship between Hume’s moral theory and the concept of character found in his 
popular essays is outlined next, before it is highlighted that Smith’s moral theory raises a 
range of important questions about the structure of a perfectionist liberal doctrine in a 
capitalist society.
i) Natural and Artificial Virtues
Hume’s celebrated anti-rationalist dictum in the Treatise o f Human Nature that ‘[r]eason 
is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions’ was part of a sceptical crusade against 
all interpretations of human experience that were not based upon appearances.175 Despite 
rejecting reason as a foundation for morality, Hume remained conscious of the need to
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explain what we mean when we talk about virtuous behaviour. His empiricism led him to 
ground ethics on what was observable, arguing that the source of morality was found in 
our common everyday sympathy for, and approval of, good moral conduct and 
character. In this, he claimed that humans possessed both natural and artificial sentiments 
which entailed corresponding natural and artificial virtues. These sentiments or virtues 
were not attributable to the work of God nor were they rational principles derived from 
Natural Law. Rather a natural virtue was a general disposition which humans naturally 
possessed and were naturally disposed to approve, while an artificial virtue was a general 
disposition contrived by humans to reproduce feelings of natural approval.
Hume argued that the natural virtues were founded upon a powerful disposition 
to feel sympathy inherent in human nature. Such sympathy could elicit profound 
sentiments relating to the approval of conduct, highlighting that ‘morality is more 
properly felt than judged o f .176 He thus claimed that ‘[T]o approve of one character to 
condemn another, are only so many different perceptions.’177 It was, therefore, ‘needless 
to push our resources so far as to ask why we have humanity or fellow-feeling with 
others. It is sufficient that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature’.178 
Inevitably, sympathy and approval were first experienced in our most immediate 
relationships and concerns, because, for Hume, it was a principle of human nature that 
we are ‘naturally partial to ourselves and to our friends.’179 Natural virtues, such as 
compassion, gratitude, fidelity, generosity, friendship and liberality,180 develop 
spontaneously through the everyday interactions with our peers and neighbours. While 
sympathies between very different groups of agents within society were less likely to
175 D.Hume, A Treatise o f Human Nature, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969, p.462.
176 ibid., p.522.
177 ibid., p.508.
178 D.Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles o f Morals, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1983, p.43.
179 ibid., p.24.
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arise spontaneously, Hume believed that humans were ‘capable of learning the advantage 
resulting from a more equitable conduct’ towards those not close to them. An innate 
malleability of the sentiments could therefore underpin the inculcation of artificial virtues, 
in particular, education ‘may frequently increase or diminish, beyond their natural 
standard, the sentiments of approbation or dislike.’181
Hume claimed that the sentimental dispositions common to all humans could be 
shaped into wider artificial virtues (especially justice) through human artifice. Politicians, 
moralists and educators could therefore make it their business to help mould character in 
desirable ways by promoting those virtues necessary for agents to flourish in a liberal 
society. To do so effectively, artificial virtues should be promoted with reference to ‘the 
constitution of government, the manners, the climate, the religion, the commerce, the 
situation of each society.’182 In a liberal society, justice viewed as a proper concern both 
for one’s own interest and especially for the public interest,183 would be the cardinal 
artificial virtue promoted by institutions of government.
In addition to creating a public sense of justice, moralists and educators could 
also help promote the virtues of moral character by contributing to a particular type of 
popular moral and political discourse. The flourishing of moral discourse in eighteenth 
century Britain lent liberal-minded philosophers’ reflections greater weight than was 
previously the case. Publications such as the Spectator offered the middle-class ‘not only 
entertainment, but more importantly educative guidance in the areas of manners, morals, 
aesthetics, and general knowledge necessary for them to take their place as ‘polite’
180 D.Hume, A Treatise o f Human Nature, p.653.
181 ibid., p.653.
182 D.Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles o f Morals, pp.24-39.
183 J.L.Mackie, Hume’s Moral Theory, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, p.84.
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citizens in society.’184 Hume’s role in this secular transformation of liberal moral thought 
is most clearly demonstrated in his essay O f the Middle Station o f Life which sets out his 
vision of the moral character appropriate for the middle-class that was the mainstay of 
such a ‘liberal’ society.
For Hume, the ‘middle station of life’ afforded its members the ‘fullest security 
for virtue’, while also offering them opportunity for the most ample exercise of it’.185 
This was so because the ‘middle station of life’ was more conducive to the virtue of 
friendship (or peer equality).186 A whole range of further virtues of character such as 
wisdom and ability were also within closer reach of the middle-class. As Hume saw it, a 
man in the middle station of life, is ‘certain that he can never rise to any distinction or 
eminence in the world, without his own industry’:
Those who are placed among the lower ranks of men, have little 
opportunity of exerting any other virtue besides those of patience, resignation, 
industry, and integrity. Those who are advanced into the higher stations, have full 
employment for their generosity, humanity, affability, and charity. When a man 
lies betwixt these two extremes, he can exert the former virtues towards his 
superiors, and the latter towards the inferiors1*1
These opportunities for virtue were both contributory to the development of character 
and to the flourishing of a liberal society. Furthermore, Hume stressed that the ‘Calvinist’ 
virtues associated with wealth creation were critical to the development of a flourishing 
liberal society.188
Affluence was integral to a liberal society, because abstract principles of the 
public good were ‘too disinterested, too difficult to support’ through moral exhortation
184 Indeed, for Copley and Edgar ‘the Spectator and the periodicals that followed it represented, 
reflected, and shaped’ the values of a middle-class ideology. S.Copley and A.Edgar, ‘Introduction’, in 
D.Hume, Selected Essays, Oxford University Press, 1993, x.
185 D.Hume, ‘Of the Middle Station of Life’, in D.Hume, Selected Essays, p.6.
186 idem.
187 ibid., pp.6-7.
188 For Hume, affluence was a crucial ‘foundation of prosperity, economic progress and refinement in 
society’. D.Hume, ‘Of Commerce’, in D.Hume, Selected essays, p. 156.
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alone. To ‘govern men by other passions’ it was necessary to ‘animate them with a spirit 
of avarice and industry, art and luxury.’189 These latter reflections indicate the rigorous 
secular basis of Hume’s thought, based as it was upon sympathy and the passions. His 
recognition of the malleable self and the importance of socialisation also lend his writings 
great ethical weight and relevance for contemporary liberal notions of character. 
However, Hume’s emphasis on the middle-class virtues comes at the expense of an 
appreciation of individual character and of the sometimes harmful effects of commerce 
on character. Nevertheless, his influential secular view of character and society was 
deepened by Adam Smith, whose understanding of sympathy and the virtues further 
expanded liberal notions of moral character.
ii) Moral sensibility, character and class
Smith (like Hume) believed that the principal determinants of human actions were natural 
sentiments. Only a natural moral sense could explain the force with which humans 
invested their interpretations of each others’ conduct. ‘Natural sympathy’ was therefore 
the central influence upon the approbation and development of moral character. 
However, although every human being possessed a moral sense of ‘natural sympathy’, 
very few conducted themselves in a manner beyond moral reproach. In particular, there 
were great tensions between self-interest and the development of character. The 
interaction of self-interest and sympathy were therefore key to understanding the 
processes of socialisation by which character was formed.
Smith argued that humans were strongly predisposed towards identifying with 
their own interests. However, despite the influence of self-interest in motivating humans, 
there were ‘evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of
189 ibid., p. 162.
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others, and render their happiness necessary to them’.190 While affluence was ‘one of the 
best known methods for obtaining the attention and admiration of other men’, the same 
desire for social recognition could lead men to pursue moral goodness and a reputable 
character - to be ‘respectable and to be respected’.191 This desire for social recognition 
elicited an ‘imaginative sympathy’ with the plight of fellow-citizens which underpinned 
an agent’s ability to envisage themselves as an ‘impartial spectator’ adjudicating the 
actions of others and themselves. Consequently, while natural sympathy implied a shared 
coincidence of certain moral sentiments, such as benevolence, it was only through the 
operation of imaginative sympathy that agents could develop shared understandings 
about what constituted good moral character. The ability to be an ‘impartial spectator’ 
was the moral glue which enabled ‘members of a society, who occupy different positions 
and have conflicting interests... to evolve agreed standards of conduct. ’192
The approbations made by an ‘impartial spectator’ would inform and be informed 
by the changing moral sensibilities of society. The sympathies of such a spectator 
therefore underwent a continual process of modification as new ‘environmental inputs 
lead to alterations in the normal attitudes of spectators and agents.’193 In each agent, this 
organic self-regulation and modification was powered by the sentiment of conscience (or 
moral sensibility) that accompanied their imaginative sympathy.194 While all humans were 
naturally inclined to do what is socially approved, only the ‘man of sensibility’ (or good 
moral character) was conscientiously drawn towards doing what was morally deserving 
of approval. Virtue was ‘excellence, something uncommonly great and beautiful, which 
rises far above what is vulgar and ordinary... There is, in this respect, a considerable
190 A.Smith, Theory o f  Moral Sentiments, New York, Prometheus, 2000, p.3.
191 ibid., pp. 120-1.
192 T.D.Campbell, Adam Smith’s Science o f  Morals, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1971, p. 102-73.
193 ibid, p. 138.
194 A.Smith, Theory o f Moral Sentiments, p. 393.
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difference between virtue and mere propriety; between those qualities and actions which 
deserve to be admired and celebrated and those which simply deserve to be approved 
of.’195 This difference between virtue and propriety was not merely a conceptual one, but 
was indicative of a distinction between public and private virtues in a liberal society - a 
distinction which contemporary perfectionist liberals need to explore. It also drew 
attention to different class moralities.
Smith identified two systems of morality common to all civilised societies, ‘one 
may be called the strict or austere; the other the liberal, or, if you will, the loose system. 
The former is generally admired and revered by the common people: the latter is 
commonly more esteemed and adopted by what are called people of fashion.’196 The 
influence of these two systems of morality was in a constant state of flux in ‘civilised 
societies’. In commercial or liberal societies this tension between the strict and liberal 
moralities was especially evident. Those who did not belong to the leisured classes were 
expected to embrace both the classic economic virtues and a set of stronger stoical 
virtues if they were to gain the respect of their superiors. They should take up ‘humble 
modesty and equitable justice’ and gain approval ‘by industry, by patience, by self- 
denial’. To attain the highest distinction an agent ‘must acquire superior knowledge in his 
profession, and superior industry in the exercise of it. He must be patient in labour, 
resolute in danger, and firm in distress... probity and prudence, generosity and frankness 
must characterise his behaviour.’197 There are, however, tensions between the stoical 
virtues of hard work and fortitude, and the seemingly amoral behaviour often enjoined by 
commercial society. Vivienne Brown has argued that Smith relegated moral discourse to 
the exhortation of the working-class and the valorisation of middle-class aspiration, while
195 ibid., p.28.
196 A.Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, Oxford University Press, 1993, p.438.
197 A.Smith, Theory o f Moral Sentiments, p.77.
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simultaneously granting unrestricted freedom for those fortunate enough to be able to 
engage in commerce.198 Nevertheless, viewing Smith’s moral theory as a straightforward 
dichotomy between class moralities simplifies his argument in two important ways.
First, Smith’s notion of class difference was applied to the leisured classes, 
aristocracy or ‘people of fashion’ and those who worked for a living, whether middle or 
working class. Second, Smith was not simply an apologist for bourgeois excess. The 
moral agent in Smith’s Theory o f Moral Sentiments may not have been especially ‘well 
endowed with a civic or political personality,’199 but, for Smith, good moral character 
was clearly distinct from social approval and the pursuit of wealth. Indeed, ‘the wise and 
virtuous man is at all times willing that his own private interest should be sacrificed to 
the public interest of his own particular order or society.’ Moreover, ‘he is certainly not a 
good citizen who does not wish to promote, by every means in his power, the welfare of 
the whole society of his fellow citizens.’200 An agent’s success and affluence may well be 
attributable to strength of character. But this did not mean that they were an agent of 
good moral character. Good moral character presupposed the display of the appropriate 
self-regarding and other-regarding virtues in one’s private ‘moral’ life.201 It was by no 
means out of the question that agents should wish to identify with those of good moral 
character or be admired for their fine and virtuous actions.202 Nature had endowed 
humans ‘not only with a desire of being approved of, but with a desire of being what 
ought to be approved of.’203 Smith therefore stressed that agents could ‘by discipline,
198 V.Brown, Adam Smith’s Discourse, London, Routledge, 1994, pp.215-20.
199 ibid., p.210.
200 A.Smith, Theory o f  Moral Sentiments, pp.346, 339.
201 For instance, tolerance of the contractual nature of the operation of the free market should not to be 
extended to one’s personal relationships.
202 Although, as Smith put it, wealth and power ‘abstracted from merit and virtue’ scarcely deserve our 
respect, ‘[w]e must acknowledge, however, that they almost certainly obtain it.’ ibid., pp.85-6. As a 
result, in a commercial society the values of successful and wealthy men became (however mistakenly) 
imitated and erected as fundamental (at least as public virtues).
203 ibid., p. 170.
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education and example’ be ‘so impressed with a regard to general rules, as to act upon 
almost every occasion with tolerable decency.’204 Although Smith believed in the value of 
public education, he did not fully explore a liberal justification for this or the likely ethical 
content. Nevertheless, his distinction between those actions which secured social 
approval and those which were morally admirable provides perfectionist liberals with a 
conceptual framework for exploring the difference between social and moral virtues of 
moral character.
Smith universalised morality insofar as ‘imaginative sympathy’ and good moral 
character transcended class distinctions. But for him, the general rules and laws that 
established such an ethic would also be supplemented by the shared moral sentiments 
generated by commerce and trade, such as trust and esteem. Perfectionist liberals would 
hope that civil society did encourage these virtues, but would also be uncomfortable with 
Smith’s impartialist attitude towards capitalism. By focusing on prosperity within a 
liberal society, principles of social utility are inevitably brought into conflict with an 
ethics of character. And the development of explicit utilitarian principles was to 
characterise the early years of the next phase of British liberalism.
4. Victorian Liberalism
The stress on the practical utility of moral principles and laws in British liberal thought 
came to be associated in the nineteenth century with the moral doctrine of utilitarianism. 
Early ‘classical’ utilitarians regarded the moral worth of all individual, social and political 
actions as dependent upon their aggregated consequences for the happiness of relevant 
human beings. Although perfectionist liberals are deeply hostile to the instrumentalist 
ethics of classical utilitarians, in the hands of proponents such as James Mill and Jeremy
204 ibid., p.230.
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Bentham it had a profound effect on political discourse in early Victorian Britain. Only 
later in the nineteenth century, would utilitarianism be supplanted by a revitalised 
character-discourse amongst liberal thinkers, which sought to give full rein to liberal 
ethical ideals. These developments in Victorian liberalism are briefly outlined below
i) Benthamite Utilitarianism
Jeremy Bentham forged the principle of utility into a comprehensive doctrine by which 
the moral quality of all laws, institutions or moral actions, could be measured and 
evaluated. He defined utility as:
that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, 
according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the 
happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in 
other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action 
whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of 
every measure of government.205
Morality and legislation were reducible to one and the same science: the calculation of 
utility. Utility could be calculated by summing the pleasures and pains for each agent 
associated with a particular individual, social or political decision. Crucially, for 
Bentham, ‘every pleasure qua pleasure is good.’206 Thus, for classical utilitarians, no 
moral virtues or human excellences had an intrinsic value beyond their pleasure- 
maximising function for agents or society as a whole; a proposal which marks classical 
utilitarianism out as an extremely non-committal variant of impartialist liberal thinking.
Bentham claimed that humans were ultimately hedonists motivated only to make 
choices through considerations of their own pleasure and interest. Where Adam Smith 
still claimed the necessity for virtue and character to sustain a liberal society, Bentham
205 J.Bentham, ‘Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation’, in C.W.Everett, Jeremy
Bentham, New York, Dell Publishing Co., 1966, p. 113.
206 C.W.Everett, ‘The Education of Bentham’, in ibid., p.38.
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thought that it was ‘vain to talk of the interest of the community’ 207 As Bentham saw it, 
self-interest was ‘that principle of action... most to be depended upon whose influence is 
most powerful, most constant, most uniform, most lasting and most general among 
mankind.’208
Bentham argued that popular morality naturally upheld the principle of utility as it 
was a clear expression of the aggregation of personal pleasures and pains. As a result, he 
disclaimed the intrinsic value and appeal perfectionist liberals attach to ethical concepts 
and ideals such as character and individual flourishing. Moreover, his view of popular 
morality simplified the complex nature of mass society and the impact of liberal 
govemmentality on character-formation -  despite his recognition of the power of 
legislation. This ignorance of the philosophical and political importance of conceptions of 
the good life was not characteristic of later nineteenth century British liberalism. Indeed, 
reflections on the concept of character came to be a distinctive feature of politics and 
philosophy in Victorian Britain.
ii) Character and politics in Victorian Britain
The Victorian era in British history is as well known for its vigorous moral debate as its 
scientific discoveries and empire-building. Moral discourse infused all areas of public and 
private life, especially, in politics where the idea of ‘character’ came to play a prominent 
part in the ever-wider scope of political decision-making. Indeed, ‘character-discourse’ 
was a distinctive feature of the late-Victorian political landscape which spanned the 
entire political spectrum, being shaped by, and reflecting the growth of, a more
207 The ‘interest of the community’ was ‘the sum of the interests of the several members who compose 
it’. J.Bentham, ‘Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation’, p. 114.
208 J.Bentham, ‘Outline of Pauper Management Improved’, quoted in H.L.A.Hart, ‘Bentham’, in 
B.Parekh e d Jeremy Bentham: Critical Assessments, London, Routledge, 1993, p.48.
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interventionist liberal political ideology.209 Co-operatives, friendly societies, elementary 
schools and the like were promoted by moralists and politicians as the means by which 
liberal virtues of good moral character, like prudence and self-reliance, could be more 
widely promoted. Moreover, political participation and the expansion of democracy were 
encouraged and justified as part of a ‘gospel of self-help’ promising ‘the removal of all 
barriers to the entry of every hard-working citizen into the lifestyle of the middle- 
classes’.210 Liberal moralists and political thinkers were convinced that the future 
progress of the nation could not be guaranteed without the continual affirmation of 
virtues of self-reliance and enterprise. Both the ‘language of virtue and the language of 
character’ were thus used to propagate the ‘moral vigour of the citizens’, with the 
development of character ‘represented as an end itself.’211
Victorian character-discourse embraced a comprehensive vision of public and 
private morality. And its prescriptions were crystallised in a moral ideal of citizenship 
that made private virtues public -  something which will be considered in more depth in 
the section on T.H.Green. This blurring of the boundaries of the public and private, 
meant that each agent was ‘not primarily regarded as a member of a political community, 
but as an already private... moral agent whose mastering of his circumstances is indirectly 
a contribution to the vitality and prosperity of his society’.212 Victorian character- 
theorists claimed that citizens could only contribute to the social good if they were of 
good moral character and vice versa. Optimal moral character would be evidenced in the 
contributions made by an agent to the wider social good. Consequently, much Victorian
209 S.Collini, ‘The Idea of ‘Character’ in Victorian Political Thought’.
210 The language of character and its ‘insistence on the related virtues of thrift, self-help, and individual 
effort were directed against the paternalistic ethos of the landed aristocracy,’ but was also used to 
‘moralise the working classes.... through the spread of bourgeois habits.’ As a result, liberal character- 
discourse had a dual political objective, ‘to pre-empt the threat of revolt from below and gain an ally 
against aristocratic privilege.’ R.Bellamy, ‘Introduction’, p.7.
211 S.Collini, ‘The Idea of ‘Character’ in Victorian Political Thought’, p.42.
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character-discourse left little room for the development of individual character or diverse 
interpretations of the good life. The infamous (public) rigours of Victorian morality 
were, therefore, criticised by some liberals for stifling rather than stimulating individual 
endeavour. The first liberal thinker to fully explore the role individuality could play 
within a liberal concept of character was John Stuart Mill.
5. John Stuart Mill: Character and Individuality
John Stuart Mill attempted to fuse many different ethical ideals (including the principle of 
utility) into a comprehensive liberal doctrine. Perhaps the most original feature of his 
liberalism was his stress on the importance of individuality and moral self-development. 
Where many Victorian thinkers thought moral character should be shaped by external 
sanctions, such as law and public opinion, Mill wished to reassert the freedom of agents 
to adopt moral principles of their own.213 This emphasis on autonomy, character and 
individuality has obvious relevance for contemporary perfectionist liberalism. The 
following section describes how, for Mill, moral and cultural advancement (as well as 
prosperity) depended on moral and individual character.
i) A liberal concept of character
Mill’s liberalism was based firmly upon a distinctive conception of malleable self. 
Following the Romantics, he recognised that inherent individual characteristics and 
potentialities could play a vital role in forming the character of agents. Agents possessed 
a kind of property in themselves which could be elicited under conditions conducive to
212 ibid., pp.42-3.
213 Mill’s criticised Bentham’s utilitarianism revolved because ‘Man is never recognised by him as a 
being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as an end; of desiring for its own sake, the conformity of 
his own character to his standard of excellence, without hope of good or fear of evil from other source
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the ‘free development of individuality’. The expression of this individuality was ‘one of 
the principal ingredients of human happiness’ and ‘the chief ingredient of individual and 
social progress’.214
Individuality and moral development
Mill’s ethical thought was rooted in the notion that agents possess, and are responsible 
for, their capacity for exercising choice. Human beings were self-interpreting beings and 
as such culpable for the choices they make. When ‘arrived at the maturity’ of their 
faculties it was both the ‘privilege and proper condition’ of agents ‘to use and interpret 
experience’ in their own way. If an agent wished to develop their individuality, they 
should ‘find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable’ to their own 
‘circumstances and character’ and to then use all their faculties in choosing a mode of 
living.215
The importance Mill attributed to individuality led him to criticise the moral 
effects of mass society. Where Adam Smith had been content to note a disjuncture 
between actual social practice and moral conduct in commercial society, Mill offered a 
more radical critique of its enervating effects. For him, wealth made democratic citizens 
(particularly, in England) inert and self-satisfied. Conformity to the standards of conduct 
enjoined by a commercial society had occasioned ‘much more of the amiable and
than his own inward consciousness’. J.S.Mill, ‘Bentham’, in G.Himmelfarb ed. Essays on Politics and 
Culture, New York, Anchor, 1963, p.97.
210 J.S.Mill, ‘On Liberty’, in J.S.Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, p. 13.
215 Those who let others dictate their ‘plan of life’ needed no ‘other faculty than the ape-like one of 
imitation’, ibid., pp.64-5.
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humane’ in society, but bred ‘a moral effeminacy’ and ‘an inaptitude for every kind of 
struggle.’216
The chief moral ills of life in modem democracy were attributable to the power of 
public opinion which made agents unable to ‘brave ridicule’ and suppressed the 
expression of their individuality. This had serious moral implications. Only a ‘person 
whose desires and impulses are his own - are the expression of his own nature, as it has 
been developed and modified by his own culture - is said to have character.’217 In stark 
contrast to the homogenisation that accompanied mass commercial society, Mill asserted 
that where ‘a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, 
his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, 
but because it is his own mode.’218 This defence of individuality led Mill to argue in On 
Liberty that the ‘only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good 
in our own way’.219
Freedom to pursue individual conceptions of the good entailed freedom of 
thought and discussion, as these were ‘the source of everything respectable in man either 
as an intellectual or as a moral being’.220 Humans learned and matured through the 
experience of making mistakes. Consequently, it was only when social conditions were 
favourable to open discussion and diverse experiences that agents could develop 
character and humans could evolve as a progressive species.
216 J.S.Mill, ‘Civilisation’, in G.Himmelfaib ed., Essays on Politics and Culture, p.58. See 
J.G.A.Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and History, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 114 for an 
interesting digression upon the gendered language often used by British moralists.
217 ‘On Liberty’, p.67. For Mill, ‘It really is of importance, not only what men do, but what manner of 
men they are that do it. Among the works of man which human life is rightly employed in perfecting 
and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself.’ ibid., p.66.
218 ibid., p.75.
219 ibid., p. 17.
220 ibid., p.24.
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Although Mill recognised that actions could never be as free as opinions, he 
emphasised that ‘different experiments in living’ were essential for the development of 
individuality. Free reign ‘should be given to varieties of character’, because it was 
overwhelmingly ‘desirable’ that ‘individuality should assert itself.’221 In proportion to the 
development of their individuality and character, ‘each person becomes more valuable to 
himself, and is, therefore, capable of being more valuable to others’. Agents who choose 
not to develop their individual character, effectively relinquish the effort to improve ‘man 
himself.222 In addition, Mill’s emphasis on the significance of individuality did not lead 
him to neglect the virtues of moral character. Moral character (like individuality) was a 
peculiarly human quality which should be ‘desired disinterestedly for itself by all agents 
in liberal societies.223 However, moral feelings could develop ‘in almost any direction’.224 
Consequently, character-development could not be left to happenstance. Individuals, 
government and society should promote the ‘cultivation of the love of virtue up to the 
greatest strength possible.’225
The development o f character
The development of moral character and individuality was predicated on a power to 
choose to amend our habits and formulate new ones. The development of this power to 
choose was, for Mill, associated with a feeling of pleasure felt during its use. The 
intensity of the pleasure associated with self-mastery, would increase as our ‘sense of 
dignity’, contingent on its exercise became deepened. This utilitarian view of moral
221 ibid., p.63
222 ibid., p.66.
223 J.S.Mill, ‘Utilitarianism’, in J.S.Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, p. 169. Indeed, Mill held that 
‘the mind is not in a right state, not in a state conformable to Utility, not in the state most conducive to 
the general happiness, unless it does love virtue in this manner- as a thing desirable in itself.’ idem
224 ibid., p. 163.
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psychology makes dubious metaphysical claims about the nature of motivation and 
autonomy. Nevertheless, to finally evince a ‘confirmed character’, Mill claimed that 
agents should be able to will independently of feelings of pain or pleasure.226 The 
‘conviction that we have real power over the formation of our own character’,227 arose 
as a product of an impulse to ‘modify our own character’ in the light of the ‘experience 
of the painful consequences of the character we previously had... or by some strong 
feeling of admiration or aspiration’. Although social circumstances had an impact on an 
agent’s character, each agent was nevertheless able to exert considerable influence upon 
its development. As Mill put it, ‘character is formed by... circumstances... desire to 
mould it in a particular way, is one of those circumstances, and by no means one of the 
least influential.’228 For good moral character to develop, the will to be virtuous ‘ought 
to be cultivated’ into a ‘habitual independence’ of character.229 In contrast to 
individuality, the cultivation of moral character would therefore need to focus on 
promoting a relatively stable set of moral virtues. But how could the will to develop 
stable virtues of moral character be encouraged?
Mill believed that the human mind was governed by universal laws, but that the 
disparate nature of human experience allowed us only to make qualified generalisations 
about its operations. By drawing generalisations from sources as varied as literature, 
biology and human experience, we could deduce psychological laws, which, though 
lacking the precision of natural science, could provide the foundation for ‘Ethology’ - a
226 Thus, ‘it is said with truth that none but a person of confirmed virtue is completely free. ’ J.S.Mill, ‘A 
System of Logic’, in J.S.Mill, Collected Works vol. VIII, University of Toronto Press, Routledge Kegan 
Paul, 1974, p.841.
227 J.S.Mill, Autobiography o f John Stuart Mill, Columbia University Press, 1960, p.119.
228 J.S.Mill, ‘A System of Logic’, pp.840-1.
229 J.S.Mill, ‘Utilitarianism’, pp. 173-5. Mill asserted that ‘the trustworthiness of human assertion’ is 
‘the primary support of all present social well-being,... the insufficiency of which does more than any 
one thing that can be named to keep back civilisation, virtue, everything on which human happiness on 
the largest scale depends.’ ibid., pp. 154-5.
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‘Science of the Formation of Character’.230 The malleability of the self at the heart of the 
perfectionist liberalism explicated here was thus a critical feature of Mill’s concept of 
character-development. While he recognised that different ‘types of character’ resulted 
from different circumstances, he also stressed we were able to alter those circumstances, 
through individual or cooperative endeavour or through various political processes.231
Mill claimed that ‘the greatest portion of character’ could be explained by 
reference to ‘differences in education and in outward circumstances’. Humans were 
moulded by their surrounding environment, but were also able to refashion that 
environment in the light of self-understanding. General laws of the mind could be used to 
understand the kind of character produced ‘by any set of circumstances, physical and 
moral’. The principles of Ethology thus corresponded to ‘the art of education’ and 
included the formation of ‘national or collective character as well as individual.’ 
Although one could never know the full range of surrounding circumstances impacting 
on character development, Mill believed that ‘there may be great power of influencing 
phenomena, with a very imperfect knowledge.’ The science of ‘Ethology’ could 
therefore enable us to ‘know that certain means have a tendency to produce a given 
effect.’232
Application of the principles of ethology in policy-making would be akin to 
principles that guide the use of political technologies by liberal governments to inculcate
230 A. J. Ayer, ‘Introduction’, in J.S.Mill, The Logic o f  the Moral Sciences, Duckworth, London, 1987, 
pp. 9-11.
231 J.S.Mill, ‘A System of Logic’, p.864. The influences which shape character are not ‘solely the result 
of their present circumstances, but the joint results of those circumstances and of the characters of the 
individuals.’ ibid., p.847.
232 ibid., pp.869-71. As a ‘science of society’ Ethology was applicable to any European country where it 
could enable us to ‘understand by what causes it had, in any and every particular been made what it was; 
whether it was tending to any, and to what, changes; what effects each nature of its existing state was 
likely to produce in the future; and by what means any of those effects might be prevented, modified, or 
accelerated, or a different class of effects superinduced.’ ibid., p.878.
123
technologies of the self. Indeed, Mill believed that social and political institutions were 
the primary means for educating the people of a liberal society.
ii) Character, politics and education
Mill’s arguments for state coordination of education were perfectionist in inspiration, 
because he believed ‘men and governments must act to the best of their ability’.233 
Indeed, the moral worth of a society could be measured by the extent and competency of 
the critical attention which its citizens were able to levy upon its ‘public transactions’.234 
Despite Mill’s insistence that there should be ‘many competing experiments’ in 
education, he indicated that the state should also provide education ‘for the purpose of 
example and stimulus to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence.’235 By 
pursuing the improvement of its citizens, a liberal state would therefore become a kind of 
‘educative democracy’.236
Educative Democracy
Mill believed that liberal democracy functioned best with the ‘active participation’ of its 
citizens. Although the opportunities for such participation ‘must be adjusted to the 
capacities and qualities of such men as are available’, these capacities and qualities could
233 J.S.Mill, ‘On Liberty’, p.24.
234 J.S.Mill, ‘Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. Andrews’, in J.S.Mill, Collected Works 
vol.XXI, University of Toronto Press, Routledge Kegan Paul, 1984, p.247. ‘It depends on the habit of 
attending to and looking into public transactions, and on the degree of information and solid judgement 
respecting them that exists in the community, whether the conduct of the nation as a nation, both within 
itself and towards others, shall be selfish, corrupt, and tyrannical, or rational and enlightened, just and 
noble.’ idem.
235 J.S.Mill, ‘On Liberty’, p. 118.
236 F.W.Garforth, Educative Democracy: John Stuart Mill on education in society, Oxford University 
Press, 1980.
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and should be fostered and developed.237 Education and socialisation could therefore 
enable citizens to become of good moral character and be ‘better disposed to do what is 
required of them both for the preservation of the institutions, and for bringing them into 
such action as enables them to produce their best results.’238 Liberal political institutions 
and policies could make a real contribution to the exercise and development of character, 
especially in public life where citizens should be helped to ‘operate with the greatest 
effect on public affairs’. This elicitation of ‘superinduced’ moral and intellectual 
capacities would make people increasingly fit for self-government.239 Extending the 
duties of citizenship and encouraging more political participation would raise the 
intellectual and moral standards of the general populace, as each citizen became required 
to ‘apply at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence 
the common good.’240
Mill argued that increasing participation in government was critical because it 
was ‘only by practising popular government on a limited scale, that the people will ever 
learn how to exercise it on larger.’241 Liberal governments could also establish 
institutions to promote and facilitate liberal ethical ideals. Although individuals should 
(on the whole) be ‘free to use their own means of pursuing any object of general 
interest’, the government, ‘not trusting the object solely to their care’, should maintain, 
side by side with their arrangements, an agency of its own for a like purpose.’ The 
overarching purpose of public agencies and institutions would be educative, embracing 
cooperative principles wherever possible, because ‘association, not isolation, of interests’
237 J.S.Mill, ‘Considerations On Representative Government’, in J.S.Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, 
pp.207-8. The ‘most important point of excellence which any form of government can possess is to 
promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves.’ ibid., p.226.
238 ibid., p.271.
239 ibid., pp.229, 233-5.
240 ibid., p.255.
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was ‘the school’ in which ‘public spirit, generous sentiments, or true justice and equality’ 
could be nurtured.242 Enabling citizens ‘to work with or for one another in relations not 
involving dependence’,243 also had important implications for political equality.
States could facilitate the development of character ‘on the one hand, by 
excluding fewest from the suffrage, on the other by opening to all classes of private 
citizens... the widest participation in the details of judicial and administration business... 
and above all by the utmost publicity and liberty of discussions.’244 Habitual co-operation 
and attendance upon the common good would enable each agent to realise that it was 
partly dependent upon their participation.245 As participation and co-operation flourished 
men should therefore become increasingly willing to accept and assist the claims of 
women to equal treatment (both in public and private life). Denying equal rights to 
women was not only harmful to their ‘sense of dignity’ but injurious to the interests of 
society as a whole.246 Moreover, the importance of generating a ‘feeling of unity with all 
the rest’ justified civic identification and co-operation being ‘taught as a religion, and the 
whole force of education, of institutions, and of opinion, directed... to make every person 
grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and by the practice 
of it.’247 Such civic education should also be supplemented by wider processes of moral 
education.
241 J.S.Mill, ‘Tocqueville on Democracy in America (vol.II)’, in G.Himmelfarb, Essays on Politics and 
Culture, p. 186.
242 J.S.Mill, Principles o f Political Economy: Books IV and V, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970, pp.305, 
128. For instance, ‘combinations such as the associations of workpeople,.., are the most powerful means 
of effecting the social emancipation of the labourers through their own moral qualities’, ibid., p.267.
243 ibid., p. 128.
244 J.S.Mill, ‘Considerations on Representative Government’, p.286.
245 ibid., pp.230-1.
246 J.S.Mill, ‘The Subjection of Women’, in J.S.Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays. Mill argued that ‘All 
the selfish propensities, the self-worship, the unjust self-preference, which exist among mankind, have 
their source and root in, and derive their principal nourishment from, the present constitution of the 
relations between men and women.’ ibid., p.59.
247 J.S.Mill, ‘Utilitarianism’, p. 166.
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Moral education
Mill argued that in a liberal society moral education could be widely administered
through the exhortation of others.
Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the 
worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter. They 
should be forever stimulating each other to increased exercise of their higher 
faculties and increased direction of their feelings and aims towards wise instead 
of foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects and contemplations.248
Crucially, moral exhortation should facilitate rather than hamper the development of 
moral character and individuality. Although ‘considerations to aid his judgement’ could 
be offered to an agent, the agent remained ‘the final judge’ of their own character.249 We 
each had a right to act upon ‘our unfavourable opinion of anyone’ as a consequence of 
our right to exercise our own individuality, but ‘the inconveniences which are strictly 
inseparable from the unfavourable judgement of others are the only ones to which a 
person should ever be subjected for that portion of his conduct and character which 
concerns his own good.’250 Agents who were of bad moral character ‘must expect to be 
lowered in the opinions of others, and to have a less share of their favourable 
sentiments.’ Such inconveniences might include a duty of others to avoid (and to caution 
others to avoid) the society of morally deficient agents.251 But this would still be framed 
by the right to ‘plan our life to suit our own character’.
Despite Mill’s stress on respect for individuality, the awareness of a reciprocal 
obligation to respect and assist the development of individual character carried with it a 
strong prescriptive notion of moral character. Citizens in a free society had a duty to
248 J.S.Mill, ‘On Liberty’, p.84. Mill wrote that ‘It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to 
suppose that it is one of selfish indifference which pretends that human beings have no business with 
each other’s conduct in life, and that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well­
being of one another, unless their own interest is involved.’ idem.
249 ibid., p.84.
250 ibid., p.86.
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encourage the life-experiments of others and to undertake their own worthwhile 
‘experiments in living’ to develop character. For Mill, utilitarian calculations of the worth 
of such experiments could be made because ‘some kinds of pleasure are more desirable 
and more valuable than others.’252 Hence, he argued agents should pursue those 
pleasures and activities judged to be of a higher quality.253 Mill’s ‘thick’ perfectionism 
provides an instructive indication of how contemporary perfectionist liberals may justify 
the promotion of intrinsically valuable activities. But how were agents to know which 
pleasures would contribute to the development of their moral and individual character?
Mill believed that those ‘who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of 
appreciating and enjoying, both [the higher and lower pleasures], do give a most marked 
preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties.’254 He 
therefore claimed that these more enlightened and educated individuals in society had a 
duty to guide their fellow-citizens in both political and moral matters. Such individuals 
were ‘competent judges’ whose verdicts possessed an authority to which others should 
presently defer.255 ‘Mental cultivation’ in the form of exposure to knowledge, culture and 
politics was a means by which all agents could develop their character, and a deeper 
more satisfying level of individual happiness.256 If Mill’s liberal democracy was indeed to 
be an ‘educative democracy’, then cultural education would contribute to the flourishing 
of moral and individual character. This implied that all citizens had a right to be able to 
participate in a liberal cultural environment, whether as ‘competent judges’, as agents
251 Although this may be offset, if ‘despite his demerits towards himself an agent possesses a ‘special 
excellence in his social relations.’ idem.
252 J.S.Mill, ‘Utilitarianism’, p. 138.
253 idem.
254 ibid., p. 139.
255 ibid., p. 141.
256 ibid., pp. 144-5.
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committed to projects of individuality or as public-spirited members of society more 
generally.
Despite the appeal of Mill’s ethical doctrine, ‘experiments in living’ need not be 
viewed as a process of eliciting determinate individual potentials. Nor need individuality 
be regarded as ultimately justified on the grounds of its utility for society or the human 
race. Moreover, intrinsically valuable activities do not need to be characterised in terms 
of the pleasure they bring, significant though this might be. Mill’s comprehensive picture 
of the liberal good life stressed the value of individuality more than most British liberals 
of the late Victorian period, but did so at the expense of a fuller realisation of its cultural 
and ideological basis. Both moral and individual character are dependent on their being 
conceptualised as liberal ethical ideals within a particular sort of ethics. The British 
Idealists sought to give a liberal conception of the good life much stronger social 
foundations. Paramount amongst these thinkers was Thomas Hill Green.
6. T.H.Green: The Ethical Ideal of Citizenship
T.H.Green’s community-orientated political philosophy sought to link rationality, 
character and citizenship. He believed that the development of good moral character was 
the revelation of the immanence of the divine within each agent. Consequently, his moral 
philosophy was ‘based on the contrast between the possible self and the actual self.’257 
The possible self was a liberal self in that every agent possessed a capacity for 
autonomously realising Christian principles in their moral character, especially within 
their conduct as a public-spirited citizen. Citizenship as an ethical ideal thus became the 
cornerstone of Green’s perfectionist liberalism.
257 A. Vincent and R.Plant, Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship, Oxford, Blackwell, 1984, p.l.
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i) An Idealist conception of character
Green argued that humans were distinguished from animals by their grasp of a ‘world of 
practice’, which could only be a product of their God-given nature as rational self- 
conscious subjects. Human ‘consciousness’ yielded ‘in its most elementary form, the 
conception of something that should be as distinct from that which is, of a world of 
practice as distinct from that world of experience.’258 The capacity for conceiving of 
‘what should-be’ provided the foundation for the development of moral character.
Green indicated that it was only possible to understand agency via reference to 
the strength of will determining choices.259 The virtues of character were therefore a 
logical adjunct of their being grounded in the free will attributable to human beings. 
Furthermore, the capacity for reflecting upon the past and conceiving some future good, 
or improvement, could only be found in humans’ sense of self. And the self was ‘not 
something apart from, feelings, desires and thought, but that which unites them, or which 
they become as united, in the character of an agent who is an object to himself.260 Green 
(like Mill) recognised that circumstances influenced the development of character, also 
emphasising the role agents played in forming their own character.261 Although an 
agent’s circumstances might condition ‘the kind of good which at any point in his life the 
person presents to himself as greatest’, their capacity for reason enabled them to choose 
how to mould their character. The formation of character was therefore dependent on
258 T.H.Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, New York, Thomas Y.Cromwell, 1969, pp.91-2.
259 ibid., pp. 104-5.
260 idem.
261 Circumstances were ‘not like forces converging on an inert body which does not itself modify the 
direction of the resulting motion. ’ ibid., p. 101. Green identified four types of ‘affective circumstances’; 
(i) Natural sensations and wants; (ii) State of health; (iii) The outward manner of life; (iv) Social 
expectations, idem.
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‘the growth of some habit of will’, which was in turn reliant on the process of self­
objectification underpinning the notion of a possible self262
‘[S]elf-objectifying consciousness’ was the work of a God-given rational faculty 
which all humans possessed. Reason was therefore the ‘foundation of morality’ because 
it constituted ‘the capability in man of seeking an absolute good and conceiving of this 
good as common to others with himself. Indeed, this capability alone ‘rendered him a 
possible author and a self-submitting subject of law.’263 The capacity for reason 
underpinned an agent’s ability to autonomously conceive of a possible self, and their 
ability to autonomously drive their dispositions towards realising that ideal self in the 
development of their moral character. And Green believed agents would develop their 
ideal self by striving to reveal Christian principles within society (particularly through 
active civic participation).
Green argued that moral character was dependent on freely acknowledging and 
acting upon the demands of social responsibility generated by Christian morality and 
rational thought, especially the duties of citizenship. This did not entail unthinking 
adherence to existing laws and prevailing social mores, but that an agent of good moral 
character would conscientiously apply Christian principles (or the dictates of practical 
reason) to social interaction and moral and political dilemmas. Agents could also help 
others to realise their moral character, because their capacity for reason enabled them to 
step outside existing social practices and be critical of the level of rationality (or moral 
rectitude) implicit within those practices. Green described this capacity as ‘the 
consciousness of a possibility of perfection’.264 The type of perfection he thought 
common to all agents was the potential for realising the rational (the moral and the
262 ibid., pp. 104-5.
263 ibid., p.214.
264 T.H. Green, The Principles O f Political Obligation, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1921, p.20.
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intellectual) within social relationships. Moral character would thus develop best where 
an agent’s choices became more amenable to the social good as laid down by dictates of 
practical reason. This ‘increasing concreteness in the idea of human perfection’ had 
evolved in modern society to incorporate ‘a complex organisation of life, with laws and 
institutions, with relationships, courtesies, and charities, with arts and graces through 
which the perfection is to be attained.’265 And Green believed that this reflected ‘both the 
idea of a possible perfection of man, the idea of which reason is the faculty, and the 
impulse after self-satisfaction which belongs to the will’.266 Perfection of character would 
therefore ultimately be judged in terms of an agent’s contribution to the social good. But 
it could not be taken for granted that agents would internalise rational moral conduct. 
Political institutions should therefore ‘represent an idea of common good which each 
member of the society can make his own so far as he is rational.’267
ii) Public institutions and morality
Green argued that all public institutions should foster character-development by requiring 
that citizens act ‘as a member of a social organisation in which each contributes to the 
better-being of all the rest’.268 This was critical to the development of moral character, 
because ‘no development of morality can be conceived, nor can any history of it be 
traced (for that would imply such a conception), which does not presuppose some idea 
of a common good, expressing itself in some elementary effort after a regulation of life.’ 
To ensure that citizens would contribute to the common good public institutions should 
express a ‘consciousness on the part of those subject to the institutions.’ Not only were 
these institutions ‘the form and body of reason, as practical in men’, but Green suggested
265 idem.
266 ibid., p.23.
267 ibid., p. 126.
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that ‘without them the rational or self-conscious moral man does not exist.’269 The power 
of public institutions was constitutive of the self and identity of citizens. Such institutions 
ranged from overarching complexes such as the state to simple social conventions or 
codes. The relationship between state intervention and self-realisation therefore had 
major implications for the development of autonomy and character.
Green stated that the importance of moralising citizens established that even ‘the 
most primitive institutions for the regulation of a society with reference to a common 
good are already a school for the character which shall be responsive to the moral 
ideal.’270 Hence the rule of law played a fundamental role in contributing to the shape of 
the society within which citizens made moral choices. Indeed, citizens could only learn to 
autonomously choose objects contributory to the common good when first ‘in the 
presence of a requirement... enforced against his inclinations’.271 Political technologies of 
domination were necessary to promote good citizenship. Nevertheless, moralistic 
legislation which constrained spontaneous moral behaviour undermined the autonomous 
development of character.272 State intervention in society should therefore be approved 
only for appropriate moral reasons. If the state ‘does not interfere with morality, it is for 
the sake of morality that it refrains: if it does interfere with external acts, it is also for the 
sake of morality that it intervenes. It is a moral being, animated by a moral purpose.’273 
In particular, the state should not constrict ‘the region within which the spontaneity and
268 ibid., pp.32-3.
269 T.H.Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p.216.
270 ibid., p.217.
271 idem.
272 Green gave three examples of how this can occur: (a) legal requirements of religious observation and 
profession of belief, which have tended to vitiate the religious source of morality; (b) by prohibitions and 
restraints unnecessary for maintaining the social conditions of the moral life, and which interfere with 
the growth of self-reliance, with the formation of a manly conscience and sense of moral dignity- in 
short, with the moral autonomy which is the condition of the highest goodness; (c) by legal institutions 
which take away the occasion for the exercise of certain moral virtues (e.g. the Poor-law which takes 
away the occasion for the exercise of parental forethought, filial reverence, and neighbourly kindness. 
T.H. Green, The Principles o f Political Obligation, p. 3 9.
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disinterestedness of true morality can have play’, but should maintain the ‘conditions of
life’ in which the autonomous development of character (self-realisation) was made
possible. Such conditions should enable each agent to display ‘an effectual self-devotion
to the work of developing the perfect character in himself and others’.274 However, in
Victorian Britain, capitalism had undermined the opportunities for all citizens to develop
their character by making such contributions to the social good.
Unrestricted commerce had a debilitating effect on the efforts of many citizens to
develop their moral character. Citizens arbitrarily suffering deprivation and poverty,
experienced an injury to their moral well-being hampering the free development and
realisation of their moral character. It was thus the business of the state to ensure that
conditions for free development of character were secured because ‘[ejvery injury to the
health of the individual is, so far as it goes, a public injury’.275 There was a ‘real
community of meaning between ‘freedom’ as the condition of citizenship in a civilised
state, and ‘freedom’ as the condition of a man who is inwardly ‘master’ of himself.’276
Freedom was therefore not simply freedom from external constraints, as this would not
destroy ‘the feeling of oppression which always goes along with the consciousness of
unfulfilled possibilities.’277 Freedom ‘rightly understood’ was:
a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something 
worth doing or enjoying, and that, too, something that, we do or enjoy 
in common with others.278
The right to be able to be significantly autonomous was thus a critical feature of Green’s 
political philosophy. Indeed, he stressed that it was not enough that agents should be free
273 ibid., p.6.
274 ibid., pp.39-41.
275 T.H. Green, Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract, in C.M.Sherover ed., the Development o f  
the Democratic Idea, New York, Mentor, 1974, p.430.
276 T.H. Green, The Principles o f  Political Obligation, pp. 16-7.
277 A feeling induced by severely limited opportunities or by severely limiting habits- most especially for 
Green the ‘bondage to liquor’, ibid., p. 18.
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from arbitrary interference in making choices they must also demonstrate their moral 
character by making worthwhile public choices.279 This reflects the quasi-Foucauldian 
interpretation of liberal govemmentality. Political institutions should promote the 
realisation of moral character in public life because ‘the realisation of freedom in the state 
can only mean the attainment of freedom by individuals through influences which the 
state... supplies.’280 For Green, the state’s responsibility for the character of its citizens 
would primarily be discharged in the system of rights which it supported.
Promoting character and good citizenship
The ‘right to free life’ in a liberal society was ‘secured to an individual by the community 
on the supposition that its exercise contributes to the good of the community’.281 In 
order to promote worthwhile public choices, the state would therefore have to remove 
obstacles to their realisation. The moral end of the state was ‘the emancipation of the 
individual from all restriction upon the free moral life, and his provision with means for 
it.’282 Citizens should be provided with opportunities and minimal means to be able to 
display the virtues of moral character. For instance, education could enable citizens to 
reflect upon their own potential to contribute to the social good. The right to be able to 
develop one’s own character also necessitated constraints upon business practice, with 
the right to property only justified because it provided an ‘education of the sense of
278 T.H.Green, ‘Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract’, p.427.
279 In ascertaining the moral growth of a society we measure ‘its growth in freedom, we measure it by 
the increasing development and exercise on the whole of those powers of contributing to the social good 
with which we believe the members of the society to be endowed; in short, by the greater power on the 
part of the citizens as a body to make the most and best of themselves.’ ‘Liberal Legislation and 
Freedom of Contract’, p.428
280 T.H. Green, The Principles o f Political Obligation, p. 8.
281 ibid., p.207.
282 ibid., p.219.
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responsibility which depends on the possibility of permanent ownership.’283 Indeed, each 
citizen should become able to reflect upon the idea of the common good and, in so 
doing, come ‘to be more aware of what he has it in him to do and to become.’284 Hence, 
if a society was to promote its own good it must encourage ‘a settled disposition on each 
man’s part to make the most or best of humanity in his own person and in the person of 
others’.285 It was also important that citizens were moralised through direct political 
participation, though given the size and complexity of modem states this would begin 
with involvement in (at the very least) communal or municipal affairs.286
Politics and morality were dependent not upon agreement and consent but upon 
identification with, and contribution to, a common good. ‘Morality and political 
subjection thus have a common source... the rational recognition by certain human 
beings... of a common well-being which is their well-being, and which they conceive of 
as their well-being.’287 For Green, the urge to be a good citizen through contributing to 
the common good could be ‘quickened by a feeling of which the ‘patria’ the fatherland, 
the seat of one’s home, is the natural object.’288 Indeed, national passion and public 
spiritedness was the unifying force underlying a flourishing liberal society. Political 
participation would encourage concern for the moral well-being of one’s fellow citizens. 
Nevertheless, ethics and morality were ultimately a matter for principled commitment to 
certain ideals. So, for Green, judgements on the moral worth of character rested on the
283 Marriage was also a character-building experience in this respect as individuals (men) would 
subordinate their own interests to those of their family thereby deepening their sense of social 
responsibility, ibid., pp.230-41. Nevertheless, for Green, women did not have equal rights in this 
regard, they were objects of a man’s interest who though possessed of a right to divorce remain confined 
to the private sphere - a notion which is clearly not compatible with a contemporary understanding of 
the right to be able to be significantly autonomous.
284 T.H.Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p.259.
285 ibid., p.262.
286 T.H. Green, The Principles o f Political Obligation, p. 127.
287 ibid., p. 124.
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extent to which agents manifested a disinterested Christian love of humanity in their 
social interaction.
Green’s ethical ideal of citizenship provides a thorough introduction to the 
importance of the political virtues in the evolution of a perfectionist liberal concept of 
character. However, the liberal character-ethics developed in this thesis does not so 
dissolve the boundaries between public and private choices. Agents have moral duties 
towards themselves that will affect their public lives and duties towards others that will 
affect their private lives, but the development of character need not have such an 
overwhelmingly strong public ethos. Green’s Idealist metaphysics means that this 
monistic view of the good life is unable to accommodate diversity in the configuration of 
character. Moreover, the promotion of a liberal character-ethics through processes of 
liberal govemmentality need not be so tightly circumscribed by the state. There are 
numerous organisations within civil society which can contribute to a flourishing liberal 
culture. Neither does Green fully appreciate the value of individual character within a 
liberal conception of the good life.
Our genealogy of character has shown that contemporary perfectionist liberals 
need to revise, adapt and enhance the concept in line with their concerns with diversity, 
individual character and non-metaphysical justification for promoting a liberal conception 
of the good life. Nonetheless, they can draw on a rich vein of ideas in order to develop 
the ethical content of a contemporary concept of character. Locke’s view of self-labour, 
Hume and Smith’s notions of sympathy and sensibility, Mill’s celebration of individuality 
and Green’s estimation of good citizenship, and their respective recognition of the 
importance of education, all chime with perfectionist liberal ethical ideals. The precise 
structure of the liberal character-ethics which provides the normative content for the 
perfectionist liberal doctrine explicated in this thesis is presented in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4: Autonomy and a Liberal Character-Ethics
A liberal character-ethics can provide the substantive content for a perfectionist liberal 
doctrine based on the right to be able to be significantly autonomous. As was indicated in 
Chapter Two, the character-ethics which perfectionist liberals should endorse is one 
based on a dual concept of character. It will therefore comprise an ethics of moral 
character and an ethics of individual character. These two aspects of a liberal character- 
ethics can provide prescriptions for policies to promote different virtues perfectionist 
liberals would wish to associate with living well. From a meta-theoretical perspective, the 
promotion of these virtues by the liberal state can be understood in quasi-Foucauldian 
terms as the inculcation of the technologies of the self inherent being significantly 
autonomous. This chapter reflects first on the conceptual relationship between individual 
flourishing and technologies of the self associated with significant autonomy, before 
describing and analysing an ethics of moral character and an ethics of individual 
character. It then discusses the achievement of good character and explores principles 
which can guide perfectionist liberal policy-making, relating them to some applications of 
a character-ethics within liberal society.
I. The Priority of Autonomy
Significant autonomy is viewed here as the ‘ultimate value’ of liberalism. As we have 
seen, it is a concept which receives close attention within perfectionist liberal thought, 
informing debates surrounding pluralism and the limits of state intervention within the 
moral lives of citizens. This section examines the special value of autonomy highlighting 
the nature of the technologies of the self which the liberal state can inculcate to enable 
citizens to become significantly autonomous. It then assesses the place promoting
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significant autonomy has within the doctrine explicated here, discussing the right to be 
able to be significantly autonomous and its implications.
i) Significant autonomy
The most culturally coherent, relevant and comprehensible liberal conception of 
autonomy is one which acknowledges it to be a ‘matter of degree’. In particular, 
perfectionist liberals would wish to stress that significant autonomy implies that agents as 
‘part creators of their own moral world have a commitment to projects, relationships and 
causes which affects the kind of life that is worth living’.289 Defining autonomy in terms 
of its significance implies more than considering it to be simply a capacity as many liberal 
philosophers commonly do.290 Nor is the meaning of significant autonomy captured by 
Kant’s classic formulation of the concept of autonomy as the capacity for applying rule’s 
to one’s conduct to which other could rationally assent.291 Significant autonomy is a 
distinctive mode of conduct which agents in liberal societies display by living well, that 
is, by creating moral and individual value(s) for themselves and for the wider good. 
Perfectionist liberals have striven to illustrate that significant autonomy presupposes a 
deep commitment to the promotion of individual flourishing.292 It is argued here that 
agents in liberal societies become significantly autonomous by adhering to a liberal 
character-ethics. In quasi-Foucauldian terms, this means that agents in liberal societies 
apply particular types of technology of the self when developing their moral and 
individual character. These contentions are now explained in greater detail.
289 J.Raz, The Morality o f Freedom, p. 154.
290 e.g. J.Rawls, A Theory o f Justice’, R.Dworkin, Liberalism.
291 I.Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics o f  Morals, Hackett, Indianopolis, 1992.
292 J.Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom', R. Young, Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive 
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Flourishing in a liberal society
Liberal commitment to individual flourishing can only be fully cashed out where 
significant autonomy is valued and protected. Although it is possible to understand 
individual flourishing in ways that are not consistent with a moral commitment to 
autonomy, in a liberal society each is presumed by the other.293 Commitment to 
significant autonomy is implied by respect for individual freedom, whether, indirectly, by 
permitting freedom of belief or speech, or directly, by encouraging agents to become 
more self-reliant in economic, political or moral matters. As was noted in the 
introduction, many contemporary liberals interpret respect for an agents’ capacity to 
form and revise their own conceptions of the good life as a commitment to autonomy. 
By contrast, perfectionist liberals believe that a commitment to individual flourishing 
entails the support and promotion of the ethical content associated with significant 
autonomy within a liberal society; ‘simply being autarchic... is not enough for autonomy’ 
or for individual flourishing.294
To live well, agents in liberal societies should be able to develop a certain type of 
character that enables them to become significantly autonomous. This means that they 
should evince a range of virtues associated with that ideal of character. The importance 
of character-development to individual flourishing also presupposes that a wide range of 
valuable practices and activities exist in which agents can pursue diverse conceptions of 
the good life. A perfectionist liberal commitment to individual flourishing therefore 
presumes (a) that agents should be able to display a range of virtues associated with 
significant autonomy and (b) that a range of social practices are supported to facilitate
293 A religious faith may claim that the flourishing of individual believers is dependent on the 
subordination of each individual to God’s (or the priesthood’s) will. Or, some types of utilitarian might 
argue that individual happiness and flourishing can be legitimately maximised by authoritarian 
autonomy-denying policies.
294 P.Digeser, Our Politics, Our Selves?: Liberalism, Identity and Harm, p. 175.
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and contribute to the development of these virtues. Support for both these conditions 
could be prevalent throughout a liberal society, but would ultimately be guaranteed by 
the liberal state. Before reflecting further on how the state promotion of significant 
autonomy is decontested within the perfectionist liberal doctrine explicated here, it is 
important to first outline how virtues of character inherent in significant autonomy can be 
viewed from a meta-theoretical perspective.
Autonomy and technologies o f the self
At a meta-theoretical level, the shape and substance given to significant autonomy in 
liberal societies is determined by the application of certain technologies of self which 
underpin the development of an agent’s character. The principal theoretical 
presupposition associated with applying those technologies of the self that can enable 
agents to live well is self-discipline. An agent’s decisions and choices cannot influence 
the significance of their autonomy if they are not self-disciplined. Self-discipline when 
becoming significantly autonomous has three features: (i) disciplined thought i.e. that an 
agent can apply sufficient self-discipline to their reasoning to call it their own; (ii) 
disciplined action i.e. that an agent can discipline their dispositions and traits to become 
significantly autonomous; and (iii) disciplined living i.e. that an agent can apply sufficient 
self-discipline to their character to be significantly autonomous, living well through a 
whole lifetime, revising and adapting their choices when necessary.
Evidently, different levels of self-discipline will be required to accomplish 
different goals and negotiate different conflicts within an agent’s life. However, agents 
are unlikely to flourish if they cannot apply some degree of self-discipline to the 
development of their character. The degree of self-discipline required for the
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development of character will presume a high degree of self-understanding. Indeed, self- 
understanding has a particularly important relationship with autonomy.
Disciplined thought, action and living all require self-awareness. For an agent to 
apply discipline to their thought, activity or living they need to know their own 
limitations and in which configurations their dispositions and traits may be combined. 
Autonomy without self-understanding would be incoherent, because agents would not be 
able to comprehend or make comprehensible why they choose to do one thing rather 
than another. Self-understanding therefore makes a vital contribution to the individual 
interpretation and evaluation of autonomy. It presupposes an ability to discipline one’s 
expectations about oneself and in a liberal society this can be accomplished best by 
adopting the vocabulary of character.
The value which a perfectionist liberal doctrine should attach to individual 
flourishing therefore goes right the way down. Self-understanding underpins the 
development of character, because an agent of good character should be able to 
conceptualise the quality of their autonomy. In turn, the impact of self-understanding is 
underpinned by self-discipline. In a liberal society, the importance of being able to apply 
these technologies of the self in order to become significantly autonomous and thereby 
flourish then grounds a requirement for some responsible agent to promote that ability.
ii) Promoting significant autonomy
Agents will not flourish in a liberal society if they cannot become significantly 
autonomous relative to their own traits and dispositions. This is effectively a process of 
developing their character. They therefore have at least a minimal obligation to become 
significantly autonomous, because for them to neglect to do so would be a failing of 
character and an indication that they were not living well. Furthermore, the importance
142
of significant autonomy in a liberal society generates an imperfect obligation for agents 
to promote the autonomy of their fellow citizens and contribute to the maintenance of 
those practices and activities in which it can become increasingly significant. In liberal 
democracies, the state is the only institution which can secure the legitimacy necessary to 
give full value to this obligation. In this respect, liberal citizens can be said to have a right 
to be able to be significantly autonomous. The right to be able to be significantly 
autonomous and the duty to promote autonomy are explored below.
A right to be able to be significantly autonomous
Liberal rights can be conceptualised as either positive or negative rights. Negative rights 
are those associated with the concept of negative freedom, such as the rights to life, 
liberty and property. Positive rights are those associated with the concept of positive 
freedom, such as the rights to welfare and education. The individual right to be able to be 
significantly autonomous is related to both negative and positive liberal rights. Negative 
rights (such as the rights to freedom of person, movement, thought, speech and 
association) are a necessary component of a right to significant autonomy. These rights 
could be justified without reference to autonomy, insofar as a society of agents who 
respected each other rights but were not autonomous was conceivable. Nevertheless, we 
saw earlier that significant autonomy implied more than simply being left alone.295 
Although a framework of negative rights is necessary for autonomy to be respected, it is 
not sufficient to uphold a right to be able to be significantly autonomous. A liberal right 
to be able to be significantly autonomous can thus be viewed as a positive cultural right 
to a particular kind of flourishing within a liberal society.
295 Also see R.Dagger, Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship and Republican Liberalism, Oxford University 
Press, 1996, p. 30.
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Agents in liberal societies have a right to significant autonomy, because living 
well autonomously is so crucial to their flourishing in those societies as that is what a 
liberal society is deemed to be for. This entails both the negative right to freedom from 
interference and the positive right to be equipped with the opportunities and abilities 
which enable them to become significantly autonomous. The first aspect of the right to 
be able to be significantly autonomous entails that citizens have a perfect obligation to 
observe minimum requirements of good citizenship that pertain to being autonomous. 
These conditions oblige each citizen to refrain from interfering with others’ and to avoid 
damaging their capacity to be able to be significantly autonomous, for example, by 
systematically excluding or alienating certain groups from participation in political 
decision-making. The second aspect of the right to significant autonomy generates 
imperfect obligations on the part of each agent to positively promote the ability to be 
significantly autonomous among their fellows. These obligations are imperfect because 
liberal citizens could not be individually held responsible for fulfilling the obligation to 
promote significant autonomy. For instance, they would not be able to individually 
deliver the education which the right to be able to be significantly autonomous demands. 
Nor would they be likely to guarantee the high degree of egalitarian redistribution that it 
may require. But agents in liberal societies are in a position to help promote the virtues 
inherent in significant autonomy by encouraging each other to display configurations of 
character that are coherent, relevant and comprehensible interpretations of perfectionist 
liberal ethical ideals. This would not imply a duty of active interference where an agent’s 
character is called into question. Beyond the registering of approval and disapproval we 
must look to the wider institutions of civil society and to the liberal democratic state to 
establish the framework conditions and capacity-building inherent in significant 
autonomy.
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A duty to promote autonomy
The full practical import of an obligation to promote significant autonomy can only be 
adequately accomplished via appropriate institutional means on behalf of liberal citizens. 
No one citizen can hope to promote significant autonomy by good works. Individual 
citizens could never expect to develop each other’s significant autonomy without some 
framework of socially or institutionally legitimised support. Indeed, an autonomy- 
supporting environment would flourish best with some form of institutional support and 
approval.296
In contemporary liberal democracies, the state and civil society generally shoulder 
the responsibility for the promotion of appropriate virtues amongst citizens. This is 
accomplished by the state through education and the rule of law and other specific 
practices and policies which pertain to the development of character (such as the 
regulation of professional standards of conduct). Civil society also has an important role 
to play in facilitating the obligation to promote the autonomy of one’s fellows, albeit an 
imperfect one. Institutions, associations and organisations that are not subject to direct 
democratic control have a duty to uphold an environment which is conducive to 
significant autonomy. They should therefore be committed to facilitating the promotion 
of appropriate liberal virtues in their internal and external interactions and relationships, 
and in their overall strategic orientation. This is not a perfect obligation in each and every 
case because these associations are privately-owned concerns and to an extent analogous 
to private citizens with corresponding imperfect duties for the wider promotion of 
significant autonomy. But associations in civil society may rightly be criticised and 
pressurised where their actions meet only minimal criteria for the respect for significant
296 J.Raz, The Morality o f Freedom.
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autonomy or do not meet them at all, and they may even be legitimately coerced in those 
circumstances where they do not meet those criteria.
The chief public agency by which associations can legitimately be held 
accountable to citizens for their contribution to significant autonomy is, of course, the 
liberal democratic state; and the state is best placed to influence the development of 
significant autonomy and to enhance the ability of all citizens to live well for two 
reasons. First, it has a pragmatic obligation to promote significant autonomy because it is 
the only institution capable of doing so to an appropriate degree throughout and across a 
liberal society. Second, it has a perfect obligation to do this because for perfectionist 
liberals its legitimacy in a liberal society is ultimately dependent on it governing in such a 
way as to secure individual flourishing.297 If democratic states are to fulfil this 
responsibility then perfectionist liberals must explore how best to promote the ethical 
content associated with significant autonomy. The doctrine presented here describes the 
promotion of the virtues inherent in significant autonomy by adopting the language of 
character.
Autonomy and a liberal character-ethics
Autonomy should be promoted within liberal democracies because agents have an 
overwhelming moral interest in becoming significantly autonomous. This implies that 
autonomy must be made meaningfully significant to each and every citizen by providing 
them with the opportunity to develop their ability to become significantly autonomous. In 
this respect, the state is the key institution which can legitimately guarantee and promote 
significant autonomy throughout liberal society. For it to do so in an appropriately 
appealing liberal manner, it should promote virtues which are associated with the
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development of character. As we have seen, at a meta-theoretical level, the promotion of 
these virtues can be illuminatingly conceived in quasi-Foucauldian terms as the 
inculcation of the liberal technologies of the self inherent in living well. The explication 
of an appealing liberal ethical doctrine should therefore give careful consideration to 
delineating liberal technologies of the self (or liberal virtues) that reflect perfectionist 
liberal aspirations for significant autonomy.
A liberal character-ethics can best frame a perfectionist conception of state 
intervention in the moral lives of citizens because, as we saw in the last chapter, it has a 
strong liberal pedigree which is tied to the importance of individual flourishing. Such an 
ethics would play the central role in indicating the type of content inherent in living well. 
In particular, promotion of a liberal character-ethics can help steer significant autonomy 
towards specific liberal ethical ideals (such as moral and individual character).
Significant autonomy implies that agents can live well or less well. An agent is 
significantly autonomous when they develop different worthwhile character- 
configurations within different valuable activities (or within those which could come to 
be regarded as valuable). The promotion of the right to be able to be significantly 
autonomous should therefore reflect this qualitative aspect of autonomy in a liberal 
society. The following two sections detail the nature of a liberal character-ethics which 
can guide the promotion of significant autonomy.
2. The Ethics of Moral Character
A liberal character-ethics will reflect perfectionist liberal aspirations for the development 
of both moral and individual character. It will unite these two aspects in one doctrine, but 
highlight that they both generate specific ethical requirements. The nature of a liberal
297 idem.
147
ethics of moral character is considered first here as the development of moral character 
precedes that of individual character. Such an ethics of moral character will focus on the 
moral dispositions inherent in significant autonomy, embracing the need for agents in 
liberal societies to develop these to live well. This section considers the philosophical 
presuppositions and the content of a liberal ethics of moral character.
i) Autonomy and the ethics of moral character
A liberal ethics of moral character has a reciprocal relationship with significant 
autonomy. An ethic of moral character partly constitutes significant autonomy, while the 
interpretation and application of an ethics of moral character implies significant 
autonomy. As we saw in Chapter Two, the virtues of a liberal ethics of moral character 
should be interpreted autonomously because autonomy is a necessary though not 
sufficient condition of having character. It indicates that our moral conduct should be our 
own. An agent could not be said to be of good moral character or be autonomous if their 
conduct and character has been governed by the will of another. The idea of moral 
responsibility is premised on the concept of autonomy. The liberal concept of moral 
character implies that an agent’s moral character is constituted by their own input into 
their decisions and activities. But in what ways can agents become able to apply an ethics 
of moral character to their autonomous choices? And, how should they seek to apply the 
ethics?
Moral character and self-discipline
The promotion of liberal virtues can directly contribute to the development of agents’ 
moral character. Nevertheless, this does not imply that liberal should compel, coerce or 
order agents to develop their moral character, because to do so would preclude the
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possibility of autonomy. Rather the promotion of liberal virtues (through processes of 
liberal govemmentality such as education) equips agents to become significantly 
autonomous. The constitutive nature of these virtues does not detract from the fact that 
they are liberal virtues which have to be autonomously adopted and applied by agents. 
They are virtues which agents manifest in their own specific ways when they live well. 
This process is central to the development of moral character, because character- 
development presupposes the autonomous disciplining of an agent’s moral conduct. 
Agents with unruly lives could not develop moral character without displaying the sort of 
disciplined commitment to valuable dispositions which could throw their disorderly life 
into a different light. How, then, might we expect agents to discipline the development of 
moral character?
Disciplined thought is a feature of good moral character for a variety of reasons. 
First, we would find it hard to envisage an agent who did not regularly have cause to 
reflect on what they should do. The interpretation of situations of moral difficulty to 
themselves is necessary if agents are to decide on appropriate conduct. Second, 
disciplined thought also enables agents to reflect on how their conduct and choices will 
in turn shape their moral character and how moral aspects of their life can be maintained, 
directed or reformed.
Disciplined action is clearly inherent in the development of good moral character. 
To claim that an agent could avoid disciplining themselves to be of good moral character 
is not even conceivable where an agent was unconsciously disciplined in their moral 
conduct. For instance, a good parent may not constantly reflect that they must discipline 
themselves to be so. But for them to have become habituated in such a manner implies 
some willed fashioning of their conduct. If they are not distracted from this goal by other
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competing desires or influences, then they are disciplining themselves by manifesting 
virtues pertaining to significant autonomy.
Overall, we might say that disciplined living is key to developing good moral 
character over the course of a lifetime. But this does not mean that the course of an 
agent’s life must follow a set course, be conducted in accordance with specific rules, or 
that they must know their place. Rather disciplined living here implies that an agent’s 
moral character is the most consistent feature and focus of their lives, action and 
thought, and that it should be cared for in a disciplined fashion if it is to enable them to 
be significantly autonomous throughout their lives. To accomplish this, agents must learn 
to care for their own moral character by applying the liberal ethics of moral character.
Applying the ethics o f moral character
Application of the ethics of moral character is essential if agents are to be autonomous in 
a manner which is conducive to their own and others’ flourishing. It is carried out by 
considering its relationship with the range of circumstances, opportunities, abilities and 
decisions of the agent concerned. Such practical application will usually entail a shared 
process of interpretation between the agent, those who are (or could be imagined to be) 
best placed to evaluate their conduct, the wider ideals of the ethics of moral character 
and the minimal conditions of good citizenship that underpin liberal democratic culture. 
Nevertheless, self-understanding will remain the primary foundation for applying the 
ethics of moral character. Although the approbation of an agent’s conduct can be made 
on their behalf, it will always be in terms which refer to their intentions, interests and 
aspirations. Ultimately, application of the relevant aspects of the ethics of moral 
character can only be made by the agent themselves. And it is on these terms that moral 
character must be assessed.
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The development of moral character will proceed via reference to a liberal 
character-ethics which can facilitate a complex of possible character-configurations. The 
development of a variety of configurations of moral character will be an inevitable 
feature of life within a liberal democracy, especially one that conscientiously promotes 
significant autonomy. The liberal democratic state will therefore be concerned with the 
opportunities available for citizens to develop diverse configurations of character and so 
will be anxious to promote the ability of agents to apply a liberal character-ethics in 
different ways. A liberal character-ethics comprises recognisably liberal ethical ideals and 
is sensitive to pluralism insofar as such configurations should be differentially coherent, 
relevant and comprehensible within a framework of virtues found in an ethics of moral 
character. This will mean that agents may choose to cast doubt on established 
configurations of moral character or that they may wish to affirm more established 
character-configurations. In either case, the application of the ethics of moral character 
will give agents the ability and opportunity to autonomously configure their character- 
development.
ii) Developing moral character
A liberal ethics of moral character prescribes the manifestation of some configuration of 
the virtues of moral character, envisaging the flourishing of agents in relation to the 
development of their own moral character and in relation to the development of the 
moral character of their fellows within liberal society. Before considering the virtues 
inherent in such a liberal ethics of moral character, it is important to examine two 
presuppositions regarding the interpretation of moral character in a liberal society.
Moral judgement and discursive opportunities
The successful configuration of the moral virtues found within a liberal character-ethics 
hinges on directing disciplined thought towards an understanding of one’s own moral 
dispositions. This is crucial if agents are to be able to develop and exercise moral 
judgement. Sound moral judgement presumes the self-aware display of the liberal virtues 
of moral character when making autonomous choices. Indeed, all the liberal virtues of 
character presume a high degree of self-knowledge and self-understanding. An agent 
could not successfully manifest virtues inherent in the development of their moral 
character if they were unaware of the constraints inherent in their own dispositions. The 
demands placed on agents in liberal societies require that they are capable of making 
strenuous moral decisions on the basis of their own judgement. It is therefore of no small 
importance that they are equipped to do so to the best of their own abilities as they find 
them. In this respect, the liberal state has a duty to promote opportunities which are 
conducive to the free development of self-understanding. But what sort of opportunities 
can enable agents in liberal societies to develop their self-understanding to ground 
significant autonomy in coherent, relevant and comprehensible moral judgements?
In a liberal society, an agent’s self-understanding can be developed through 
learning how to interpret a liberal character-ethics. This implies an education for 
significant autonomy which includes political education and direct participation in 
political and moral discourse. For agents to become significantly autonomous they 
should be able to participate in the interpretation of its ethical content. In particular, they 
should be afforded discursive opportunities to actively participate in the evolution of an 
ethics of moral character. Participation in the evolution of a liberal character-ethics can 
be both active and vicarious. It is active when agents engage in the problematisation of 
the ethics of moral character by criticising, supporting, reforming or entrenching possible
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interpretations of its normative prescriptions. Participation that is vicarious will entail 
private intellectual engagement with the ethics of moral character, where agents reflect 
on the adequacy of its possible interpretations in relation to their own and others’ 
character-development.
Opportunities for participation in discourse pertaining to the ethics of moral 
character without the support of the state can arise within the family and civil society. 
However, for the disposition and ability to actively and vicariously participate in this 
discourse to be widely and fairly promoted it is necessary for its encouragement to be 
sustained by a legitimate authority to which all citizens could consent. The liberal state 
should therefore create and promote opportunities associated with the interpretation of 
the ethics of moral character. This will also help agents to develop the diverse 
configurations of the virtues of moral character which are a feature of significant 
autonomy in a liberal society. These virtues are described and analysed next.
iii) Virtues of good moral character
Liberal virtues constitute the substantive content of a liberal character-ethics. The virtues 
pertaining to a liberal ethics of moral character fall into three broad categories: social, 
moral and political. While these different categories of virtue are not perfectly distinct, as 
each implies the other in a variety of ways, agents should be able to manifest some 
configuration of a number of these virtues in order to develop moral character. The 
content of the different classes of liberal virtues of moral character is explored further 
below.
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Social or civil virtues
The social or civil virtues are the so-called ‘little virtues’ of moral character. They 
comprise those dispositions towards others which make social interaction agreeable, such 
as being polite, friendly and helpful. Strictly speaking, within an ethics of moral character 
these other-regarding social virtues do not include all the qualities that make agents 
agreeable to others. For instance, although we might prefer our fellow citizens to be 
entertaining or witty, we are unlikely to regard the continual display of these latter 
virtues as inherent in moral character. The social virtues also include self-regarding 
personal dispositions which make an agent’s conduct agreeable, such as modesty. Both 
these other-regarding and self-regarding social virtues are a feature of an ethics of moral 
character insofar as perfectionist liberals would not wish to ignore the role that these 
virtues play in the character-development of agents.298
Social virtues fulfil an important role within the ethics of moral character, 
because they fill in the mundane detail of how people should behave in ordinary day-to- 
day social interactions. An ethics of moral character would thus not be restricted to those 
virtues inherent in negotiating morally demanding situations. It would reflect the civility 
agents in liberal societies are commonly expected to manifest in their everyday 
interactions. These interactions may or may not require the resolution of morally 
complex decisions, but they will require conduct that takes into account the interests of 
others as this is a characteristic commitment of a significantly autonomous agent.
If agent x is openly rude to agent y  in the street then there may on the face of it 
be very little serious moral loss. However, the significance of their autonomy at that time 
(in terms of the value it contributes to the kind of social life worth living) could have
298 Indeed, other-regarding moral virtues spring from the same disposition of sensitivity towards others 
as their social counterparts. And self-regarding moral virtues spring from the same disposition of self- 
respect as their social counterparts.
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been improved had they conducted themselves in accordance with virtues of civility. This 
does not imply that to be significantly autonomous agents have an obligation to maximise 
each other’s significant autonomy, but they should meet minimum standards of civility 
which are necessary for its facilitation. Uncivil behaviour reflects very poorly on the 
character of the uncivil agent, in particular, indicating that they care very little for the 
quality of their own autonomy or that of others. This would not be conducive to a liberal 
society in which individual flourishing was paramount. Indeed, it would not take a very 
great leap of imagination to envisage the negative impact on the character of agents in 
liberal societies if they routinely disregarded each others’ civil sensibilities. Hence, other- 
regarding social virtues should be promoted as the vital bedrock of conduct within a civil 
society. But what role do self-regarding social virtues play in our ethics of moral 
character?
Social virtues of moral character can be other-regarding for a very clear reason. 
They are conducive to civility in social relations and the development of significant 
autonomy in society. However, it is often less obvious how social virtues of moral 
character may be self-regarding. Ultimately, the self-regarding social virtues of moral 
character fill out an agent’s self-respect when they enter social relations. For instance, 
social (or civil) relations can exist between an agent of great modesty and another who is 
without shame. However, we are likely to question whether the two agents were 
committed to the same sort of civility, because their contrasting display of virtues reveals 
very different levels of care for their moral character. Dire socio-economic 
circumstances, a commitment to challenging society’s norms or individual preference 
may lead an agent to have what appears to be an idiosyncratic interpretation of the self- 
regarding social virtues of moral character. Nevertheless, this interpretation is not 
consistent with significant autonomy for two reasons: first, the shameless agent does not
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appear to have a sufficient regard for their own character; second, they do not appear 
concerned about the offence or concern which their lack of self-respect may give to 
others. Agents who neglect the self-regarding social virtues of moral character do not (as 
a rule) care sufficiently for their own autonomous choices nor set an example to their 
fellows which is conducive to significant autonomy. Furthermore, the ‘social capital’ and 
trust upon which a flourishing civil society depends299 can only be developed where 
agents share a willingness and ability to exercise other-regarding and self-regarding 
social virtues of moral character.
Promoting an ethics of moral character which comprises other-regarding and self- 
regarding social virtues is an essential task if liberal governments are to encourage civil 
interaction. To ensure that citizens are fully disposed to develop their moral character 
these little social virtues must be supplemented by broader moral virtues.
Moral virtues
The moral virtues within a liberal ethics of moral character are also other-regarding and 
self-regarding. They are grounded in dispositions of sensitivity to others and self-respect. 
These dispositions presuppose an agent’s care for the development of their character. 
This notion of ‘care’ is integral to the moral virtues of moral character in a deeper 
manner than for the social virtues. Civility and sociability imply a relationship of care 
towards others or oneself, but moral praiseworthiness requires that this type of care- 
orientated conduct is more painstaking and conscientious in its application. Moral 
sensitivity to others entails manifesting moral virtues of moral character in ways that 
reveal an agent’s moral conscience. Civility implies only that agents display the other-
299 R.Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italy, Princeton University Press, 
1993.
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regarding social virtues of moral character in respect of agreeable social relations. It does 
not entail a further obligation to show especial concern for their flourishing. Neither does 
it imply a moral disposition towards one’s own character which extends much beyond 
not giving offence.
The other-regarding liberal moral virtues which evince sensitivity to the 
flourishing of others are those which classically pertain to taking pains to address the 
concerns of relevant others or even to putting their needs before one’s own. These 
virtues will include such qualities as selflessness, beneficence and generosity. Such 
virtues are more than simply social virtues because they imply more than merely civil 
conduct towards others. They entail particular types of disposition towards others and 
the manifestation of very specific types of moral act. While they are not as ubiquitous as 
the social virtues, these other-regarding moral virtues are the moral glue that sustains 
families, associations, societies and polities. Civility may ensure that social life is 
generally agreeable or at least not unbearable. Acts of generosity, understanding and 
beneficence ensure that the fragility of individual flourishing is not overcome by the force 
of adverse circumstances. The survival and flourishing of agents, associations and 
institutions within civil society depends on how able and willing agents are to participate 
in the improvement of the well-being of their fellow family members, associates, citizens 
and so on. Moral virtues of moral character are therefore crucial for the development of 
the moral conduct which sustains the shared ethical ideals of a society, culture or 
practice. A collection of self-interested amoral agents who co-operated solely to achieve 
their own aims could not generate sufficient moral capital to sustain ethical ideals 
pertaining to the welfare of its members or for the practices in which they could flourish. 
A liberal society presupposes shared ideals that inform how that society is organised and
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how agents within that society should display some degree of moral conscience in their 
treatment of each other.
Care for the flourishing of others is the foundation for the right to be able to be 
significantly autonomous. But an ethics of moral character would also require that agents 
demonstrate commitment to their own flourishing by displaying a variety of self- 
regarding virtues of moral character pertaining to significant autonomy. These self- 
regarding virtues would again hinge on self-respect. Self-respect is the fundamental 
disposition which drives agents to make their autonomous choices a valuable 
contribution to their own moral well-being and flourishing. It hinges on the ability to care 
for the development of one’s moral character. The moral virtues which are implied by 
this attitude of self-respect (such as prudence and sensibility) are those which reflect how 
an agent seeks to develop their moral character. These self-regarding virtues are 
emphatically not the same as self-regard. They are linked to the other-regarding moral 
virtues of moral character because their exercise often entails displaying a fine sensitivity 
to the needs of others. Indeed, as Jane Austen’s novels show, the acute sensibility of 
some agents can be revealed in how they treat others. More generally, if agents do not 
respect themselves then they may be less able or inclined to promote the flourishing of 
their fellow agents. This suggests that the self-regarding moral virtues of moral character 
are prior to the other-regarding moral virtues and the social virtues. For an agent to 
display moral character when interacting with others it is assumed that they stand in 
some sort of appropriate relation to the development of their own moral character. Self- 
respect therefore grounds ethical conduct towards oneself and towards others, implying 
awareness that appropriate care for one’s self will also evince sensitivity to the 
flourishing of others.
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Overall, other-regarding and self-regarding moral virtues of moral character 
reflect an agent’s moral conscience. Differing configurations of these virtues are not 
manifested simply because they are the right thing, but because they are the sort of things 
that might be done by a certain sort of agent -  a significantly autonomous agent of good 
moral character. This does not entail a rigid moral code to which agents must adhere. A 
liberal character-ethics enables the moral character of agents to be autonomously 
configured through many different combinations of the liberal virtues of moral character. 
These combinations of social and moral virtues of moral character will also be 
supplemented by liberal political virtues. Indeed, significant autonomy is severely 
diminished and may be threatened where agents in liberal societies are neither disposed 
nor able to display at least some of these.
Political virtues
Significant autonomy within the political sphere is a crucial concern for agents in liberal 
democracies. Individual flourishing and liberal polities themselves, are seriously 
weakened where citizens were unable, or unwilling, to participate in or deliberate on the 
public application and interpretation of a liberal character-ethics. The liberal political 
virtues inherent in good citizenship are therefore an integral feature of a liberal ethics of 
moral character. A liberal ethics of moral character will embrace a range of virtues which 
are closely associated with the responsibilities of citizenship within a liberal democracy, 
such as tolerance, political participation and deliberation. These virtues will build on 
minimal requirements of good citizenship. Indeed, the basic demand of the ethics of 
moral character would be based on the political virtue of restraint, indicating that a good 
citizen must at least be someone who respects the right of other agents to be able to be 
significantly autonomous. However, an agent who simply exhibited restraint without
expressing any interest in politics and political discourse would not be living well. The 
development of good moral character requires that agents are committed to maintaining 
an environment conducive to its growth and exercise. Good citizenship is therefore 
constituted by different types of responsible political engagement. This can only be fully 
accomplished where a substantial proportion of citizens are inclined to participate in and 
deliberate on the public discourse which pertains to liberal society, politics and culture.
The liberal political virtues pertaining to responsible political engagement in a 
liberal society are participative and deliberative, and may be either active or vicarious. 
Participative political virtues are actively exercised in campaigning on behalf of a political 
party, for a political issue, by writing to an MP, publicly demonstrating against policies, 
institutions or organisations, attending local council meetings and so on. These political 
virtues are also often supplemented by active moral virtues, such as giving money and 
time to charities, helping others in the locality, and physically aiding the vulnerable. 
These latter moral virtues of moral character form an important counterpoint to the 
participative political virtues, but on the whole, perfectionist liberal participative political 
virtues centre on the importance of responsible political engagement.
Responsible political engagement in a liberal democracy involves acting on and 
developing sound political judgements when making autonomous choices in the political 
sphere. The active participatory virtues are composite virtues that combine the moral 
virtues of moral character such as courage, beneficence and fairness in ways which 
demonstrate commitment to the outcomes of political deliberation. Responsible political 
participation is thus political engagement for a purpose - to influence political decision­
making whether on a small-scale by lobbying for local road safety improvements or on a 
large-scale by protesting about war or taxation. It evinces sensitivity to the demands of 
effecting political change in a morally appropriate manner in a liberal democracy. For
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instance, civil disobedience may be justified in certain cases but will require careful 
explication and management to evince a proper respect for liberal ideals, such as 
democratic decision-making or representative government. Direct political participation 
is of course active, but vicarious participation occurs when a voter or a union member 
takes part only vicariously in the actual conduct of parliamentary debates or wage 
negotiations. Political participation is here vicarious in the strict sense that it has been 
conducted on behalf of an agent by an authorised representative - citizens do not 
participate directly in parliamentary sessions, but elected representatives do so in their 
place.
Deliberative political virtues comprise the ability to make political decisions, the 
skills necessary to formulate and propose solutions to political issues, the skill to express 
political opinions in a relevant manner, and the capacity for engaging responsibly in (and 
perhaps leading) political debates. They are exercised actively in the voting booth, in 
public assemblies and committees and within government. These virtues can be exercised 
actively in a wide range of situations where agents resolve conflicts and distribute 
resources and tasks, including the family, the workplace and associations in civil society. 
They can also be exercised via the written word or other media in newspapers, books or 
on the internet, where the vicarious aspect of certain political deliberations may become 
especially apparent. The deliberative political virtues are here manifested vicariously in 
the loose sense that they are directed towards the discussion rather than the resolution of 
political issues. Vicarious deliberative political virtues are therefore evident most 
frequently in University seminars, school classrooms, the family, social life and in the 
privacy of an agent’s conscience. The vicarious deliberative political virtues need not be 
orientated towards actual political change, but can occur for the purposes of
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entertainment, edification, or education. As a consequence, they can be exercised in a 
greater diversity of ways than their participative counterparts.
Overall, a liberal ethics of moral character will propose that the participative and 
deliberative political virtues should be promoted because responsible political 
engagement is an integral feature of good moral character. The vital importance of the 
political virtues to the flourishing of agents in future years would mean that liberal states 
should focus very careful attention on a political education which can promote 
responsible political engagement.300 Nevertheless, there are other valuable virtues which 
supplement those associated with good moral character that contribute to the 
maintenance of wider aspects of an autonomy-supporting liberal culture. Indeed, the 
importance of these virtues and the opportunity to exercise them in specific social 
practices can only be fully explicated in a liberal ethics of individual character. Such an 
ethic is described next.
3. The Ethics of Individual Character
A liberal ethics of individual character enhances the ethics of moral character by stressing 
the virtues associated with developing a distinctive self and giving colour to one’s way of 
life. We have seen how an ethics of moral character is the basic foundation for agents to 
become significantly autonomous. An ethics of individual character is also required to 
promote significant autonomy because in a liberal society individual flourishing involves 
more than moral conduct or political engagement. A liberal ethics of individual character 
is the most appropriate conceptual device for giving substance to the notion that 
significant autonomy is also tied to individuality and freedom of expression. This section
300 This argument is given greater substance in Chapter Five, while Chapter Six of the thesis examines 
the prescriptions and normative cogency of the programme of citizenship education recently introduced 
in English schools.
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considers the philosophical presuppositions and content of such a liberal ethics of 
individual character.
i) Autonomy and the ethics of individual character
Individual character seems to be intuitively more closely related to the liberal concept of 
autonomy than moral character. Indeed, the idea that autonomy is ‘doing one’s own 
thing’ implies that it is a matter of expressing individual preferences. However, individual 
character is partly constituted by the idea of moral character. For instance, agents would 
be expected to display some of the virtues of moral character in developing their 
individual character. In turn, an agent’s character would be incomplete if its individual 
aspect had not been in some way developed. So individual (like moral) character is a 
normative concept and as such implies certain types of ethical attributes. But in what 
ways can agents become able to apply an ethics of individual character to their 
autonomous choices? And, how should that ethics be applied?
Individual character and self-discipline
To become significantly autonomous, agents in liberal societies should be able to 
discipline their thought, actions and lives. The promotion of virtues contributes directly 
to the ability of agents to be able to do this. An ethics of individual character implies that 
agents can give a particular shape to the development of their individual traits. Although 
the bedrock of an agent’s flourishing is dependent on the development of their moral 
character, for an agent’s life in a liberal society to be completely fulfilling entails an 
ability to discipline their individual character-traits to develop a distinctive individual 
aspect of their character. If agents are to develop their individual character-traits they
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will probably have to display some level of disciplined commitment to virtues inherent in 
the social practices in which they participate.
Disciplined thought will be integral to the development of individual character. 
Understanding their potentialities and limitations is essential if agents hope to understand 
how they may participate in social practices that are conducive to their individual 
flourishing. Disciplined thought will also enable agents to reflect on how their 
autonomous choices constitute their individual character and how it can be sustained or 
directed. Disciplined action is necessary for the development of individual character 
because its achievement presupposes a degree of active commitment to specific traits. 
Moreover, as Mill famously noted in On Liberty, we could not ascribe any sort of 
regularity to the individuality of agents whose actions were never disciplined in any 
particular direction. To claim that agents could develop individuality in a liberal society 
without disciplining their actions would render their individual character entirely 
arbitrary, much like personality. Hence, the development of individual character is 
necessarily the product of some degree of autonomous self-mastery.
An agent of confirmed individual character becomes significantly autonomous 
through commitment to the social practices in which they participate. Once more, we 
might therefore say that disciplined living is the key to developing individual character 
over the course of a lifetime. An agent’s individual character is that feature of their lives 
that is inherent in how they have chosen to give it their own value; which identifies them 
as an agent with a distinctive mode of flourishing. Consequently, it should be nurtured 
carefully if it is to be directed well. To accomplish this, agents in a liberal society should 
be able to apply the liberal ethics of individual character.
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Applying the ethics of individual character
Application of the ethics of individual character differs from that of the ethic of moral 
character. It is largely based on how well agents participate within specific types of social 
setting. The application of the ethics of individual character (like that for the ethics of 
moral character) is based on reflection on the range of circumstances, opportunities and 
abilities of the agent concerned. However, in the case of individual character there is 
greater scope for diverse configurations of the virtues of individual character. Although 
individual character is developed in pursuit of goals within social practices that may have 
well-established criteria for success, the diversity of practices in which agents participate 
indicates that the differences between individual character-configurations are likely to be 
greater. By contrast, the development of moral character is likely to comprise certain 
core social, moral and political virtues, such as politeness, forgiveness and restraint. The 
development of individual character is as at least diverse as the types of social practices 
in which agents choose to participate.
Liberal virtues can be configured in a variety of ways to develop an agent’s 
individual character. Indeed, they are likely to be manifested in a continually evolving 
autonomous response to changing circumstances and interests. The virtues inherent in an 
ethics of individual character are central to enable agents to conduct themselves in ways 
which are conducive to the achievement of specific individual goals and the evolution of 
a distinctive character. They therefore give a particular shape to an agent’s individual 
interests and accomplishments. Although application of the ethics of individual character 
within different social practices may be tightly prescribed, the overall application of an 
ethics of individual character implies a vast diversity of configurations.
An ethics of individual character comprises certain generic criteria that can feed 
into its application in specific practices by agents. The application of these generic
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prescriptions for individual character will proceed in a similar way to those for an ethics 
of moral character,301 and, for perfectionist liberals, it would be especially important to 
promote these generic virtues of individual character. Nonetheless, it is also vital that 
conditions are conducive to the flourishing of the specific virtues inherent in different 
social practices, some of which a liberal state may choose to actively promote through 
education, subsidised training or public broadcasting. This can be best accomplished by 
facilitating and promoting a diverse range of opportunities for the development of 
individual character, as these are the cornerstone of each agent’s distinctive character. 
Hence, the scope for celebrating diversity in a liberal society could be given greatest 
weight within an ethics of individual character.
A liberal ethics of individual character will relate to significant autonomy in a 
more open-ended way than the ethics of moral character, because the opportunities to 
develop individual character-configurations are likely to be extremely diverse within a 
liberal society. Perfectionist liberal commitment to individual character would thus be a 
commitment to diversity and to the type of society and social practices in which diversity 
may flourish. How this contributes to the development of individual character is 
considered next.
ii) Developing individual character
The development of individual character presupposes the fashioning of individuality 
within selected valuable social practices. Promotion of a liberal ethics of individual 
character will recommend that agents can display a range of generic virtues inherent in 
significant autonomy across different social practices and specific virtues within those
301 Indeed, it is a commonplace feature of life within a liberal democracy. For example, within ordinary 
social discourse agents frequently discuss themselves and each other in generic terms relating to their 
individually distinctive lives.
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practices. The former process is one in which the liberal state promotes generic virtues 
associated with the development of individual character. The latter process is primarily 
one in which associations in civil society will promote very specific virtues. However, 
before examining the virtues of individual character it is important to conceptualise how 
they contribute to the development of individual character.
Self-realisation, self-creation and authenticity
Perfectionist liberals can conceive the development of individual character in a number of 
interesting ways. For instance, it may be seen as a process of self-realisation, self- 
creation or as the display of authenticity. Self-realisation implies ‘the development and 
expression of characteristic attributes and potentials in a fashion which comprehensively 
discloses their subject’s real nature’.302 This indicates that given the right environment 
agents will progressively make manifest their essential traits and potentials. These traits 
are unlikely to be entirely peculiar for each agent. For instance, the idea of self-realisation 
suggests that ‘there are certain features common to everyone’s self-realisation: similar 
kinds of potential’. But self-realisation also implies that each individual has a real (but as 
yet) undisclosed nature. Self-realisation therefore entails the elicitation of certain innate 
individual character-traits. However, this realisation of innate potentials may be tied to 
goals other than the autonomous development of individual character.303 We would also 
be especially concerned that such an metaphysical teleological concept of self­
development undermines the malleability of the self which is the first presupposition of 
the perfectionist liberal concepts of autonomy and character proposed here.
302 M.Evans, ‘Self-Realization’, in E.Craig ed., Routledge Encyclopaedia o f  Philosophy vol.8, London, 
Routledge, 1998, p.633.
303 ibid., pp.633-4. Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that the realising of innate potentials is 
unambiguously desirable. Promoting the development o f the inherent potentials of a successful violent
167
A non-metaphysical perfectionist liberalism challenges the idea that agents 
possess traits with fixed predetermined natural content that is waiting to be realised. 
Such a notion of self-realisation implies a metaphysical concept of the self which was 
earlier rejected as incompatible with significant autonomy. But can the development of 
individual character be conceptualised without recourse to metaphysical notions? 
Another interesting way of conceptualising the development of individual character is as 
a process of self-creation or a display of authenticity. This idea has its roots in existential 
philosophy. For an agent to be an ‘authentic’ individual, they must understand that it is 
existentially imperative to create their own individual character.304 If an agent does not 
fashion their own existence and allows everything in their life to be determined by 
convention, they have become ‘absorbed into the world of objects as just another 
object.’305
The concept of authenticity ‘points us towards a more self-responsible form of 
life’,306 because it makes us wholly culpable for the extent to which we successfully 
develop our individuality. Authentic agents thus establish a truly unique individual 
character through unsolicited acts of self-creation. However, the notion that uniqueness 
is ‘a goal to be aimed at, the person one should strive to become’307 privileges a kind of 
individuality that may not require much social interaction to achieve fulfilment.308 As 
Charles Taylor notes, ‘authenticity can’t, shouldn’t go all the way with self-determining
thug (for example) is not likely to feature in a liberal ethic of individual character. This again illustrates 
that for liberals the ethics of individual character will inevitably be premised on that for moral character.
304 T.R.Baldwin, ‘Authenticity’, in T.Honderich ecL, Oxford Companion to Philosophy, p.68.
305 J.Macquarrie, Existentialism, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972, p.74. In this sense to be increasingly 
other-directed is to become increasingly unfiree and inauthentic - to act in ‘bad faith’, by denying one’s 
status as a free subject.
306 C.Taylor, The Ethics o f  Authenticity, Harvard University Press, 1991, p.74.
307 Y) AL.Coopcx, Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche’s Educational Philosophy, Aldershot, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1991, pp.7-14.
308 See for instance, F.Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969.
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freedom. It undercuts itself.309 The relationships and commitments at the heart of 
significant autonomy could not be developed if agents chose to abjure society or social 
practices. Furthermore, for self-creation to be a comprehensible goal for agents within 
societies, it must be pursued within the framework of an ethics of self-creation. It is 
therefore highly unlikely to be able to slip social or moral interpretation and approbation. 
Indeed, if it could slip these culturally grounded moorings it could generate a dangerous 
moral indifference.310 An alternative approach has been to view authenticity as ‘the 
possibility and the point of looking beyond the self, as a process of somehow 
overcoming existential anxiety by giving oneself up to a well-defined or conventional 
role.311 While this ‘ability to accept the way things go’ may play some role in a liberal 
conception of the good life, it would not generate any substantive criteria for 
encouraging agents to become ever more significantly autonomous. Nor could it capture 
the notion that to flourish in a liberal society is (in part) to flourish in an individually 
distinctive way.
The concepts of self-creation and authenticity do not facilitate perfectionist liberal 
aspirations for individual character, because they either preclude specification of ethical 
content or marginalise the place of autonomy in a liberal conception of the good life. The 
existentialist notion of the malleable self is generally too flexible to acknowledge that the 
development of individual character takes place in a cultural context. Individual character 
develops as agents become able to become significantly autonomous in different social 
practices. It is therefore a theoretical construct which implies that interaction between 
the normative commitments of individuals, culture and society shapes the development of
309 C.Taylor, The Ethics o f  Authenticity, p.68.
310 As Macquarrie notes ‘if  eveiy individual claimed the right to set aside his ordinaiy moral obligations 
for the sake of the ultimate demands of his own authentic selfhood, surely we would soon find ourselves 
in moral chaos’. J.Macquarrie, Existentialism, p.213.
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individuality. The social conditions for the development of individual character in a 
liberal society are described below.
Participation and achievement
In a liberal society, individual character can be developed through participation in a wide 
range of valuable social practices. Participation in these practices is intrinsically valuable 
for the development of individual character, because such practices enable agents to 
develop coherent, relevant and comprehensible configurations of generic and specific 
virtues of individual character. This presumes that the existence of many social practices 
should encourage diverse outlets for different modes of individual flourishing.
A liberal ethics of individual character will underpin different forms of flourishing 
by informing the criteria for opportunities and achievement within specific social 
practices. Agents should be able to participate in the negotiation of these criteria guiding 
the appraisal and achievement of individual character within different practices. Again, as 
was the case for moral character, participation in the evolution of the ethics of individual 
character may be active or vicarious. It is active when agents posit original or powerful 
configurations of the virtues of individual character inherent in the practice in which they 
are participating. By contrast, vicarious participation here entails that agents reflect on 
the excellence of possible configurations of virtues which could be inherent in the ethics 
of individual character. This can occur prior to, during, following or when observing 
active participation in a range of different social practices. And, it is this discussion and 
reflection on the achievements of individual practitioners within a social practice that
311 P.Standish, Beyond the Self: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Limits o f  Language, Aldershot, 
Avebury, 1992, pp.218, 209.
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constitutes the shared criteria, interest and virtues which are vital to its survival and 
health.312
Opportunities for participation in discourse pertaining to a liberal ethics of 
individual character may arise within any sphere of a liberal democratic society. In this 
case, the disposition to do so is sustained obliquely through the virtues of moral 
character and through the impact of the virtues of individual character within different 
social practices. To sustain the flourishing of this discourse on individual character the 
liberal state can promote virtues associated with the interpretation and development of 
individual character. These virtues will consolidate the efforts of agents to develop 
different configurations of individual character. The following section discusses the range 
of virtues inherent in a liberal ethics of individual character.
iii) The virtues of individual character
The virtues pertaining to an ethics of individual character fall into four broad categories: 
social, moral, cultural and intellectual. Each of these different categories of virtue 
overlaps and interacts in ways that ground and guide their configuration by agents. They 
also provide clarity for the derivation of prescriptive criteria which can inform character- 
promoting policies of liberal governments. The content of the different classes of liberal 
virtues of individual character is described and analysed next.
Social virtues
The social virtues of individual character are related to those of moral character, but are 
usually manifested within specific social or cultural settings. They comprise those traits
312 This mirrors some of what Alistair MacIntyre says of the virtues inherent in different practices. 
However, it must be remembered that for perfectionist liberals these virtues are primarily valuable for 
the flourishing of individuals rather than the community.
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which make an agent’s pursuit of their own personal goals and individual character 
agreeable to their fellows who participate in (or observe) the same social practices. But 
the social virtues here have a different shape to those found in the ethics of moral 
character. They centre on the virtues which pertain to competence or professionalism 
within their chosen field of activity. So while it is possible to recognise individual 
achievement where competency is disregarded it is neither desirable nor likely that it 
should be discarded regularly. For a practice to sustain itself we must assume that the 
social capital that this requires will occasion the competency of its practitioners. 
Although the social virtues of moral character may develop social capital by filling in the 
details of how people ought to behave in their social interactions, the social virtues of 
individual character will not play the same role in specific social practices. Within distinct 
social practices the requirement for the exhibition of social virtues of moral character 
(however desirable) may be less stringent than for the social virtues of individual 
character. If agent x is rude to agents in the office, studio, kitchen or on the building site 
we are less likely to regard it as a failing where the virtues associated with competence 
are in evidence. Neglect of the social virtues of moral character within a social practice 
therefore has no necessary impact on appraisals of individual character.313
In an ethics of individual character, the other-regarding and self-regarding social 
virtues may be described as virtues of competence, because they are directed by, and 
towards, standards of proficiency within a social practice. These virtues fill out the 
expectations that practitioners have about each other’s agreeableness when they engage 
in their social practice(s). Consequently, agents’ significant autonomy is lessened when 
their commitment to competence can be called into question. To ensure that agents are
313 Indeed, it may be the case that specific types o f disagreeable behaviour are inherent in success or 
achievement within certain social practices. For instance, Sergeants in the Marines are usually expected 
to display certain unpalatable types of conduct towards their charges.
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disposed towards virtues of competence, an ethics of individual character will then 
promote broader moral virtues than those associated with competence and proficiency.
Moral virtues
The moral virtues encompassed within an ethics of individual character are primarily 
constituted by integrity. Agents should develop their individual character in a way that 
displays an appropriate level of care for the distinctiveness of their significant autonomy. 
This entails a set of moral virtues which may bear little relation to those found in an 
ethics of moral character. Selflessness, beneficence and generosity are in not necessarily 
inherent in the development of individual character. While other-regarding moral virtues 
of moral character may be the moral glue that sustains social practices, they have less of 
a bearing on the actual individual character of participants in those practices. The display 
of moral virtues of individual character by participants within a social practice implies 
that agents exhibit a particular kind of moral attitude towards their participation in a 
social practice. In a liberal society this means that agents develop individual character by 
demonstrating integrity.
The virtues associated with integrity drive agents to ensure that their autonomous 
choices within specific social practices are valuable and distinctive contributions to their 
own flourishing. Ideally, an agent’s respect for their individual character will reveal itself 
as care for their achievements within a social practice. In an ethics of individual character 
the moral virtue of integrity therefore co-ordinates the social virtues associated with 
competency and the cultural and intellectual virtues associated with achievement. An 
agent’s integrity in the pursuit of goals within a social practice grounds ethical conduct 
towards themselves and also towards others, implying a constancy of purpose in giving 
distinctive shape to their autonomy. Integrity is therefore a moral virtue that has no
173
determinate specifiable content. In an ethics of individual character it is simply the 
generic requirement for displaying a moral commitment to one’s autonomous choices 
and how they fit into one’s overall flourishing. This does not mean that agents have to 
maintain one steady course throughout their lives. Integrity is inherent in the 
development of diverse and changing configurations of the virtues of individual character 
provided that they can be coherent, relevant and comprehensible in terms of an agent’s 
evolving character. Agents will therefore need to manifest certain moral virtues adhering 
to integrity when participating within their chosen social practices. In addition, they will 
exhibit certain cultural and intellectual virtues when they develop their individual 
character within those practices.
Cultural and intellectual virtues
Cultural and intellectual virtues are initially apparent in a general commitment to the 
flourishing of social practices within a liberal society. These virtues are inherently 
valuable to liberal society itself because it is in the moral interest of agents in a liberal 
society to be committed to distinct intellectual and cultural virtues. The flourishing of 
commerce, science, the Arts and local communities is dependent on the commitment and 
ability of agents involved and of those disposed to appreciate their contribution to a 
liberal society. The cultural and intellectual virtues inherent in a liberal ethics of 
individual character are generic and specific, enabling agents to secure certain levels of 
individual achievement within their chosen social practices. These virtues are essentially 
interpretive and performative and are displayed as agents seek to attain different levels of 
accomplishment within specific social practices.
Cultural and intellectual virtues of individual character comprise generic virtues 
of interpretation and performance. For example, understanding the general nature of
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individual achievement might include the virtues of discernment and taste. While those 
inherent in commitment to achievement could include virtues associated with learning 
and creativity. Virtues of individual character also entail very specific virtues of 
interpretation and attainment within different cultural milieus. For example, those 
associated with being an appreciative art critic or an accomplished artist will differ from 
those associated with being a perceptive management consultant or a capable manager. 
Specific social and cultural practices determine the criteria for how well specific virtues 
are manifested by participants, but a liberal ethics of individual character can specify 
generic cultural and intellectual virtues inherent in most of those social and cultural 
practices.
Cultural and intellectual virtues give a highly distinctive contour to the 
achievements in an agent’s life. In this respect, they continually constitute and re-define 
an agent’s individual character throughout their life. These virtues are self-regarding 
insofar as they pertain directly to the shape of an agent’s individual character. For 
instance, an agent’s decision to paint abstract rather than naturalist art entails the 
manifestation of specific cultural and intellectual virtues which re-shape their life as an 
artist. In addition, the cultural and intellectual virtues are also other-regarding in that 
they are inherently valuable to the social practices in which agents participate. Indeed, 
the future health of diverse modes of individual flourishing in a liberal society is 
dependent on the skills and achievements of participants in different social practices.
By participating in practices which enable them to fulfil themselves in liberal 
societies, agents also make vital contributions to the growth and development of such 
practices within those societies. They encourage fellow participants to continue their 
engagement with the practice, and promote and market its viability as an option for the
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development of individual character.314 Moreover, the quality of opportunities for 
significant autonomy can shape the differential development of cultural and intellectual 
virtues. These opportunities imply that agents should reflect and act on their 
contributions to the practices in which they engage. Such reflections may concern their 
own performance and achievement, or the performance of other participants, or it may 
concern the general presuppositions, criteria for achievement and underlying philosophy 
of the relevant practice.
A liberal ethics of individual character can synthesise a wide range of virtues 
which are integral to the flourishing of agents within liberal societies. The role of the 
state in promoting these will be discussed later. Having detailed the liberal ethics of 
moral and individual character we must now explore how agents may be expected to 
autonomously fulfil criteria pertaining to their development. The following section 
examines what constitutes good character in a liberal society and how it can be achieved.
4. Achieving Good Character
A liberal character-ethics synthesises a range of virtues which adhere to moral and 
individual character. A certain level of excellence in some configuration of those virtues 
should be achieved for agents to be considered of good character. But what are the basic 
requirements for an agent to avoid disapprobation? And, how can perfectionist liberals 
evaluate good character given the very different configurations and combinations of 
virtues that agents may display? This section explores how the achievement of good 
character can be understood.
314 In this respect, the cultural virtues of individual character can be allied to political virtues of moral 
character, such as negotiation, persuasion, debate, and so on.
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i) Evaluating the achievement of good character
An agent’s achievement of good character depends on their displaying some 
configuration of the virtues inherent in a liberal character-ethics. Configurations of the 
liberal virtues of moral and individual character can be evaluated from a number of 
perspectives and in a number of spheres - in families, within the workplace, the 
associations of civil society, and in political participation. Agents in liberal societies are 
likely to participate to some degree in social, moral and political discourses which reflect 
and influence the nature of a liberal character-ethics. Evaluation of the achievement of 
good character will therefore be informed by the outcomes of these discourses. 
Nevertheless, certain minimal levels of excellence can be derived for the achievement of 
good character. These minimal requirements are detailed next, before the priority of 
good moral character for the overall achievement of good character is discussed.
Minimal requirements o f good character
The minimal requirements for achieving good character hinge on the barest exhibition of 
those virtues which mean an agent cannot be subject to disapprobation. They are 
therefore framed by the political virtue of restraint. A right to be able to be significantly 
autonomous entails that agents in liberal societies are free to become significantly 
autonomous and have the opportunities and ability to do so. This right implies that every 
citizen must fulfil a basic duty to respect the right to significant autonomy of each of 
their fellow citizens if they are to avoid moral disapprobation. This does not mean that a 
liberal democracy would wish to support a society of agents whose virtues were simply 
those of avoiding giving offence. The vitality of a liberal society, individual flourishing, 
and a liberal character-ethics will depend on some agents challenging or offending the 
presuppositions of their fellows. As Mill made clear, ‘experiments in living’ can be a
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dynamic force for positive change in society. Nevertheless, building on the barest 
minimal requirements of good character is an essential foundation for the promotion of a 
liberal character-ethics. But would perfectionist liberals ascribe good moral character to 
someone who exhibited only the minimal requirements?
Citizens who are not significantly autonomous at all are not necessarily morally 
reprehensible. For instance, they may not have directly harmed the autonomy of any of 
their fellows. However, if they are not actively committed to their own flourishing it 
could be argued that they undermine the flourishing of their fellows in two important 
senses. First, to neglect one’s own flourishing is to set a poor example which could have 
deleterious effects on the autonomy of others (such as one’s peers, one’s children, or, 
indeed, newcomers to liberal society and its many social practices). The types of 
inactivity that may cause this (such as spending all day every day watching soap operas 
or sports programmes on television) may not render an agent fit for moral 
disapprobation, but they will not lead to their approval. Second, although the minimal 
requirements for avoiding moral disapprobation of one’s character are minimal, the 
minimal requirements for achieving the positive approbation of good moral character are 
not at all negligible. Possessing no character worth speaking of is no great moral crime, 
but neither would any approval be given to an agent so constituted.
A liberal character-ethics specifies a wide range of virtues for the agent of good 
character. Although there may be a multitude of configurations of these virtues worthy 
of positive moral approval, those which are (or could be) inherent in moral character will 
provide the core focus for understanding the achievement of good character.
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The priority o f good moral character
The notion of ‘good’ character is evidently linked to positive moral approbation. Hence, 
it is important to consider in what ways moral character is the chief determinant of good 
character and what impact individual character has on the evaluation of good character. 
Good moral character is central to significant autonomy, because each is a necessary 
condition of the other. The ethics of moral character provides crucial guidelines for 
agents, civil society and the state to sustain significant autonomy and for the character- 
development of agents to be accomplished autonomously. Virtues of moral character 
therefore underpin liberal evaluations of good character because they are inherent in the 
most important of liberal ethical ideals. For instance, we would not attribute good 
character or autonomy to an agent whose moral character was either seriously deficient 
in virtues or simply absent. The same stringency would not apply for an agent whose 
individual character was underdeveloped or neglected.
Although the ethics of moral character is the fundamental guide to evaluating the 
achievement of good character, the ethics of individual character would nonetheless 
contribute to the evaluation of good character in a number of ways. In particular, the 
ethics of individual character provides a conceptual framework for assessing whether 
agents are flourishing autonomously and how their participation in various social 
practices reflects their development of a distinctive mode of living well. Perfectionist 
liberals would consider an agent of good character to be one whose conception of the 
good life was their own. And, these conceptions of the good life would be increasingly 
impoverished if they were not infused with an autonomous commitment to the 
development of individual character.
The place of an agent’s individual character in the evaluation of their achievement 
of good character will focus on how it reflects and is reflected in their moral character.
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For instance, agents’ individual accomplishments should ideally contribute to the 
flourishing of others as well as their own. This does not mean that they are expected to 
be selfless or other-directed. Rather it signifies that the autonomous development of 
individual character takes place within different social practices and would therefore be 
expected to make some contribution to the life of those practices. The ethics of 
individual character therefore supports the evaluation of good character in a subsidiary 
sense. Perfectionist liberal aspirations for individual character are a further aspect of their 
aspirations for the development of moral character.315 Nevertheless, an underdeveloped 
individual character is partly subject to an aesthetic disapprobation which may be 
distinguished from moral disapprobation. While the ethics of moral character is where 
liberal interpretation and configuration of good character is begun, it can only be 
completed through the interpretation and configuration of the virtues of individual 
character. The nature of this interpretation and the shape of configurations in a liberal 
society are discussed next.
ii) Interpreting the achievement of character
Interpreting how and when good character has been (or could be) achieved is a crucial 
issue for perfectionist liberals committed to promoting a liberal character-ethics. The 
reasons for this are threefold: first, interpretation is important to ensure that the 
vocabulary associated with a liberal character-ethics can be understood; second, 
interpretation can underpin how that vocabulary would evolve and be susceptible to 
reinterpretation; and, third, interpretation can provide political theorists with a means for 
evaluating the character-configurations of agents within a liberal society. Assessing the
315 Indeed, moral character can sometimes be a defining feature of an agent’s individual character, 
where for example they are committed to certain types o f personal relationships, altruistic gestures or 
‘good works’.
180
sources of interpretation and how we may understand different configurations of 
character is thus critical for understanding the achievement of character.
Sources o f interpretation
Within liberal democracies, interpretations of the achievement of character are derived 
from four key sources: Self-interpretation; interpretation within specific social, cultural 
or moral practices; wider interpretation throughout civil society; and ideological 
interpretations within political discourse. Influential interpretations from each of these 
sources interpenetrate and may conflict or cohere with each other. In either case, their 
interaction with each other will require negotiation if agents are able to reflect accurately 
and equitably on the nature of good character. The level of influence of each sphere on 
the interpretation of good character may vary according to which aspect of character we 
are focusing on, but need not do so. For instance, if we are reflecting on an agent’s self- 
regarding moral virtues, their self-interpretation is essential to interpreting the moral 
quality of their actions. But it would not necessarily be the final arbiter of the quality of 
their character. We may still wish to compare their interpretation against that embodied 
in other agents’ configurations of the self-regarding moral virtues to assess the 
coherence, relevance and comprehensibility of these different configurations.
Interpretations of character will be carried out by agents and by imaginary and/or 
actual observers of their conduct. Of course, this would not mean that in a liberal society 
a moral inspectorate will evaluate the character of each and every citizen. It would 
simply entail that interpretations undertaken within the framework of a liberal character- 
ethics can provide a synthesis or repository of guidelines for our everyday interpretation 
of our own and each other’s character-configurations. This would pay particular
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attention to how different virtues of moral character and individual character are together 
configured.
Understanding configurations o f character
One way to explore the interplay of the virtues of moral and individual character in 
character-configurations is to focus on the divide between the public and private spheres. 
Richard Rorty argues that in the private sphere agents should be free to play with 
individuality, but in the public sphere they should adopt the posture of a citizen 
concerned to uphold community solidarity.316 However, while achievement in developing 
one’s individual character would not necessarily entail any special qualification for 
holding a political or social function, this does not mean that the development of 
individual character should be so restricted to the private sphere. As Nancy Fraser has 
stressed, individuality and political activity do not ‘divide neatly into public and private 
sectors’, nor do actions ‘neatly divide into private or public.’317 Moreover, we might 
expect some agents to be especially qualified for positions of responsibility and authority 
if they have achieved high levels of individual excellence within their chosen social 
practices. Within politics itself, we are likely to hope that those in authority achieve 
individual character by successfully displaying relevant liberal virtues, that is, that 
politicians should be exemplars of liberal aspirations for public figures. Liberal culture 
can not be entirely depoliticised nor is politics a purely technical activity ‘restricted to 
liberal problem-solving’.318 Virtues of moral and individual character therefore have both
316 RRorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
317 N.Fraser, ‘Solidarity or Singularity? Richard Rorty between Romanticism and Technocracy’ in 
A.Malachowski ed., Reading Rorty: Critical Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature (and 
Beyond), Oxford, Blackwell, 1990, pp.307-9, 313.
318 Jo Burrows describes this attitude towards politics as ‘I just do what works, they get into 
ideology/politics’. But often ‘political issues cannot even be identified pragmatically, that is non-
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public and private aspects which underpin the nature of different character- 
configurations. The virtues of moral character may take priority in understanding the 
achievement of good character, but understanding those of individual character is 
essential for comprehensive assessment of an agent’s private and public autonomy. 
Evaluations of character-configurations must therefore carefully consider how the 
multiplicity of configurations of the relevant virtues is cashed out in terms of both 
aspects of a liberal character-ethics.
The configuration of their character by agents is an on-going application of the 
liberal character-ethics carried out privately and publicly by agents. Interpretation of 
these configurations is based on a continual assessment of an agent’s private and public 
intentions, interests and circumstances and their virtues of moral and individual 
character. Although the criteria relevant to configuring good character are in the final 
instance public, the configuration of moral and individual character also takes place 
(whether vicariously or actively) in private. Nevertheless, even these character- 
configurations would relate to certain publicly accessible, refinable and revisable 
explications of the public and private manifestation of virtues of moral and individual 
character. A basic schemata of some key liberal virtues for configuring good character is 
shown in the table below. The table indicates that a liberal character-ethics coheres 
around certain key virtues, and that there would be a range of virtues associated with 
these. So, for instance, social virtues of moral character, such as politeness and 
discretion, are attached to the generic virtue of civility. Likewise, public-spiritedness and 
humanitarianism are attached the generic political virtue of responsible engagement. This 
table does not exhaust the liberal virtues nor provide direct instruction in how agents
ideologically’. J.Burrows, ‘Conversational Politics: Rorty’s Pragmatist Apology for Liberalism’, in ibid., 
pp.327-8.
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should configure their own character. But it does show that a liberal character-ethics can 
furnish perfectionist liberals with the substantive content for an attractive conception of 
the good life and provide agents with an indication of how they might live well 
autonomously.
Table of liberal virtues of moral and individual character
Social
Virtues
Moral
Virtues
Political
Virtues
Cultural
and
Intellectual
Virtues
Moral Character
Civility
Modesty
Sociability (friendly, witty, etc.)
Politeness
Discretion
Moderation
Conscience
Benevolence
Beneficence
Courage
Forgiveness
Fairness
Responsible engagement
Respect/Restraint
Deliberation
Participation
Public-spiritedness
Humanitarianism
Individual Character
Competence
Utility
Professionalism
Industry
Healthiness
Cleanliness
Integrity
Determination
Reputation
Exemplariness
Sincerity
Enterprise
Commitment
Passion
Learning
Liberality
Discernment
Imagination
Interpretation
Empathy
Irony
Creativity
Configurations of the liberal virtues are as diverse as there are agents developing such 
configurations. The right to be able to be significantly autonomous presupposes the 
promotion of a liberal character-ethics to encourage the ability to display some
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configuration of liberal virtues. How the promotion of such a character-ethics can 
influence the policy-making of liberal governments is examined next.
5. Liberal character-ethics and policy-making
Promotion of a liberal character-ethics by the state and throughout civil society is vital 
for the flourishing of agents in liberal societies. For perfectionist liberals, the policies 
which the state may introduce to achieve this aim should be guided by principles inherent 
in the normative commitments associated with character and significant autonomy. The 
following section will examine how the right to be able to be significantly autonomous 
and a liberal character-ethics can inform policy-making.
i) Principles of liberal policy-making
State intervention in the moral lives of citizens to promote significant autonomy would 
need to reflect perfectionist liberal aspirations for the development of character. Liberal 
principles of policy-making would codify certain aspects of a liberal character-ethics to 
guide its promotion by the state, constraining the use of power to constitute the 
character of citizens. These normative principles would have substantive import for 
politics and policy-making in liberal democracies, ensuring that the ‘repressive 
hypothesis’ posed by impartialist liberals is negated. This section identifies five key 
principles which should guide the promotion of liberal virtues by liberal governments.
1. A principle o f equal respect
The fundamental political and moral principle inherent in a liberal character-ethics is a 
commitment to equal respect for the right to be able to be significantly autonomous. 
Indeed, this is the principle which justifies state involvement in promoting the
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appropriate virtues to enable agents to flourish in a liberal society. The right to have the 
opportunities and abilities required for significant autonomy entails that each liberal 
citizen has an equal right to be the beneficiary of policies designed to equip them with the 
virtues associate with living well. Perfectionist policies to promote the virtues inherent in 
moral and individual character must therefore be implemented with reference to this 
principle before any other. The principle of equal respect thus implies and is implied in 
the second principle of liberal policy-making.
2. The principle o f the priority o f autonomy
The priority of autonomy is a critical principle of liberal policy-making guided by a liberal 
character-ethics. Significant autonomy is characteristic of living well in a liberal society. 
Consequently, agents within a liberal society must be able to become significantly 
autonomous if they are to flourish, and the flourishing of a liberal society is in turn 
dependent on the autonomy of agents. Although a cultural interpretation of autonomy 
can render a character-ethics vulnerable to the charge of conservatism or 
conventionalism, its relationship with significant autonomy renders it susceptible to 
diverse configuration. Indeed, the priority of autonomy can encourage new ways of 
generating diverse conceptions of the good life within liberal societies. The priority of 
autonomy can therefore provide both a space and guidelines for state intervention in the 
moral fives of citizens. This principle is then the ethical ideal which informs the principle 
of equal respect within policy-making. A further ethical ideal that will guide policies to 
promote character is a commitment to specific moral and political perfectionist 
principles.
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3. A perfectionist principle o f valuable activities
A central presupposition of the promotion of a liberal character-ethics is that some 
activities and practices are more valuable than others. A perfectionist principle of 
valuable activities is therefore intrinsic to policies which seek to promote liberal virtues 
associated with living well. The achievement of good moral and individual character here 
presumes that there are more worthwhile ways of conducting oneself and that agents can 
generate more or less valuable configurations of the virtues of good character. A 
perfectionist principle of valuable activities will therefore complement the first two 
principles of a liberal policy-making because perfectionist liberal policies should only 
promote virtues integral to the development of moral and individual character. This also 
implies a supplementary principle legitimising such policies.
4. A perfectionist principle o f legitimate intervention
The perfectionist principle of valuable activities presupposes a further perfectionist 
principle legitimising state intervention within the moral lives of citizens. The liberal 
democratic state is uniquely positioned as the democratically legitimated guarantor of the 
rights of its citizens to significant autonomy. The limits of perfectionist intervention will 
be established by the priority of autonomy, distinguishing between policies which are 
recognised to be autonomy-enhancing and those which impede the right to be able to be 
significantly autonomous. These limits can be subject to interpretation, revision and 
debate within liberal social, moral and political discourse. For agents in liberal societies 
the importance of being able to contribute to these debates thus generates a final 
principle of commitment to moral and political education.
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5. A principled commitment to moral and political education
A commitment to moral and political education is inherent in liberal policies to promote a 
liberal character-ethics. It also implies that children can be given explicit education in the 
liberal virtues in state schools, especially in those pertaining to responsible political 
engagement. A principled commitment to moral and political education based on the 
ability to become significantly autonomous is thus a logical implication of the principles 
of equal respect, the priority of autonomy and perfectionist liberal principles. A number 
of policy applications for which these five principles are relevant are explored next.
ii) Applications
Besides education some areas which have especial relevance to attempts to promote a 
liberal character-ethics include law and order, healthcare, housing and planning, and 
leisure and culture. This section assesses the role of policy-making principles in guiding 
the development of significant autonomy by focusing on the role a liberal character-ethics 
can play within these policy areas. The following chapter will explore these themes in 
greater depth by developing a liberal education for significant autonomy.
Establishing a minimal social morality
The idea of a liberal character-ethics has great resonance within the sphere of law and 
order, most particularly with regard to how far the law should be used to enforce 
morality. The concept of moral character inevitably has a bearing on the decisions of 
juries to convict criminals. Indeed, judgements passed on habitual criminals are often 
dependent on the perception of their moral character and their future intention to repair 
their character and its reputation. This reflects their moral virtues of moral character. For 
instance, a recidivist criminal may be perfectly charming but have no discernible
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conscience. The idea of good character is also a central object of slander and libel cases. 
These generally cast doubt on the moral virtues of moral and individual character. For 
example, tabloid sensationalism of a sportsperson’s life raises questions about their 
integrity and personal reputation generally and as a representative of their particular 
social practice. However, the positive injunctions of a liberal character-ethics may add to 
these types of crime against the person, property or reputation of others, in particular, 
they may require that agents manifest social or civil virtues of moral character within 
social and public life.
Persistent or blatant non-display of certain social virtues of moral character may 
be regarded as a public nuisance or offence against decency, or (if in the workplace) 
serious breach of professional conduct.319 Perfectionist liberals must therefore consider in 
what circumstances and to what extent legal or coercive means could be used to ensure 
an acceptable level of excellence in the social virtues. To accomplish this they can refer 
to the liberal character-ethics and principles of policy-making presented in this chapter.
H.L.A.Hart argued that liberals are ‘committed to the general critical principle 
that the legal coercion by any society calls for justification as something prima facie 
objectionable to be tolerated only for the sake of some countervailing good.’320 Such a 
‘countervailing good’ in a liberal society is the moral weight attached to the right to and 
opportunity for significant autonomy. The priority of autonomy always frames legal 
coercion, but this can be supplemented by a perfectionist principle of valuable activities 
to establish grounds for intervention. So how would this apply to uncivil behaviour?
319 It has been suggested that the function of the law is to ‘preserve public order and decency, to protect 
the citizen from what is offensive or injurious and to provide sufficient safeguard against exploitation or 
corruption of others.’ Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (CMD 247), 
1947, HMSO.
320 H.L.A.Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality, Oxford University Press, 1963, p.20
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The limits to legal enforcement of moral conduct have often been conceptualised 
by using John Stuart Mill’s famous ‘harm’ principle, which stipulated that ‘the only 
purpose for which power can rightly be exercised over any member of a civilised 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.’321 The harm principle suggests 
that an agent’s actions can be impeded by legal sanctions where their actions threaten to 
harm the ‘interests’ of others ‘which either by express legal provision or by tacit 
understanding, ought to be considered as rights’.322 But how could perfectionist liberals 
understand the notion of offence here? Mill’s reflections on the idea of public offence are 
notoriously opaque. In an early passage of On Liberty he noted that the ‘liberty of the 
individual must be so far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other 
people.’323 Acts of public nuisance are later described as those ‘acts which, being directly 
injurious only to the agents themselves ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if 
done publicly are a violation of good manners, and, which coming thus within the 
category of offences against others, may rightly be prohibited.’324 These remarks indicate 
that uncivil conduct may be susceptible to coercive measures, but do not entirely clarify 
what counts as a ‘violation of good manners’. Nor do they reveal the circumstances in 
which prohibition may rightly be considered.
Hart illustrated the nature of public offence by highlighting the case of the 
bigamist who ‘is punished neither as irreligious nor as immoral but as a nuisance’ 
because the law is ‘concerned with the ofifensiveness of his public conduct.’325 Offence 
could thus be said to be constituted by a particular sort of blatancy, whereby an agent’s 
character-configuration not so much challenges as entirely disregards commonly held
321 J.S.Mill, ‘On Liberty’, p.14.
322 ibid., p.83.
323 ibid., p.62.
324 ibid., pp. 108-9.
325 H.L.A.Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality, p.41
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liberal aspirations for the achievement of character. However, certain types of ethical 
conduct may not be particularly laudable insofar as few reasons can be advanced by 
liberals on their behalf, but they may often be tolerated. So it would only be when an 
agent’s conduct flouts all consideration for being coherent, relevant and comprehensible 
within a liberal character-ethics that they come under sufficiently serious moral scrutiny 
to require the possible imposition of legal sanctions.
Legal punishment of blatantly offensive uncivil behaviour relating to character 
could be based on a harm principle. However, the harm principle is susceptible to very 
wide interpretation.326 A more general notion of public nuisance based on the publicly 
revisable prescriptions of a liberal character-ethics can delimit some degree of coercive 
legal intervention to promote certain virtues of civility. The harm principle may then 
function as a subsidiary principle for the interpretation of nuisance, which informs the 
limits that perfectionist liberals may wish to place on individual (not significant) 
autonomy.
Significant autonomy within a liberal society underpins individual flourishing, but 
can only do so for agents where they (a) are not impeded by other agents and (b) 
develop their moral and individual character autonomously. The giving of offence clearly 
impedes the right and opportunity of others to be significantly autonomous, but agents 
who behave offensively also exhibit a kind of moral negligence. By failing to adhere to 
the general prescriptions of a liberal character-ethics they reveal that they do not care for 
their own character or for their right to be able to be significantly autonomous. An agent 
who is ejected for making a ‘nuisance’ of themselves by shouting obscenities at the 
actors during the public performance of a play is not living well. In this instance, their
326 Joseph Raz notes that there are many ways in which a person’s actions can cause ‘harm’ to others 
which may not necessarily involve physical frustration of their freedom of action. Morality o f  Freedom, 
pp.413-9.
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right to significant autonomy has been curtailed because they have conducted themselves 
in a way which reflects especially poorly on their character. This example can also 
illuminate one further interesting aspect of the idea of public offence. That is, the right of 
certain officeholders to enforce ejection or other quasi-legal sanctions based on the 
general presumption that there are certain social virtues which agents can legally be 
expected to display in public places.
Perfectionist liberals can refer to the social virtues of moral character to 
conceptualise how public nuisance and a minimum social morality might be interpreted. 
They can also indicate how these can be alternatively interpreted within different 
specifiable social settings. Overall, there are four spheres of social and public life in 
which a citizen’s social virtues could be subject to legal constraints guided by liberal 
principles of policy-making: familial interactions; social interaction within associations in 
civil society; trade and the workplace; and public debate and discourse. The notion of 
public nuisance will enjoin that the perfectionist principle of valuable activities comes 
into play to ensure that the regulation of a social (or civil) minimum is tailored to these 
different spheres. The role of legal sanctions in establishing the conditions for significant 
autonomy will therefore shift for different cases of offence within different spheres, 
entailing at least (but no more than) minimal display of the virtues of civility across these 
spheres.327 The following section considers an interesting example of how self-regarding 
social virtues of individual character are also a central concern of liberal policy-making.
327 For instance, in the workplace the notion of offence may not be as rigorously applied as in public 
debates or the theatre.
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Public health
Good health and hygiene are self-regarding social virtues of individual character central 
to an agent’s ability to develop a distinctive character. The liberal democratic state can 
promote these virtues through water sanitation, sewage treatment and disposal, health 
and safety legislation, emergency and accident services, and a general health care system. 
But are basic framework conditions for public health all that perfectionist liberals would 
countenance?
For agents to develop significant autonomy, policies could be implemented which 
enable them (wherever possible) to look after themselves physically and financially.328 An 
agent of good character should be able to manifest appropriate self-regarding social 
virtues of individual character. They need to be healthy in order to be able to develop a 
distinctive character. This will entail maintaining good hygiene and cleanliness, 
reasonable physical fitness, good diet, and some degree of moderation. We have seen 
that a minimum social morality can require legal sanctions to secure the display of certain 
social virtues of moral character, but can the same sorts of sanctions be used to ensure 
the display of the social virtues of good health and hygiene?
Perfectionist liberals would not punish citizens who did not maintain good health 
nor would they advocate the coercion of unhygienic citizens into cleanliness. However, 
guided by the perfectionist principle of valuable activities, liberal states could implement 
policies which promoted healthy and hygienic behaviour and living. They could 
accomplish this either by introducing strong disincentives against unhealthy living styles, 
for instance, by taxing cigarettes heavily. Or by promoting healthy living and introducing 
initiatives to encourage citizens to become healthier, for instance, by providing free
328 For instance, social services generally endeavour to enable citizens with disabilities or elderly citizens 
to live in their homes, rather than be cared for in institutions.
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dietary advice or contraceptives. Furthermore, the state may in certain instances directly 
intervene to help citizens. It could remove children from parents unable to adequately 
care for their health or provide assistance for citizens diagnosed with mental health 
problems. In these cases intervention is justified to help citizens (and children) live well 
over the course of a lifetime. This notion that the condition of citizens’ lives is an object 
of care for the state could also inform housing and planning within liberal democracies.
Perfectionist liberals could endeavour to make sure that decisions relating to 
housing, transport, waste collection and disposal, and parks and open spaces are 
conducive to virtues associated with significant autonomy. To do so they would need to 
take account of many peripheral issues which bear on the lives of agents in liberal 
societies, such as crime, sustainability, pollution and fuel consumption. Policy-making in 
these areas could embrace the idea that significant autonomy flourishes within certain 
kinds of built and natural environment. And, the principle of equal respect implies that 
the state has a wide role in ensuring that the built and natural environments are 
conducive to significant autonomy in all localities. The cultural environment of a liberal 
society also makes a substantial contribution to the opportunities which all citizens have 
for living well.
A liberal cultural environment
Liberal principles of policy-making can apply to state involvement in maintaining a liberal 
cultural environment. Such an environment is characterised by very diverse social 
practices within which citizens can develop individual character. Many citizens who 
participate in these cultural activities will do so as active participants at the highest 
levels. However, many will do so as observers or participants at a lower level, or as a 
pastime or leisure pursuit. Moreover, all citizens are either potential participants or
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observers of cultural and leisure activities. The value attributable to leisure and culture in 
a liberal society is thus ultimately premised on individual flourishing.
A liberal character-ethics can apply to leisure and culture in a number of ways. 
First, the ethic of individual character enjoins that citizens should be physically and 
mentally healthy enough to develop a distinctive character. Sporting activities can give 
citizens valuable opportunities in this regard, and this may entail the state-provision of 
incentives for citizens to visit leisure centres or the direct sponsorship of certain sports. 
Second, the perfectionist liberal principle of intrinsically valuable activities implies that 
certain types of activity can make a particularly worthwhile contribution to significant 
autonomy. Third, the idea of significant autonomy implies standards of excellence within 
various social practices. This may mean that the liberal state should invest in national 
coaching for athletes or provide sponsorship of artistic or cultural activities (such as 
higher education and research). As a result, we might suggest that the liberal state can 
play a wide role in sustaining a vibrant liberal cultural environment.329 And the principle 
of equal respect presupposes that significant autonomy requires state support and 
involvement in the maintenance of that culture. Furthermore, the climate for a free press 
and media are a central feature of an autonomy-enhancing culture.
Diverse modes of flourishing raise questions about censorship and moral 
responsibility. We have already seen how individual citizens are expected to adhere to a 
minimum social morality. But how do the moral injunctions of a liberal character-ethics 
apply to cultural products such as the media, art, drama and film? Social practices that 
broadcast or represent character-configurations should maintain a respect for the equal 
right to be able to be significantly autonomous. So, for instance, plays and novels that
329 This may mean that the state invests in opera houses, music schools, writing grants, science museums 
and displays and research institutions and grants.
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portrayed homophobic, racist or sexist characters sympathetically could be proscribed by 
being deemed detrimental to the equal opportunity to living well in a liberal culture. A 
role for censorship could therefore be established on the basis that the development of 
character has some distinct liberal constraints, justifying restrictions on freedom of 
speech or expression subject to the principles of liberal policy-making and democratic 
deliberation. Indeed, perfectionist liberals may also be concerned that citizens will require 
guidance on how certain materials may impact on their character-development. They may 
thus choose to ban certain materials if they believe them to have an extremely pernicious 
influence on the character-configurations promoted within civil society.330
Overall, the role of a liberal character-ethics within liberal policy-making areas is 
an educational one, and it is to education we now turn in the following chapter, 
discussing at length the philosophical, political and policy issues relevant to an education 
for significant autonomy.
330 For instance, it is illegal to purchase or view certain types of pornography.
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Chapter 5: An Education for Significant Autonomy
Education is the critical field of policy in which the liberal state can seek to directly 
discipline the character of citizens. Schools are recognised to be key institutional means 
through which a range of virtues can be promoted, and the demands of a liberal 
character-ethics would be especially apparent in a certain type of liberal educational 
philosophy. Indeed, a liberal character-ethics can have its fullest expression within the 
sphere of education as it is one area in which liberals are commonly comfortable with 
using (quasi) coercive measures for encouraging specific sorts of desirable behaviour. In 
this chapter, the implications of a liberal character-ethics for education policy are 
conceptualised within a liberal education for significant autonomy, illustrating how this 
might be expressed in state schools. The chapter begins with a discussion of the 
conventional approach to character education. A radical alternative to state-led 
education is then examined, before the requirements of a state-led education for 
significant autonomy are described and analysed, with particular attention being given to 
the role of political education.
1. Conventional Character Education
The promotion of character in education has a long and venerable history. Its 
development has traditionally provided an underpinning ethos linking individual academic 
subjects to wider educational objectives. Within state schools, conventional character 
education has rested on the assumption that classrooms are an appropriate disciplinary 
setting in which certain virtues can be promoted. This section explores the roots of 
character education and assesses its development in the UK, reflecting on the 
conventional approach to its application in schools and its relationship with an education 
for significant autonomy.
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i) Character education in the United Kingdom
The concept of character has been a prominent feature of education policy and discourse 
in the UK during the past two centuries. As we have seen, a concern for the moral 
character of citizens accompanied the growth of capitalism, the industrial class system 
and the modem British state. In this context, education and schooling came to play a 
crucial role in mobilising and moralising mass society.331 The place of character 
development within the educational philosophy of the time reflected these social and 
political developments and the rise of liberalism. In particular, nineteenth-century liberals 
adapted their educational prescriptions from those found in classical antiquity.
Roots o f character-education
Theories of character-education are initially drawn from the philosophical discussions of 
the Ancient Greeks. For Plato, education was needed to shape the character of children. 
Poets and other teachers should promote appropriate roles by seeking to ‘speak in the 
style of a good man’ and adhering to ‘moral principles in their stories’.332 Indeed, ‘a very 
great deal of importance should be placed upon ensuring that the first stories... [children] 
hear are best adapted for their moral improvement.’333 Furthermore, every social artefact 
and institution which children came into contact with could influence the development of 
their moral character. The sweep of Platonic education was therefore vast, comprising an 
enormous variety of influences that could shape the moral dispositions of the human
331 E.Hobsbawm, The Age o f Empire, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1987, pp. 149-50.
332 Plato, Republic, pp. 91-5.
333 ibid., p.73. Citizens in the ideal polity are unlikely to wish that children ‘listen to any old stories, 
made up by just anyone, and to take into their minds views which, on the whole, contradict those we’ll 
want them to have as adults’, ibid., pp.71-2.
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psyche.334 The importance of character-formation and an appropriate education was also 
recognised by subsequent Greek philosophers.
Aristotle contended that humans had ‘a character to work on that has some 
affinity to virtue’, but that ‘a right training for goodness from an early age’ was 
essential.335 Within such training an education for civic virtue would be indispensable. 
This presupposed a wide variety of educational experiences in which children (and 
adults) could be socialised into being of good moral character by following laws, 
participating in politics and discussing and contemplating the nature of the good life. 
They could also learn what means were most effective in promulgating good moral 
character by assuming ‘the role of legislator’. In turn, acquiring knowledge o f ‘the art of 
legislation’ could deepen each citizen’s capacity to contribute towards the character of 
their fellows (especially, that of their own children).336
Eventually, the educational precepts and debates of Plato, Aristotle and 
subsequent Greek philosophers came to be formulated within an orthodox ‘Hellenistic 
education’. This supplemented moral and civic education with a ‘general education’ in 
grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music and gymnastics. 
Such a general education was justified as ‘a means of moulding human character in 
accordance with an ideal,’ and would later influence Roman schemes of education.337 For 
Greek and Roman thinkers and statesmen alike, the development of character was thus 
inherent in virtuous conduct and good citizenship, with the health of the state often seen 
to be dependent on its successful inculcation. Later, as we have seen, early liberals such
334 Poets, artisans and craftsmen had a responsibility to ensure that ‘the young people of our community 
can live in a salubrious region where everything is beneficial and where their eyes and ears meet no 
influences except those of fine works of art, whose effect is like a breeze which brings health from 
favourable regions, and which imperceptibly guides them, from childhood onwards’, ibid., p. 100
335 Aristotle, Ethics, p.337.
336 ibid., pp.338-9.
337 E.B.Castle, Ancient Education and Today, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1961, pp. 102, 133-8.
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as John Locke restated the belief that the development of moral character was the first 
principle of a child’s education.338 Indeed, a stress on character has been a consistent 
feature of the development of educational thought and practice in the UK.
Character-education in British schools
The historical evolution of character-education in British schools can be directly traced 
to two interrelated sources. First, the rise of industrial capitalism lead to a need for a 
disciplined, literate and numerate workforce whose attitudes and actions would 
contribute to the common good without undermining the stability of the liberal order and 
capitalist economy. Second, the nineteenth-century Public School stress on character- 
training became the accepted model for state schooling.339 The 1904 Board of Education 
code of practice emphasised that the ‘purpose of the Public Elementary School is to form 
and strengthen the character and to develop the intelligence of the children entrusted to 
it.’340 Although character-education was strongly tied to the duties of patriotic 
citizenship, it also had a broader meaning implying moral socialisation within the 
classroom. Thus, the educational reformer William Temple argued that the ‘main ground 
[for schooling] is the necessity of providing a social life or community in which the 
individual may feel that he has a real share and for which he may feel some genuine 
responsibility.’341
Character-education within schools was an essential means for preparing children 
for the moral demands placed on them by society. Given that the idea of character 
education was drawn largely from the ‘liberal’ education to induct young men from the 
upper-classes in Ancient Greece and Rome into traditional values and practices it is
338 J.Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education.
339 W.O.Lester Smith, Education: An Introductory Survey, Hannondsworth, Penguin, 1957, p.24.
340 Education 1900-50, Cmd.8244, HMSO, 1951, p.36 quoted in ibid., p.25
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perhaps no surprise that its aspirations were often interpreted very conservatively.342 
Traditional academic disciplines such as grammar, music, poetry, maths and rhetoric 
were applied with great enthusiasm in most of the developing Western European 
education systems, underpinning the types of curriculum found in secondary schools. In 
British schools, the influence of this classical model of education resonated with the 
growth of the Empire and the promotion of patriotic character. It also embraced a 
number of key pedagogical approaches conventionally associated with character- 
development. This approach to character education is outlined next.
ii) Character education: the conventional approach
The conventional approach to character education in the UK emerged during the
nineteenth century and has continued to influence different aspects of education in state
schools. There are four key pedagogical dimensions of the conventional approach to 
character-education: physical education, direct instruction, teaching by example and the 
school ethos. Evaluation of the philosophy behind each of these dimensions and how 
they have influenced the school curriculum is important for perfectionist liberals seeking 
to assess the relationship between a conventional character education and a liberal 
education for significant autonomy.
Physical Education
The importance placed by the Ancient Greeks on gymnastics and sport for the 
development of character is well-known. Many liberal philosophers of education have 
also regarded the training of the body and its physical health as the primary requirement
341 William Temple and his Message, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1946, p.228 quoted in ibid., p.26.
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for moral development. For instance, John Locke stated that good health was necessary 
to ‘our business and happiness’, because we must be able to endure the ‘hardships and 
fatigue’ inherent in human life. Physical training, frugal living and a good diet could 
enable agents to cope with the stresses of life. Due care for the body was essential ‘so 
that it may be able to obey and execute the orders of the mind.’ 343 Proponents of 
conventional character education believe that if a child does not learn to care for their 
physical health then there is little hope that they will be able to care for their moral well­
being.
The stress placed on health education as an important preliminary for character- 
education is frequently allied to the facility of physical education and sporting activities. 
While not all educationalists view the competitive aspects of sport and games 
positively,344 the conventional approach to character education places a great deal of 
emphasis on the values which they are said to foster. In particular, physical education is a 
feature of a conventional character education because it is thought to promote a healthy 
attitude to the vicissitudes of life. Playing sport provides an ideal opportunity for children 
to learn about success and failure, teamwork, industry, determination, fair play, rule- 
following and so on.
Physical education in British schools originated in the patriotic character 
education followed in Victorian schools, where sporting virtues were held to be crucial 
to the building of the empire. Leadership on the playing field was here assumed to 
translate to leadership in ‘industry, business, government and the military.’ And, faith in 
the character-building nature of these sports was so great that they were often
342 For instance, Matthew Arnold preached the virtues of promoting ‘the best that has been thought and 
said’. M. Arnold, ‘The Function of Criticism’, in M. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy and Other Writings, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 50.
343 J.Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, pp. 10-25.
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‘organised, managed and officiated by the pupils.’345 However, there is no reason to 
suggest that the rules, rule-following or fair play in sport promote intrinsically valuable 
dispositions. For instance, professional sportspeople often seek to test the boundaries of 
the rules and the spirit of games in order to win. Certain features of sport (such as 
competition, nerve, skill and so on) which are inherent in the development of ‘strong’ 
character may be reflected in successful participation in competitive activities as morally 
vacuous as Russian roulette.
Sport does not necessarily presuppose care for or consideration of the moral 
well-being of one’s opponent. In fact, it often highlights the need for ruthlessness 
towards one’s competitors if one is to achieve victory or excellence. This could be 
problematic for a liberal education for significant autonomy. On the sporting field, the 
virtues central to victory may also be appropriated legitimately for the humiliation of an 
opponent. This may occasionally be mirrored in other social practices where competition 
or ruthlessness is required, but there is no liberal ethical grounding for teaching virtues of 
success above virtues of beneficence and benevolence.
In an education for significant autonomy, physical educators would therefore be 
faced with a great responsibility to ensure that participation in sporting activities does 
not undermine the development of the virtues of moral character by carefully monitoring 
the attitudes and actions of participants. In particular, pupils should display 
sportsmanship and respect for their fellow competitors, building a sense of shared 
responsibility which is inclusive of all their fellows. Physical education would perhaps be 
a more appropriate device for promoting virtues of individual character by stressing that 
sport and games are valuable features of living well. Indeed, such games have intrinsic
344 D.Eder and S.Parker, ‘The Cultural Production and Reproduction of Gender: the Effect of
Extracurricular Activities on Peer-Group Culture’, Sociology o f Education, vol.60, July, 200-13.
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value as enjoyable or entertaining activities which can contribute to an agent’s distinctive 
character. The values of play and enjoyment in sport and games are hence susceptible to 
development as much as values associated with sportsmanship. Although a liberal 
education for significant autonomy would not seek to coerce children to participate in 
sport, direct instruction has traditionally been an important aspect of promoting values 
through physical education. In fact, it is a central pedagogical dimension of teaching and 
learning within a conventional character education.
Direct Instruction
The importance of direct instruction in the moral virtues has been recognised by many 
educational thinkers.346 In British schools, direct teaching of moral virtues has played a 
major role within a conventional character education. Such instruction within 
conventional character education has often been authoritarian, class-based and Christian 
in orientation. As we saw in Chapter Two, Foucault highlighted that Christian schools 
were the progenitors of modem character education because they inaugurated the idea of 
the classroom as a ‘space of ethical formation’.347 And for proponents of conventional 
character education, the authority of the teacher in the classroom is absolute. Although 
liberals -  contra their critics -  tend not to want undermine authority, they would be 
concerned that direct instruction could hamper the development of autonomy.
345 R.Bailey, ‘The Value and Values of Physical Education and Sport’, in R.Bailey ed., Teaching Values 
and Citizenship Across the Curriculum, London, Kogan Page, 2000, p. 106.
346 W.Kilpatrick, Why Johnny Can’t Tell Right from Wrong: Moral Illiteracy and the Case for 
Character Education, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1992; T.Lickona, ‘Eleven Principles of Character 
Education’, Journal o f Moral Education, vol.25, no.l, pp.93-100.
347 1.Hunter, ‘Assembling the School’, pp. 159-61.
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On the whole, programmes of direct moral instruction in a conventional character 
education have adhered to an ‘objectivist’ account of moral values.348 That is, they hold 
that certain virtues of character can and should be taught because it can be objectively 
known that they constitute good moral behaviour. However, the existence of such 
metaphysical attributes has been disputed here. As a result, an education for significant 
autonomy would not be as rigidly prescriptive as a conventional character education. 
This would not mean that direct moral instruction would be totally proscribed within a 
liberal education rather it would require careful delimitation for it to be conducive to the 
ability to be significantly autonomous. Perfectionist liberals would, therefore, sanction 
direct instruction only in those virtues which are fundamental to the minimal 
requirements of character (such as restraint) on the grounds that they are basic to the 
ways in which agents can constitute themselves as significantly autonomous.
In a liberal education for significant autonomy, the liberal moral virtues which 
might require direct instruction would be those associated with the minimal requirements 
of good moral character and good citizenship. These are necessary framework conditions 
for the possibility of developing significant autonomy. Promotion of other liberal virtues, 
such as courage, beneficence and so on, is clearly inherent in an education for significant 
autonomy. Nevertheless, direct moral instruction in these would not proceed further than 
advice, exhortation or elicitation within the classroom or on the playing field. By 
contrast, in a conventional character-education direct instruction in these sorts of moral 
virtue is regarded as essential. This is also supplemented by very great stress on the 
example set by teachers.
348 M.Bottery, ‘Values Education’, in R.Bailey ed., Teaching Values and Citizenship Across the 
Curriculum, p.4.
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Teaching by example
A conventional character education is based firmly on the continual strict disciplining of 
pupil’s. The impact of the example set by teachers in classrooms in promoting 
appropriate values and attitudes relates to two key aspects of this rigorous process of 
character-development. First, that behaviour can be learned from role models, and 
second, that role-modelling is an effective and appropriate means for transmitting virtues 
of character. Supporters of role-modelling, claim that it initially influences behaviour at 
an unconscious level with neither teachers nor pupils fully aware of any modification of 
their conduct.349 The growth of this ‘expressive morality’ can then encompass the whole 
range of communication between teachers and pupils, comprising the care, attention and 
integrity with which the relationships between pupils and teachers are conducted. This is 
especially important because children are thought to imbibe key moral virtues through 
the process of establishing supportive relationships with others. In this the role of the 
teacher and other adult mentors (or indeed peer mentors) is clearly central.
Teachers (and other role models) must be fit to carry out the responsibility for 
establishing supportive relationships with children during lesson-time and throughout 
school life.350 Indeed, research into the psychology of learning has indicated that children 
respond best to and enjoy learning with teachers whose moral qualities they admire or 
respect.351 Teachers, of course, undergo training designed to assist them in embodying 
appropriate moral conduct within their professional lives. Such training also forms a 
useful springboard for promoting a shared commitment to the development of character
349 P. W. Jackson, R.E.Boostrom and D.T.Hansen, The Moral Life o f  Schools, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 
1993, pp.29-42.
350 As Jackson notes, not only do pupils have to observe rules of good conduct in classrooms, but 
teachers are also expected to be ‘on their good behaviour’. P. W. Jackson, ‘The Enactment of the Moral in 
What Teachers Do’, Curriculum Inquiry, vol.22, no.4, 1992, p.404.
351 D.Hayes, ‘The Good, the Bad, the Ugly and the Memorable: A Retrospective of Pupil-Teacher 
Relationships’, Education 3-13, vol.21, no.l, pp.53-9.
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in schools. So a conventional character education presumes some degree of moral 
reinforcement via the transmission of appropriate values, which also implies a mutual 
readjustment to the moral sympathies of all the participants in school life. Such a mutual 
morality develops through the example set by teachers and pupils, with teachers, of 
course, expected to take the lead role. It may also emerge as part of a deliberate 
development of shared understandings between teachers and pupils in class lessons and 
throughout the school.352
An education for significant autonomy could draw on these proposals as it seeks 
to understand the subtle processes by which the liberal virtues may be promoted. In 
particular, the importance of encouraging mutual sympathy could provide pupils with a 
practical schooling in many of the virtues of moral character. However, perfectionist 
liberals would be careful to ensure that the example set by teachers elicited the 
development of autonomy rather than a dull conformity. This means that pupils will have 
greater responsibility for promoting each other’s character-development in a liberal 
education for significant autonomy. The stress on the growth of a mutual morality also 
leads us to a further pedagogical dimension of conventional character education.
The School ethos
In a conventional character-education, the school ethos underpins the values and virtues 
transmitted in and outside the classrooms. Although every school has its own peculiar 
‘moral climate’, a conventional character education rests on a particular view of the 
appropriate school ethos.353 This view and its implementation are often referred to as the
352 D.T.Hansen, ‘From Role to Person: the Moral Layeredness of Classroom Teaching’, in American 
Educational Research Journal, vol.30, no.4, 1992, pp.651-67.
353 Halstead and Taylor note that ‘the moral climate’ of the school can ensure that ‘character 
development is integrated into every aspect of the daily life and relationships of the school.’
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‘hidden curriculum’. The ‘hidden curriculum’ comprises extra-curricular conscious and 
semi-conscious processes associated with socialisation in schools which can be regarded 
as ‘symbolic aspects of the school environment’. These ‘symbolic aspects’ include rules, 
rituals and routines such as: assemblies, inter and intra scholastic competition, the school 
motto and colours, recognition for outstanding conduct or achievement, and policies 
regarding homework, discipline and safety. They will also include documents such as: 
yearbooks, newspapers and newsletters, school handbooks, mission statements, and 
reports on school community projects.354 The form of the hidden curriculum is likely to 
be relatively similar for a conventional character education and an education for 
significant autonomy. However, there will be major differences in the content of the 
respective curricula, with an education for significant autonomy focusing on the 
autonomous development of character.
While the impact of the school ethos on character, like that of role models, is to 
some extent unconscious, it is also susceptible to leadership in a variety of areas. 
Leadership strategies acceptable within an education for significant autonomy might 
include: proactive community relations, internal pupil involvement in decision-making, 
agreed whole-school discipline and conflict resolution procedures, and flexible 
management styles. All these measures are sensitive to ideological pressures. And, for 
this reason, attention has consistently been paid to the various modes of management 
used in schools. Strong top-down leadership is generally presumed within conventional 
character education, but in an education for significant autonomy the school ethos should 
reflect a more democratic approach which accords greater respect for the implications of 
the equal right to significant autonomy.
J.M.Halstead and M.J.Taylor, The Development o f  Values, Attitudes and personal Qualities: A Review 
o f Recent Research, Slough, National Foundation for Educational Research, 2000, p. 3.
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As we have seen, the conventional approach to character education embraces a 
comprehensive view of the role of education in promoting a conception of the good life. 
Nevertheless, it may or may not seek to advance a liberal conception of the good life or 
be influenced by the right to be able to be significantly autonomous. Recognising that 
significant autonomy is characteristic of a liberal society therefore generates specific 
pedagogical and institutional concerns for liberals. Broadly speaking, these focus on 
concerns for the self-development presupposed by the priority of autonomy. The overly 
authoritarian nature of learning within a conventional character education, its faith in the 
constitutive power of physical education and a conservative hidden curriculum, would 
make it an unsuitable basis for promoting significant autonomy. One possible solution to 
the dilemma posed by these tensions between autonomy and authority could be to 
radically restructure education to facilitate self-chosen learning pathways.
2. A Radical Alternative to Character Education
During the 1960s, the growth of egalitarian social policies and the perceived affluence of 
Western democracies spurred re-evaluation of the purposes and methods of state 
schooling. Progressive educationalists argued that conventional character-oriented 
pedagogy was excessively authoritarian, undemocratic and did not elicit the individual 
potential of children. In particular, de-schoolers believed that the release of a child’s 
individual abilities could only be achieved in an education system devoid of conventional 
authority, control, discipline and ‘book-learning’. This radical alternative to conventional 
character education in schools has especial relevance for liberals committed to the right 
to be able to be significantly autonomous, because its principles were guided by an
354 D.J. Wren, ‘School Culture: Exploring the Hidden Curriculum’, Adolescence, vol.34, no. 135, 1999, 
pp.595-6.
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emphasis on individual freedom. The following section describes the general nature of 
progressive education, before outlining de-schooling as an educational philosophy. The 
adequacy of de-schooling as an alternative approach to an education for significant 
autonomy is then discussed.
i) Progressive education
The central aspect of progressive philosophy of education is the notion that pupils should 
be given the opportunity to learn through play and personal exploration. In this respect, 
education could encourage ‘discovery learning’ through ‘child-centred’ methods, rather 
than direct moral instruction or the structured delivery of a set of curriculum-centred 
competencies. While enthusiasm for such a progressive view of education has never 
superseded reliance upon conventional pedagogical methods in Western democracies, its 
philosophy has profoundly affected educational debate, giving rise to a number of 
experimental schools in the UK dedicated to its proposals.355 It was also reflected in the 
radical prescriptions of the de-schooling educationalists. The origins and influence of 
progressive education and its general tenets provide an indication of the appeal of de­
schooling as an educational philosophy.
Origins and influence
The starting-point for progressive educational doctrines is generally recognised to be 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Emile. In this work he declared the importance of a child- 
centred pedagogy to the process of learning. Rousseau argued that children should be 
encouraged by tutors or guides to discover things for themselves rather then be directly
355 For instance, Sands School in Devon, St.Christopher’s School in Hertfordshire and Summerhill 
School in Suffolk.
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instructed in blocks of knowledge. Hitherto schools had simply replicated the hierarchies 
and injustices of existing social systems. Tutors adhering to Rousseauian principles could 
enable pupils to overcome these and finally achieve genuine freedom by becoming healthy, 
independent, morally autonomous adults. To treat a child as a moral being with the potential 
for autonomy, educators should therefore ‘[l]ove childhood; promote its games, its pleasure, 
its amiable instinct’.356 Emile thus focused on the value of learning through discoveiy, in 
particular, on how children are capable of learning for themselves the physical and moral 
boundaries which inevitably constrain freedom.357 Nevertheless, at the centre of Rousseau’s 
educational philosophy is the ‘Emile paradox’. While it was only through discovery that Emile 
learnt his physical and moral boundaries, he required very careful supervision and even 
manipulation of his processes of discovery. In other words, children have to learn how to be 
autonomous under the guidance of suitable educators. How else could it be guaranteed that 
moral corruption would be circumvented? An education for freedom therefore required subtle 
structuring to achieve its aims.
Twentieth-century progressive educationalists have drawn inspiration from Rousseau 
but largely rejected the idea that the ‘Emile paradox’ is not a paradox at all and that autonomy 
must be taught -  something which our quasi-Foucauldian approach makes plain. For 
progressive educationalists, the ‘Emile paradox’ signifies that children can never be 
taught genuine autonomy where there is the involvement of educators. The flourishing of 
each child could therefore only be assured through the most minimal pedagogical 
practices. Such radical views took root in Western democracies during the 1960s in 
social circumstances which reflected a growth in demands for individual freedom and 
fulfilment. In the UK, improved social and economic conditions coupled with expansions
356 J.J.Rousseau, Emile, pp.78-9.
357 Indeed, Rousseau argued that this principle of freedom ‘need only be applied to childhood for all the rules 
of education to flow from it’, ibid., p.84.
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in the rights of citizenship led to the introduction of comprehensive schooling to promote 
equality of opportunity. As a result, education policy-makers explored many new ideas, 
eventually developing serious proposals based on selected progressive educational 
principles. These were most succinctly expressed in the Plowden Report in 1967.358
The Plowden report examined the provision of Primary education in England, 
making a variety of radical recommendations based on the proposition that the ‘best 
preparation for being a happy or useful man or woman is to live fully as a child’.359 The 
primary school should therefore enable:
children to be themselves and to develop in the way and at the pace 
appropriate to them. It tries to equalise opportunities and to compensate for 
handicaps. It lays special stress on individual discovery, on first hand experience 
and on opportunities for creative work. It insists that knowledge does not fall 
into neatly separate compartments and that work and play are not opposite but 
complementary.360
Although the report was critical of the fashionable nature of much child-centred 
philosophy, it sought to applaud primary schools and teachers who were adopting 
innovative methods in classrooms, especially those promoting discovery learning.361 The 
types of principles noted in the Plowden report were later applied by supportive 
practitioners of progressive pedagogy and given rigorous exposition and development by 
progressive educationalists, especially the de-schoolers.
General principles o f progressive education
Progressive education is generally associated with child-centredness and discovery 
learning. This ‘liberality’ towards children echoes aspects of the liberal preoccupation
358 Central Advisory Council for Education (CACE), Children and their Primary Schools (The Plowden 
Report), London, Dept, of Education and Science, 1967.
359 ibid., p. 188.
360 ibid., p. 187.
361 In this, the report stressed that educational theory should emerge from teachers’ ‘astringent 
intellectual scrutiny’ of their own practice, ibid., p.201.
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with autonomy. Indeed, there are two key aspects within progressive education which 
reflect aspirations many liberals associate with autonomy: (i) the libertarian aspect which 
stresses individual freedom - that children should be free to learn as they please; and (ii) 
the democratic aspect which stresses social co-operation - that every child would 
develop best when the conditions for self-education are established co-operatively for all 
potential learners. For progressive educationalists, both aspects are united in the notion 
that children have an entitlement to be encouraged to discover truth for themselves, 
whether individually or in groups.
The stress on freedom and self-education has led progressive educationalists to 
be affected by many aspects of thought not always associated with liberalism (such as 
romanticism and phenomenology). In particular, existential notions of individual 
authenticity heavily influenced the libertarian strand of progressive education, suggesting 
that the personal growth and individuality of children should be a process of self- 
creation. These notions of self-creation and authenticity also impacted on the 
development of the cooperative aspect of progressive education. This aspect has a very 
strong affinity with the democratic educational philosophy of John Dewey, which stands 
in tension with education for self-creation, especially his notion of learning through 
shared experience. For Dewey, this implied that children should learn in a cooperative 
fashion, viewing it as a means to arrive at their own solutions - a proposal which may 
have a role in a liberal education for significant autonomy.362 However, some progressive 
educationalists extended cooperative principles to include ownership of learning and 
development itself. The key pedagogical principles of progressive education therefore 
unite libertarian and democratic prescriptions for the development of individuality.
362 J.Dewey, Experience and Education, London, Collier Books, 1963.
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Generic principles of progressive pedagogy would include:
(a) Child-centredness (i.e. an individualised curriculum);
(b) Relevance (e.g. to working class and ethnic minority children);
(c) The teacher as a guide rather than an instructor;
(d) Discovery learning;
(e) No competitive testing;
(f) An emphasis on co-operation and group work;
(g) An overall aim of individual flourishing.363
These broad principles highlight that the key aim inherent in the thought of progressive 
educationalists centres on the freedom of the child within their cooperative relations with 
their fellows. This is an aim which was often extended to the educational choices of 
children and Dewey’s concern with the democratisation of schools and classrooms.
Although the liberal credentials of progressive education reside in its primary7 
interest in the fulfilment of individual potential, we can observe that progressive 
education has most in common with social democratic and anarchistic traditions of 
cooperative education. Application of its principles to state education systems would 
inevitably have many profound implications for liberal democracy and liberal society. 
Those implications were wholeheartedly endorsed by those progressive educationalists 
who wished to totally de-institutionalise education.
ii) De-institutionalising education
The Plowden report highlighted the crucial importance of progressive pedagogies at the 
primary level. Nevertheless, many radical educationalists also suggested that the 
principles of progressive education should be rigorously applied at the secondary level 
and beyond. The most radical reflections on the introduction of progressive principles 
within the education system can be found in the work of the ‘de-schooling’ educational
363 Adapted from D.Hill, New Labour and Education: Policy, Ideology and the Third Way, London, 
Tufnell Press, 1999, p. 16.
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thinkers, such as Paul Goodman, Ivan Illich, and Everett Reimer.364 These progressive 
educationalists drew up a manifesto for the institutional change necessary to promote 
alternative educational principles, including the ‘de-schooling’ of society. Such proposals 
were based on the view that state schools simply could not accommodate free learning 
and self-education and so should be disbanded.
Free learning and self-education
Progressive educationalists define education as a process of individual or co-operative 
self-learning. As we have seen, this is derived from the fundamental value they attribute 
to individual freedom. Educationally speaking, ‘doing one’s own thing’ is thus a means 
for children to come to their own understanding of how their capabilities can best be 
adapted to reflect their personality. Conventional character education obviated the 
possibility of personal growth, because it did not accommodate free or discovery 
learning. Learning in state schools took place only in very structured circumstances 
within primary and secondary schools. By focusing on instruction as the most 
appropriate means for stimulating personal growth and learning, conventional character 
education also undermined the flourishing of individual potential. In particular, self- 
education was impossible in state schools because ‘reliance on institutional treatment’ in 
schools rendered ‘independent accomplishment suspect’. Indeed, de-schoolers argued 
that ‘every step in learning’ was made to fit ‘previously approved measures of social 
control’.365 Only through discovery learning could children begin the process of self- 
education upon which their freedom would depend.
364 Here I refer to the work of Illich as representative of the de-schooling theorists.
365 I.Illich, Deschooling Society, London, Calder and Boyars, 1971, pp. 10, 19.
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Ivan Illich stated that self-education was accomplished through the ‘open-ended, 
exploratory use of acquired skills’.366 This exploratory process had three aspects. First, it 
was integral to the efforts of each child to develop an understanding of their own nature, 
potential and interests. Second, it was inherent in the growth of their knowledge and 
understanding about the natural and social worlds. Third, it was the vital precursor to 
grasping the nature of the inequalities that exist within a liberal capitalist society. 
Ultimately, discovery learning and self-education were envisaged as radical devices for 
empowering less-advantaged children.
Progressive pedagogical methods could subvert the inequities of the existing 
social system because they would attribute equal weight to the learning choices and 
development of each individual child. Furthermore, if resources were directed towards 
enabling any child to pursue their interests how, when and where they chose, the 
curriculum would be democratised by rendering attainment individual or co-operative 
rather than comparative and competitive. Establishing opportunities for free learning and 
self-education could thereby secure commitment to deeper forms and levels of personal 
achievement and fulfilment, particularly amongst pupils from less-advantaged 
backgrounds. Commitment to the equal development of every child was a direct 
challenge to the replication of the class structure by schools. And, de-schooling 
educationalists believed that this could be best effected by totally de-institutionalising 
education in Western societies.
De-schooling democracies
De-schooling educationalists argued that ‘school systems’ in liberal democracies were 
based on a myth that they promoted meritocracy and equal opportunity. In reality, they
366 ibid., p.24.
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• 367equipped ‘man for disciplined consumption’ and wage labour in a capitalist economy. 
State schooling thus actually marginalised those disadvantaged groups who were 
supposed to gain the most from mass education. By increasing the reliance of the 
underprivileged on ‘institutional care’ the state-provision of education had added ‘a new 
dimension’ to their ‘helplessness’.368 The pace and style of learning in schools also 
alienated many pupils from less advantaged backgrounds who lacked the educational 
opportunities at home that were ‘casually available to the middle-class child.’369 As a 
result, state schools had seriously damaged the egalitarian values and outcomes to which 
they nominally aspired. To establish equal opportunities for free learning and self- 
education, de-schooling educationalists (such as Illich) argued that Western democracies 
should be ‘de-schooled’.
Schools were not only hierarchical and authoritarian; they also appropriated all 
the educational resources within society to an extent that ‘discourages other institutions 
from assuming educational tasks. ’ ‘Work, leisure, politics, city living and even family life 
depend on schools for the habits and knowledge they presuppose, instead of becoming 
themselves the means of education.’370 For de-schoolers, self-education through 
discovery learning could only be made meaningful and effective where schooling was 
thoroughly unstructured and ‘dissociated from obligatory attendance.’371
De-schoolers believed that self-education was dependent on freely chosen 
learning relationships between educational guides and learners. To establish such 
relationships, educators (and educational networks) should help match ‘partners to meet
367 ibid., pp.50-1.
368 The possibilities for self-education were also damaged by rendering the disadvantaged ‘increasingly 
incapable of organising their own lives around their own experiences and resources within their own 
communities.’ ibid., p. 12. In fact, the ‘mere existence of schools discourages and disables the poor from 
taking control of their own learning.’ ibid., p. 15.
369 ibid., p. 14.
370 ibid., pp. 15-6.
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so that learning can take place.’ Schools, universities and other structured learning 
environments were not appropriate places for ‘matching people’ because they were tied 
to courses that prevented groups of peers from freely enquiring about the intellectual 
issues which interested them. The curricula for courses were either determined by 
governments, state education departments or university lecturers. This gridlock resulted 
in resources being earmarked to ‘purchase the time and motivation of a limited number
372of people to take up predetermined problems in a ritually defined setting.’ By contrast, 
the de-schoolers wished to establish the availability of a more fluid learning environment, 
where facilitators and participants could choose to generate shared areas of interest. The 
most ‘radical alternative to school would be a network or service which gave each man 
the same opportunity to share his current concern with others motivated by the same 
concern.’ Opportunities for the ‘exploratory and creative use of skills’ should therefore 
be thrown open to the market and made freely available by ‘customer-led’ facilitators. 
The guiding principle of free and equal educational opportunity within a de-schooled 
society was therefore that ‘education for all means education by all.’373
The radical nature of de-schooling proposals requires that perfectionist liberals 
committed to an education for significant autonomy pay close attention to how they 
match their normative commitments. Indeed, there are a great many concerns about the 
theoretical cogency and practical applicability of the principles and recommendations of 
de-schooling.
371 ibid., p.24.
372 ibid., pp.24-6.
373 ibid., pp.21-9.
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iii) Conceptual and practical issues for de-schooling
De-schooling is a radical social libertarian philosophy of education. Ideas such as 
discovery learning, no competition or examinations and non-compulsory attendance in 
schools have serious implications for other aspects of society and government policy. At 
both the primary and secondary levels of education, rigorous application of de-schooling 
principles would require more than tinkering with current pedagogy. There are therefore 
a range of considerable theoretical and practical complexities associated with the 
adoption of the de-schoolers ideas in liberal democracies.
Autonomy and social support
Progressive education is a highly principled approach to revolutionising the education of 
children in Western democracies, drawing inspiration from many of the values inherent in 
liberal societies, especially the value of individual freedom. However, we have seen that 
significant autonomy in liberal societies is not simply coterminous with freedom from 
constraints. Autonomy can only contribute to individual flourishing in liberal societies 
where it is significant. The malleability of the self makes it possible for legitimate 
intervention by democratically accountable bodies to help agents autonomously develop 
their character. This requires the careful promotion of the virtues inherent in the ability to 
become significantly autonomous within an appropriate learning environment.
Although children usually have a degree of freedom when they play, significant 
autonomy is not a necessary feature of their development. Significant autonomy implies 
the disciplining of character rather than its impromptu blossoming as progressive 
educationalists have suggested. It is structured by a wide range of liberal virtues within 
diverse social activities and practices. The play of children in unconstrained environments 
is less likely to contribute to their ability to discipline their character and so would not be
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an appropriate grounding for significant autonomy - though it may be viewed as an 
intrinsically valuable feature of a liberal concept of childhood. The supposition that 
freedom, discovery and play could deliver agents capable of being autonomous in a 
manner conducive to individual flourishing in a liberal society is perhaps the most 
questionable aspect of progressive education. Moreover, it implies a metaphysical notion 
of the inevitable autonomous realisation of innate potentials. As we have noted, the 
‘Emile paradox’ is not really a paradox at all. It highlights that children can only learn to 
become significantly autonomous through the tutelage of dedicated teachers. In quasi- 
Foucauldian terms, there is no paradox in this because the inculcation of technologies of 
the self is necessary for agents to become significantly autonomous. Progressive 
strategies may be appropriate for certain aspects of early education or the provision of 
community education, but they are unlikely to promote the equal opportunity to develop 
moral and individual character. Liberals would also doubt that de-schooling could 
receive legitimacy and social support from parents or children themselves. Even if the 
de-schoolers educational principles were the ideal philosophical representation of an 
education for significant autonomy, it may not be practicable to implement such a 
demanding pedagogy in every school.
The practical recommendations of de-schoolers raise a whole host of questions to 
which perfectionist liberals require coherent answers. In a liberal democracy, 
justifications for the introduction of such a progressive educational manifesto would rest 
on democratic foundations, but what democratic procedures exist to legitimise a mandate 
for wholesale change to progressive pedagogy or de-schooling? And, who would retain 
the mandate on which such change would be based? Should children be consulted on the 
educational arrangements of society? Would all voters have an equal right to vote on the 
issue or should only parents or prospective parents be accorded this right? Or teachers?
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Moreover, could voters later renege on their decision and reintroduce state-sponsored 
schooling? These questions illustrate both that it is unlikely that a liberal state would be 
able to de-school society without an overwhelming democratic mandate, and, that even 
with such a mandate it would be unlikely to de-institutionalise education. Indeed, it is 
clear that if de-schooling failed, ‘re-schooling’ would prove an extremely costly and 
damaging exercise. Nonetheless, if perfectionist liberals were serious about certain 
progressive educational ideals (such as self-education and discovery learning), they could 
be adapted to fit with certain normative commitments associated with a liberal education 
for significant autonomy, such as promoting individual character. Experimenting with 
partial de-schooling could also be a means for responding to social diversity.374
In certain respects many neo-liberal ideas about educational choice are akin to the 
de-schoolers notion that ‘one size’ does not fit all in education. For instance, recent 
proposals in the UK for education vouchers mirror proposals for education credits made 
by the de-schoolers. But even if society were to be partially de-schooled there are further 
barriers to the adoption of such progressive educational methods which must be 
considered, and which illustrate that state schooling is necessary to give full value to the 
right to be able to be significantly autonomous.
Accountability and Regulation
Education in a liberal society should possess legitimacy in its efforts to prepare children 
for significant autonomy.375 The de-schooling of society or the establishment of 
independent schools dedicated to progressive education would inevitably be subject to 
strictures of public accountability. This could cause serious problems for the survival of
374 Indeed, John Stuart Mill proposed that state education should ‘only exist, if  it exist at all, as one 
among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus to keep the 
others up to a certain standard of excellence’. J.S.Mill, ‘On Liberty’, p. 118.
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de-schooling aspirations. Illich argued that the greatest evil posed by state schooling was 
that children became ‘victims of an effective process of total instruction and 
manipulation.’376 In a liberal democracy, de-schooled educational networks would have 
to be held accountable for their success in developing pupils’ awareness of when and 
where this manipulation was being circumvented or overturned. The state (or citizens’ 
educational associations) would thus need to consider deriving criteria for a ‘free’ 
education. Yet it is unclear how the spread of a free market of educational guides or 
providers would eradicate ‘total instruction’, manipulation or programmes of education 
designed to propagate consumerist ideology (or other ideologies). With regard to the 
former, one need only look at the proliferation of those professing to be guides to 
enlightenment to see how those who claim educational expertise may not be committed 
to progressive, liberal or indeed any principles of education.
De-schoolers also seek to exclude notions of authority from the processes of 
learning. However, ‘educational guides’ must inevitably lay claim to being authoritative 
in the learning paths they recommend or in the ‘matching’ that they facilitate. If such 
guides received state-support they would require recognised accreditation demonstrating 
moral fitness for the role and that their educational programmes met certain centrally 
regulated ethical requirements. The return of regulation would surely lead back towards 
some variant of education with the structures of authority, schooling and curricula that 
thoroughgoing de-schoolers deplore. Indeed, fee-paying private educational institutions 
already provide an excellent example of how a free market for education can deliver 
exactly the kind of education that one particularly powerful consumer group (wealthy or 
willing parents) desire. Would de-schoolers therefore recommend outlawing all
375 A.Gutmann, Democratic Education, 2nd ed., Princeton University Press, 1999.
376 1.Illich, De-Schooling Society, p.30.
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educational institutions which adhered to the sorts of curricula, instruction and 
measurement that they abhor? Again the state (or some democratically accountable 
inspectorate) would be required to regulate the relative ‘progressiveness’ of all 
educational guides against some set of predetermined criteria, but these criteria would 
begin to look suspiciously like the sort of ‘hidden curriculum’ they criticise. So can de­
schoolers offer any indication of how the difficulties indicated above may be overcome in 
theory or in practice?
In After Deschooling What? Illich hinted that institutional arrangements could be 
set up to ‘protect the autonomy of the learner’ which involve learners ‘at every stage’ of 
the educational process.377 De-schooling could be established through legal codification 
of ‘institutional arrangements that are the inverse of school’, such as non-compulsory 
attendance and individual control of tax funds. Moreover, learning and teaching could be 
restructured to prevent the re-emergence of hierarchical structures.378 Despite these 
provisos, it seems difficult to imagine how state support for widespread de-schooling 
could occur without a commitment to a ‘progressive’ teaching profession and some 
commonly acknowledged pedagogical devices aimed at encouraging ‘uniqueness.’ 
Pedagogical practices inevitably embody a degree of orthodoxy, whether in a 
conventional character education, a progressive education or an education for significant 
autonomy. Moreover, many observers have argued that ‘socially powerful knowledge’ 
has never been offered in alternative progressive schools, ‘instead, pottery, electric 
guitar, coffee bars and discotheques are provided.’379 The de-schooling model may be
377 1.Illich, After De-schooling What?, London, Writers and Readers Publishing Co-operative, 1976. The 
ultimate goal of this is to safeguard the ‘free determination by each learner of his own reason for living 
and learning - the part that his knowledge is to play in his life.’ ibid., p.44. Illich describes this 
autonomy on the part of the learner as the ‘private initiative to decide what he will learn and his 
inalienable right to learn what he likes rather than what is useful to somebody else’, ibid., p.32.
378 ibid., pp.47-9.
379 1.Lister, ‘Introductory Essay’, in I.Illich, After De-schooling What?, p. 13.
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appropriate for the provision of community education which contributes to the 
significant autonomy of adults, but is unlikely to deliver on the entitlement of each fixture 
citizen to be significantly autonomous. Our critique of de-schooling, thus leads us to re­
examine the case for a state-led education for significant autonomy.
3. Principles and Presuppositions of an Education for Significant Autonomy
De-schooling proposals for the cultivation of individual flourishing do not adequately 
account for the ‘Emile paradox’ and rely on a metaphysical account of the self based on 
the realisation of determinate innate potentials. The malleability of the self and the 
promotion of certain virtues are vital presuppositions of enabling agents to become 
significantly autonomous. A state-led education therefore clearly has a central role to 
play in helping children develop significant autonomy. An education for significant 
autonomy which promoted a liberal character-ethics would be the most appropriate 
means for the liberal state to fulfil its obligations to its citizens. This section establishes 
the credentials of such an education, discussing the need for authority, the nature of an 
appropriate learning environment and the role of a liberal character-ethics.
i) For state schooling
Examination of proposals for institutionally arranged de-schooling and the wider 
promotion of discovery learning is important for perfectionist liberals committed to the 
right to be able to be significantly autonomous, not least because institutional reform in 
the 1970s actually looked like a possibility.380 However, since the 1980s the resurgence 
of traditional views of schooling and of its role as the provider of skilled labour and
380 As Lister notes, both the 1973 Brown Report in the USA and the 1972 Report of the Post-Secondary 
Education Commission in Canada indicated a willingness on the part of liberal democratic governments 
to embrace the idea (if not the substance) of radical educational change, idem.
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disciplined consumers has waxed rather than waned.381 The egalitarian values which had 
influenced education were supplanted by a pedagogy whose values embodied the classic 
dichotomy between individual enterprise and moral authoritarianism of ‘New Right’ 
ideology.382 Nevertheless, for liberal educationalists, the return of state schooling need 
not be entirely a matter for despair. Disciplinary practices in schools do not have to be 
tied to direct instruction specifying the skills inherent in the capitalist labour market or 
the virtues inherent in a hierarchical class system. Indeed, the promotion of appropriate 
liberal virtues can enable children to learn to flourish in a diverse range of intrinsically 
valuable ways. The prescriptions of a liberal education for significant autonomy will 
therefore reflect certain aspects of the conventional approach to character-education, in 
particular, the need for some structures of authority and strategic coordination, but aim 
to reconfigure these in line with perfectionist aspirations for significant autonomy.
The need for authority
We have highlighted that there are substantial conceptual and practical barriers to the 
widespread implementation of de-schooling in liberal democracies. In particular, de­
schooling cannot ground techniques for properly equipping and disciplining children for 
the demands associated with significant autonomy in a liberal society. One important 
feature of this criticism is the argument that teachers need to exercise authority in the 
learning situation. Some liberal philosophers of education have rejected the idea of 
education through free exploration, discovery learning and play. For them, progressive
381 J.Halliday, Markets, Managers and Theory in Education, Falmer, Basingstoke, 1990.
382 A development described by Stephen Ball as ‘cultural restorationism’. S.Ball, ‘Education, Majorism 
and the Curriculum of the Dead’, Curriculum Studies, vol.l, no.2, 1993, pp. 195-214 . For an 
examination of New Right ideology see Andrew Gamble’s The Free Economy and the Strong State, 
London, Macmillan, 1989.
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educationalists misapprehend the disciplinary nature of learning.383 As the ‘Emile 
paradox’ demonstrates, often ‘the most effective way’ for teachers to induce ‘interest in 
what they are doing may be to instruct, to adopt ‘authoritarian’ methods.’384 In a liberal 
education for significant autonomy these methods are primarily used to encourage 
virtues of tolerance and restraint. Hence, teachers should generally choose to use a range 
of less strict disciplinary methods to promote significant autonomy, but maintain their 
authority to encourage pupils to display certain virtues of moral and individual character.
The promotion of character by teachers is implied by the principle of educational 
authority. For children to develop character in a liberal education for significant 
autonomy, they should have the opportunity to be taught in a learning environment 
where they feel that their contribution is valued and respected. It is therefore essential 
that educators have the authority to enable them to do so. The role of the teacher in 
authoritatively promoting and encouraging the exhibition of virtues in a broadly 
democratic learning environment is therefore an important feature of an education for 
significant autonomy. As Dewey stressed, this can be accomplished by eliciting a 
‘sympathetic understanding of individuals as individuals’ to gain ‘an idea of what is 
actually going on in the minds of those who are learning.’385 Teachers would then seek to 
cultivate and direct the ability of each student to manifest liberal virtues when developing 
their own character. This is not anti-democratic or anti-liberal, because it is based on the 
understanding that children require authoritative guidance to enable them to constitute 
themselves in the most suitable way. And, the malleability of the self means that 
legitimate use of education authority to accomplish this has real bite. Hence, the tensions 
between freedom and authority, individual ability and participatory equality would be
383 R.S.Peters, ‘Education as Initiation’, in R.D.Archambault ed., Philosophical Analysis and Education, 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965, pp. 94-5.
384 J.Gribble, Introduction to Philosophy o f Education, Boston, Allyn&Bacon, 1971, p.7.
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resolved in each classroom by teachers and pupils. A state-sponsored education for 
significant autonomy also presupposes a degree of strategic coordination and 
organisation of its overarching purposes.
Co-ordinating education
The need to co-ordinate and regulate education across society is a major concern for the 
liberal state. The notion that schools or teachers can retain complete autonomy over the 
curriculum and pedagogical methods is unlikely to be supported by perfectionist liberals 
committed to ensuring that all children receive their entitlement to an equal opportunity 
to develop significant autonomy. Nor would it persuade perfectionist liberals that the 
education system is likely to promote wider national priorities, such as a flourishing 
liberal culture. If school choice was established as a principle, a loose-knit state 
education system would be responsive only to powerful consumers of education. For less 
advantaged citizens and areas, the system would become increasingly fragile and 
precarious. Greater parental choice could lead many to exit those local schools seen to 
provide an inferior education to their neighbours, contributing to a decline in standards 
and opportunities, particularly in deprived areas. This could lead to further decline in the 
numbers and quality of the pupils attending unpopular schools. The liberal state should 
therefore coordinate and regulate schooling for two interconnected egalitarian reasons: 
first, to establish equality of opportunity by ensuring that appropriate standards in the 
provision of preparation for significant autonomy are being met in all schools; second, to 
convince parents that their commitment to local schools is matched by the government. 
This need not entail that a national curriculum is necessary for a liberal state education,
385 J.Dewey, Experience and Education, p.39.
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but it does imply that some regulation of education is appropriate for propagating certain 
key liberal virtues.
Strategic co-ordination of education is necessary to ensure that state schools give 
full value to the right to be able to be significantly autonomous. De-schooling would be 
unlikely to promote virtues necessary to discipline character-development and a 
conventional character-education would excessively constrain the development of 
diverse configurations of character. The principles of liberal policy-making established 
earlier indicate that the state can implement policies to promote valuable activities 
provided they exhibit equal respect for all children. The principle of moral and political 
education in policy-making also implies that government should have some control over 
the overall strategic direction of schools and their curriculum. An extremely pertinent 
contemporary issue relating to this strategic concern for moral and political education is 
the rise of the ‘civic deficit’ in liberal societies.
Addressing the civic deficit
Political sociologists and observers have identified a ‘civic deficit’ caused by the 
disengagement of many citizens from liberal democratic political processes in many 
Western democracies. Declining electoral turnouts, low levels of political participation 
and interest coupled with anti-social behaviour, youth disaffection and drug taking have 
suggested that support for civic culture and democratic political institutions is 
deteriorating. As Robert Putnam has made clear, ‘stocks of social capital, such as trust, 
norms, and networks, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative.’ By contrast, ‘distrust, 
shirking, exploitation, isolation, disorder, and stagnation intensify one another in a
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suffocating miasma of vicious circles’.386 However, the retrieval and growth of social 
capital has been shown to be susceptible to political influence.387 As a result, 
governments have become interested in promoting support for political institutions, 
especially amongst young people.
Recent European and international studies have highlighted serious concerns 
about young people’s perceptions of politics. In particular, young people are ‘unlikely to 
think that conventional political participation is particularly important.’388 Although they 
remain ‘open to forms of civic and political engagement unrelated to electoral political or 
parties’, increasing numbers are uninterested in conventional democratic participation or 
the democratic political system.389 While liberal citizens may become more interested in 
policy and politics as they come into contact with work, mortgages, taxes and so on, 
disparities in political engagement and influence between those from affluent and those 
from deprived areas are likely to be exacerbated by deficiencies in civic competence and 
political knowledge. However, research has suggested that the quality of democratic 
participation can be improved where children become involved in conventional types of 
political participation.390 The liberal state could therefore play a critical role in co­
ordinating policies to sustain the vitality of liberal democratic politics. For instance, it
386 RPutnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italy, p. 177.
387 See for example, S.Knack, ‘Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from the States’, 
American Journal o f  Political Science, vol.46, no.4, 2002, pp.772-85; T.W.Rice, ‘Social Capital and 
Government Performance in Iowa Communities’, Journal o f Urban Affairs, vol.23, nos.3-4, 2001, 
pp.375-89.
388 For instance, eighty per cent of the fourteen year olds sampled in this study indicated that presently 
they did not ‘intend to participate in the conventional political activities generally associated with adult 
political involvement: joining a party, writing letters to newspapers about social and political concerns, 
and being a candidate for a local or city office.’ J.Tomey-Porta, RLehmann, H.Oswald and W.Schulz, 
Citizenship and Education in Twenty-eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and Engagement at Age 
Fourteen, Executive Summary, International Association for the Evaluation of Educational 
Achievement, 2001, p. 10.
389 idem.
390 The more young people know about the democratic process, the more they expect to participate in 
that process as adults. D.Kerr, A.Lines, S.Blenkinsop and I.Schagen, Citizenship and Education at Age 
14: a Summary o f the International Findings and Preliminary Results for England, Slough, National 
Foundation for Educational Research, 2001, p.4.
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may introduce policies which make it easier for citizens to vote, such as postal or on-line 
voting, or it may seek to directly promote engagement with democratic politics through 
participation strategies or political education in schools. For an education for significant 
autonomy, the latter of these is of particular interest.
Political education is effectively an investment in the agents in whose hands the 
future right to significant autonomy rests; and research has shown that schools that 
model democratic practices in the classroom and throughout the school score highest in 
tests evaluating civic knowledge and participation.391 Consequently, a liberal education 
for significant autonomy would benefit from promoting a liberal character-ethics within a 
very particular type of learning environment.
ii) Education for significant autonomy
A state-led liberal education should concern itself with delivering appropriate preparation 
for significant autonomy. This education would presume that children were equipped to 
develop configurations of moral and individual character which are conducive to their 
own flourishing. Such an education for significant autonomy has two key dimensions. 
First, and foremost, its learning environment should be designed to inculcate the capacity 
for self-discipline from an early age. This is essential, because significant autonomy 
implies that agents are able to discipline their dispositions, traits, choices, and so on, to 
achieve both good moral and good individual character. In addition, a whole raft of 
academic disciplines and leisure activities should be structured into school timetables to 
ensure that pupils can autonomously develop diverse configurations of the liberal 
character virtues. The importance of the learning environment and a liberal character-
391 J.Tomey-Porta et al, Citizenship and Education in Twenty-eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and 
Engagement at Age Fourteen, p.8.
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ethics are discussed below before the structure and subject matter of a liberal education 
for significant autonomy is outlined in the remainder of the chapter.
The learning environment
In an education for significant autonomy a carefully structured learning environment can 
pay greatest heed to the truth of the ‘Emile paradox’ that children require guidance to 
develop significant autonomy. This would build on many of the dimensions of a 
conventional character-education, in particular, the notion that the different members of 
a school community should each be able to contribute to the moral welfare and 
development of that community. This is a familiar theme amongst education thinkers 
who have theorised the nature of a suitable democratic learning environment. For 
instance, John Dewey argued education should be a co-operative enterprise amongst 
pupils within the classroom which could modify their habits and affect the ‘quality of 
subsequent experiences.’392 In this, educators were charged with ensuring that the 
learning environment ‘will interact with the existing capacities and needs of those taught 
to create a worthwhile experience.’393 The learning environment for an education for 
significant autonomy should therefore be in a constant state of organic growth, evolving 
in ways cultivated by teachers. The aim in creating the right learning environment would 
thus be to prepare pupils for liberal democratic life.394 This means pupils should be given 
the opportunity to develop both their moral and individual character.
392 J.Dewey, Experience and Education, p.35.
393 ibid., p.45.
394 ibid., p.44. For Dewey, knowledge or ‘objective intellectual organisation’ was never to be viewed as 
‘an end in itself, it was a means ‘by which social relations,.. ,may be understood and more intelligently 
ordered.’ ibid., p.83. Dewey wrote that ‘there is no such thing as educational value in the abstract.’ The 
‘formation of enduring attitudes, of likes and dislikes, may be and often is much more important than 
the spelling lesson or lesson in geography or history that is learned.’ ibid., pp.46, 48.
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The development of significant autonomy underpins the promotion of the liberal 
virtues in schools. The authority of teachers to rigorously promote these virtues should 
be exercised within culturally valued curricula settings and would be directed towards the 
inculcation of self-discipline. Significant autonomy requires the habitual application of 
self-discipline, because the virtues of moral and individual character which give it 
substance imply the direction or modification of an agent’s dispositions and traits. Within 
an education for significant autonomy, pupils should learn to be self-disciplined to 
develop their character, rather than to achieve specific competences or perform certain 
skills. Autonomy is significant only when guided by the application of a liberal character- 
ethics.
Self-discipline is the first goal of an education for significant autonomy. 
However, as we have seen self-discipline requires cultivation and guidance. Pedagogical 
devices for facilitating the growth of self-discipline are crucial, particularly as self- 
discipline is also inherent in the possibility of learning and participating in lessons. The 
progressive development of each pupil’s self-discipline is also akin to their progress 
towards maturity. Agents in liberal societies are only meaningfully regarded as 
significantly autonomous (or mature) where their configuration of character has been 
developed by giving suitable ethical content to the disciplining of their thoughts, actions 
and life: that content should be drawn from a liberal character-ethics.
The role o f a liberal character-ethics
The educational philosophy specified here focuses on promoting significant autonomy by 
facilitating wide scope for diverse configurations of moral and individual character within 
education. It thus supplies the grounding for the inclusion of different academic subjects, 
artistic pursuits, and sporting and leisure activities within liberal state schools.
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Preparation for significant autonomy could not be ensured where reliance on traditional 
methods (and traditional justifications) underpins the notion of character-development. 
Nor would a conventional character education account for the interpretive and 
interactive nature of a liberal character-ethics or furnish liberals with conceptual 
resources to ground an education for significant autonomy. Certain progressive methods 
for the free development of character do not pay sufficient attention to the need for some 
discipline and authority in education. Programmes of learning for children also require 
continuity and structure to ensure that education is linked to the equal right of all citizens 
to significant autonomy.
A liberal character-ethics can supply the content and interpretive background and 
discourse through which children begin to develop diverse configurations of moral and 
individual character. Disciplinary teaching methods structure the initial development of 
these character-configurations where pupils must learn tolerance and restraint. They are 
also appropriate where they require guidance relating to aspects of the development of 
individual character, such as learning historical dates or mathematical rules. Authority is 
necessary for teachers to be able to adequately fulfil these duties of guiding pupils 
towards the liberal virtues of character. As Dewey indicated, this was essential where 
democratic or participatory methods of learning are being used to develop the virtues of 
moral character. Such methods, and their alignment with children’s development, are 
central to the development of significant autonomy. In particular, a liberal political 
education should prepare pupils for participation and deliberation in a liberal democracy. 
How these methods, principles and aims can be realised in a state-led education for 
significant autonomy is discussed in the following three sections.
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4. Education for Moral Character
Moral and political education is the foundation of an education for moral character. The 
moral and political virtues found in the ethics of moral character are especially critical to 
being significantly autonomous in a liberal society, providing the bedrock for agents to 
autonomously develop and defend diverse modes of flourishing. This section begins by 
exploring the role of liberal moral education in an education for significant autonomy. It 
then examines political education, especially the teaching of participative and deliberative 
political virtues, concluding with reflections on the politics associated with an ideal 
liberal political education.
i) Liberal moral education
The primary goal of liberal moral education is to build good as opposed to strong 
character. While good character presupposes a degree of strong character, it is 
nevertheless the case that an agent can come to develop character in ways that would not 
secure moral approval. For instance, hardened criminals may possess many admirable 
qualities such as courage or resourcefulness, yet are clearly not regarded as being of 
‘good character’.395 Strong character is a character-trait which may be instrumentally 
useful to the achievement of good character, but has no intrinsic value. By contrast, good 
character is constituted by the manifestation of the disposition to display some 
configuration of intrinsically valuable virtues. In a liberal education for significant 
autonomy, moral education would promote only the liberal virtues associated with good 
moral character. To display sufficient regard for the development of significant
395 Moreover, prison itself may be ‘character-building’ in this less acceptable respect for convicts, 
serving as a means by which criminals learn new trade skills for use in crime and become hardened in 
their attitudes, in effect, becoming habitual criminals or institutionally criminalised.
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indoctrination.
Moral certainty and educational discretion
Earlier in the chapter, that direct instruction in ‘moral knowledge’ is an appropriate ideal 
for a liberal education for significant autonomy was disputed. Significant autonomy 
implies that agents can configure their moral and individual character in a host of diverse 
valuable ways. A liberal moral education should therefore seek to reflect and celebrate 
the validity of diverse conceptions of the good life. This can be most effectively pursued 
in a carefully cultivated democratic learning environment using a variety of different 
methods, activities and pedagogies. Such a moral education also has a number of 
important practical implications that must be addressed when establishing an appropriate 
learning environment.
Teachers are often reluctant to be moral educators beyond establishing 
appropriate classroom behaviour (significant though this is). Although some of the 
stakeholders in education often see schools as a means of instruction in a single 
conception of the good, teachers (and other educationalists) frequently feel that schools 
should be extremely careful to avoid accusations of moral indoctrination. Despite these 
fears, perfectionist liberals can be confident that concerns about indoctrination can be 
resolved in a variety of ways when moral education is grounded in the development of 
significant autonomy. Indeed, many liberal philosophers of education and moral 
psychologists have justified moral education by focusing on the role of autonomy within 
a liberal education.396 A variety of conceptions of the good life and character-
396 For instance, Meira Levinson, The Demands o f  Liberal Education, Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Also, see Richard Peters, Ethics and Education, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1966 and Lawrence 
Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development vol. 1: The Philosophy o f  Moral Development: moral stages
configurations can be explored within moral education (though prescriptions associated 
with these would be framed within a liberal character-ethics). An education for 
significant autonomy therefore implies that pupils should learn to habitually manifest 
some configuration of liberal social, moral and political virtues to develop good moral 
character. Significant autonomy not only presupposes character-development, but that 
this development will flourish best where agents display a constant commitment to 
ethical conduct. Pupils can accomplish this by learning to configure their character in a 
manner that is coherent, relevant and comprehensible within a liberal character-ethics.
No value would be attributed to character-configurations that could not be 
regarded as coherent, relevant and comprehensible ethical interpretations of a liberal 
character-ethics. For instance, a criminal lifestyle does not exhibit the virtues inherent in 
ethically appropriate care for individual flourishing in a liberal society, compounding the 
moral failings in a way that liberals may overlook. By adhering to a non-metaphysical 
perfectionism, we are not called on to question the rational capacities of those of bad 
character, but to consider whether the configurations of their character are coherent, 
relevant and comprehensible in terms of the ethical ideals associated with liberalism. To 
promote virtues of moral character in programmes of moral education is, then, to enable 
pupils to develop the ability to create valuable liberal character-configurations which 
contribute to their flourishing and that of a liberal culture. An education for significant 
autonomy will therefore focus first on encouraging the social and moral virtues of moral 
character because these are critical to the development of character-configurations more 
generally.
and the idea o f  justice, London, Harper and Row, 1981. Such a focus on the significance of autonomy 
also informs much of the recent philosophical literature about citizenship education. See espec. 
E.Callan, Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1997.
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Promoting the social and moral virtues of moral character
The social and moral virtues of character can be promoted from an early age in a variety 
of educational environments, such as the family, nurseries and primary schools. Indeed, 
encouraging civility and praiseworthiness is self-evidently a central preoccupation of 
most parents and teachers. It is also a legitimate concern of the liberal state because it is 
charged with the duty of ensuring that its citizens are equipped to exercise their right and 
opportunity to be able to be significantly autonomous. The promotion of virtues required 
for this to be a possibility would begin at an early age. Children are envisaged as agents 
with the potential for self-disciplined autonomy in adult life. In this respect, they are not 
yet able to fully display the social and moral virtues that will enable them to be 
significantly autonomous, but can be encouraged to do so, learning (as adults do) to 
value their autonomy more or less through the course of their development.397
Children are generally exhorted by those concerned for their welfare to be able to 
display appropriate social behaviour. In socialising, playing and learning they are 
expected to progressively demonstrate their ability to think more about how their actions 
affect others and how they can show consideration for the interests of others. At a very 
early age this may include the direct teaching of ‘good manners’ and civility. It can also 
involve helping them develop their own moral conscience, by encouraging their ability to 
reflect on their actions and those of others. Children also learn in their interactions with 
the peers that they are unlikely to get their own way at all times, gradually becoming 
aware that there are others who have interests not necessarily coterminous with their 
own. In this respect, child development can be viewed as contributing to a process of 
self-discipline or character-formation. Nevertheless, moral education is critical to
397 R. Jonathan, Illusory Freedoms, p. 162.
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encourage the growth of worthwhile character-configurations while this process takes 
place.
The learning environment within an education for significant autonomy will be 
concerned with creating diverse opportunities to manifest virtues associated with civility 
and moral conscience. Classroom interactions between pupils usually take place within 
the framework of a certain set of rules, practices and expectations, such as waiting one’s 
turn, not shouting out answers and so on. Moreover, teachers will seek to ensure that 
these virtues are displayed whenever other relevant circumstances apply. For instance, 
social virtues of moral character are manifested on greeting visitors to schools, while 
moral virtues of moral character are stressed when someone is ill or injured. At the 
secondary stage of their education pupils will generally be expected to embrace the social 
and moral virtues and be able to reflect upon and develop worthwhile character- 
configurations. They should also be stimulating each others’ manifestation of the virtues, 
by questioning the actions of their peers and by displaying commitment to moral 
sensitivity. While adolescents are not necessarily capable of routinely manifesting social 
and moral virtues of moral character, it would be taken for granted that their ability and 
disposition to do so becomes ever more in evidence as they progress towards life beyond 
school. Furthermore, it can be anticipated that they will begin to form a political view of 
their personal experiences within school and the classroom, as they begin to understand 
the relationship with structures of authority.398
The social and moral virtues of moral character described in Chapter Four, such 
as sociability, forgiveness and courage, are likely to be encouraged in schools in unison 
with more specific virtues such as understanding, care and empathy. A liberal character-
398 C.Cullingford, Children and Society: Children's Attitudes to Politics and Power, London, Cassell, 
1992.
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ethics would thus form the major part of the general liberal moral vocabulary that 
teachers and pupils could use to describe how they can and should relate to each other. 
As pupils become more ‘morally literate’ in the use of this language, we would expect 
that they become increasingly able to live well autonomously as members of liberal 
societies, leading naturally to a concern with education pertaining to politics and good 
citizenship.
ii) Liberal political education
John Rawls proposed that ‘children’s education includes such things as knowledge of 
their constitutional and civic rights.’399 However, living well in a liberal society implies 
more than knowing your rights. An education for significant autonomy would therefore 
include a political education which focused on promoting the ability to manifest some 
configuration of the participative and deliberative political virtues of moral character. 
The type of political education that this will require should reflect a perfectionist liberal 
ideal of good citizenship. The nature of this ideal and its relationship with a liberal 
political education is described and discussed next.
Promoting political participation
The reciprocal nature of education and citizenship was rendered plain by T.H.Marshall 
who stated that, ‘the education of children has a direct bearing on citizenship and when 
the state guarantees that all children should be educated, it has the requirements and the 
nature of citizenship in mind.’ For Marshall, the importance of this preparation for 
citizenship was reflected in a wider ‘duty to improve and civilise oneself.400 As we saw
399 J.Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 199.
400 T.H.Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, London, Pluto Press, 1992, pp. 16-7.
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in the previous chapter, the achievement of good moral character is based first on the 
minimal duties of citizenship. And these minimal duties would guide the basic aims of a 
liberal political education. But to promote significant autonomy state schools should also 
produce citizens who are willing and able to participate in and deliberate on liberal 
politics and democratic processes. A liberal political education would therefore focus on 
creating a strong commitment to the participative and deliberative political virtues. The 
nature of this commitment to political participation is fully captured in the notion of 
‘ active citizenship ’.
The ideal of active citizenship implies that membership within a liberal political 
community entails acting upon social and political obligations as well as rights and 
entitlements. Marshall noted that active citizenship would not require an agent ‘to 
sacrifice his individual liberty or to submit without question to every demand made by 
government’, but to ‘be inspired by a lively sense of responsibility towards the welfare of 
the community.’401 Nevertheless, the sense of responsibility at the heart of the ideal of 
active citizenship has been interpreted in different ways, most pertinently by civic- 
individualists and civic-republicans. The debate about these different interpretations of 
active citizenship is summarised here in order to illuminate the perfectionist promotion of 
political participation within a liberal education for significant autonomy.
Civic-individualists associate active citizenship with voluntary work, the exercise 
of consumer rights and social entrepreneurship.402 Efforts to promote this type of 
citizenship in education therefore focus on encouraging self-reliance by decreasing 
dependence on state welfare and inculcating the skills citizens need to become informed 
consumers of public services. This view of active citizenship was epitomised in the UK
401 ibid., p.41.
402 R.Bellah et al eds., Habits o f  the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life, University 
of California Press, 1996.
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‘Citizen’s Charter’ of 1991 which associated it with the exercise of consumer rights.403 
And the civic-individualist view of active citizenship has also been associated with the 
promotion of volunteering to pick up the pieces of failing public services. However, 
active citizenship has been interpreted by civic-republicans to mean direct involvement in 
the politics and decision-making of a distinctive liberal culture.404 Consequently, many 
left-of-centre thinkers have underlined the radical possibilities inherent in the idea of 
active citizenship.
The promotion of this civic-republicanism in schools would equip citizens to 
participate in local and national democratic political processes. It would also focus on the 
need to encourage the participation of diverse, disaffected or disengaged social groups in 
democratic politics. Within the terms of our liberal character-ethics the stress on 
responsible political engagement would lead us to say that the promotion of active 
citizenship in schools should adopt this civic-republican approach. Responsible political 
engagement so conceived would underpin a citizenship-ideal which could guide the 
promotion of the liberal political virtues in schools, comprising two vital distinct but 
interlocking aspects: the notions of responsible individual and responsible collective 
political engagement.
The idea of responsible individual political engagement is inherent in the 
autonomous development of active citizenship. In schools, responsible individual political 
engagement need not imply that each pupil should be continually involved in political 
activism; indeed, it can accommodate the view that not participating in politics may be 
tolerated on the grounds that it can be a form of political engagement. Nevertheless, 
learning duties associated with responsible individual engagement implies that pupils
403 The Citizen's Charter: Raising the Standard, London, HMSO, 1991.
404 See for instance, R.Dagger, Civic Virtues Rights, Citizenship and Republican Liberalism, Oxford 
University Press, 1996.
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should become able to develop the coherence, relevance and comprehensibility of their 
configuration or interpretation of the participative political virtues. By contrast, 
responsible collective political engagement implies that children learn to be collectively 
capable of engaging in worthwhile political activity. In these instances, such engagement 
is primarily based on the notion that a shared display of certain key virtues of good 
citizenship can ground responsible judgement on ‘what should be done’. As a result of 
this focus on political engagement, we can stress that active participatory activities such 
as community work and volunteering, though morally admirable, are not central to 
political education. The development of virtues associated with active citizenship 
therefore rests upon the efficacy with which the learning environment in schools and 
classrooms promotes the liberal participative political virtues. The promotion of virtues 
of responsible political engagement would also concern itself with engagement with 
cultures outside liberal democracies through the notion o f ‘world citizenship’.
Although it is difficult to specify precisely what rights and duties adhere to 
membership of the global community, responsible political engagement presupposes the 
legitimacy of developing a sense of obligation towards agents in other states and 
societies other than our own. For children to learn to live well, the virtues of good 
citizenship may therefore be extended to include certain virtues associated with world 
citizenship. World citizenship implies that agents are able to regard themselves ‘as human 
beings bound to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern.’405 The 
virtues of world citizenship would therefore include ‘a sympathetic understanding of
405 M.Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical defense o f  Reform in Liberal Education, Harvard 
University Press, 1997, p. 10.
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distant cultures’ and ‘a willingness to doubt the goodness of one’s own way and to enter 
into the give-and-take of critical argument about ethical and political concerns’.406
The moral requirements of world citizenship will enjoin that the interests of other 
human agents across the globe play a part in political deliberation and action. The 
promotion of responsible political engagement would mean that agents should (at least) 
reflect on which virtues of world citizenship they might associate with living well. This 
may mean a good citizen is merely aware of human rights abuses in other countries or 
that they demonstrate or campaign against unjust regimes. The extent of the coherence, 
comprehensibility and relevance of an agent’s responsible political engagement will be 
reflected in their ability to manifest liberal participative political virtues. It will also 
presuppose that they can exhibit liberal deliberative political virtues.
Promoting political deliberation
Bernard Crick once stated any ‘worthwhile education must include some explanation 
and, if necessary, justification of the naturalness of politics: that men both do and should 
want different things that are only obtainable by means or by leave of the public power, 
and that they can both study and control, in varying degrees, the means by which they 
reconcile or manage conflicts of interests and ideals.’407 An ideal liberal political 
education which reflects this aspiration can be developed from the right to be able to be 
significantly autonomous in liberal societies. In particular, the importance of democratic 
politics within a liberal society means that the promotion of political deliberation is a vital
406 ibid., pp.69, 62. Indeed, some philosophers claim that the demands of world citizenship (or global 
justice) ultimately trump those of domestic citizenship or justice. For example, P. Singer, One World: 
The Ethics o f Globalization, Yale University Press, 2002
407 B.Crick, ‘Introducing of Politics in Schools’, in B.Crick, Political Theory and Practice, London, 
Allen Lane, 1971, p. 184.
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feature of the liberal democratic state’s duty to promote the ability of agents to become 
significantly autonomous.
In a liberal education for significant autonomy, the political education of children 
in liberal democracies would involve the promotion of a range of deliberative political 
virtues. To do this effectively it is essential that pupils learn something about politics, and 
‘moral choice’ within politics. The recognition of hard cases in political decision-making 
thus presupposes a particular approach towards their importance. Promotion of political 
deliberation in a liberal political education would therefore focus on the inculcation of a 
‘moral attitude’ towards politics to ensure pupils can fully appreciate and be committed 
to deliberative political virtues. Michael Walzer states that the study of politics should 
help ‘ordinary citizens reflect upon the most important matters of state. It should prepare 
leaders, would-be leaders, and vicarious leaders - which is to say, it should prepare all of 
us - for the democratic business of taking stands and shaping policies.’408 A liberal 
political education would need to be more than simply preparation for actual political 
decision-making. It should aim at creating ‘a shared sense of moral concern’, becoming 
both a barometer and steward of the political climate. Although citizens ‘in their real and 
vicarious decision-making’ may not always make the ‘right decisions’, it is fair to expect 
that they at least ‘worry about the right things’.409
Practising and reflecting on political decision-making in the classroom is a vital 
precursor to the decision-making and reflection that accompanies responsible political
408 M. Walzer, ‘Political Decision-making and Political Education’, in M.Richter ed., Political Theory 
and Political Education: Princeton University Press, 1990, pp. 160-1.
409 ibid., p. 172. Walzer argues an ‘ongoing process of (vicarious) decision-making’ in schools would 
mean that ‘leaders and citizens would look to the school in a new way - not always as training grounds 
for talented men and women, but as centres of oral argument and sources of guidance in political 
decision-making.’ ‘Political and military leaders should be made aware that moral choices are being 
anticipated and second-guessed in a systematic fashion. For then, inevitably, they will be drawn into the 
process, forced to reason according to certain standards, forced to justify their actions in certain ways. In 
a democracy, to educate citizens is to coerce leaders. That is the real point of teaching politics.’ ibid., 
pp. 171-4.
244
engagement.410 The demands of an education for significant autonomy enjoin that 
children must learn how to think for themselves. This does not mean that they must 
develop original thoughts or be incessantly creative in their reflections; displaying virtues 
which require disciplined thought is a more nuanced activity. In studying and debating 
politics they should develop and exercise techniques of discernment to judge matters for 
themselves, particularly when considering the trustworthiness and legitimacy of the 
claims of different social and moral authorities. The promotion of the deliberative 
political virtues within a liberal political education is therefore a moral enterprise based 
on three assumptions: first, that democratic decision-making is the most appropriate 
form of political decision-making within liberal societies; second, that pupils ought to 
autonomously ascribe to this when studying politics; third, that the values inherent in 
democratic political processes in liberal democracies are ones to which liberal societies 
should ideally subscribe and approximate. This will mean that political debate within 
classrooms will have to be carefully modelled to encourage the deliberative political 
virtues to flourish.
Modelling political debate
One interesting way in which political debate in the classroom can be modelled is 
through the Rawlsian notion of public reason. For Rawls, public reason is ‘characteristic 
of a democratic people: it is the reason of citizens, of those sharing the status of equal 
citizenship.’ It has ‘the good of the public’ as its general object, rather than abstract right 
or justice and is an ‘ideal conception of citizenship for a constitutional democratic 
regime’.411 As an ideal of citizenship, public reason implies a moral duty that citizens
410 For instance, Walzer insists that the active goal of moral and political ‘orientation’ in schools is to 
promote the activity of ‘making up one’s mind’, ibid., p. 161.
411 J.Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.213.
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should be able to ‘explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the 
principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political 
values of public reason.’ These principles and policies should be such that ‘each could 
reasonably expect that others might endorse as consistent with their freedom and 
equality’. To do this in a democracy is to have a ‘willingness to listen to others and a 
fair-mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be 
made.’412 This has obvious relevance for political debate in the classrooms in liberal state 
schools.
Rawls argued that agents should conduct public debate by appealing ‘only to 
presently accepted general beliefs, and the methods and conclusions of science when 
these are not controversial.’ This would ensure that citizens’ public reasons are both 
reasonable and intelligible from within the established values and practices of liberal 
democracy. These constraints on public reason are designed to establish that the 
‘structure of government be changed only as experience shows it to be required by 
political justice or the general good, and not as prompted by the political advantage of 
one party or group that may at the moment have the upper hand.’413 The ideal of public 
reason can thus be best realised in democratic debate when citizens ‘think of themselves 
as i f  they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons 
satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact.’414 In 
education, public reason can therefore be viewed both as an ideal type of political 
discourse for pupils to aspire to, and as a baseline for rules of political debate. In
412 ibid., pp.217-8.
413 ibid., pp.224-8. Rawls claimed that the institutionalisation of the ideal of public reason could form 
part of ‘the wide, or educative, role of public reason’, ibid., p.236.
414 J.Rawls, The Law o f Peoples with the Idea o f Public Reason Revisited, Harvard University Press, 
2001, p. 135. Rawls stressed that one of the ‘essential elements’ of deliberative democracies is ‘the 
knowledge and desire on the part of citizens generally to follow public reason and to realise its ideal in 
their political conduct.’ ibid., p. 139.
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classrooms, students of a liberal political education could then regard themselves as 
‘ideal legislators’ when participating in political debate. Nevertheless, there are other 
features inherent in politics which perfectionist liberals would wish to see reflected in 
classroom debates.
Legislators in liberal democracies need not actually (or ideally) enact laws based 
on terms that would be agreed to be reasonable by all citizens. In fact, it is not clear that 
perfectionist liberals would accept (as Rawls seems to) Kant's dictum that ‘every claim 
upon right must have this [or any other] public quality.’415 Presentation of only public 
reasons may suppress the natural expression of where citizens privately stand on issues. 
Public reason may be accepted as an edifying aspect of political debate in schools, where 
it could be understood to mean that advocacy of principles or laws can be ‘followed or 
adopted by others’, rather than accepted as reasonable by others.416 This seems to more 
accurately reflect the actual conduct of political debate. Participants in politics generally 
offer public justifications for their actions, policies and decisions in terms that are 
expected to be followable by others without their necessarily being accepted as 
reasonable. Hence, we might conclude that in a liberal political education public reason 
could be one (important) aspect of a process through which pupils should be able to 
explicate rather than justify their political positions or principles in terms that are 
coherent, relevant and comprehensible within a liberal character-ethics. This deliberative 
model of political debate in classrooms will therefore be one infused with normative 
commitments. But could such a model of political debate in the classroom reflect the 
diversity of ideological positions characteristic of a liberal democracy?
415I.Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’, I.Kant, Political Writings, 2nd ed., Cambridge 
University Press, 1991, p. 125. Public justification is perhaps no better placed to serve as a precondition 
for legitimate political action than many other liberal political values. M.Evans, ‘Is public justification 
central to liberalism?’, Journal o f Political Ideologies, vol.4, no.l, 1999, pp. 117-36.
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The politics o f political education
Many supporters of political education have argued that it should reflect a conventional 
character education by using traditional teaching methods. In particular, conservatives 
fear that a democratic learning environment could ‘encourage endless and superficial 
debate among students which is likely to undermine necessary and proven forms of 
belief, practice and value.’417 This argument for a ‘degeneration effect’ reflects the 
concerns of Michael Oakeshott’s work on political education. Oakeshott rejected 
programmatic liberal, socialist or democratic political education, because he claimed it 
was dangerous to view politics as the ‘activity of amending the arrangements of a society 
so as to make them agree with the provisions of an ideology.’ Rather political education 
should be conducted by ‘exploring the intimations of a political tradition’.418 Oakeshott 
suggested that to accomplish this in schools, pupils could learn ‘how to participate in... 
[political] conversation’ through ‘the observation and imitation of the behaviour of our 
elders’. Consequently, the fruits of an Oakeshottian political education would only 
‘appear in the manner which we think and speak about politics and perhaps in the manner 
in which we conduct our political activity’.419
Although the ideological status of Oakeshott’s work may be disputed, many of 
his reflections on political education mirror those of conservative supporters of political 
education. For conservative proponents of political education, it should be conducted 
with the greatest sensitivity towards existing political traditions to minimise its radical 
transformatory possibilities. It would stress that pupils should be instructed in traditional
416 O.O’Neill, ‘Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John Rawls’ Political 
Liberalism’, The Philosophical Review, vol. 106, no.3, 1997, pp.411-28.
417 T.H.McLaughlin, ‘Citizenship Education in England: The Crick Report and Beyond’, Journal o f  
Philosophy o f Education, vol. 34, no.4, 2000, p. 553.
418 M.Oakeshott, ‘Political Education’, in Rationalism in Politics and other essays, Indianapolis, Liberty 
Fund Inc., 1991, p.58.
419 ibid, pp.62, 66.
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political virtues, such as respect for authority. But would this notion be compatible with 
the prescriptions of a liberal political education?
While teachers are given the authority to deliver a liberal political education, 
perfectionist liberals would expect that they avoid delivering a set of their own 
authoritative prescriptions or overly structure the terms of debates. In a liberal education 
for significant autonomy, pupils should be encouraged to learn how to pursue their own 
answers and ‘intimations’. This of course would not be done without limitation, as pupils 
would still be expected to work within the normative prescriptions of a liberal character- 
ethics. But it would not entail directly instructing pupils in a determinate set of traditional 
virtues, because inducting pupils into liberal democratic discourse is very different from 
instruction in the terms of a political tradition. A liberal political education that 
recognises the ‘Emile paradox’ would encourage teachers to use their authority to 
establish a democratic model of learning that can accommodate a range of political 
opinions and political positions. It could thus accommodate certain conservative and 
socialist concerns about the purposes of political education.
Socialists have traditionally viewed education as potentially either liberating or 
enslaving. These mixed feelings are based on acknowledgement that agents can be 
constituted and reconstituted through different processes of education and socialisation. 
Political education can facilitate radical socialist aims, especially through the notion that 
young people should make the world ‘a better place’. But socialists also suspect liberal 
political education would simply domesticate children by inducting them into the values 
of the liberal capitalist economy. By contrast, socialist political education would focus on 
enabling pupils to understand the inequities of their society, helping them to conceive of 
ways in which they may be able to effect systemic change.
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Bowles and Gintis stressed that to accomplish their aims socialist educationalists 
need not adopt revolutionary pedagogies or support the total de-schooling of society.420 
Nevertheless, we might say that it is essential that socialist educationalists encourage 
their students to modify their society where it oppresses them, recognising that pupils are 
able to theorise and construct meaning themselves.421 Paulo Freire has described these 
socialist educational processes as ‘conscientisation’, the growth of which is cashed out in 
a commitment to make the world ‘a better place’.422 These sort of sweeping 
requirements stand in direct contrast to the conservative vision of political education. 
But can ‘conscientisation’ be accommodated within a liberal political education?
The raising of political awareness will inevitably be a key feature of a liberal 
political education. Manifestation of the participative and deliberative political virtues is 
based on the notion that agents should be able to explicate why they are exercising them 
in one way rather than another. Moreover, although the ethics of moral character is a 
liberal character-ethics, many of the political virtues at its heart can be accepted by 
socialists. For instance, the stress laid on respect for diversity and the duties associated 
with responsible political engagement. A liberal political education can therefore do more 
than accommodate ‘conscientisation’; it can positively encourage and foster its 
development as an integral feature of its own aspirations. Nevertheless, perfectionist 
liberals would not stress activism over awareness as this may detract from the 
deliberative virtues which are at the heart of political decision-making in a liberal
420 S.Bowles and H. Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions 
o f Economic Life, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976, p.255. By contrast, Marxists believe that 
socialist education should result in ‘an actual overthrow of social relations through praxis’. ‘Disputes 
about reform’ are not important as they may ‘become a substitute for revolutionary action’. M.Sarap, 
Marxism and Education, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, pp.4, 162.
421 As Gramsci noted, ‘all men are intellectuals... but not all men have in society the function of 
intellectuals’. A.Gramsci, ‘Prison Notebooks’, in R. S.Gottlieb ed., An Anthology o f Western Marxism, 
Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 115-6.
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democracy. If the principle of ‘conscientisation’ is to play a role in a liberal political 
education it would not entail a call to arms, but would focus on participation in a wide 
range of issues and conflicts and cognisance of the difficulties which accompany their 
resolution.
The commitment of pupils to a liberal polity and its democratic decision-making 
processes are essential educational consideration. Indeed, pupils should be encouraged to 
be committed to responsible political engagement within their local community and the 
wider liberal society. This engagement with wider society is also a feature of their efforts 
to develop individual character. The manner in which an education for significant 
autonomy addresses education for individual character is examined in the following 
section.
5. Education for Individual Character
Agents in liberal societies should be able to develop diverse configurations of individual 
character which reflect virtues appropriate to their own traits and circumstances. An 
education for significant autonomy should therefore provide children with a sense of 
responsibility towards their individual character, facilitating activities which promote a 
wide range of generic and specific virtues of individual character. The provision of 
academic disciplines and leisure opportunities in schools can give pupils the necessary 
impetus for developing their individual character in this manner, but a liberal education 
for individual character would also play a vital role in guiding their relationship with the 
demands of life in a capitalist society. This section examines educational prescriptions
422 P.Freire, The Politics o f Education, London, Macmillan, 1985, p. 106. For Freire, ‘political illiteracy’ 
was a state of having ‘an ingenuous perception of humanity in its relationship with the world. ’ ibid., 
p. 103.
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which can underpin the development of individual character, before outlining the 
intrinsically valuable activities associated with an education for individual character.
i) Facilitating the development of individual character
The development of individual character in a liberal society occurs within diverse social 
practices, but becoming significantly autonomous in this manner also presupposes that 
agents are able to maintain a basic level of independence. This is particularly so in liberal 
capitalist societies, where individual flourishing is inevitably constrained by the need to 
cope with the demands of a very specific type of economy. A liberal education for 
individual character needs to accommodate some of the life-management skills inherent 
in survival in a capitalist society. However, it must ensure that the development of these 
competence-based skills is not prioritised over virtues of individual (or moral) character 
or that education is reduced to training for the labour market.423 These reflections are 
explored further below.
Life-management skills
A liberal education for significant autonomy should pay some heed to enabling citizens to 
manage life in a capitalist economic system. Life-management in such an economic 
system requires very specific skills many of which are not simply related to securing 
employment but which contribute to the ability to sustain a distinctive character. 
Financial management, utilising technology and accepting non-fulfilment of wants are all
423 Something to which a recent Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
report Education Policy Analysis alludes, ‘It is more important to aim at educational objectives of a 
general character than to learn things that are too specific. In the world of work, there exists a set of 
basic competencies - relationship qualities, linguistic aptitudes, creativity, the capacity to work in a team 
and to solve problems, a good understanding of new technologies - which have today become essential to 
possess to be able to obtain a job and to adapt rapidly to the evolving demands of working life. OECD,
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integral aspects of coping with day to day existence in a capitalist society. These skills 
can help agents to be significantly autonomous throughout the course of their lives and 
can be taught in schools to encourage children to later establish conditions of living 
conducive to the development of their individual character. Financial hardship and 
incompetence may not prevent an agent achieving individual character, but they most 
certainly make it very difficult for them to participate in many social practices. The 
development of individual character in liberal societies hangs on the ability to maintain a 
basic level of independence. Parenting, career management and community cohesion also 
presume that citizens have at least a minimal ability to sustain their distinctive character 
through time. Public services can fill many of the gaps left by the inability (or 
unwillingness) of some citizens to manage their lives, especially in relation to healthcare, 
personal pensions and unemployment insurance. However, a liberal state would not 
directly specify or control the organisation of most personal issues (such as, planning for 
children or financial debt),424 because such a course of action would constitute a serious 
breach of the right to be able to be significantly autonomous. Nonetheless, the state 
could legitimately seek to influence the personal and financial decisions of citizens 
through education. An education for significant autonomy should therefore seek to 
promote some skills associated with long-term life-management in a liberal society.
A liberal society with a capitalist free market presupposes that agents can be 
minimally self-dependent or self-reliant over a large part of their lifetime. Skills of life- 
management, such as timekeeping, financial prudence and coping with loss or failure are 
akin to self-regarding social virtues associated with the development of individual 
character. Moreover, significant autonomy could not be sustained in the long term if
Education Policy Analysis, 1998, quoted by R.Hatcher and N.Hirtt, ‘The Business Agenda Behind 
Labour’s Education Policy’, in M. Allen et al, New Labour’s Education Policy, p. 15.
424 It may seek to provide tax benefits or other incentives for citizens to accomplish these successfully.
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agents were not committed to the conditions necessary for its exercise throughout their 
lifetime. This does not mean that liberal citizens should exist in an atomistic isolation 
from each other nor that they should routinely require assistance from their fellow 
citizens. For the liberal state to render its citizens helpless by making them entirely 
dependent on state support or the support of other citizens would undermine the 
development of their moral and individual character. For individual flourishing to be 
sustained, a liberal education should ensure that citizens can individually (and 
collectively) manage their relationship with capitalism, money and the labour market with 
sufficient competence for them to be able to live well. Furthermore, life-management 
skills also adhere to wider social and political goods in a liberal society.
An education for individual character should reflect how children can make the 
most appropriate contribution to the development of their community and the wider 
social good. These are best promoted by ensuring that children are provided with the 
opportunity to participate in decision-making and to fulfil and be committed to roles 
appropriate (as far as is possible) to the development of their individual character. For 
perfectionist liberals, this means that children in state schools should be assisted in 
making appropriate choices about how they can best contribute to the social good. 
Careers education in schools can provide positive guidance about the nature and values 
inherent in the different jobs and professions to which pupils may be suited or attracted.
Careers education
The promotion of a liberal character-ethics indicates that economic priorities should be 
made subordinate to a concern for significant autonomy via the liberal principles of 
policy-making. Careers education is a particularly interesting example of this principle in 
action, providing a link between the exigencies of the labour market and the opportunity
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for agents to develop their individual character. Although a capitalist economy may 
valorise flexibility above other values within the labour market, an education for 
significant autonomy would not do so. Careers education can enable children to find an 
appropriate balance between their individual character, the demands of the capitalist 
economy and the wider social good. Inevitably, careers education in a liberal society is 
likely to be cognisant of the labour market. However, commitment to promoting 
significant autonomy within a liberal education should enable children to negotiate the 
free market in a way that can enable them to develop their individual character. Although 
there is no reason to suppose that the demands of capitalism are inevitable or immutable, 
it seems fair to suggest that a liberal education should steer children towards the most 
appropriate employment opportunities.
To help children become significantly autonomous, schools can direct them 
towards choosing a career which can enable them to develop their individual character. 
This highlights that the right to be able to be significantly autonomous exists in tension 
with and alongside many of the demands of the capitalist economic system. Although in 
a market economy the right to an education for significant autonomy would not 
necessarily establish absolute economic equality, the equal opportunity to develop 
significant autonomy implies recognising a need to promote the ability to engage 
(critically) with market society. This, in essence, is the purpose of careers guidance (and 
training in life-management skills) within a liberal education. An education for significant 
autonomy can stress that the choosing of a career is not necessarily dictated by the 
workings of the free market (though it may be informed by these). Careers education is 
thus an entitlement to be given the best possible chance of being significantly 
autonomous within what is often an unfair economic system. Radical socialists or liberals 
might question why pupils should be prepared for such an unequal society. But being
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fitted in some way for opportunities in the workplace may be viewed as a primary 
expectation of pupils and parents as citizens in a liberal society.425
An education for significant autonomy presumes that each pupil’s learning should 
be moulded (as much as possible) to their own requirements for flourishing. 
Nevertheless, the demands of the labour market will also influence the development of 
these requirements to some degree. An education for significant autonomy would ensure 
that occupational demand does not wholly determine the moral requirements of 
education in a liberal society. Promotion of a liberal character-ethics in schools can thus 
contain some of the contradictory impulses of the free market and avoid the charge of 
being socialisation into the world of work.
Facilitation of career choices within education implies a strong commitment to 
individual character. Indeed, the resolution of the tensions between the educational 
requirements of significant autonomy and the free market are ultimately found in the 
ethics of individual character. Nevertheless, the requirements of the labour market would 
not be regarded as intrinsically valuable by perfectionist liberals. How intrinsically 
valuable educational activities can promote the virtues of individual character is outlined 
next.
ii) Intrinsically valuable activities
Training in life-management skills and careers education provide very clear examples of 
how a liberal state can facilitate the development of individual character. They enable 
children to develop their individual character within their working lives, becoming 
significantly autonomous there in a way that is consistent with their own individual traits.
425 Marshall wrote that, ‘one, at least, of the values the pupil expects to get from it [education] is a 
qualification for employment at an appropriate level.’ ibid., p.37.
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However, for perfectionist liberals, children should above all have the opportunity to 
develop individual character-traits which are of value extrinsic to the labour market 
because the development of individual character is itself intrinsically valuable. By 
contrast, anti-perfectionists and impartialists are unable to adequately account for the 
value and purpose of academic disciplines, such as mathematics or history as they are 
unwilling (in principle) to commit to a liberal conception of the good life. An education 
for significant autonomy will presume that opportunities exist within education to 
develop specific cultural and intellectual virtues of individual character, such as artistic or 
intellectual ability. It will also include opportunities to pursue sporting and other leisure 
pursuits and hobbies. Educational presuppositions associated with promoting the virtues 
of individual character and their role in the curriculum are explored below.
Promoting virtues o f individual character
Foucault argued that human beings constitute their individual character through a variety 
of processes of ‘self-work’.426 Academic disciplines can therefore play a vital role in 
promoting virtues of individual character that are the outward manifestation of ‘self­
work’. Indeed, in the context of a mass society only an established education system is 
likely to provide agents with the cultural resources from (or against) which they can 
draw, to discipline and develop their individual character. This will be achieved by 
exhibiting generic social and moral virtues of individual character, and the generic and 
specific cultural and intellectual virtues of individual character.
The social and moral virtues of individual character are primarily those which 
enable a distinctive individual character to be developed within appropriate settings. This 
will entail learning and acting upon acceptable interpretations of achievement and
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appreciation within different academic disciplines. The generic social and moral virtues of 
individual character are those associated with competence and integrity. These virtues 
occur within the workplace as professionalism; in social and charitable activities as 
efficacy or utility; in cultural, leisure pursuits and hobbies as proficiency or appreciation; 
and in personal relationships as surety. In a liberal education, these generic social and 
moral virtues of individual character can be promoted throughout the curricular 
programme and within a wide range of academic disciplines. Academic opportunities 
would also provide a suitable environment for developing cultural and intellectual virtues 
of individual character. These virtues of individual character relate to how successfully 
agents shape the distinctiveness of their character and how this makes a contribution to 
their flourishing. And, as we have seen, cultural and intellectual virtues are both generic 
and specific. To promote significant autonomy, children should be given a broad range of 
opportunities to learn certain key generic and specific cultural and intellectual virtues 
across different practices and within those practices.
Generic cultural and intellectual virtues are those qualities which pertain to 
individual achievement (such as, creativity, mastery and refinement) and appreciation of 
individual achievement (such as, discernment and taste). These virtues of good character 
can creatively sustain and develop an agent’s distinctive character and may be best learnt 
by being actively exercised. A suitable learning environment would thus provide an 
excellent framework for the autonomous development of certain generic cultural and 
intellectual virtues to be stimulated. Nevertheless, within different disciplines it would be 
necessary to pursue more highly structured promotion of specific cultural and intellectual 
virtues because instruction is central to their initial development. An education for
426 M.Foucault, The History o f  Sexuality, Volume 3: The Care o f the Self
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significant autonomy thus has a vital role to play in nurturing the potential of children for 
making very distinctive contributions to different social practices.
To learn both generic and specific virtues of individual character, children can 
receive grounding in the most valued activities and practices in liberal society. A liberal 
curriculum including the Arts, humanities and sciences can therefore promote their ability 
to live well autonomously.
Arts, humanities and sciences
The perfectionist liberal policy-making principles enjoin that it is legitimate to promote 
intrinsically valuable activities within liberal societies. As a consequence of its duty to 
secure the right to be able to be significantly autonomous, the state is therefore justified 
in promoting those activities which can be deemed most valuable to agents in liberal 
societies. An education for significant autonomy, fully informed by an ethics of individual 
character, could establish that academic disciplines and recreation activities can provide 
agents with opportunities to manifest generic and specific virtues that will enable them to 
give distinctive valuable shape to their individual character across a lifetime.
The Arts and humanities can stimulate pupils’ imagination, providing a creative 
outlet for them to develop very particular virtues of individual character. Music, art, 
literature, history and other relevant subjects can develop the aesthetic sensitivity and 
sensibilities of pupils, deepening their emotional susceptibilities and their range of 
experiences. And they offer opportunities for children to find personal fulfilment by 
participating or excelling in activities which they appreciate or enjoy. In this regard, they 
are precursors to those practices outwith the labour market in which agents will have the 
opportunity to manifest generic and specific virtues of individual character. Indeed,
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autonomy would be much diminished if these opportunities did not exist or if children 
were not given an equal opportunity to display the virtues inherent in their pursuit.
A wide range of academic disciplines can stimulate the imagination of pupils and 
facilitate generic and specific virtues through which they can develop their individual 
character. The Arts can develop pupils’ aesthetic capabilities by teaching them to express 
themselves creatively and to appreciate the creative expressions of others. Schools can 
also play an important role in encouraging art and music by having concerts, 
competitions, art displays, assemblies and so on. Such activities also improve pupils’ 
access to different modes of communication, whether through performance or through 
reflection and criticism.427 Arts syllabi would seek to promote a wide range of diverse 
valuable experiences. Hence, the relevance of the Arts springs from the promotion of 
certain liberal virtues and from the diverse subject matter that is communicated or 
appreciated. This latter consideration is also a key feature of teaching humanities in 
schools, especially in the teaching of literature.
The study of literature is often regarded as an outstanding opportunity to 
systematically consider different moral and aesthetic dimensions of leading a good or 
fulfilling life. In particular, it can play a central role in shaping the moral vocabulary 
available to students. A liberal education for significant autonomy would thus place great 
value on the development of ‘narrative imagination’ to promote virtues associated with 
empathic understanding, responsible judgement and imaginative interpretation and 
development of meanings.428 These virtues are central to the development of both moral 
and individual character. Only where a liberal education seeks to influence the 
imagination, can democratic citizenship cultivate ‘a sympathetic responsiveness to
427 F.Smith, ‘The Contribution of the Arts to Values Education and Citizenship’, in R.Bailey ed., 
Teaching Values and Citizenship Across the Curriculum, p.34.
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another’s needs’ that ‘understands the way circumstances shape those needs, while 
respecting separateness and privacy.’429 The humanities are therefore a highly edifying 
means to promote liberal values because they are based on the freedom to re-describe 
what is humiliating or cruel to human beings.430 Studying literature shapes the 
imagination of pupils, enabling them to develop respect for the individual character of 
their fellows, as well as enabling them to develop their own individual character.
The Arts and humanities can stimulate both the imagination and the distinctive 
sympathies and tastes of individual agents. The latter of these effects is central to the 
notion that an education for significant autonomy comprises more than simply passing 
examinations or becoming employable, and is indicative of the inability of anti­
perfectionists to provide a cogent defence of the intrinsic value of education. 
Perfectionist liberals openly acknowledge the idea that some activities and practices have 
more intrinsic value than others do in a liberal society, and evince awareness that there 
are also many different practices which are, or which could become, valued in a liberal 
society. Hence, learning specific cultural and intellectual virtues should have the effect of 
encouraging agents to be committed to diverse ways of configuring their individual 
character. Nevertheless, the Arts and humanities do not capture the entire range of 
academic disciplines which can play a role in promoting diverse configurations of 
individual character.
428 M.Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity. L.Trilling, The Liberal Imagination, London, Mercury Books, 
1966.
429 ibid., p.90. However, Nancy Fraser asks ‘is it really the case that societies which produce the best 
literature are also the most egalitarian?’. N.Fraser, ‘Solidarity or Singularity? Richard Rorty between 
Romanticism and Technocracy’, in A.R.Malachowski ed., Reading Rorty: Critical Responses to 
Philosophy and the Mirror o f  Nature (and Beyond), p.308.
430 Nonetheless, as Michael Fischer notes, ‘though not scientists, literary critics speak a more stable 
vocabulary and heed firmer rules than Rorty supposes’. M.Fischer, ‘Redefining Philosophy as Literature: 
Richard Rorty’s ‘Defence’ of Literary Culture’, in ibid., p.237.
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Mathematics and science are generally held to be of critical social and academic 
value in a liberal education. Basic numeracy and mathematical skills are regarded as 
essential for children to be able to function effectively in later life. Moreover, the 
technological and scientific practices in a liberal society presume a range of different 
types of technical literacy. Perhaps surprisingly, mathematics can also be seen as both an 
essential preparation for the background conditions of being able to live well and a 
means for disciplining the imagination. The spirit of enquiry and the intellectual virtues 
(such as thoroughness and experimentation) which are inherent in mathematics and 
science can also guide the development of individual character. Disciplined mathematical 
and scientific thinking can be a useful model for decoding certain types of information 
(especially statistics), but are also central to the general business of interpreting life and 
one’s own circumstances. Indeed, mathematical and scientific skills abstractly reflect 
much of the general nature of problem solving. Managers, strategists, technicians, 
craftspeople and writers all require the capacity to be able to create and adapt systems or 
products which have some degree of coherence and which can be susceptible to 
adjustment, repair or improvement.
An education for significant autonomy would stress the facility of mathematics 
and science in providing children with an effective means of orientating themselves 
within the natural and social worlds. Mathematical and scientific skills can also contribute 
to life-management. For instance, by providing the knowledge required to understand the 
consequences of certain types of phenomena or actions, such as boiling water, driving a 
motor car or surfing the internet. However, this does not mean that mathematical skills 
or scientific understanding are simply instrumental requirements for flourishing in a 
liberal society. The strength of science, in particular, in stimulating the imagination of 
pupils and enabling them to develop virtues of individual character lies in the generic
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skills inherent in its method, particularly, the intellectual virtues of judgement and 
creativity 431 In addition, study of pure mathematics can convey the idea that valuable 
knowledge is not necessarily tied to the labour market. The school curriculum can also 
provide opportunities for individual character to flourish in ways that are not associated 
with academic subject matter.
The hidden curriculum revisited
As we saw earlier, sport and physical education can give pupils opportunities to 
participate in activities which may contribute to the development of their character. 
These are activities that they may later engage in as members of a liberal society. Schools 
should therefore be equipped to provide some level of training, education and guidance 
for all children to have an opportunity to participate in sports which they may later 
choose to pursue. This does not mean that all sports could receive equal attention within 
schools. Liberal governments will coordinate broad strategic decisions about the sporting 
priorities within schools. This would not rule out alternative sports or entail encouraging 
only those which are financially lucrative. Democratic curriculum decisions could take 
place in schools, local communities and councils about the ethical value of each sport.
The place of sporting activities in schools is also mirrored by the scope which 
schools have for co-ordinating a wide range of other leisure activities, such as camping, 
kite-making, horse-riding and so on. These activities would constitute a varied ‘hidden 
curriculum’ within an education for significant autonomy, by enabling pupils to posit 
distinct configurations of individual character. In fact, there is no reason why these 
activities need be regarded as a ‘hidden’ purpose of schooling. While leisure pursuits
431 G.Nicholls, ‘Citizenship: The Case of Science’, in R.Bailey ed., Teaching Values and Citizenship 
Across the Curriculum, pp. 128-9.
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would play a subsidiary role in comparison with academic disciplines and sport, they can 
provide a valuable means for filling in the finer details of the development of individual 
character. They may also be less tied to the competitive striving for achievement that is 
often inherent in other aspects of the curriculum, offering wider opportunities for pupils 
to develop their own interests.
Perfectionist liberals are unlikely to suggest that play and hobbies constitute 
activities which are analogous in intrinsic value to arts, humanities, mathematics and 
science. Nor do they necessarily embody the same sort of spirit of seriousness inherent in 
playing sport. Developing a distinctive character is a rigorous and determined activity.432 
Nevertheless, perfectionist liberals committed to significant autonomy would not draw an 
impermeable distinction between the contribution made to the development of character 
by the ‘forms of knowledge’ and that of other potentially valuable activities.433 The 
school curriculum can therefore co-ordinate a wide variety of liberal normative 
commitments, not least the notion that ‘play’ itself can be an important feature of 
developing individual character.
The priority o f moral and political education
The role of schools in promoting the development of individual character is clearly 
critical, but will nevertheless remain secondary to their role in promoting the 
development of moral character. Moral character is prior to individual character in a 
liberal character-ethics, consequently it is the key preoccupation of an education for 
significant autonomy. In particular, a liberal education should concentrate great attention 
on promoting the liberal political virtues because participation in politics and democratic
432 See D.Cooper, Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche’s Educational Philosophy.
433 P.H.Hirst and R.S.Peters, The Logic o f  Education, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970.
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decision-making form such a crucial part of significant autonomy in a liberal society. 
Individual flourishing is ultimately dependent on the disposition of agents to be 
responsibly engaged with decision-making which has implications for living well. The 
recent introduction of a scheme of political education in English state schools provides 
an especially interesting case study for perfectionist liberals committed to the critical 
relationship between character, politics and education. This scheme and the current 
politics and philosophy of education and citizenship in the UK are described and 
evaluated in the final chapter of the thesis.
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Chapter 6: Political Education in England
A programme of political education has now been introduced as a statutory foundation 
subject on the National Curriculum for secondary school pupils in England. Pupils aged 
11-16 follow a Citizenship curriculum with statutory requirements prescribing study of 
the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. This initiative has tremendous significance 
for the development of state education in the UK and major implications for political 
study and discourse. Not only are pupils expected to learn a range of political virtues, but 
political parties, scientists and theorists in the UK will be able to closely map the 
relationship between education, politics and democracy. The importance of political 
education for the development of moral character leads perfectionist liberals to ask two 
pivotal questions about Citizenship in English schools. First, can Citizenship promote the 
liberal political virtues found within a liberal character-ethics? Second, will the learning 
environment in which it is delivered effectively model responsible political engagement? 
The chapter will begin by discussing the historical context and development of political 
education in England. The curriculum orders will then be described before some relevant 
issues surrounding the delivery of Citizenship are outlined. The liberal character-ethics 
explicated in this thesis is then used to interrogate the principles and teaching of 
Citizenship.
1. The Evolution of Political Education in England
The introduction of the statutory Citizenship orders for English secondary schools is the 
result of three decades of campaigning by educationalists, political theorists and 
politicians.434 Its ascent up the political agenda reflected a number of factors inherent in
434 1.Davies, ‘What has Happened in the Teaching of Politics in Schools in England in the Last Three 
Decades, and Why?’.
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the UK’s political culture and education system. The decline of Empire, the rise of 
political radicalism and the need to respond to the growing civic deficit hastened 
agreement about the need for a programme of political education. Despite the complex 
politics of political education in schools, the establishment of the National Curriculum 
enabled the Labour government to push through statutory provision of Citizenship. This 
section explains and assesses the nature of the crucial influences on the evolution of 
political education in England, with a view to later assessing its potential impact on 
character-development.
i) The politics of post-war education
The imperialist character education delivered in British schools before the Second World 
War was revised and rethought following its cessation as Britain fell from global political 
and economic pre-eminence. Social upheavals and political change hastened this impulse 
during the 1960s and 1970s, generating a new kind of debate about the role of politics in 
education. Many political observers and parties began to view schools as the most 
appropriate focus for coordinating and implementing national responses to economic and 
social change such as the globalised economy and increasing ethnic diversity. As a result, 
the politics of post-war education has inevitably influenced the emphasis given to 
political education within British state schools.
Patriotism and national character
Secondary schools were introduced in Britain in 1902 to further the process of 
socialisation begun with the establishment of primary schools in 1871.435 At the time, 
schools were the main vehicles for transmitting the literacy and numeracy upon which
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national economic and military mobilisation depended, becoming a focal point for states 
to forge the character of their citizens in particular ways. Indeed, Victorian politics was 
coloured by a concern with the formation of character.436 In Britain, an education 
suitable for forging imperial character and preparing elite leaders of the Empire had been 
developed in privately-owned Public schools, with the same model of imperial character 
education later adopted in state schools. Although the close of the British Empire caused 
policy-makers to distance themselves from some aspects of this imperialist education, the 
belief that patriotic character was the central aim of education remained intact.437
Imperial character education was reflected in curricular pronouncements made in 
the 1944 Education Act which stressed ‘the role of the classics’ and dismissed ‘such 
subjects as international relations, economic and political structures, local and central 
government, and the history and economic resources of other countries’.438 Following 
the war, politics, citizenship and government did not feature on the educational agenda 
for different reasons. The war had been won and the Labour government had begun 
implementing a wide-range of radical social reforms which circumvented political 
disquiet in British society. In particular, the 1944 Education Act had established that 
secondary schooling should be provided according to ‘age, ability and aptitude’ rather 
than means.439 Nevertheless, post-war education maintained the pre-war focus on the 
virtues of British national character. Indeed, these virtues were viewed by many 
educational policy-makers as providing the backbone of victory in 1945. The continued
435 E.Hobsbawm, The Age o f Empire, pp. 149-50, 178.
436 S.Collini, ‘The Idea of ‘Character’ in Victorian Political Thought’.
437 Before the Second World War some observers had noted the role that teaching the virtues of 
democratic citizenship could play in a state education, but the conventional imperial character education 
was not substantially problematised until the war ended. For example, W.E.Forster, The Citizen Reader, 
London, Cassell and Co. ltd, 1926 emphasised that ‘boys and girls in our Elementary Schools’ should 
learn ‘their rights, duties and privileges as British Citizens’, pp. 12-37.
438 C.Bamett, The Verdict o f Peace, p.452.
439 W.O.Lester-Smith, Education: An Introductory Survey, pp. 102-4.
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influence of patriotism on post-war British education therefore led schools to stress 
economic and communal virtues associated with a flourishing nation state (especially 
those associated with industrial and commercial occupations) rather than the political 
virtues inherent in a liberal democracy.440
‘Politics’ was regarded as a dangerous ideological minefield for policy-makers in 
post-war Britain, especially within schools, where ‘prescribing the curriculum was 
something that fascists did and democrats did not.’441 Politicians across the political 
spectrum felt that quiet maintenance of the social status quo combined with radical post­
war welfare reforms would safeguard the political culture and parliamentary democracy 
of the UK. One prominent British academic of the time noted that the best regulated 
democracies were those in which the majority of citizens were apathetic about politics, 
leaving government to a small class of professionals.442 And, by remaining ‘prisoners of 
Britain’s recent past as a great imperial and industrial power’, Britain’s politicians and 
bureaucrats exacerbated this disdain for politics and democracy.443
The profound self-satisfaction of the political elite was also evident in Britain’s 
reluctance to retire gracefully from the world stage. Tensions between the need to invest 
in rebuilding Britain and the cost of gradually relinquishing global dominance impacted 
heavily on the development of new educational initiatives.444 This was particularly so for 
academic subjects which might contain controversial material. Political education may 
have been delivered to ‘elite students’ in private schools, but the ‘civics’ tutorials given 
in state secondary schools provided only a basic grounding in patriotism.445 State-led
440 ibid., pp.215-8.
441 M.Barber ed., The National Curriculum: A Study in Policy, Keele University Press, 1996, p. 16.
442 W.H.Morris-Jones, ‘In Defence of Apathy’, Political Studies, 1954.
443 C.Bamett, The Verdict o f  Peace, xvi.
444 ibid., p.460.
445 1.Davies, ‘What has Happened in the Teaching of Politics in Schools in England in the Last Three 
Decades, and Why?’, p. 126.
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programmes of training for citizenship were thought fit only for mature students within 
‘the wider sphere of adult education’.446 What political education there was in British 
state schools was therefore treated ‘in a diffuse and uncoordinated way in various forms 
of curriculum structure, pedagogic strategy and school organisation’.447 However, 
marginalisation of political subject matter within British schools was transformed by the 
social change sweeping through Western democracies during the 1960s.
The rise o f ‘issues-poliiics'
The expansion of secondary education and the growth of a politically active younger 
generation during the 1960s made politics and ideology more appealing and accessible to 
teachers, university students and school pupils. This generated a groundswell of greater 
political awareness and debate that evolved throughout the 1970s, giving rise to New 
Social Movements and student radicalism in Universities. In turn, these developments 
were paralleled by the efforts of many educationalists and political theorists to encourage 
explicit teaching of political issues within secondary schools.448 A movement which was 
bolstered when the voting age was lowered to 18 in 1970, prompting calls for sixth- 
formers to receive an education that enabled them to register a properly considered
449vote
The Department of Education and Skills 1980 publication A Framework fo r the 
School Curriculum reflected the influence of growing support for political education 
during the 1970s, stating that Personal and Social Education in schools should include a
446 Educational Reconstruction, Cmd.6458, HMSO, 1943, quoted in W.O.Lester-Smith, Education: An 
Introductory Survey, p.20.
447 T.H.McLaughlin, ‘Citizenship Education in England: The Crick Report and Beyond’, Journal o f  
Philosophy o f  Education, vol. 34, no.4, 2000, p.544.
448 Bernard Crick recent Chair of the Citizenship Advisory Group was instrumental in driving these 
developments from the early 1970s, in particular, through the Political Studies Association.
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political dimension that was ‘issue focused’. This should promote skills of participation 
as well as appropriate values and attitudes.450 Although this publication did little to 
create a groundswell for a statutory political element within the curriculum, teachers’ 
pressure groups began to develop subjects centring on such politically charged issues as 
‘Peace Studies’, ‘Women’s Studies’ and ‘Environmental Awareness’. These ‘adjectival’ 
subjects did not ‘constitute a coherent and unified programme, other than in their 
commitment to social justice’ and were often hostile to the development of a more 
general political education. Despite support from many teachers and a degree of 
coordinated curriculum development the radicalism of ‘adjectival educations’ was also 
their weakness, with their various protagonists unable to reach agreement on an 
overarching purpose. Policymakers also shied away from embracing a political education 
which could alienate pupils by focusing on ‘trendy’ social and political issues.451 Such 
fears were fuelled by the portrayal of many ‘loony-left’ councils in the popular media of 
the time. Nevertheless, as the 1980s progressed many observers came to recognise that 
political education could be an effective policy instrument for governments seeking to 
deliver solutions to social problems.
Education fo r active citizenship
The impact of political radicalism on the development of political education in England 
was overshadowed in the 1980s by emerging concerns about a ‘civic deficit’ in Western 
societies. As we have seen, declining electoral turnout and the growth of social 
disaffection suggested that support for civic culture and democratic political institutions 
were deteriorating. The sense of crisis that the civic deficit has spurred generated support
449 1.Davies, ‘What has Happened in the Teaching of Politics in Schools in England in the Last Three 
Decades, and Why?’, pp. 126-7.
450 ibid., p. 128.
271
for some form of citizenship-orientated education in schools across the political 
spectrum. Nevertheless, the proposals for citizenship education that emerged from this 
period were cashed out in very different philosophical terms. Some proponents viewed it 
as a panacea to failing public services and respect for authority, while some viewed it as 
an integral feature of the good life in liberal democracies, with others regarding it as 
necessary to generate congruence between increasingly diverse social groups.452 These 
disparate proposals developed rival interpretations of the active citizenship deemed 
necessary to overcome the ‘civic deficit’. As we have noted, these interpretations have 
been mainly influenced by two rival schools of thought: civic-individualism and civic- 
republicanism, but they have also been affected by supporters of civic-pluralism. Debate 
between these different groups is explored in further depth here to philosophy of political 
education in England.
Civic-individualist notions about active citizenship have been influenced by a 
range of managerialist assumptions relating to consumerism in the public sector. These 
assumptions and ideals have drawn on the work of many post-war political theorists, 
economists and sociologists who argued that government was safest in the hands of 
efficient administrators, with citizenship properly exercised only in the election of 
competing political parties or the affirmation of certain policy objectives.453 In British 
politics, civic-individualism became especially evident in the authoritarian and neo-liberal 
prescriptions of the New Right, particularly the Citizen’s Charter in 1991. In effect, the 
Charter codified a civic-individualist ideal of citizenship by indicating that citizens were 
primarily constituted by their status as taxpaying customers of government services.
451 ibid., pp. 128-30.
452 N.Rosenblum, ‘Democratic Character and Community: The Logic of Congruence’.
453 A.Downs, An Economic Theory o f Democracy, New York, Harper&Row, 1957; J. Schumpeter, 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York, Harper&Row, 1962.
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Civic individualists believe that active citizens should be self-reliant, respectful 
agents able to manifest skills associated with informed consumption of public services 
and civic volunteering. They promote a kind of citizenship, ‘in which, for example, a 
citizen is defined as the kind of person who secures a pension for him or herself.454 
Political education should therefore focus on ensuring that pupils have the skills to 
become self-disciplined informed consumers respectful of the need for public authority. 
Moreover, civic-individualists promote volunteering and charity work as a substitute for 
state-provision of certain welfare services. Hence, a civic-individualist approach to 
education for active citizenship in English schools could elicit ‘the potential for young 
people’s idealism to be exploited in a non-academic, undifferentiated altruism.’ Indeed, 
this negative association of education for active citizenship with the ‘societal status quo’ 
has been a common criticism of political education in English schools in the past.455 
Nevertheless, civic-individualist attitudes towards citizenship and education have been 
challenged by the revival of civic-republican ideas.
Contemporary civic-republican theorists argue (as did classical republicans) that 
participation in political deliberations is a critical presupposition of the freedom from 
domination which underpins liberty in a civilised state.456 To encourage such active 
citizenship in modem societies civic-republicans argue that citizens must be given the 
opportunities and capacity to participate in democratic decision-making. The promotion 
of active citizenship therefore has wider ethical, social and political purposes than the 
organisational performance of public institutions or civic volunteering. In particular, it 
can have a profound effect on the moral character of citizens by enabling them to be
454 1.Davies, ‘What has Happened in the Teaching of Politics in Schools in England in the Last Three 
Decades, and Why?’, p. 131.
455 ibid., pp. 134, 131. Guidance on citizenship education provided by the government during the 1980s 
was generally ‘narrowly and negatively associated with the recommendation for more voluntary action 
by young people’, idem.
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significantly autonomous in the political sphere. To that end, civic-republicans seek to 
develop policies to promote the development of political virtues at the heart of political 
engagement, including certain types of community participation strategy, such as 
Citizens’ Juries, and programmes of civic or political education.
As we saw in Chapter Five, civic-republicanism is consistent with an ideal liberal 
political education. And civic-republicans agree with perfectionist liberals that equal 
opportunity for participation in democratic decision-making is necessary to promote 
responsible political engagement and to address the civic deficit. They view the civic- 
individualist interpretation of active citizenship as likely to increase social disaffection 
and polarisation, particularly given the association of consumerism with decreased local 
accountability.457 Participation in local and national democratic political processes 
presupposes that school pupils have the opportunity to learn both the deliberative and 
participative political virtues. However, some observers have argued that the promotion 
of a civic-republican ideal of citizenship could reinforce the marginalisation of certain 
underrepresented, excluded or disaffected social groups because it conceptualises the 
public interest and the common good as a single homogenous whole. These ‘civic- 
pluralists’ argue that recognition of the diversity within contemporary Western societies 
means that there is a multitude of publics relevant to political decision-making 
processes458 and that this should be fully acknowledged in government policy-making. In 
particular, ‘a policy of active cultural pluralism’ in schools is believed to be ‘essential if 
minority groups are not to feel alienated from society’.459
456 P.Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory o f Freedom and Government, Oxford University Press, 1999.
457 S.Ranson, ‘Towards a Political Theory of Public Accountability in Education’, Local Government 
Studies, vol. 12, no.3, 1986.
458 M.Bames et al, ‘Constituting ‘The Public’ in Public Participation’, Public Administration, vol.81, 
no.2, 2003, pp.379-99.
459 A.Baumeister, ‘Cultural Diversity and Education: the Dilemma of Political Stability’, Political 
Studies, vol.46, 1998, p.925.
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Drawing on theories of the ‘politics of difference’,460 civic-pluralists believe 
political education should focus on encouraging the virtues necessary to promote 
congruence between the plurality of groups within society. Active citizenship is therefore 
viewed by civic-pluralists as a process of actively demonstrating sensitivity to difference. 
This can occur where citizens participate on an equal footing in the political processes 
and can thus be strengthened through the implementation of a wide range of positive 
discrimination policies. A civic pluralist ideal of active citizenship therefore builds on the 
participatory virtues inherent in civic-republicanism. Consequently, many civic- 
republicans question what civic-pluralism can add to their reflections on politics and 
citizenship, highlighting that ‘the politics of difference relies on an implicit appeal to 
autonomy and solidarity’, but ‘subverts itself by stressing difference and particularity 
rather than the sense of common ground... that fosters solidarity’.461
White and Hunt have contended that a pluralist ideal of citizenship can confuse 
the public realm with ‘other people’ as agents are drawn towards ‘the regressive 
minimalism of identity politics of race, ethnicity and gender.’462 These ‘reductionist forms 
of identification’ paradoxically restrict public freedom of political choice, while 
enhancing public freedom of expression, as we are forced to choose ever more restrictive 
and narrow political identities. Collective responsible political engagement may therefore 
become increasingly dispersed as the ‘multiplicity of differentiated relations between self 
and others, individuals and institutions’ necessitates greater resources and capacities ‘for 
constructing meaningful and effective linkages between diverse projects’.463
Focusing on difference inevitably deepens the fragmentation and categorisation of 
available political identities. The rise of cultural diversity and the subsequent
460 In particular, I.M. Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference, Princeton University Press, 1990.
461 RDagger, Civic Virtues, p. 180.
462 M. White and A.Hunt, ‘Citizenship: Care of the Self, Character and Personality’, p. 106.
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‘proliferation of lifestyles’ has thus left many observers concerned that identity politics 
simply promotes ‘the self-seeking individual portrayed in neo-liberal economic theory’ 464 
Richard Rorty highlights that ‘the moral identity’ of citizens in a liberal society is 
‘constituted in large part, though obviously not exclusively, by his or her sense of 
participation in a democratic society.’ Hence ‘identity’ and ‘difference’ are emphatically 
not ‘concepts which can be made relevant to political deliberation.’ Liberal moral and 
political theory should encourage ‘people to have a self-image in which their real or 
imagined citizenship in a democratic republic is central.’465 This sense of the public good 
could become ever more marginalised ‘in a society that contains large numbers of people 
who feel no sense of empathy with their fellow citizens and do not have any identification 
with their lot’.466 Thus perfectionist liberals would affirm that civic-republican aspirations 
for public-spiritedness are more likely to provide suitable content for an attractive 
programme of political education.
Each of the notions of active citizenship outlined above, appeals to liberal 
aspirations for significant autonomy. The liberal political education explicated in the 
previous chapter represents a civic-republican approach to political education because of 
its emphasis on responsible individual and collective political engagement. Civic- 
individualism sits uneasily with the right to be able to be significantly autonomous in the 
political sphere. Furthermore, its conception of the skills associated with active 
citizenship excludes political virtues associated with responsible political engagement. 
Civic-pluralism recognizes the different political interests of different social groups, but 
fails to acknowledge the importance of the public good much beyond this. Although it is
463 ibid., p. 108.
464 A.Giddens, The Third Way, p.35.
465 R.Rorty, ‘Globalisation, the Politics of Identity and Social Hope’, in RRorty, Philosophy and Social 
Hope, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1999, pp.234, 237-9.
466 B.Barry, Culture and Equality, Cambridge, Polity, 2001, p.79.
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a worthy ideal in contemporary liberal democracies, it is one whose realisation is 
dependent on virtues of public-spiritedness within a civic-republican framework. These 
alternative approaches to active citizenship thus have had varying implications for how 
political education in England has been conceptualised and implemented. The impact of 
these different conceptions of citizenship on the current programme of political education 
in England will be examined in more depth later in the chapter.
Different theoretical views of citizenship have consistently been reflected in 
varying proposals for political education. These have also been greatly influenced by the 
politics of post-war education in the UK and the politics of political education in England 
itself, which has played a formative role in guiding the implementation of Citizenship.
ii) The politics of political education
The responses of government to social and political change have impacted on the 
development of political education in England. Throughout its evolutionary period there 
have been two substantial political issues associated with the introduction of political 
education in the secondary school curriculum. The first of these issues is the ‘anti- 
political’ culture of the UK. The second is the professional culture and power of 
teachers. Assessing the influence of these issues within the English politics of political 
education can provide an indication of the types of practical concerns which surround 
programmes of political education.
The British ‘anti-political ’ culture
British society is thought by many observers to be especially hostile towards political 
ideas and ideologies. Elizabeth Frazer has highlighted four key aspects of the anti­
political culture in Britain that have undermined the growth of wide support for political
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education in schools: (i) citizenship is a ‘foreign concept’ to many UK citizens who have 
understood themselves to be subjects of the crown; (ii) it is also a concept associated 
with a deferential class identity; (iii) there are no historical narratives or supporting texts 
for citizenship in the UK (unlike, for instance, the Declaration of Independence in the 
USA or the Declaration of the Rights of Man in France); (iv) there is general antipathy to 
‘politics’ and politicians amongst British citizens, particularly with the abrasive 
adversarial political system and its polarisation around ‘party-politics’.467 Moreover, 
much influential (conservative) British political thought has treated politics with great 
suspicion. As a recent publication made clear, there is a widespread perception in 
England that political ideas are the preserve of Europeans, while the ‘English’ focus on 
practical solutions to political problems.468 This ‘anti-political’ attitude has influenced 
debates about the desirability and need for political education. But does this mean that it 
can not and should not be introduced in the UK?
Suspicion of political ideas and their practitioners in Britain may be seen as both a 
symptom and a further contributor to the civic deficit. Indeed, mistrust of democratic 
politics and politicians may have deepened under the ‘spin culture’ of Tony Blair’s 
Labour administration.469 Nevertheless, none of the adverse cultural attributes associated 
with an often anti-political citizenry provides a justification for not teaching politics and 
citizenship in secondary schools. In fact, as Frazer argues, these factors and the 
conflictual nature of public institutions and decisions in the UK make an understanding of 
politics and the democratic process essential for British citizens.470 Moreover, the
467 E.Frazer, ‘Citizenship Education: Anti-Political Culture and Political Education in Britain’, Political 
Studies, Vol.48, 2000, p.96. This raises the further possibility that the civic deficit is simply a natural 
feature of British political culture, rather than a new phenomenon.
468 J.Paxman, The English: A Portrait o f  a People, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1999.
469 N. Jones, The Control Freaks: How New Labour Gets its Own Way, London, Politico’s, 2001.
470 E.Frazer, ‘Citizenship Education: Anti-Political Culture and Political Education in Britain’, pp.96- 
100.
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political history of modem Britain is replete with examples of political activism on the 
part of citizens, and with a flourishing public discourse on political issues. Learning 
about wider aspects of the British political culture, such as the media demonisation of 
politics and politicians, should not be proscribed simply because it might involve a 
commitment to certain political virtues. The duties associated with responsible political 
engagement imply that however hostile to politics each citizen bears some responsibility 
for the development of their political culture and society. This enjoins an education 
which is committed to creating a culture conducive to the development and exercise of 
the liberal deliberative and participative political virtues. The nurturing of this culture 
within English schools may require a significant shift in existing political attitudes. To 
accomplish this, a programme of political education can only be implemented with the 
support of the teaching profession.
Teachers ’ autonomy
The professional autonomy of teachers in the UK has traditionally been regarded by 
policy-makers as an obstacle to the introduction of new curricular initiatives. Prior to the 
Second World War the statutory requirements placed on British state schools were 
unstructured and broad in their intent. Basic reading, writing and arithmetic skills were 
taught in elementary schools, while in secondary schools, teachers and schools were 
largely free to determine the content of the curriculum. Indeed, national examinations 
and qualifications for secondary pupils were developed only during the post-war 
period.471 Hence, teachers had a considerable degree of autonomy in their professional 
lives.
471 M.Barber ed., The National Curriculum: A study in policy, p. 15.
279
The professional autonomy of teachers had been guaranteed in the 1920s to 
ensure that they would not become involved in the increasingly strident Labour 
movement. Teachers on the front-line were therefore directly ‘incorporated to some 
extent as partners in the policy process’, with ‘control over the curriculum’ largely their 
responsibility.472 Although the influence over their own working practice was central to 
teachers’ professional identity, it was then persistently questioned by national 
governments seeking to re-establish greater control over education. The first serious 
threat to teachers’ professional autonomy emerged at the end of the Second World War 
when the 1944 Education Act gave central government extensive powers to direct and 
control local authorities.473 Despite this extension of central control, the ‘influence and 
respectability’ that had detached teachers from the labour movement sustained the 
professional status quo. As a result, the shape of the secondary school curriculum in 
England remained largely in the hands of headmasters and individual teachers. This 
meant that the curriculum sometimes developed in a haphazard nature, with new 
recommendations debated only at professional conferences. However, this local 
autonomy was undermined again when the Schools Council (a partnership between 
teachers, local and central government) was inaugurated during the 1960s to coordinate 
curriculum innovations. Central government proposals for a national curriculum were 
invariably rejected by the Council,474 but its establishment represented the first step in a 
process towards standardising the curriculum. Perfectionist liberals would not claim that 
a rigidly standardised curriculum was integral to an education for significant autonomy, 
recognising that without suitable liberal provisos it could embody an illiberal conception 
of the good life. They would also be concerned about excessively constricting the
472 ibid, p. 16.
473 W.O.Lester-Smith, Education: An Introductory Survey, pp. 136-7.
474 M.Barber ed., The National Curriculum: A Study in Policy, p. 18
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autonomy of teachers to develop their own approaches to promoting liberal virtues 
within classrooms. However, the right to be able to be significantly autonomous is one 
which generates an entitlement for every child to be provided with a political education. 
And, the advent of the national curriculum enabled supporters of political education to 
gain a strong foothold in educational policy debates.
iii) Establishing an agenda
During the 1980s and 1990s the prospects for political education in British schools 
changed dramatically. Rising concern about the civic deficit and the campaigning of 
political education enthusiasts caused policy-makers in government to re-think the need 
for some form of political education in the school curriculum.475 Two key institutional 
developments finally led to the statutory provision of political education in England: the 
establishment of the National Curriculum in 1990 and the establishment of the 
Citizenship Advisory group in 1997.
The National Curriculum
Teachers in English schools continued to have considerable discretion over the 
curriculum even after the establishment of the Schools Council. However, the assault on 
their professional autonomy continued as the economic crises of the 1970s led politicians 
to scrutinise the funding and delivery of education more carefully. In particular, the 
disparate nature of curriculum requirements in different schools was seriously questioned 
- most famously in James Callaghan’s Ruskin College speech. Closer examination of the 
inputs and outcomes within education led to sustained reappraisal of the need for
475 1. Davies, ‘What has Happened in the Teaching of Politics in Schools in England in the Last Three 
Decades, and Why?’; T.H.McLaughlin, ‘Citizenship Education in England: The Crick Report and 
Beyond’.
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national curricular prescriptions. This had very important implications for supporters of 
political education: as the drive to circumscribe local autonomy and standardise the 
curriculum became more marked, so the possibility of the place of a national programme 
of political education within it became more attainable. A possibility made emphatically 
more likely by the introduction of the National Curriculum in 1990.
The National Curriculum emerged from policy recommendations for the 
standardisation of curricular requirements across the England and Wales. Many 
educationalists argued that it sanctioned an outdated authoritarian view of schooling 
which marked a return to conventional character education.476 And, although they were 
consulted throughout its development, teachers remained concerned about the further 
threat its imposition posed to their professional autonomy.477 But in spite of this initial 
unpopularity amongst teachers, it is nevertheless clear that some form of standardisation 
can make schools more responsive to (liberal or illiberal) national priorities. The National 
Curriculum therefore provided a broad framework within which educationalists could 
debate and propose reforms to schooling, making a national programme of political 
education manageable in a way not previously thought possible.
The National Curriculum Council set up a Commission for Citizenship in 1990 to 
assess the prospects for a statutory programme of political education. The resulting 
policy recommendations stressed that without statutory requirements political education 
would continue to lack the status of other core and foundation subjects.478 Nevertheless, 
the Council chose only to promote introduce politics in schools as a non-statutory cross­
curricular theme, rendering it largely impotent within secondary schools. This situation
476 S.Ball, ‘Education, Majorism and the Curriculum of the Dead’, pp. 195-214. AND
477 Throughout the early stages of its implementation the National Curriculum was subject to 
tremendous pressures, culminating in the test boycott in 1993 and the Dealing Review in the same year.
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was decisively altered when the Labour government established the Advisory Group on 
Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools in 1997.
The Citizenship Advisory Group
The Citizenship Advisory Group was set up by the Labour Government to evaluate the 
most effective means for delivering political education within the school curriculum. 
Teachers and educationalists drew up specific proposals for primary and secondary 
schools which the Advisory Group (chaired by Professor Sir Bernard Crick) then 
debated, before publishing their recommendations in 1998. Broadly speaking the Crick 
Report (as it became known) contained five key claims about the implementation of what 
became described as ‘citizenship education’ in English schools:
(i) Citizenship education should be a separate statutory curriculum 
requirement;
(ii) Citizenship education involves learning to be an active citizen;
(iii) Teachers require well-designed guidelines to teach controversial issues;
(iv) Learning objectives should be set to facilitate inspection.
(v) A Standing Commission on citizenship education should monitor its
479progress.
The final report affirmed that the aim of the Group’s proposals was to effect ‘no less 
than a change in the political culture of this country both nationally and locally.’480 
Educational practitioners and theorists alike received the Crick Report as an important 
contribution to the debate on political education in schools. Most lauded its stress on a 
civic-republican notion of the virtues of active citizenship, but some supportive political
478 The Commission’s report stated that ‘the study and experience of citizenship should be a part of 
every young person’s education’ from early years through to higher education ‘whether in state or 
private schools’. Commission on Citizenship, Encouraging Citizenship, London, HMSO, 1990, xvii.
479 Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, Education for Citizenship and the Teaching o f Democracy 
in Schools, Final Report of the Advisory Group on Citizenship, London, QCA, 1998.
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and educational theorists were concerned that actually increasing electoral turnout and 
political involvement might yet prove too ambitious and demanding an aim.481
Despite these concerns, the recommendations of the group were sufficiently 
cogent and popular for the government to decide that Citizenship for secondary school 
pupils in England should be implemented in August 2002. And the 2000 curriculum 
orders specifying the structure of Citizenship for secondary school pupils give an 
indication of the type of activities which should be promoted.
2. The 2000 Citizenship Orders
The National Curriculum specified for English secondary schools in 2000 stated that 
from August 2002 onwards Citizenship would be a foundation subject for pupils at Key 
Stage 3 (11-14 year olds) and Key Stage 4 (14-16 year olds).482 Citizenship is intended 
to build on what teachers are ‘already doing in a flexible and innovative way.’483 
Nevertheless, provision for political education in most English schools was decidedly 
patchy prior to 2002. As a result, curriculum orders comprise a wide-ranging 
introduction to politics and citizenship.
i) Citizenship at Key Stage Three
Key Stage Three pupils in English schools study a broad range of subjects until they 
select those which they wish study for examination at Key Stage Four. Like all National
480 Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, Education for Citizenship and the Teaching o f Democracy 
in Schools, 1.5.
481 T.KMcLaughlin, ‘Citizenship Education in England: The Crick Report and Beyond’, pp.546-54.
482 In Wales, Citizenship is currently a feature of the guidance for Personal and Social Education. See 
my article ‘Community, Culture and the Curriculum Cymreig: Citizenship Education in Wales’, Journal 
o f Welsh Education, vol. 10, no.l, 2001, pp.21-31. In Scotland, it is a non-statutoiy feature of their 
modem studies and community education provision. In Northern Ireland, it is a non-statutory part of 
their education for mutual understanding.
483 Citizenship at Key Stages 3 and 4: A Guide for Senior Managers and Governors, London, QCA, 
2000 .
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Curriculum subjects, the curriculum requirements for Citizenship at KS3 are given 
detailed substance in programmes of study developed by the central government 
department responsible for education. These specify units of study with teaching 
activities, learning objectives and outcomes, and teaching methods.
Units o f study
At Key Stage 3, there are fifteen units specific to discrete provision of Citizenship and 
six designed for cross-curricular use. The specific Citizenship units include: Citizenship - 
what’s it all about; Human Rights; Government, elections and voting; The significance of 
the media in society; and, Developing skills of democratic participation. Cross-curricular 
units include: Debating a global issue (with geography); Why did women and some men 
have to struggle for the vote in Britain? (with history); How do we deal with conflict? 
(with Religious Education); and, What’s in the public interest? (with science).484
Learning Objectives
The key learning objectives for the discrete Citizenship units of study are based around 
three key skills: ‘Knowledge and understanding about becoming informed citizens’; 
‘Developing skills of enquiry and communication’; and ‘Developing skills of 
participation’.485 Specific objectives include: establishing ground rules for discussion; 
understanding rights and responsibilities; learning how issues are debated in parliament; 
understanding voting and elections; understanding how government spends public 
money; learning to influence change; and interpreting news stories and the media. The 
key learning objectives for the linked units include: understanding global issues
484 ‘Citizenship’, Key Stage 3 Schemes o f Work, London, QCA, 2001.
485 How Citizenship can enhance English literacy and the use of language is also described in the 
programmes of study.
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(geography); learning from political history (ihistory); understanding conflict resolution 
{religious education); taking responsible action (science)426 These key learning 
objectives are then broken down into learning outcomes.
Learning outcomes
The learning outcomes pertaining to Citizenship are specific targets which teachers 
should help pupils aim to achieve. So, for instance, when pursuing the objective of 
‘establishing ground rules for discussion’, pupils should learn to ‘know what helps or 
hinders discussion and what rules are needed to enable all members of the group to 
contribute to the discussion.’487 To successfully accomplish the learning outcomes pupils 
should ‘think creatively and critically about hypothetical situations and relate 
hypothetical conclusions to real-life situations’.488 Further examples of learning outcomes 
for Citizenship at KS3 include, being able to discuss ‘crime statistics in relation to causal 
factors’, recognising that ‘rights can compete and/or conflict’, understanding ‘what it 
means to be a global citizen’, appreciating ‘some of the possible consequences of low 
turnout’ and being able to ‘identify and evaluate a range of ways in which decisions are 
made’.489
Teaching methods
The guiding pedagogical philosophy behind the schemes of study for Citizenship at KS3 
is that ‘pupils are more likely to become active citizens if their learning experiences have 
enabled them to take responsibility for their learning.’ This means that, for pupils, the 
'way in which learning experiences are provided in citizenship is, therefore, fundamental
486 ‘Citizenship’, Key Stage 3 Schemes o f Work, London, QCA, 2001.
487 ibid, pp. 4-5.
488 idem.
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to the development of effective practice.’ The learning environment for Citizenship 
should support pupils in ‘discussing views which may be contrary to their own’ by 
‘promoting appreciation, courtesy, concern, respect, responsibility and understanding.’ 
Moreover, pupils themselves are expected to learn to ‘establish ground rules that will 
enable them to work effectively together.’490 The methods adopted for delivering 
Citizenship will also depend on the type of teaching activity, with teachers expected to 
‘use a range of teaching styles to accommodate the different learning styles of 
individuals’.491 For example, pupils may work in pairs or talk in groups to discuss ground 
rules for discussion and why they are needed or present and vote on the pros and cons of 
micro-decisions which affect them (such as the seating arrangements) 492 The objectives, 
outcomes and methods for Citizenship for KS3 pupils thus form the foundation for its 
continuation at KS4.
ii) Citizenship at Key Stage Four
Key Stage Four pupils in English schools currently study up to eleven academic subjects 
for examination. Examination in Citizenship is currently optional, but a statutory 
requirement to deliver it remains. Again, the programmes of study for Citizenship specify 
units of study with teaching activities, learning objectives and outcomes, and teaching 
methods.
489 idem. The status of many of the principles of Citizenship is discussed in Section three of this chapter.
490ibid., p.35. Pupils’ ground rules include: ‘Make sure everyone has a chance to speak’; ‘Don’t use put 
downs or make fun of what others say or do’; ‘Be helpful or constructive when challenging another’s 
viewpoint’; ‘You have a right to ‘pass’ if you do not want to speak on an issue’; ‘Show appreciation 
when someone explains or does something well, or is helpful in some way to you.’ idem.
491 ibid., p. 11.
492 Other activities include: conducting mock trials; reflecting on personal experiences; creating a 
charter of rights; analysing literature; mock elections; research surveys; watching televised debates; 
writing reports; mock committee meetings; workshops, visiting speakers; and events days. idem.
287
Units of study
At KS4 each of the units in the programmes of study are citizenship - specific. They 
include: Young people and car crime; Challenging racism and discrimination; How and 
why are laws made?; How the economy functions; Planning a community event; 
Producing the news; and Rights and responsibilities in the workplace.493
Learning Objectives
The key learning objectives for KS4 Political Literacy focus on political issues and 
generic political concepts. They include understanding: human rights; racism; making and 
changing laws; having a say; taxation; the economy; improving performance/self- 
evaluation; making editorial decisions; fair trade; and sustainable development.494 Again, 
these learning objectives are broken down into learning outcomes.
Learning outcomes
The learning outcomes for KS4 Citizenship reflect the increased standard of debate that 
is expected at this stage of pupils’ development, in particular, they centre on the 
relationship between political opinions and positions and the institutional means by which 
political solutions are implemented. So for example, when learning about human rights 
pupils are expected to be able to ‘discuss difficult issues’ and ‘know who to go to for 
help and advice if they feel their rights have been breached.’ The emphasis at KS4 is 
therefore on the practical application of political literacy. Indeed, ‘[ajctive participation is 
the key to citizenship at this important stage.’495
493 ‘Citizenship’, Key Stage 4 Schemes o f Work, London, QCA, 2000.
494 idem.
495 ‘Teacher’s Guide’, Citizenship: A Scheme o f Work for Key Stage 4, London, QCA, 2001, pp.3, 10.
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Teaching methods
The methods for encouraging active participation are described in detail in the 
publication Staying involved: extending opportunities fo r pupil participation496 
Community work and volunteering is encouraged, but there is also stress laid on 
opportunities for pupils to participate in simulated political decision-making procedures 
(such as mock trials and council debates). Staying Involved stresses that KS4 ‘pupils 
should be used to taking part in the day-to-day organisation and running of the school’ 
through involvement in school decision-making, awareness-raising days, environmental 
projects and a wide range of community activities.497
The Citizenship orders reflect the use of political education as a policy 
instrument. Nevertheless, for perfectionist liberals, its delivery and principles should also 
reflect its importance as a normative ideal based on the right to be able to be significantly 
autonomous. But before critically examining Citizenship we will first consider some 
important philosophical and educational issues associated with its delivery and 
assessment.
3. Delivering Citizenship
This chapter has so far described the development and content of the statutory orders for 
Citizenship in England. But is such a structured approach appropriate for promoting the 
development of character and significant autonomy? Should a political education be
496 ‘Citizenship at Key Stage 4 ’, Staying Involved: Extending Opportunities for Pupil Participation, 
London, QCA, 2000.
497 ibid., p.l. Staying Involved also envisages pupils contributing to consultations on ‘the achievement of 
local targets as part of national government priorities, for example through Health or Education Action 
Zones, Best Value, crime and disorder strategies, health improvement programmes or drug prevention 
priorities.’ ibid., p.5. Indeed, local authorities are now expected to alert ‘young people to the working of 
social and public life... and the means at their disposal for influencing local policies’ as part of their 
wider duty to promote ‘effective community engagement’. DTLR, Strong Local Leadership - Quality 
Public Services, White Paper Presented to parliament December 2001, p.20.
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delivered and assessed within a separate statutory framework? And if so, how can 
Citizenship best accomplish its aims? This section reviews the justification for the 
provision and assessment of Citizenship and examines some conditions associated with 
its effective delivery.
i) Justifying statutory requirements
The provision of any subject in liberal state schools presumes some degree of 
commonality in the approaches adopted by those schools. And the involvement of 
government in codifying and auditing statutory orders implies that certain learning 
objectives or outcomes will probably be set for schools to adopt. The National 
Curriculum in England provides an excellent example of how foundation subjects for 
state-led secondary education may be given extremely rigorous specification by national 
agencies. But is such rigour really necessary to ensure that children within England 
receive preparation in the liberal political virtues? And, is substantial dedicated 
curriculum time required to convince pupils of the worth of civic behaviour and political 
participation?
Establishing a place in the curriculum
The Citizenship orders in England were introduced on the understanding that statutory 
requirements were necessary to ensure all schools gave it substantial standing within the 
curriculum. Michael Barber has highlighted that for most developed countries the control 
of one or two major aspects of a curriculum subject (such as their learning objectives or 
teaching methods) is usually sufficient to ensure an acceptable degree of compliance
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amongst teachers.498 The National Curriculum prescribes orders for three aspects of each 
curriculum subject: objectives; outcomes; and methods. This suggests that there may be 
some scope for making the delivery of the orders in the classroom more flexible.
Although the National Curriculum has made a national programme of political 
education possible, many supporters of political education have argued that ‘a tightly 
prescribed curriculum’ could undermine teachers’ commitment to deliver it and may 
ultimately alienate many pupils from civic and political involvement. By contrast, a more 
flexible structure could make room ‘for teachers and students to engage with some 
degree of rigour in a wider range of practices that connect with students’ prior and 
concurrent interests.’499 These educationalists believe that rigid application of a schema 
of learning objectives and outcomes in classrooms will not promote diverse 
configurations of the liberal virtues of good citizenship. But would perfectionist liberals 
accept that the political virtues would flourish in an unstructured learning environment? 
We saw earlier that the use of some disciplinary pedagogical methods plays a crucial role 
in promoting virtues that can enable children to develop good moral character. Indeed, 
the ‘Emile paradox’ indicates that the careful inculcation of technologies of the self is a 
vital precondition for pupils to become significantly autonomous. However, the 
importance of trying to develop a democratic learning environment within classrooms 
illustrates that direct instruction tied to very specific outcomes would be carefully 
circumscribed. Perfectionist liberals are therefore able to accommodate a certain degree 
of educational prescription for Citizenship, provided it can be revised and adapted by 
teachers, pupils and schools. But would this then presuppose considerable dedicated 
curriculum time for Citizenship?
498 M.Barber ed., The National Curriculum: A Study in Policy, p.38.
499 J.Halliday, ‘Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education: Towards Curriculum Reform’, British 
Journal o f Educational Studies, vol.47, no.l, 1999, p.45.
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Dedicated curriculum time in secondary schools was a central aim of the 
Citizenship Advisory Group, but it was also acknowledged that ‘aspects of citizenship 
education already existed in many schools and therefore the time required was a mixture 
of existing and additional provision.’500 As a result, ‘[r]eal curriculum time for 
citizenship’ would be ‘counterbalanced by the importance of recognising that it cannot be 
delivered through the formal curriculum alone.’501 However, a recent inspection report 
has highlighted that perceived lack of clarity in the statutory proposals has meant that 
initial provision of Citizenship was ‘low-key’ and unsatisfactory in many schools.502 
Subsequent inspections have revealed that while provision has improved, pupils’ 
experience and understanding of citizenship remained ‘patchy’.503 A major factor 
influencing the decision to introduce a programme of political education in schools was 
the desire to ensure that it was delivered with consistency and coherence to all pupils in 
the English education system. In the past, cross-curricular guidance led to variable 
results, with most schools providing very little in the way of political education. Real 
curriculum time was a critical aim of the Citizenship Advisory Group, because space for 
distinct provision was regarded as essential for all pupils to have the opportunity to learn 
political virtues in a dedicated learning environment. Without such an environment, 
Citizenship can be steered away from the promotion of responsible political engagement 
towards volunteering or work-related education. Perfectionist liberals would thus 
acknowledge (as school inspectors have) that Citizenship requires substantial curricular
500 D.Kerr, The Making o f Citizenship in the National Curriculum (England): Issues and Challenges, 
www.Leeds.ac.uk, Education-line, p.9.
501 J.Newton, ‘Citizenship Education in the Curriculum: The Practical Side’, Parliamentary Affairs, 
vol.55, no.3, July 2002, p.527.
502 Office for Standards in Education, National Curriculum Citizenship: planning and implementation 
2002/03, London, Ofsted, 2003.
503 Office for Standards in Education, Ofsted Subject Reports 2002/03: Citizenship in Secondary 
Schools, London, Ofsted, 2004; Office for Standards in Education, Ofsted Subject Reports 2003/04: 
Citizenship in Secondary Schools, London, Ofsted, 2005.
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commitment within schools. But how would they justify cementing the place of statutory 
requirements for Citizenship in the English secondary school curriculum?
The right to be able to be significantly autonomous provides a strong justification 
for establishing a dedicated Citizenship learning environment. In a liberal society, the 
liberal political virtues are inherent in the development of good moral character. The 
liberal political virtues are also central to the democratic evolution of liberalism itself. In 
the doctrine explicated here, the promotion of these virtues is therefore held to be so 
important for the flourishing of agents in liberal societies that the liberal state should 
implement policies to facilitate their development. Moreover, the possibility that the 
voting age could be lowered to 16 in the UK means that a programme of liberal political 
education should be given high priority and strong curricular support within secondary 
schools.
If we accept that political education has uniquely important liberal autonomy- 
enhancing attributes then its place in the curriculum can be cemented by either (a) 
supplementing the existing secondary school curriculum or (b) directly replacing another 
curriculum subject.504 This autonomy-based justification for dedicated curriculum time is 
also reflected in the principles of the liberal policy-making described in Chapter Four 
which established that the liberal state was justified in promoting certain intrinsically 
valuable activities. There are also good educational reasons for substantial dedicated 
Citizenship provision.
Perfectionist liberals can view political virtues as especially important for agents 
to demonstrate good moral character. The development of good moral character and 
good citizenship involves manifesting these virtues within a set of highly complex public
504 Indeed, one critic of Citizenship in England asks ‘which parts of the existing curriculum structure are 
to be jettisoned to make way for the implementation of the proposals?’, J.Halliday, ‘Political Liberalism 
and Citizenship Education: Towards Curriculum Reform’, p.43.
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and private settings. As we have seen, this in turn entails that agents should be able to 
provide coherent, relevant and comprehensible interpretations of their own 
configurations of the virtues of moral character. The high degree of complexity that this 
interaction with a liberal character-ethics and democracy presumes, means that a political 
education can synthesise greater opportunities for character-development and intellectual 
growth than many other foundation subjects. Indeed, political education may also 
introduce pupils to many different subject areas, encouraging them to acquire ‘those 
many forms of reasoning that enable participation in a democratic form of life.’505
If Citizenship can considerably enhance both the character and cognitive 
development of pupils because of its overlap with such a wide range of other practices, 
there is therefore a compelling educational argument for ensuring it is given substantial 
curriculum time. This also implies that it could be subject to some form of assessment. 
The political and educational issues surrounding the assessment of Citizenship are 
examined next.
Assessment o f Citizenship
The assessment of Citizenship opens up a number of avenues of political and 
philosophical interest. Political and educational philosophers can view it as a focal point 
for studying the teaching and learning of normative ideas. Political scientists can gamer 
its outputs to evaluate the long-term impact of political education on civic attitudes and 
political participation. For policy-makers, the acceptability and efficacy of its assessment 
is likely to play a major part in its future status within the curriculum.
Although there are no hard and fast guidelines for its assessment, the 
programmes of study for Citizenship are detailed enough to support a fairly rigorous
505 ibid., pp.53-4.
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examination and inspection regime. At KS3, teachers are expected to utilise a range of 
‘active assessment strategies’ to develop targets, including: ‘observing pupils’, asking 
‘open-ended questions’; ‘asking pupils to communicate their ideas and thoughts’; and 
‘discussing words and how they are being used.’506 Attainment is then negotiated via 
self-assessment, peer assessment and the assessment of teachers and other relevant 
adults, such as community leaders. At KS4 pupils’ attainment and progress is assessed 
through broadly similar means to KS3, with assessments evaluating the extent to which 
pupils ‘have a comprehensive knowledge of the topical events they study’. They will also 
consider pupils’ ability to ‘form and express an opinion’, to ‘evaluate the effectiveness of 
different ways of bringing about change at different levels of society” and to ‘take part 
effectively in school and community-based activities, showing a willingness to evaluate 
such activities critically.’ Overall, pupils should ‘demonstrate personal and group 
responsibility in their attitudes to themselves and others.’507
As yet the General Certificate in Secondary Education (GCSE) (short course) in 
Citizenship Studies is not a compulsory requirement for the assessment of Citizenship. 
The possibility of making Citizenship a compulsory GCSE leads to a whole range of 
issues surrounding the examination and assessment of programmes of political education. 
For perfectionist liberals, a liberal political education can be subject to some structured 
assessment. However, not all educationalists are convinced that assessment is helpful for 
delivering appropriate educational outcomes in political education. Some regard the 
assessment of Citizenship as a dangerous threat to civil liberties in liberal democracies, in 
particular, they believe that the possibility of failing pupils in Citizenship would have two 
seriously illiberal consequences: (i) it would call into question the rights of failing pupils
506 ‘Teachers Guide’, Citizenship: A Scheme o f  Work for Key Stage 3, pp. 13-6.
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to participate fully in democratic political processes; (ii) if failed pupils are in fact later 
permitted to participate in elections and other democratic processes, then important 
processes of decision-making are undermined because the competence of participants 
may be called into question.
Political literacy tests may be useful for evaluating political knowledge and 
understanding, but they would clearly be a crude way of assessing active participatory 
virtues. Indeed, as the Citizenship orders recognise ‘[assessment in citizenship should 
not imply that pupils are failing as citizens. It should not be a judgement on the worth, 
personality or value of an individual pupil or their family’.508 While the participative 
political virtues may be a developmental aspiration, the deliberative political virtues 
remain susceptible to some form of structured assessment as it may be possible to devise 
tests that can accurately and equitably reflect pupils’ understanding of politics and 
citizenship.509 Nevertheless, some observers have criticised the prescription of learning 
outcomes within a subject that is concerned with the promotion of liberal-democratic 
values. For these commentators, the ‘move from tightly prescribed outcomes to tightly 
prescribed activities designed to achieve those outcomes is all too easy to make in a 
[political] climate that favours immediate and obvious measures of accountability.’ They 
also contend that the ‘formulation of ‘outcomes” could result in ‘a behavioural 
manifestation of those values in the supposed interests of standards and objectivity.’510 
These illiberal consequences can be best avoided by ensuring that teachers have sufficient
507 ‘Teacher’s Guide’, Citizenship: A Scheme o f Work for Key Stage 4, p. 18-9. Staying Involved also 
contains a variety of further suggestions for promoting pupil participation that can be recorded by pupils 
in a ‘citizenship portfolio’, providing a link with their careers and lifelong learning.
508 Citizenship at Key Stages 3 and 4: A Guide for Senior Managers and Governors, p.2.
509 For instance, the IEA Citizenship Survey was based on a multiple-choice test utilising a variety of 
factual and value-based questions based on internationally agreed ‘fundamental democratic principles 
and processes’ and commonly held ‘concepts of citizenship, attitudes, and civic-related activities.’ 
J.Tomey-Purta et al, Citizenship and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and 
Engagement at Age Fourteen, pp. 3-4.
5,0 J.Halliday, ‘Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education: Towards Curriculum Reform’, pp.49-52.
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freedom to use their common sense in the classroom -  a requirement which is discussed 
later in the chapter. Here we may note that, although assessment may not be able to fully 
reflect different worthwhile modes of political participation, perfectionist liberals would 
nonetheless wish to assess political deliberation because of their susceptibility to 
formalised processes of equitable assessment. Moreover, the importance of the 
deliberative political virtues within liberal democracies provides further reason for 
developing effective assessment procedures. They would also be concerned that 
Citizenship could encourage the actual manifestation of the political virtues.
ii) Making Citizenship work
The effectiveness of any new curriculum requirement for schools is subject to great 
scrutiny and evaluation. Citizenship will continue to be given especially close 
consideration because its subject matter is characterised by many contested normative 
aims and objectives. Perfectionist liberals (and many other supporters of political 
education) will be particularly concerned that it can (potentially) achieve the goal of 
promoting the political virtues associated with responsible political engagement. To 
promote these virtues teachers of Citizenship will probably have to reduce the 
disaffection of many pupils towards politics and political education. In doing so they 
would need to apply suitable teaching strategies relevant to their own circumstances.
Overcoming superficiality and disaffection
Critics of political education have identified a whole range of barriers to successfully 
delivering Citizenship in secondary schools. These barriers must be addressed if children 
are to be given the best opportunity to become significantly autonomous. Supporters and 
detractors of political education both argue that it places greater pressure on teachers to
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engage and enthuse pupils than other curriculum subjects. An especially important barrier 
associated with the ‘difficult’ nature of political education is the danger that it can 
become a superficial learning experience as teachers strive to simplify issues and debates. 
The simplification of politics by Citizenship teachers could potentially make pupils 
disinterested in the very issues which the curriculum orders envisage firing their 
imagination and enthusiasm. It could also confirm Oakeshott’s fear that teaching politics 
can give pupils a misguided overestimation of its possibilities. In England, the 
unfamiliarity of political education in schools may exacerbate these difficulties. The 
success of teachers attempting to negotiate the general thrust of the Citizenship orders 
could hinge on the standing it is given in the secondary school curriculum by School 
Management Teams. Indeed, compulsory assessment and examination may be a preferred 
means for overcoming accusations of superficiality. In addition to the problem of 
simplification, there are also specific barriers relating to the civic deficit that attach to the 
delivery of political education in secondary schools.
As we have seen, politics and political participation are unattractive to large 
segments of the British population. Introducing Citizenship in schools could therefore 
increase disaffection with politics and political issues amongst those that it desperately 
needs to re-engage with democratic processes. The disinterest in democratic politics and 
participation currently displayed by many young people could be hardened if teachers 
endeavour to involve them in sustained political discussion. There are two things 
perfectionist liberals can note in response to these concerns.
First, as was argued earlier, claiming that political education may fail to engage 
many pupils is not a telling argument against its introduction. Not all students of English 
at secondary school will become devoted to reading poetry nor students of science build 
bridges, but a liberal education for significant autonomy assumes that children should be
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given the greatest opportunity to develop their character in such diverse valuable ways. 
In particular, political education is an essential feature of a liberal education for 
significant autonomy because the liberal political virtues are critical to living well in a 
liberal democracy. Second, it is perhaps unfair to suggest that young people care very 
little for politics. Although they may have little faith or interest in politicians, ‘party 
politics’ and the democratic political system, the political activism of young people 
illustrates that they engage with and are committed to political issues. Indeed, many 
commentators see the emergence of young people’s social and political activism as 
evidence for a heightened awareness of the wider possibilities of political engagement.511
In addition to these concerns about the precise nature of the civic deficit, critics 
of Citizenship have claimed that political education is superfluous in an advanced 
democracy such as the UK. They argue that there is ‘a gamut of local, national and 
international activities through which citizenship education might be more profitably 
conveyed’, such as ‘newspapers, magazines, television and radio and internet input.’512 
However, a major feature of tad hoc and the ‘untidy” learning opportunities is the 
‘variability of student access to, and engagement with them.’ In fact ‘even significant 
engagement will not necessarily satisfy demands of breadth, balance, coherence and the 
like.’513 To allow that pupils have the opportunity to learn what they choose about 
politics from a variety of sources says nothing of their facility for exploring the reliability 
or ideological bias of those sources.514 Political awareness and interpretation are
511 Research conducted by the Trust for the Study of Adolescence in 1997 quoted in the Crick Report 
highlighted that the majority of young people in their sample had been involved in ‘some form of 
political or community action the previous year.’ Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, Education 
for Citizenship and the Teaching o f Democracy in Schools, p. 1.
512 J.Tooley, ‘The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Conceptual and Practical Problems with Labour’s 
Citizenship Education’, Education-line, 2000, pp.2-3.
513 T.H.McLaughlin, ‘Citizenship Education in England: The Crick Report and Beyond’, p.548.
514 The IE A study highlighted that in England ‘students show only a moderate grasp of skills of 
interpreting political materials, such as cartoons and election leaflets.’ J.Tomey-Purta et al, Citizenship 
and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and Engagement at Age Fourteen, p.4.
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increasingly important in a society in which the ‘images and stories through which we 
understand the world are effectively controlled’ by a small number of media groupings.515 
Nor can mere assimilation of ‘basic information and political facts’ be likened to the 
education for significant autonomy essential to the development of the political virtues. A 
Social and Community Research survey from 1996 suggested that young people 
generally do have a grasp of ‘some basic but important political facts’, but that this 
information ‘does not get ingested whatever the source.’516 Evidently, that many young 
people are involved in political or community action may tell us very little about their 
understanding of participation in the political process in liberal-democracies.
Perfectionist liberals will remain aware of the potential pitfalls of teaching politics 
to young people, but be convinced that political education can provide an excellent 
opportunity for young people’s enthusiasm for political issues to be encouraged within 
an appropriate learning environment. Naturally, this implies that teachers would play the 
critical role in making Citizenship work.
Effective delivery o f Citizenship: Pedagogic Phronesis
The success of Citizenship (as for other subjects) will ultimately depend on the efforts of 
teachers to create the most appropriate learning environment for enthusing and 
stimulating the interest of their pupils. Teachers of Citizenship will therefore have to be 
extremely aware of the barriers to learning which can be associated with humanities 
subjects, such as political education. To ensure their practice is not perfunctory or 
patronising they will thus have to deliver the subject matter in sufficient depth and from a 
variety of different perspectives, avoiding reducing it to soundbites or to their own
515 P.Harrington, The Third Way: An Answer to Blair, Third Way Publications, London, 1998, p. 11.
516 Quoted in Education for Citizenship and the Teaching o f Democracy in Schools.
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preferences. They will also have to take great care to ensure that all pupils have an
opportunity to manifest the liberal political virtues.
A political education should encourage the ability and inclination of their pupils 
to exhibit virtues associated with good citizenship. To minimise disaffection teachers will 
have to present politics and political issues in such a light that their pupils come to care 
about the different ideological approaches towards them and the democratic processes 
through which they are resolved in a liberal society. Crucially, teachers of political 
education ‘cannot always take the neutral chair but must often enter the situation and... 
show how arguments are used to persuade people to act in certain ways’.517 It is 
therefore important that Citizenship can facilitate a broad range of coherent, relevant and 
comprehensible liberal democratic interpretations of politics by teachers.
The Teacher’s Guide for Citizenship recognises that experienced teachers will
handle sensitive and controversial issues without setting themselves up as ‘the sole 
authority not only on matters o f ‘fact’ but also on matters of opinion.’518 Teachers would 
therefore configure their lessons according to the circumstances of the subject matter and 
their pupils -  a sensitivity to context which is captured in the notion of ‘pedagogic 
phronesis’ (or ‘teaching common sense’).519 Pedagogic phronesis (when guided by a 
liberal character-ethics) should enable teachers to promote liberal political virtues 
amongst pupils from a range of (acceptable) political perspectives. By cultivating pupils’ 
awareness of all aspects of politics, their opportunity to be able to configure the political 
virtues in diverse ways can be given due respect. To accomplish this, Citizenship
517 R.Brownhill and P. Smart, Political Education, London, Routledge, 1989, pp. 127-8.
518 ‘Teacher’s Guide’, Citizenship: A Scheme o f Work for Key Stage 3, p. 14. Indeed, it is only as ‘a tool 
used by teachers’ that ‘the difficulties and dangers of the framework which have been noted may be 
ameliorated or avoided.’ T.H.McLaughlin, ‘Citizenship Education in England: The Crick Report and 
Beyond’, p.557.
519 T.H.McLaughlin, ‘Beyond the Reflective Teacher’, Educational Philosophy and Theory, vol.31, no.l, 
pp. 9-25.
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teachers should use their common sense to accommodate, discuss and elicit a range of 
alternative opinions, stances and positions. A variety of practical suggestions for 
promoting the development of the deliberative and participative political virtues (such as, 
discussion groups and mock parliaments) are also outlined in the Citizenship orders and 
programmes of study. Nonetheless, these activities (like the standardised orders) would 
ideally be regarded as indicative suggestions, and not be viewed by schools, inspectors or 
policy-makers as more important than the good teaching practice on which the political 
education of pupils depends.
The principles at the heart of the recommendations for Citizenship teaching seem 
to reflect much that is at the heart of a liberal character-ethics. How well Citizenship is 
likely to realise such a perfectionist liberal ethical ideal is discussed next.
4. Liberal Character-Ethics and Political Education in England
Debates about the principles and purposes of political education in England are likely to 
persist in academic and policy-making circles. For perfectionist liberals committed to the 
right to be able to be significantly autonomous, the cogency of its principles and 
aspirations are of great interest. Their assessments of political education will ultimately 
rest on the extent to which it is consistent with an education for significant autonomy 
guided by a liberal character-ethics. This section concludes the thesis by critically 
evaluating political education in England, before reflecting further on the nature of 
citizenship-ideals and an ideal liberal political education.
i) Citizenship and responsible political engagement
As we have seen, an ideal liberal political education would concentrate on promoting the 
political virtues that can best enable agents to develop their character when participating
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in democratic politics. Citizenship represents a particularly interesting case study of a 
state that is actively seeking to promote political virtues associated with significant 
autonomy and character. Examination of the relationship between Citizenship, the liberal 
political virtues and significant autonomy can therefore provide perfectionist liberals with 
an indication of the prospects for the future of their ethical ideals in England.
Whether Citizenship can facilitate the development of the liberal political virtues 
found within our liberal character-ethics is evidently an issue of pressing concern for 
liberal supporters of political education in schools. As we have seen, a programme of 
liberal political education should play a critical role in ensuring that an education for 
autonomy is indeed one which enables citizens to become significantly autonomous. In 
the past, programmes of citizenship education in English state schools have encouraged 
only charitable behaviour, patriotic feeling or respect for authority. If Citizenship cannot 
facilitate opportunities to display the liberal political virtues, then its coherence as a 
programme of political education can be called into question.
The Citizenship orders, programmes of study and the available teaching material 
focus on specific aspects within which different approaches to promoting the liberal 
political virtues may be applied. There are three main aspects of Citizenship for English 
schools: Social and Moral Responsibility, Community Involvement and Political 
Literacy. The Social and Moral Responsibility and Community Involvement strands 
mirror much of the guidance for personal and social education, but include further 
guidance on volunteering and community participation. The Political Literacy aspect of 
Citizenship most clearly distinguishes it as a programme of political education.520
520 Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, Citizenship at Key Stages 3 and 4: Initial Guidance for 
Schools, London, QCA, 2000, p.4.
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The orders state that there are three broad features of political literacy: (i) 
Becoming an informed citizen - learning about rights and responsibilities, government, 
democratic processes, the media, global interdependence and so on; (ii) Expressing and 
understanding opinions - thinking about topical issues, contributing to discussion and 
justifying opinions; (iii) Responsible involvement - participating responsibly and 
reflectively.521
The different features of political literacy clearly focus on areas pertinent to the 
development of the liberal political virtues described in Chapter Four. Becoming an 
informed citizen and Expressing and understanding opinions essentially comprise 
different perspectives from which the deliberative liberal political virtues can be viewed. 
First, becoming an informed citizen is central to the virtues of deliberation and to 
achieving any degree of political understanding. Second, the ability to express and 
understand opinions is an essential requirement for the virtues associated with political 
deliberation. Although this suggests there will be great scope for promoting the 
deliberative liberal political virtues within Citizenship, perfectionist liberals will 
nevertheless be concerned that this will be done in accordance with the civic-republican 
ideal of active citizenship earlier associated with living well. The Responsible 
Involvement aspect of Citizenship is here the focus for aspirations for active citizenship. 
And Citizenship could fulfil those aspirations by promoting virtues associated with 
responsible political engagement. Nevertheless, perfectionist liberals would be especially 
concerned that schools do not dilute this aspect of political education by focusing on 
voluntary work or other less politically orientated aspects of good moral character. They 
would also be interested in the pedagogical principles which underpin Citizenship.
521 Citizenship at Key Stages 3 and 4: A Guide for Senior Managers and Governors, p. 4.
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The Citizenship orders specify three overlapping pedagogic approaches for the 
delivery of the political literacy component. A concepts approach that examines ‘the key 
concepts identified by the Advisory Group’;522 a skills approach based on ‘the skills of 
enquiry and communication’ and ‘the skills of participation and responsible action’; and, 
an enquiry approach that applies the fruits of the first two approaches to specific 
political and social issues.523 The first of these approaches would require pupils to 
discipline their thought as they attempted both to comprehend and express an 
understanding of political concepts. The liberal deliberative political virtues could clearly 
be enhanced through such pedagogy. The second of the pedagogic approaches can link 
both disciplined thought and disciplined action, in particular, by stressing the notion of 
responsible judgement which underpins the participative and the deliberative political 
virtues. Finally, the third approach returns us to the importance of disciplined thought in 
giving clarity to the deliberation and interpretation of political issues. The extent to 
which these approaches may successfully inculcate disciplined living can be assessed by 
examining the teaching material for Citizenship.
The teaching material available for Citizenship at Key Stages 3 and 4 has only 
recently been developed to provide activities for bespoke courses that schools can 
choose to implement to meet the statutory curriculum orders. Although these courses are 
framed by the political literacy guidance, their structure and content does not always 
mirror the civic-republican approach found within the Citizenship programmes of study, 
in particular, the emphasis on the political virtues inherent in good citizenship receives 
highly variable treatment.
522 These are: democracy and autocracy; co-operation and conflict; equality and diversity; fairness, 
justice, the rule of law; rules, the law and human rights; freedom and order; individual and community; 
power and authority; and rights and responsibilities.
523 Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, Citizenship at Key Stages 3 and 4: Initial Guidance for 
Schools, pp. 20-2.
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One course primarily focuses on an education for community cohesion, stressing 
the importance of the legal system, community work and rights and responsibilities 
within the workplace.524 Although there is a good deal of material that focuses on the 
delivery of public services and solutions to social problems, the material does not reflect 
the depth of the responsible political engagement associated with active citizenship. For 
instance, when focusing on the learning objective of ‘understanding the need for laws’ 
there is no indication that people challenging the law may be living well. Neither is there 
any acknowledgement that laws change when citizens protest and demonstrate in the 
streets.525 The material therefore gives the impression that engagement with law making 
is a process of registering an opinion akin to marking a ballot paper. Likewise political 
participation is predominantly portrayed as a single-issue transitory activity that aims at 
improving policy decisions, rather than an intrinsic feature of good citizenship. The 
liberal political virtues are here viewed in abstraction from the on-going democratic 
process and evolution of liberalism, thereby rendering politics and citizenship 
unnecessarily remote from the promotion of virtues associated with living well.
The perfectionist liberal aspirations for good citizenship presented in Chapters 
Four and Five receive greater attention from another course which begins by stressing 
the role of debate in Citizenship. However, this course again adheres to a very 
conservative civic-individualist notion of the virtues inherent in good citizenship. For 
instance, amongst the twenty-one characteristics of a good citizen it identifies, there are 
only four that refer to political activities other than voting. The characteristics identified 
are predominantly associated with the virtues of civic behaviour rather then political 
participation. For example, a good citizen ‘works for a local charity’, ‘does not write
524 C.Culshaw, J. Wales, P.Clarke and N.Reaich, Citizenship Today, London, Harper Collins, 2002, 
pp. 17-54. See espec. pp.44-5.
525 idem.
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graffiti on the walls’, or ‘helps elderly neighbours’.526 While these worthwhile activities 
may be correlated with increased political engagement,527 they are not equivalent to 
political participation or deliberation.
The alternative interpretations of Citizenship within different courses illustrate 
the importance of pedagogic phronesis for teachers seeking to deliver a political 
education based on the civic-republican citizenship ideal found in the orders. The 
philosophical issues which different courses raise are also evident in the proposed 
assessment requirements. Fifty per cent of assessment in one Citizenship course is for 
participation in a ‘citizenship activity’. However, the suggested citizenship activities are 
predominantly community-orientated rather than political. For instance, pupils might like 
to consider whether there ‘are some elderly people who would enjoy a visit’, or ‘an open 
space that could be turned into a garden’, or if they would like to ‘help some younger 
people with their reading’, or ‘work with other young people to discuss community 
issues like graffiti’.528 These worthy activities are clearly positive ways to encourage 
pupils to display virtues inherent in civic behaviour, but again are not equivalent to the 
political participation held central to the ideal of responsible political engagement or to 
the civic-republican ideal of active citizenship which guided the development of the 
curriculum orders.
ii) Citizenship education and capitalism
The expansion of global capitalism has led many liberals and social democrats to openly 
accommodate free market principles when putting ‘theoretical flesh on the skeleton of
526 T.Fiehn, This is Citizenship 1, London, John Murray, 2002, pp.58-9.
527 C.Pattie, P.Seyd and P.Whiteley, ‘Citizenship and Civic Engagement: Attitudes and Behaviour in 
Britain’, Political Studies, vol.51, 2003, pp.443-68.
528 C.Culshaw, J. Wales, P.Clarke and N.Reaich, Citizenship Today, London, Harper Collins, 2002, pp.7- 
8 .
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their policy-making’.529 In particular, the goal of creating a flexible workforce ripe for re­
skilling whenever employer demands change has had a major impact on education policy. 
As a result, schools are expected to stress the importance of work and the contribution 
made by ‘businesses to the local economy’530 as part of their responsibility to deliver 
political education across the curriculum. The significance of these developments leads 
us to consider the precise implications that they have for the character-development of 
children.
Responding to Global Capitalism
In response to global capitalism and the neo-liberal re-evaluation of the welfare state 
Western governments have acknowledged the increased power of economic competition. 
However, acceptance of some of the rigours of global capitalism should not negate the 
ethical role of politics and policy-making. Rather, policies in areas such as education 
should ensure that agents may flourish despite demands for economic competitiveness. A 
liberal character-ethics can indicate how tensions between capitalism and living well are 
handled in Citizenship.
In the UK, educational responses to the flexible labour market have led to the 
emergence of a ‘skills-discourse’ centring on what Anthony Giddens has called the idea 
of ‘portability’.531 That is, the notion that agents should possess a core of common skills 
that are portable from job to job and that form a foundation upon which to build new 
employment skills. This is highly evident in the Citizenship orders, where generic key 
skills are emphasised as part of the ‘skills approach’ to political education. Drawing on 
the doctrine explicated here, perfectionist liberals would contend that emphasising these
529 A. Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal o f Social Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998.
530 ‘Citizenship’, Key Stage 4 Schemes o f Work, London, QCA, 2001.
531 A.Giddens, The Third Way, p. 125.
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types of transferable or core employability skills in education (especially in political 
education) undermines much that is at the heart of liberalism. To focus on promoting 
skills associated with employer demands is to diminish liberal aspirations for individual 
flourishing. Portable employment skills are not inherent in the virtues of moral and 
individual character; character requires that an agent’s autonomy is given liberal ethical 
content. There is also an inherent contradiction between a character-ethics and the 
demand for a predefined type of end product. The development of distinctive diverse 
character-configurations by agents in liberal societies is seriously constrained where they 
are only equipped to be at the mercy of the labour market. Such a situation would not be 
consistent with the state’s duty to promote significant autonomy nor would it reflect 
perfectionist liberal policy-making principles.
Employment-orientated educational aims leave the state playing second fiddle to 
employers within the development and regulation of the curriculum.532 Indeed, preparing 
citizens for the capitalist labour market in British schools has already sanctioned a variety 
of public and private sector partnerships that constrain opportunities for individual 
flourishing, including direct business involvement in developing the school curriculum 
and the establishment of ‘Business and Enterprise’ special status schools which place 
greater emphasis on economic understanding in Citizenship,533 These developments have 
also been reflected in the school improvement agenda at the heart of the National 
Curriculum which views learning as a series of tightly defined ‘outputs’ and ‘outcomes’ - 
a notion which clearly narrows the range of possibilities for the configuration of 
character.
532 To some extent skills-discourse has altered the traditional perception in British education that 
workplace and management skills could simply be picked up along the way. C.Bamett, The Verdict o f 
Peace, London, Macmillan, 2001.
533 http://www.schoolsnetwork.org.uk/item.asp?item=54&page=15.
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A further problem associated with opening up education to employers’ demands 
has been the reduced political influence of local education authorities. This has 
undermined local accountability by parcelling greater responsibility for learning 
objectives to non-elected managers and local business interests. The growth of such local 
governance534 is linked to government responses to risk and globalisation, but it has 
profound consequences for significant autonomy because it reduces the scope for citizens 
to manifest the political virtues (especially by enhancing managerial over local 
discretion). This is also important as political education in England is also associated 
with encouraging local economic prosperity.
Local prosperity and decision-making
For many observers, the tensions between citizenship, local communities and global 
capitalism reflect the ‘risk’ and uncertainty inherent in a market society. We all 
experience risk when we compete for resources, employment and cultural goods. 
Consequently, citizens and local communities have to constantly assess and re-assess 
their strategies to ‘keep-up’. For some, this makes it imperative that political education 
equips children with the skills necessary to contribute to the economic prosperity of their 
local communities. Indeed, a ‘positive engagement with risk’ is described by one 
observer as a ‘positive and inevitable part of a successful market economy.’535 However, 
uncritical acceptance of risk and uncertainty in education policy-making reduces 
character and community development to gambles on a highly restricted set of choices.
534 C.Skelcher, The Appointed State: Quasi-Govemmental Organisations and Democracy, Buckingham, 
Open University Press, 1997.
535 For Giddens, in ‘a society such as ours, oriented towards the future and saturated with information, 
the theme of risk unites many otherwise disparate areas of politics: welfare state reform, engagement 
with world financial markets, responses to technological change, ecological problems and geopolitical 
transformations.’ A.Giddens, The Third Way, pp.63-4.
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State-sponsored local entrepreneurial initiatives, public-private sector 
partnerships and the voluntary sector are increasingly thought to be vibrant sources of 
community renewal and development, especially in areas of socio-economic 
deprivation.536 Indeed, in the UK, Education Action Zones have been created in deprived 
areas to attract private sector finance to local schools and communities.537 However, 
many critics have asked if the ‘emphasis on the role of the voluntary and private sector 
might simply be a means for the State to abdicate its own proper responsibilities.’538 
Although governments may redefine the ‘proper responsibilities’ of the state, it seems 
clear that laying stress on local enterprise has profound consequences for the types of 
life-choices available to local citizens.
Stressing the place of entrepreneurialism in Citizenship indicates that children will 
be expected direct some of their energies towards adaptability to the changing 
requirements of the capitalist economy. But a liberal political education would not be 
concerned to organise their lives and social activities around economic growth and local 
prosperity. In addition to impoverishing many of the ethical aspects of community 
development associated with political education, the single-minded pursuit of economic 
prosperity may also have a detrimental effect on character. Individual flourishing hinges 
on citizens being autonomous in a diverse variety of ways. Although it can play a role in 
an agent’s conception of the good life, entrepreneurialism (or responsiveness to 
capitalism) is neither a necessary or sufficient feature of a liberal conception of the good 
life. By contrast, a concern with local issues promotes shared ownership of the 
autonomy-practising environment generating ethical, collective and non-economic social
536 ibid., p.65. Giddens notes that the ‘renewal of deprived local communities presumes the 
encouragement of economic enterprise as a means of generating a broader civic recovery’, ibid., p.82.
537 As a consequence, schools in these areas can also opt-out of the National Curriculum to provide 
predominantly basic vocational training.
538 P.Harrington, The Third Way, p.9.
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capital. Encouraging this type of local focus in political education would elicit mutual 
interest and trust amongst fellow pupils, especially in less-advantaged areas, where 
disaffection with local decision-making is often greatest.539 These aspects of significant 
autonomy can also be addressed by the involvement of public institutions in community 
education at the local level.
A distinctive approach to political education that gives full value to the 
opportunity for significant autonomy in local decision-making is essential for the 
development of the virtues associated with responsible political engagement. However, 
entrepreneurialism is not inherent in the development of virtues associated with 
community development. The place of entrepreneurialism and skills-discourse in the 
Citizenship orders indicates that there are significant tensions in the Labour 
government’s conception of citizenship and political education -  though these may be 
more deep-rooted than party political pronouncements. Further reflection on the 
citizenship ideals guiding the formulation and delivery of Citizenship can therefore elicit 
valuable insights into the nature of an ideal liberal political education.
iii) Citizenship and citizenship ideals
The pedagogical principles of Citizenship clearly chime with those of an ideal liberal 
political education, but there are serious concerns about its likely content and outcomes 
in English secondary schools. Although considerable notice is paid to reducing certain 
aspects of the civic deficit, perfectionist liberals will feel that the liberal political virtues 
may not be adequately conceptualised in the teaching material and could receive 
insufficient attention in schools. The growing influence of skills-discourse and the stress
539 1.Docherty, R.Goodlad, and RPaddison, ‘Civic Culture, Community and Citizen Participation in 
Contrasting Neighbourhoods’, Urban Studies, vol.38, no. 12, 2001, p.2244.
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on employability in education make these concerns increasingly urgent. Final evaluation 
of political education in England will therefore turn on the aspirations for active 
citizenship which inform relevant policy-making. These aspirations are found both within 
the curriculum orders and the teaching material. This section critically examines them in 
relation to the ‘Third Way’ theorising of the Labour government, assessing their future 
prospects before restating the importance of virtues associate with responsible political 
engagement.
Citizenship and the Third Way
Third Way theorising in the UK has focused government policy on developing new ways 
to approach the resolution of pressing social issues, especially the growing civic deficit. 
In particular, Third Way protagonists have developed a variety of proposals for the 
promotion of active citizenship. However, the ‘stakeholding’ ideal of citizenship at the 
heart of these initiatives has attempted to reconcile civic-individualist and civic- 
republican ideals. This Third Way approach has inevitably influenced the ideal of 
citizenship found within Citizenship.
As we have seen, the conceptual coherence and attractiveness of political ideals 
and aspirations are important objects of scrutiny for students of politics and ideology. 
They also form a crucial focal point for policy-makers seeking to articulate systematic 
programmes for reform. Third Way policies to promote active citizenship have reflected 
civic-individualism by supporting consumer rights, skills-discourse, entrepreneurialism 
and volunteering, while also seeking to promote civic-republicanism through support for 
direct participation in political decision-making. The introduction of Citizenship has been 
no exception to this conflation of theoretical perspectives. But can such an artificial
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congruence between opposing views of what it means to be a good citizen be sustained 
in theory and in practice?
Third Way theorists argue that for a social democratic government to construct 
‘a moral community’ that can co-exist with ‘a successful capitalism’ then the promotion 
of divergent aspects of active citizenship are essential policy objectives.540 This has 
become an increasingly important determinant of policy aims because the civic deficit has 
undermined what it means to be empowered as a citizen. The Third Way response to the 
perceived effects of the civic deficit has been to stress the need for developing a 
stakeholding democracy where citizens are ‘producers of government, its shareholding 
owners and its customers’.541 But stakeholding citizens only have a role in political 
decision-making where they have a relevant relationship with the decisions being 
debated. So for instance, as citizens (in a strictly formal sense) they vote in elections; as 
consumers they use local services; and as shareholders they pay local (and national) 
taxes.542 Consequently, the extreme individualisation implicit in the stakeholding ideal of 
active citizenship undermines both responsible individual and collective political 
engagement.
Active citizenship presupposes that agents demonstrate moral character when 
participating in local communities and democratic decision-making, by exhibiting the 
virtues associated with responsible political engagement rather than through the 
preference maximisation associated with stakeholding. Indeed, the Crick Report 
highlighted that Citizenship should be based on a civic-republican understanding of
540 W.Hutton, ‘An Overview of Stakeholding’, in G.Kelly et al eds., Stakeholder Capitalism, London, 
Macmillan, 1997, p.8.
541 A.Bamett, ‘Towards a Stakeholder Democracy’, in ibid., p.91.
542 J.Gyford, Citizens, Consumers and Councils: Local Government and the Public, London, Macmillan, 
1991, p.181.
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active citizenship. So to what extent does Citizenship reflect perfectionist liberal 
aspirations for political education?
Citizenship has been introduced on the understanding that the right to share and 
participate in a civic culture must begin in schools. It is therefore ‘an entitlement for all 
pupils’. This notion of entitlement is clearly equivalent to the notion that all liberal 
citizens require opportunities for the exercise of their right to be able to be significantly 
autonomous and resonates with civic-republican notions of active citizenship. The 
inclusiveness which the orders specify also includes a direct civic-pluralist exhortation to 
ensure that school provision ‘reflects and values all social and ethnic groups’.543 
However, as we have seen there have been and continue to be a wide range of competing 
influences on the development of political education in England. In particular, we earlier 
questioned the attractiveness of much of the course material for Citizenship, highlighting 
that liberals are likely to be concerned that it stresses civic-individualism at the expense 
of the appealing aspects of civic-republicanism.
Civic-individualism promotes the idea of the citizen as a consumer, entrepreneur, 
worker or volunteer rather than as an agent with a moral interest in developing character 
through responsible political engagement. This highlights that there is a deep conflict 
between the roles of individual consumer or stakeholder and that of the public-minded 
citizen, moreover, viewing the public as simply ‘an aggregate of consumers... by 
definition fragments the idea of a public as a public’.544 The democratic ‘forum’ and the 
‘marketplace’ are qualitatively different institutional forms with different imperatives.545
543 Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, Citizenship at Key Stages 3 and 4: Initial Guidance for  
Schools, p. 5.
544 S.Ranson, ‘Towards a Political Theory of Public Accountability in Education’, p.95.
545 J.Elster, ‘The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory’, in J.Bohman and W.Rehg 
eds., Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, London, MIT Press, 1997, pp.3-34.
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The Citizenship course material clearly reflects the ideological tensions at the 
heart of Third Way thinking. For instance, it proposes a range of activities that would do 
little to assuage our earlier concerns about the possible over-emphasis on volunteering 
and employability. This civic-individualism was also reflected in the stress laid on 
improving the provision of public services. The participation that perfectionist liberals 
envisage is not simply a matter of engaging in civic volunteering nor is it equivalent to 
the promotion of consumers’ or stakeholders’ ‘voice’. It presumes that citizens can 
display liberal virtues inherent in acting politically, by individually and collectively 
developing and defending political positions and diverse modes of flourishing.
The focus on civic volunteering and democratic consumption in the Citizenship 
teaching material reflects a one-sided view of the civic deficit that is not apparent in 
many of the recommendations made in the curriculum orders. This disjuncture between 
the orders and the teaching material being produced for Citizenship tends to support the 
conclusion that: (a) civic-individualist notions of good citizenship could influence its 
future development; and (b) that Third Way aspirations for citizenship require more 
careful explication. For many critics suspicious of the aims of political education, civic- 
individualism may be the most desirable outcome of Citizenship. However, such a 
pacifying and individuating conception of active citizenship may render children unable 
to later participate in the ‘active, collective engagement that was part and parcel of 
involvement in autonomously organised grassroots community associations.’546 For 
perfectionist liberals committed to the political virtues inherent in responsible political 
engagement, this is clearly not an attractive outcome of a programme of political 
education.
546 D.Chandler, ‘Active Citizens and the Therapeutic State: The Role of Democratic Participation in 
Local Government Reform’, Policy and Politics, vol.29, no.l, 2000, p. 12. This pacification is also
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Character, political engagement and Citizenship
The requirement for a full recognition of the contribution of the political virtues to living 
well entails that a liberal political education is ultimately based on a civic-republican ideal 
of active citizenship. Encouraging good citizenship thus presupposes an overall 
pedagogic approach based on promoting responsible political engagement. The teaching 
material for Citizenship focuses on a pedagogy that coheres around civic-individualist 
citizenship, such as respect for the law, democratic consumption of public services and 
volunteering. The pedagogic focus of a political education should be political 
participation and political deliberation, to enable pupils to continually develop and revise 
the liberal political virtues throughout their life.547 The political virtues are not simply 
instrumentally contributory to a civic culture, but are an inherent feature of developing 
character and living well in a liberal society.
As we saw in Chapter Five, an appropriate learning environment for political 
education should reflect the ideal and actual nature of political debate. If a liberal 
political education is to generate serious political study, reflection and discourse then it 
must avoid simply promoting neighbourliness, charitable involvement or stakeholding. It 
must be conceived in such a way as to encourage the manifestation of diverse 
configurations of the virtues inherent in responsible political engagement, because these 
are integral to the development of character. Such engagement implies responsible 
individual and collective participation in politics and political decision-making. 
Citizenship should therefore focus on encouraging pupils to be reflective autonomous 
agents when displaying the liberal political virtues. This means that they should be able to
evident in the proliferation of consultation procedures which substitute individual expression for 
collective decision-making.
547 An approach which can link the ethics of moral character and the ethics of individual character, by 
stressing how the political virtues can contribute to the development of good moral character and a 
distinctive mode of living well.
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develop an awareness of the vital contribution that responsible political engagement can 
make to their own flourishing and that of others in a liberal democratic society. A 
dedicated learning environment could provide pupils with an opportunity to gain such 
awareness and become committed to liberal democratic politics. Meta-theoretically 
speaking, it can inculcate certain key technologies of the self associated with significant 
autonomy.
Responsible political engagement presupposes a shared interpretation of some of 
the key political virtues of good citizenship that agents must manifest when they 
participate in the democratic processes. As a result, we can reiterate that the activities 
proposed in the teaching material for Citizenship to encourage civic behaviour (such as 
community work and democratic consumption) do not provide sufficient opportunities 
for the development of good citizenship. A liberal political education that seeks to 
stimulate the capacities for individual and collective responsible engagement would 
concentrate on promoting political participation and democratic deliberation. These 
aspirations for significant autonomy highlight the vital role that democracy can play in 
eliciting diverse ways of conceiving the good life. It also indicates that the evolution of a 
differentiated liberal culture should nonetheless be guided by the virtues associated with 
responsible political engagement.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
This thesis has explicated a non-metaphysical perfectionist liberalism based on a liberal 
character-ethics. The doctrine is an important project because diversity in contemporary 
Western societies has engendered widespread liberal scepticism about the good life. 
Pluralism and scepticism have undermined the metaphysical claims to universal 
objectivity made by many liberal political theorists in the past, calling into question the 
promotion of liberal values and generating fierce debates about the limits of state 
intervention in the moral lives of citizens. Nevertheless, few liberals have adopted the 
language of character to address these issues. Yet the concept of character is highly 
pertinent to these philosophical disputes about the good life, especially as a growing civic 
deficit in liberal societies has lead to wide-ranging concern about the prospects for 
democratic citizenship. Indeed, contemporary liberals have been forced to re-appraise the 
philosophical cogency of their normative positions in response to each of these 
contemporary developments.
Impartialist liberals have proposed that the application of a principle of liberal 
neutrality between different conceptions of the good life is the only coherent means for 
liberals to render their political thought sensitive to diversity. By contrast, perfectionist 
liberals have claimed that renewed justification of liberalism must concentrate on 
providing foundations for an explicitly liberal conception of the good life that can guide 
political thinking and decision-making. This thesis has argued that an especially attractive 
way for perfectionist liberals to respond to diversity and the civic deficit is to view 
liberalism in terms of its ethical commitments and ideals as a political ideology. That is, 
to theoretically explicate what liberals ‘stand for’ qua liberals, in particular, by stressing 
the role which character, politics and education play within a doctrine based on a right to 
be able to be significantly autonomous.
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Our first claim was that the centrality of significant autonomy to the flourishing 
of agents within liberal societies established a right to be able to be significantly 
autonomous. Our second claim was that the malleability of the self meant that agents 
could develop a particular type of liberal character to become significantly autonomous, 
particularly within liberal democratic political decision-making. Chapter Two outlined a 
liberal concept of character that reflected perfectionist liberal aspirations for significant 
autonomy, highlighting that character comprises complementary moral and individual 
aspects. This lead to our third claim, that the importance of the right to be able to be 
significantly autonomous meant it was important to promote those liberal virtues that can 
enable agents to develop diverse configurations of character conducive to living well. 
Chapter Three highlighted that a focus on character and its promotion was an important 
preoccupation for many perfectionist liberals in the past. Chapter Four explicated a 
liberal character-ethics that synthesised a range of liberal virtues which agents in liberal 
societies could display when developing their own configurations of moral and individual 
character. Moreover, this character-ethics highlighted that good citizenship was a 
necessary (though not sufficient) condition of good moral character - a contention made 
more urgent by the civic deficit within liberal democracies. Our fourth claim was that the 
promotion of a liberal character-ethics by the state could be edifyingly illuminated at a 
meta-theoretical level in quasi-Foucauldian terms as the inculcation of liberal 
‘technologies of the self via a wide range of policies, particularly those pertaining to 
education. Finally, it was claimed that state intervention to promote liberal virtues should 
be guided by liberal principles of policy-making. The five principles associated with the 
promotion of a liberal character-ethics sensitive to diversity proposed here were: (i) the 
priority of autonomy; (ii) equal respect for agents; (iii) a perfectionist principle of
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valuable activities; (iv) a perfectionist principle o f legitimate state intervention; and (v) a
commitment to moral and political education.
Chapter Four concluded that for perfectionist liberals the most important and 
interesting area of policy within which liberal technologies of the self could be inculcated 
was education. The key philosophical claims made in the thesis thus lead us to draw a 
number of conclusions about the nature of a liberal education
The promotion of a liberal character-ethics that is entailed by the right to be able 
to be significantly autonomous underpinned a distinctive liberal education for significant 
autonomy. Conventional character education could not fulfil this role because it does not 
pay enough attention to autonomy. The radical educational philosophy of de-schooling 
was rejected as an alternative approach to state education because it does not recognise 
that an education for significant autonomy presupposes the application of specific 
disciplinary methods by both teachers and pupils (not least because significant autonomy 
itself presupposes discipline). Furthermore, it was contended that the principles of liberal 
policy-making, in particular, the priority of autonomy and the principle of equal respect 
imply that disciplinary pedagogical techniques require sensitive application within a 
suitable learning environment. These processes could be illustrated in quasi-Foucauldian 
terms to indicate the theoretical cogency of a liberal education for significant autonomy. 
Indeed, the language of technologies of the self can illuminate the constitutive theory of 
the malleable self underpinning education and character-development.
A liberal character-ethics shaped the focus and the content of the curriculum 
within a liberal education for significant autonomy. Although much of the curricular 
content of this liberal education inevitably remained familiar, the priority of autonomy 
and the dual concept of liberal character generated a very particular way of configuring, 
conceiving and justifying the subject material taught within liberal state schools. First, the
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critical importance of good moral character and good citizenship to living well entailed 
that moral and (especially) political education were the primary goal of a liberal 
education. This would be reflected in the secondary school curriculum in the teaching 
methods and learning environment adopted for all subjects, and through dedicated 
curriculum time for political education. Second, the distinctive importance of individual 
character to perfectionist liberals wishing to promote individual flourishing entailed that 
aesthetic and performative education were also important goals of a liberal education for 
significant autonomy. This would be reflected in the secondary school curriculum 
through the provision of certain statutory subject matter and through the so-called 
‘hidden curriculum’. Chapter Five also indicated that a liberal education for significant 
autonomy would need to address the ‘life-management skills’ associated with a capitalist 
society to enable children to develop significant autonomy.
Overall, the arguments presented in the thesis contributed to a robust 
perfectionist liberal doctrine. Its engagement with philosophical and political issues (such 
as diversity and the civic deficit) illustrated its sensitivity to specific contextual concerns 
and the democratic evolution of its concepts and ideas. This grounding in liberal culture 
and democracy permitted us to draw on and develop the normative prescriptions and 
ethical ideals of the liberal thinkers examined in Chapter Three. Hence by emphasising 
the inherent normativity of theorising we gave the doctrine a distinctive critical and 
action-guiding character. And in Chapter Six, a liberal character-ethics and an ideal 
liberal political education were used to assess the coherence, relevance and 
comprehensibility of the new Citizenship orders for secondary schools in England. The 
ideological influences behind the development of the orders and their implementation 
were shown to be in a state of considerable tension, with the actual delivery of 
Citizenship teaching perhaps likely to be driven towards volunteering, respect for
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authority and democratic consumption. The possible marginalisation of the political 
education which the thesis showed to be central to developing good moral character 
remains a matter of serious concern for contemporary liberal theorists.
The challenge to develop a doctrine that is responsive to diversity, scepticism 
about the good life and the ‘civic deficit’ is one of pressing importance for liberal 
political thinkers. As we have seen, a perfectionist liberalism sensitive to these 
philosophical, ethical and political concerns embraces the inherent normativity of political 
thinking, in particular, by indicating that political theory can be attractively viewed as an 
enterprise of conceptual explication. The liberal concepts defended in this thesis focus 
the attention of students of political theory and ideology on the interplay between 
political ideas and ethical commitments within liberal thought. The thesis also made it 
clear that this method is especially relevant to developing a doctrine that relates to liberal 
society, politics and culture. Indeed, liberals generally should emphasise the link between 
liberal political thought and policy-making. And quasi-Foucauldian interpretation of 
perfectionist state intervention reminded us that the promotion of a liberal character- 
ethics can be given robust meta-theoretical underpinnings.
Focusing on significant autonomy illustrates that liberal citizens, democratic 
politics and culture only flourish where children are able to manifest virtues inherent in 
developing their configurations of good character. Indeed, a liberal education for 
significant autonomy is required to ensure children receive the best opportunity to 
develop their character in diverse ways by being able to participate fully in a liberal 
democratic culture. As we saw in Chapter Six, a liberal education for significant 
autonomy which is sensitive to diversity need not be based on encouraging a civic- 
pluralist ideal of citizenship. Indeed, it was suggested that the politics of difference (or 
identity politics) can be accommodated within a civic-republican ideal of citizenship.
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Nevertheless, there are a range of important issues that diversity spurs within liberal 
education policy, which for reasons of space, are not explicitly discussed here. For 
instance, disputes about state-sponsorship of separatist religious schools and the merits 
of multicultural education have clear relevance to all liberals seeking to promote good 
citizenship within political education. These concerns and a host of additional 
philosophical and practical issues pertinent to liberal politics and policy-making provide 
further opportunities for reflection and research.
For perfectionist liberals committed to the right to be able to be significantly 
autonomous, a liberal character-ethics can systematise a wide range of their aspirations 
for individual flourishing. And its place within a non-metaphysical doctrine can exhibit 
responsiveness to diversity and the evolution of liberal democracy. A robust liberal 
character-ethics can also play two key roles in relation to political and policy-making 
issues. First, it can facilitate the advocacy of perfectionist liberal proposals in a range of 
areas of society which have serious implications for the opportunities and resources 
available to citizens. For instance, different types of economic redistribution can be 
introduced to give full value to the right of each citizen to be able to become significantly 
autonomous. Or public institutions could be restructured to facilitate opportunities for 
citizens to develop character by participating directly in decision-making. Second, a 
liberal character-ethics can provide a tool for criticising other liberal doctrines and the 
policy-making and politics of liberal states. For instance, it highlights that all liberals can 
and should openly explore the ethical content inherent in liberal concepts and ideals; and, 
it could also indicate how policy-making can bolster or undermine the depth of 
responsible political engagement associated with active citizenship.
These ‘advocacy’ and ‘critical’ roles of the perfectionist liberalism explicated here 
generate a whole series of further research questions: ‘What principles of social justice
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are supported by a right to be able to be significantly autonomous?’; ‘What is the 
relationship between democracy and the evolution of a liberal character-ethics?’; ‘What 
implications can a liberal character-ethics have for the assessment of non-liberal 
cultures?’; ‘Will a liberal political education successfully encourage responsible political 
engagement?’; ‘Can the use of quasi-Foucauldian language be applied to other projects 
of conceptual explication?’ Answers to these questions can be derived using a wide 
range of research methods and techniques, but will lead perfectionist liberals back to 
consider the aspirations associated with individual flourishing and autonomy.
The relationship between character, politics and education will remain an 
important object of interest for liberals committed to the right of agents in liberal 
societies to be able to be significantly autonomous. The promotion of liberal virtues in a 
variety of policy areas and throughout civil society can enable agents to constitute 
themselves in different ways. Such processes of ‘govemmentality’ thus have major 
implications for individual flourishing. Liberal political theorists and ideologists must 
confidently explicate their ethical ideals and their aspirations for significant autonomy, 
and be prepared to use new conceptual tools, if they are to shape democratic politics, 
policy-making and culture for ethically noble ends in the twenty-first century.
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